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ABSTRACT 
The conflict in the Far East between 1941 and 1945 is occasionally referred to as the 
“Forgotten War” in Britain and this description extends to the way the campaign’s air war 
has been analysed. However, the role of air power in Burma was vitally important to the 
campaign, in particular the attainment of air superiority in order to facilitate supply and close 
support operations. The foundation of these operations was dependent on the Allies 
achieving and maintaining air superiority and latterly air supremacy over the Japanese. This 
thesis will analyse how the Allies lost air superiority during the initial exchanges, and then 
how technical and material difficulties were overcome before air superiority was won in 
1944 and air supremacy was gained in 1945. It will analyse the importance of the RAF’s 
tactics, early warning systems, equipment, training and counter-air offensive in the theatre 
between 1941 and 1945.  Furthermore, the thesis will demonstrate how Japanese industry, 
their war in the Pacific, and their use of air power in Burma ultimately affected the air war’s 
eventual outcome. The study will examine current historiography to question and 
corroborate existing views, as well as to reveal new information not previously published.  
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 When I started to research this thesis I must admit I had a total ignorance of the air 
war in Burma and the Far East. Apart from knowing a little bit about Buffalos over 
Singapore, air transport operations and seeing some film footage of Hurricanes dropping 
bombs near to the Imphal Plain, I had no idea of the long and involved air campaign which 
was crucial to the Allies’ eventual success in Burma. As my research progressed and the 
themes developed, I realised that the efforts of Allied service personnel stationed a very long 
way from home are overshadowed in academic terms by more domestic events. Bookshelves 
are full of academic re-appraisals of the Battle of Britain or the Strategic Air Offensive, but 
there is nothing about the R.A.F.’s long-range bombing operations over Burma, or maritime 
reconnaissance sorties over the Indian Ocean. This thesis is, to the best of knowledge, the 
first academic work about one aspect of the air war in Burma and I sincerely hope it will 
inspire other researchers to explore the subject not only to further historical knowledge but 
also to honour the Far East service personnel who were stationed a long way from home in a 
country with violent extremes of weather, fighting an often ruthless and relentless enemy. 
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but I would say that is not totally true. Without the help and support of so many people a 
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Centre for their forbearance producing the Portal Papers and the staff at Northwich library 
for obtaining obscure books from all over the country without once blinking their eyes.  
 My everlasting gratitude goes to Peter Elliot, the Keeper of Records at the Royal Air 
Force Museum in Hendon. Peter has been, without doubt, one of the most influential people 
involved in this and previous projects, always ready to field my questions or queries with 
good humour and expert knowledge.     
 Special thanks must be offered to Professor Malcolm Wanklyn for proof reading the 
thesis. 
 Thank you to my friends and acquaintances, far too numerous to name, who have 
provided support, practical advice, and listening ears for my tales of triumph and tragedy.  
 Thank you to Professor John Buckley who supervised this thesis with good humour, 
tact, understanding and sympathy. I have been very lucky to have had John as my supervisor 
and friend, and shall always be in his debt. 
 Finally to my family, past and present, thank you for your support and 
encouragement, but in particular my wife, Susan, who has played a huge role in putting up 
with absences, despair, joy and frustration to ensure this thesis was completed. All success I 
achieve will be yours.     
  To you all, a sincere and heartfelt thank you.     
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Explanatory Notes 
 
1. To maintain consistency 1940s place names will be used, for example, Siam instead of 
Thailand, Ceylon instead of Sri Lanka. 
 
2. Japanese records. This thesis has made extensive reference to Christopher Shores’ Air 
War for Burma. Mr Shores was assisted by two Japanese historians, Hiroshi Ichimura and 
Doctor Yasuo Izawa who had access to official Japanese records and their findings have 
been used in preparing the day to day summaries of Japanese operations and aircraft losses 
for this book. Therefore when ‘Japanese records’ are referred to in this thesis the information 
will have been taken from Air War for Burma, and suitable references will be made to the 
relevant page or pages in the footnotes.  
 
3. Aircraft Nomenclature. British aircraft will be referred to by their name, e.g. Spitfire. 
United States aircraft initially will be referred to by the company code and name, e.g. P-51 
Mustang, and after that by its name only. The exception to this will be the P-40 whose 
different marks were referred to by different names (Warhawk, Tomahawk, Kittyhawk) so to 
maintain consistency the term P-40 will be retained. The American C-47 transport aircraft 
was known in U.S. service as the Skytrain, but more commonly in R.A.F. service as the 
Dakota, and this name will be used in the thesis. Japanese aircraft will be referred to in the 
first instance by its company code and Allied code name, e.g. Ki-43 Oscar, and from then by 
its official Allied code name only. The following list shows a table of all the Japanese 
aircraft mentioned in the thesis, giving their parent company, Japanese names, Allied 
codenames (when given) and purposes: 
 
Company/Code    Japanese Name           Allied name                  Purpose 
Kawanishi N1K1-J Shiden (Violet Lightning) George  Single-engine fighter 
Kawasaki Ki-45  Toryu (Dragon Killer)  Nick  Twin-engine fighter 
Kawasaki Ki-48     Lily  Twin-engine bomber 
Kawasaki Ki-61 Hien (Flying Swallow)  Tony  Single- engine fighter 
Kawasaki Ki-100       Single-engine fighter 
Mitsubishi A5M     Claude  Single-engine fighter 
Mitsubishi A6M     Zeke or Zero Single-engine fighter 
vii 
Mitsubishi G4M     Betty  Twin-engine bomber 
Mitsubishi J2M  Raiden (Thunderbolt)  Jack  Single-engine fighter 
Mitsubishi Ki-21     Sally  Twin-engine bomber 
Mitsubishi Ki-46                                                     Dinah  Twin-engine 
                                                      reconnaissance 
Nakajima Ki-27     Nate  Single-engine fighter 
Nakajima Ki-43 Hayabusa (Peregrine Falcon) Oscar  Single-engine fighter 
Nakajima Ki-44 Shoki (Demon)   Tojo  Single-engine fighter 
Nakajima Ki-100 Donryu (Storm Dragon)  Helen  Twin-engine bomber 
Nakajima Ki-84 Hayate (Gale)   Frank  Single-engine fighter 
 
4. Japanese Army Air Force Organisation. The following table gives a guide to the J.A.A.F. 
operational organisation as described in the thesis.  
 
Kokugun (Air Army) Exercised the highest administrative and 
operational authority. 
 
Hikoshidan (Flying Division) Coordinated operations over a given area. 
 
Hikodan (Air Brigade) Each Hikoshidan controlled two or more 
Hikodan. Flexible in composition and size, 
mixed fighter and bomber formation with a 
small H.Q. flight of reconnaissance or photo 
reconnaissance aircraft. General strength of 
three or four Hikosentai plus ancillary units.  
 
Hikosentai (Flying Operational Unit) Basic operational unit of the J.A.A.F. with a 
strength of 27 aircraft. Name often shortened to 
Sentai. 
 
Hikochutai (Flying Company-Squadron) Three Hikochutai to a Hikosentai, each with a 
strength of nine aircraft. Name often shortened 
to Chutai. 
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Hentai (Section) Smallest tactical formation in J.A.A.F., flight of 
between three to five aircraft.  
 
 
The approximate comparative structure of the combatants’ flying units is as follows: 
 R.A.F.   J.A.A.F.   U.S.A.A.F.   
  
 Group   Hikodan     Wing 
 Wing   Sentai    Group 
 Squadron  Chutai     Squadron 
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Principal Allied Commanders 
 
This list is not exhaustive, but reflects the commanding officers referred to in the thesis, their 
rank on appointment and the date, when available, they were appointed. First names are 
given when available. 
 
Air Commanders 
 
         Date of Appointment 
Prior to December 1941 
Commander in Chief, Far East 
A.C.M. Robert Brooke-Popham      18th November 1940 
A.O.C. R.A.F. India 
A.M. Philip Joubert de la Ferte     29th September 1937  
 
Commanders during the Japanese Invasion 
 
R.A.F. Air Headquarters Far East 
A.O.C.  
A.V.M. Conway Pulford      6th March 1941 
Assistant A.O.C. 
A.V.M. Paul Maltby       11th February 1942 
 
A.O.C. No 221 Group 
A.V.M. Donald Stevenson      17th December 1941 
 
 
x 
 
India Command 1942-1943 
A.O.C.in C. 
 
A.M. Sir Richard Pierse      6th March 1942 
(Promoted to A.C.M. July 1942)       
 
 
A.H.Q. Bengal 
 
A.V.M. Donald Stevenson      20th April 1942 
A.V.M. Thomas Williams      1st January 1943 
 
 
221 Group R.A.F. 
 
Air Commodore H.J.F. Hunter     20th April 1942 
Air Commodore H.V. Rowley     1st May 1943 
 
222 Group R.A.F. 
 
A.V.M. J.H. D’Albiac      13th March 1942 
A.V.M. A. Lees       1st December 1942 
 
 
223 Group R.A.F. 
 
Air Commodore P.H. Mackworth     5th May 1942 
Air Commodore A. Gray      2nd August 1942 
Air Commodore H.J.F. Hunter     1st May 1943 
 
224 Group R.A.F. 
 
Air Commodore G.E. Wilson      24th August 1942 
Air Commodore A. Gray      2nd January 1943 
 
225 Group R.A.F. 
 
Air Commodore P.H. Mackworth     2nd June 1942 
  
 
 
AIR COMMAND SOUTH SEA ASIA formed on 15th December 1943 
 
 
Allied Air Commander-in-Chief 
A.C.M. Sir Richard Pierse      16th November 1943 
Air Marshal Sir Guy Garrod (Temporary)    27th November 1944 
xi 
A.C.M. Sir Keith Park      25th February 1945  
 
 
EASTERN AIR COMMAND (disbanded on 1st June 1945) 
Air Commander (and Second in Command) 
Lieutenant-General George E. Stratemeyer (U.S.A.A.F.)   15th December 1943 
 
 
Assistant Air Commander 
 
A.V.M. Thomas Williams      15th December 1943 
A.M. Sir Alec Coryton      4th December 1944 
 
HEADQUARTERS R.A.F. Burma 
A.M. Sir Alec Coryton      4th December 1944 
A.M. Sir Hugh Saunders      10th August 1945 
 
THIRD TACTICAL AIR FORCE (disbanded on 4th December 1944) 
A.M. Sir John Baldwin      15th December 1943 
A.M. Sir Alec Coryton      15th August 1944 
 
STRATEGIC AIR FORCE 
Brigadier-General Howard Davidson (U.S.A.A.F.)   15th December 1943 
Air Commodore Francis Mellersh     20th June 1944 
 
PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE FORCE 
Group Captain S.G. Wise      1st February 1944 
Colonel Minton Kaye (U.S.A.A.F.)     9th January 1945 
 
TROOP CARRIER COMMAND 
Brigadier-General William Old (U.S.A.A.F.)   15th December 1943 
 
TENTH U.S. ARMY AIR FORCE   
Major-General Howard Davidson     20th June 1944  
 
xii 
221 GROUP R.A.F. 
Air Commodore H.V. Rowley     15th December 1943 
A.V.M. Stanley Vincent      17th February 1944 
A.V.M. Cecil Bouchier      12th June 1944 
 
222 GROUP R.A.F. 
A.V.M. A. Lees       16th November 1943 
A.M. A. Durston       28th March 1944 
 
224 GROUP R.A.F. 
Air Commodore A. Gray      15th December 1943 
A.V.M. the Earl of Bandon      19th July 1944 
 
 
225 GROUP R.A.F.  
Air Commodore P.H. Mackworth     16th November 1943 
A.V.M. N.L. Desoer       23rd August 1944  
 
 
 
 
CHIEFS OF THE AIR STAFF 
A.C.M. Sir Cyril Newall      1st September 1937 
A.C.M. Sir Charles Portal      25th October 1940 
 
 
 
Land Commanders 
 
 
Far East Command 
 
Lieutenant General Sir Henry Pownall    23rd December 1941  
     
Malaya Command 
Lieutenant General Arthur Percival     May 1941 
 
Commander in Chief India 
General Sir Archibald Wavell     June 1941 
 
xiii 
Burma Corps 
Major General William Slim      13th March 1942 
XV Corps 
Lieutenant General William Slim     June 1942 
Fourteenth Army 
Lieutenant General William Slim     October 1943 
(Promoted to Colonel January 1944, Knighted December 1944) 
 
 
Chief of Staff China Theatre and U.S. Commander China-Burma-India Theatre 
 
Major General Joseph Stilwell     January 1942 
 
 
Long Range Penetration Force (The Chindits) 
 
Colonel Orde Wingate      April 1942 
(Promoted to Major General January 1944)        
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Introduction 
 In December 1941 Japanese forces attacked American and British bases in the Pacific 
and Far East with a series of well planned and executed air raids which disabled their 
opponents, quickly giving the Japanese air superiority. From June 1942 the Allies, notably 
Britain, its Commonwealth forces and America, had to reverse these early setbacks 
themselves to gain air superiority. By mid-1944 this had been broadly achieved. This thesis 
will critically analyse the air superiority campaign in Burma, India and Malaya between 
1941 and 1945. It will demonstrate how and why the Japanese initially won air superiority 
through a combination of better aircraft, experienced aircrew and a successful pre-emptive 
counter-air campaign. The thesis will then analyse how, why and with what effectiveness the 
Allies overcame their initial weaknesses in early warning, aircraft, aircrew and air combat 
tactics to gain air superiority in 1944 and air supremacy in 1945. Furthermore the thesis will 
examine the crucial role Japanese industry played in failing to supply sufficient resources to 
the Burma front and how Japan’s war in other theatres affected the eventual outcome.  
 Gaining and retaining air superiority in Burma was supremely important to the 
Allies. Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park, Commander-in- Chief Air Forces South Sea Asia, 
was in no doubt of the importance of air superiority when he wrote in 1945: 
It is however worth pausing to consider the results had enemy aircraft been 
allowed unrestricted use of the sky. The air supply on which the whole land 
campaign hinged would have been impossible, the attrition rate of our close 
support squadrons, which worked with accuracy and effect would have been 
prohibitive and the disruption caused by our strategic bombers to the enemy’s 
communications far to the rear could not have been such as to have materially 
influenced the battle.1 
As supplies and material arrived to reinforce the region in 1942, Indian ports, particularly 
Calcutta, had to be defended against air attack, as did Indian industry and the extensive 
airfield building programme. Air superiority in Burma assumed greater importance in 1944 
                                                          
1 The National Archives Kew (TNA), Air 23/4665, Despatch on Air Operations by Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith 
Park 1944-1945, p.22. 
2 
when General William Slim advocated his strategy of troops standing and fighting rather 
than withdrawing when surrounded; troops would be resupplied by air transport and 
supported by ground attack aircraft, both classes of aircraft being vulnerable to Japanese 
fighters. Air transport was also central to General Orde Wingate’s Long Range Penetration 
Force, more commonly known as the Chindits, and their two incursions into Burma in 1943 
and 1944.  Air superiority was vital to allow these aircraft to operate successfully and this 
thesis will show how and with what success this was achieved. From October 1944, the 
Allied air superiority campaign was assisted by the withdrawal and transfer of Japanese air 
units to defend their bases in the Pacific and Japan itself. Air combat between the 
protagonists reduced and the counter-air campaign showed little return against the effort as 
there were fewer Japanese aircraft dispersed around many airfields. By June 1945, the 
Japanese Army Air Force (J.A.A.F.) had completely withdrawn from Burma leaving the 
Allies with unchallenged air supremacy which continued until the war ended in August 
1945.   
 In order to provide a methodological framework, it is necessary to understand what is 
meant by the terms air superiority and air supremacy. Both concepts are discussed in air 
power literature such as Hallion and Gooch, but essentially air superiority can be considered 
as controlling one’s airspace so as to ensure that other operations, in the air and on land and 
sea, can proceed without interference.2 In 2003 Meilinger quoted the U.S. Department of 
Defense definitions and these give a clear description; air superiority: 
That degree of dominance in the airbattle [sic] of one force over another 
which permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, 
sea and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference 
by the opposing force. 
 
 
                                                          
2 Hallion, Strike from the Sky, p.1 and Gooch, Air Power Theory and Practice, p.17. 
3 
Air supremacy: 
That degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of 
effective interference.3 
A modern definition taken from the R.A.F.’s AP 3000 British Air and Space Power Doctrine 
is “The freedom, bound by time, to use a volume of airspace for one’s own purposes while, 
if necessary, denying its use to an opponent.”4 Air supremacy is the most desired state, 
where the enemy air force is incapable of effectively interfering with operations. Air 
superiority is the previous stage where interference is reduced to the lowest possible levels. 
So in essence air superiority can be likened to an aerial ‘umbrella’ under which air, land and 
sea operations may proceed. This ‘umbrella’ does not have to be a permanent state, as 
localized temporary air superiority over a battlefield may result in ground forces operating in 
a sterile environment secure from enemy aerial interference.  
 Air superiority can be achieved in a number of ways. Budiansky wrote of the 1935 
Luftwaffe Regulation 16: 
It stated that the air forces would be called upon to perform many tasks, from 
supporting the army and navy to striking strategic targets. Gaining air 
superiority was a prerequisite for all these missions, but there were many 
places where the battle for air superiority would be decided: in attacks on 
enemy airfields and aircraft factories, in air-to-air combat, in the fire from 
flak units defending German troops and targets.5  
The fundamental aim is to cause attrition to the enemy’s air strength by attacking it at source 
in the aircraft factories or maintenance depots, and by attacking enemy airfields where there 
is a possibility of reducing aircraft strength as well as damaging or destroying important 
ancillary supplies and equipment. Attrition can also be inflicted by losses in air-to-air 
combat either in defensive or offensive operations, or by anti-aircraft fire defending targets. 
                                                          
3 Meilinger, Airwar: Theory and Practice, p.32.  
4 Anon, AP 3000 British Air and Space Power Doctrine, Centre for Air Power Studies R.A.F. 2009. 
5 Budiansky, Air Power, p.205. 
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 To achieve these aims relevant factors and equipment are vital. Attacking the 
enemy’s aircraft factories requires a suitable bombing force capable of potentially deep 
penetration raids. In terms of air defence an efficient early warning and command and 
control system is essential to prevent unnecessary combat air patrols being flown, which can 
prove wasteful in terms of aircraft and aircrew fatigue, and stop the enemy attacking you. To 
complement this system, suitable, modern fighter aircraft that have the ability to climb to 
advantageous heights and then successfully engage the enemy with relevant combat tactics 
have to be deployed on well sited airfields. Offensively there is a requirement for long-range 
well armed fighter aircraft, capable of attacking enemy airfields whilst at the same time 
successfully engaging enemy aircraft in air combat. These interdiction operations are 
enhanced by an effective intelligence organization, which establish enemy airfield and unit 
activity, and direct efficient strikes. To fly and operate both categories of aircraft, well 
trained and combat experienced aircrew are essential to maximize the potential of defensive 
and offensive aircraft to achieve air superiority. 
 Since 1945 the importance of air superiority in Burma and the understanding of how 
it was eventually achieved have received different levels of analysis. During the 1950s the 
official British histories of the Second World War began to be published, five volumes of 
which covered the war in the Far East, but the air war in this theatre was not given any 
separate volumes.6 The five volumes cover the land war in great detail and for the most part 
they deal with the air war as a supporting factor to ground operations, particularly supply 
and ground support. Whilst the air superiority campaign is mentioned and acknowledged it is 
not analysed in any detail; for example there is no analysis of how the early warning 
organisation was established from 1942, or why Spitfire fighters took so long to reach the 
region. A more detailed official appreciation of the air war is given in the ‘in-house’ 
narrative series written by the R.A.F. Air Historical Branch (A.H.B.) for the government 
                                                          
6 Kirby (ed.), The War Against Japan, Five Volumes.  
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during the late 1940s and early 1950s, but not released for public viewing until the early 
1970s. The narratives describe how air superiority was lost and how it was gained, and cover 
such factors as aircrew, aircraft and tactics and the importance of the American contribution 
to the counter-air offensive in 1944. However although the narratives make good use of 
primary sources they fall short of critical detail in a number of areas. The establishment of 
the early warning organisation during 1942 is little discussed, and there is a reliance on 
aircraft damage claims which were probably exaggerated during the counter-air offensive in 
early 1944. Japanese tactics in the theatre are discussed, but there is little qualitative analysis 
of the effect of Japan’s war in other regions on the Burma campaign. Another semi-official 
history of the R.A.F.’s participation in Burma was contained in the three volume set written 
by Richards and Saunders and published in 1953-1954.7 Whilst using official sources, the 
books, intended for public consumption, lack in-depth analysis as all theatres were covered 
in relatively small volumes, where little in-depth coverage of many aspects of the air 
superiority campaign in Burma is offered. The American official history of the U.S. Army 
Air Force edited by Craven and Cate predictably focuses on American operations, but is 
nevertheless a useful source for the Allied counter-air campaign.8 On the other hand a series 
of reports by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey dealing with aspects of the 
campaign such as Japanese air power, the China, Burma, India theatre and Japanese industry, 
do not present a detailed analysis of the air superiority campaign in Burma. 
 In books on air power written and edited by academic scholars such as Boog, 
Buckley, Budiansky, Cox, Gray and Meilinger, the Burma air war is either not mentioned at 
all, or referred to in brief terms as part of the overall war in the Pacific.9 For example in 
Buckley’s Air Power in the Age of Total War, a full chapter deals with Japan’s war against 
                                                          
7 Richards and Saunders, Royal Air Force 1939-1945, Three Volumes. 
8 Craven and Cate (eds.), The Army Air Forces in World War II, Six Volumes.  
9 Boog, The Conduct of the Air War in the Second World War; Buckley, Air Power in the Age of Total War; 
Budiansky, Air Power; Cox and Gray, Air Power History: Turning Points from Kitty Hawk to Kosovo; 
Meilinger, Airwar: Theory and Practice. 
6 
the Allies, but the war in South East Asia warrants only a few lines. However, he 
acknowledges that attainment of air superiority, “allowed innovatory measures to be 
undertaken, notably... the air supply of Orde Wingate’s Chindits.”10 Overy’s The Air War 
1939-1945 takes a similar approach by subsuming the Burma war into the rest of Japan’s 
conflict.11 It is useful, for example, in establishing how the Pacific fighting affected Burma, 
but it does not deal with specific issues such as the air superiority campaign or its essential 
factors. However Overy’s analysis of the Japanese aircraft economy and its difficulties in 
providing aircraft in quantity and quality is essential in understanding why Japanese air 
resources were in short supply. 
Specific Burma air war literature varies in analytical content. Books by Probert and 
Pearson offer an overall picture of the air war, but as they deal with the whole air campaign 
this inevitably means that any one aspect of the air offensive fails to receive a full analysis.12 
Whilst Probert mentions the air superiority campaign it is generally within chapters rather 
than as a separate chapter. As a result, whilst he acknowledges the work entailed in 
establishing an early warning organisation in 1942, space prevents deeper explanation and 
analysis. Other books dedicated to the air war in Burma by, for example, Shores, Cull and 
Franks, are useful for personal accounts by combatants and the chronology of events but 
they often lack deeper academic analysis. Shores’ Air War for Burma, on the other hand 
contains a daily record of operations which is vital as his two collaborators, Hiroshi Ichimura 
and Yasuo Izawa, had access to surviving Japanese military records which show the attrition 
rates of Japanese units.13 Furthermore campaign books such as those written by Allen and 
                                                          
10 Buckley, Air Power in the Age of Total War, p.187.  
11 Overy, The Air War 1939-45. 
12 Probert, The Forgotten Air Force and Pearson The Burma Air Campaign 1941-1945. 
13 Shores, Air War For Burma. 
7 
Latimer deal with the air war either perfunctorily or with specific reference to ground 
operations.14  
 There is a clear variance in how literature deals with the air superiority campaign but 
they generally agree that the campaign was important in allowing Allied air and ground 
operations to take place. The only publications that give the campaign separate sections are 
the A.H.B. narratives, but even those lack detailed discussion of such topics as the early 
warning organisation, aircraft supply, and the failures of Japanese industry to supply aircraft 
in quantity and quality.  
Together with secondary sources, this thesis has made extensive use of technical, 
governmental and operational primary source material held at the National Archive, Kew. 
Furthermore, original papers appertaining to the Chief of the Air Staff, Sir Charles Portal, 
were consulted at Christ Church College, Oxford University, as were those of Field Marshal 
1st Viscount William Slim, at Churchill College, Cambridge University, and the Air 
Commander of Far East Air Forces, Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Pierse, at the R.A.F. 
Museum, Hendon. Its object is to bring together all the air superiority elements in one study, 
analyse how each element worked and how they interacted to achieve the goals of air 
superiority and air supremacy. It will provide the reader with new interpretations that modify 
or correct previously held views and it will refine the understanding of how the air 
supremacy campaign was conducted in Burma from 1941 until 1945.  
 The diversity of literature relating to the air war in Burma means there are various 
fundamental questions to be addressed. First the thesis will analyse why the early warning 
organisation was not established before the initial Japanese attacks, how it was built up 
during 1942 and 1943, and the importance of its contribution to the success of the campaign. 
Second, current literature does not analyse how the combined elements of aircraft, aircrew 
                                                          
14 Allen, Burma, The Longest War and Latimer, Burma: The Forgotten War. 
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and air combat tactics contributed to the demise of Japanese air power. Third, scholarship 
relating to the counter-air campaign from 1942 until the end of 1943 requires examination. It 
was described by Craven and Cate as being unsuccessful owing to aircraft deficiencies, but 
the Allied air offensive during the six month period at the beginning of 1944 is said by the 
A.H.B. to have broken the back of Japanese air strength.15 Thus further analysis is required 
to ascertain whether it achieved such a level of success as it appears Japanese aircraft 
strength did not deteriorate commensurately in line with Allied claims. Fourth there is the 
question of the extent to which individual factors such as Japanese industry, Japan’s war in 
other theatres and the Japanese High Command contributed towards the eventual loss of air 
superiority. In addition to these fundamental questions two further pivotal issues will be 
addressed - when were air superiority and then air supremacy was gained, and to what extent 
were the Allies and Japanese affected by priorities in other theatres? Only after all these 
factors have been weighed in the balance can the most fundamental question of how air 
superiority was won be addressed with confidence.  
 The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter One will analyse the early warning 
organisation in terms of the lack of equipment in Malaya and Burma prior to 8th December 
1941 and the Japanese attacks. It will demonstrate how the organisation was established, 
despite supply and technical difficulties, during 1942 and 1943 until it achieved a level of 
efficiency in India in 1944 comparable with systems operating in Britain. It will also analyse 
the technical difficulties of providing mobile early warning facilities in adverse conditions of 
topography and climate when the Allies were under siege in early 1944, and then during 
their advance into Burma later that year. 
 Chapter Two will analyse the contribution of suitable modern aircraft in their 
defensive and offensive roles, highlighting the tipping point in late 1943 when the Spitfire 
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and American long-range fighters were introduced to India. Chapter Two will also 
demonstrate how Allied aircrew improved in quality and quantity from mid-1942, and 
analyse why Japanese aircrew quality did not deteriorate in the Burma theatre. Air-to-air 
combat tactics will be analysed, and will demonstrate how existing tactics were improved 
and adapted to engage Japanese fighters. 
 Chapter Three will discuss the importance of an efficient counter-air campaign and 
how the Japanese were able to devastate British and American air strength during the first 
days of war. It will also analyse how the Allied counter-air campaign in 1942 and 1943 
failed to achieve attritional goals against the J.A.A.F. due to a lack of suitable aircraft. 
Finally it will show how the introduction of long-range American fighters in late 1943 
transformed the counter-air campaign into a positive operation albeit not as successfully as 
previously thought. 
 Chapter Four will examine how the Japanese industry failed to produce sufficient 
aircraft in both quality and quantity for Japan’s Army and Navy air arms, and how these 
shortages impacted on Japan’s war in Burma. It will also analyse how Japan’s war priorities 
in the Pacific, China and in the homeland affected the supply of aircraft and aircrew to 
Burma. Finally the chapter will show how Japanese tactics in the theatre failed to take 
advantage of Allied defensive weaknesses at crucial periods during the campaign, and 
therefore missed opportunities to disrupt Allied operations.  
 It is inevitable that some factors of the campaign cannot be fully analysed in a work 
of this nature. This study will principally deal with the Royal Air Force’s air superiority 
campaign in Malaya, Burma and India between 1941 and 1945, although some assessment 
will be made of the American contribution. Whilst the American contribution to air defence 
was less than that of the R.A.F., its involvement in the counter-air campaign was crucial. 
This will be studied and analysed in Chapter Three.  
10 
The essential work of the Wireless Observer Units and the Observer Corps in relation 
to the early warning organisation is acknowledged in Chapter One without giving the units a 
full appreciation. Similarly although the thesis makes use of the intelligence agencies’ 
appreciations of Japanese strength and losses during the campaign, and mention is made of 
intelligence sources in Chapter Three in relation to the counter-air offensive, a full 
appreciation would have added another chapter which space did not allow. Furthermore 
although R.A.F. Regiment and Army gunners manned anti-aircraft guns on the advanced 
landing grounds and airfields, both repelling Japanese raiders and taking a toll of enemy 
aircraft, space precludes a detailed analysis of their contribution. However, it is fully 
appreciated. 
 By analysing the elements of the air superiority campaign in Burma between 1941 
and 1945 as a whole rather than individually, this thesis provides a new and crucial 
contribution to the understanding of the air war in Burma. In the process it sheds light on 
previously un-researched factors. It also corroborates some existing views, whilst examining 
critically and challenges some claims about the campaign which have remained largely 
unquestioned. 
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Chapter One – The Early Warning Organisation 
One of the essential elements in the process of attaining and maintaining air 
superiority is an effective early warning system and the importance of such a system to 
defend against enemy air attack cannot be over emphasised. It acted as a significant 
enhancing or force multiplier increasing the potency of all other aspects of air superiority 
assets. The alternative necessitated standing patrols which would impact on the airframe life 
of aircraft resulting in more servicing, a costly waste of fuel and an increase in aircrews’ 
flying hours. Moreover there was no guarantee that the patrols would effectively locate the 
enemy once airborne. This chapter will examine the reasons why, despite its proven value, a 
viable early warning system was not in place in the Far East in December 1941 and how this 
deficiency was resolved in India by 1944. Following the fall of Burma in the Spring of 1942, 
great efforts were made to equip India with an efficient defence system which included 
radar, supported by an Observer Corps and the formation of Wireless Observer Units, both 
of which would fill gaps in the radar chain. After defending India, Allied air forces moved 
on the offensive into Burma, and the early warning system had to be adapted to protect the 
temporary airfields and landing grounds characteristic of the campaign. This chapter will 
evaluate for the first time how this was achieved, and explain how the various technical 
difficulties encountered were overcome. It will also evaluate and analyse how the early 
warning organisation contributed to the Allies achieving air superiority in 1944 and air 
supremacy in 1945.  
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Early Warning and the British Model 
From its beginnings in the mid-1930s the early warning system had developed in 
Britain to a stage that by the summer of 1940 incoming raids were being detected in 
sufficient time to warn the defenders of their presence and direction. The R.A.F. system in 
Britain consisted of an organisation of radar stations that were linked to filter rooms and then 
to Group and Sector operation rooms which would analyse the information and warn of the 
raids’ presence, and then control them until the enemy was sighted. This system was called 
Ground Controlled Interception (G.C.I.). Gaps in the radar chain, particularly at low level, 
and confirmation of enemy activity were provided by the Observer Corps who manned 
strategically placed posts. This is a very simplified description of a complex operation 
which, nevertheless, proved its worth during the Battle of Britain. However it must be 
recognized that even accounting for radar’s success, the equipment, if not the concept, was 
in its early stages of development; incoming raids were regularly detected, but aircraft 
heights and numbers were often unreliably interpreted.1  
Radar stations, Observer Corps posts and the operations rooms were linked by an 
efficient and reliable system of telephone landlines which were first laid in 1937, so that a 
radar operator on the coast would be able to report a raid securely by telephone to other links 
in the chain. The telephone lines were laid when the first radar stations had been built and so 
by 1940 were well tried and tested. A second element was the relationship between aircraft 
and the early warning system. Radar stations and Observer Corps positions were situated far 
enough forward to provide sufficient warning for R.A.F. fighters to engage the enemy in 
favourable conditions of height, with the sun behind them; the Hurricane Mark I and Spitfire 
Mark I could attain 20,000 feet between seven and seven and a half minutes.2 Nevertheless 
radar was not enough. Britain could have possessed the finest early warning system, but 
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without reliable communications and high performance aircraft to exploit the advantage the 
system was incomplete. 
 Thus by the late Summer of 1940 Britain possessed the first integrated air defence 
system in the world. There were technical difficulties as the system was in its technological 
infancy, but it was good enough to be copied by the United States which adopted it for its 
own air defence.3 However, although the system was used for the defence of Malta and areas 
of the Middle East, it had either not arrived or been fully implemented in the Far East at the 
outbreak of war in 1941.  
Early warning in the Far East prior to war  
 The situation in the Far East was far removed from the model of early 
warning efficiency that existed in Britain. Malaya and Singapore waited for equipment 
behind other theatres, having “less importance and lower priority”.4 The original intention 
was to have 20 radar stations in Malaya, but by 1st December 1941 only six had been 
completed.5 Other stations were in the process of construction, but would not play a part in 
trying to repel Japanese attacks. In Burma there was a problem associated with where some 
of the airfields had been sited. The plan to have a North-South alignment of airfields to 
provide “maximum operational mobility” was laudable, but:  
The Northern ones were placed too far forward in the Sittang valley where no 
radar warning was possible. They should have been in the Irrawaddy and 
Chindwin valleys, allowing radar units to be located to the East... the airfields 
had been well built by the Burma Public Works Department for all weather 
use but they were indefensible without an efficient warning system.6  
 
 
                                                          
3 Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Volume One, p.290. 
4 TNA, Air 41/88, Signals Volume V: Fighter Control and Interception, p.55. 
5 TNA, Air 41/35, The Campaigns for the Far East, Volume I, Far East Defence Policy and Preparations for 
War, p.19.  
6 Probert, The Forgotten Air Force, p.83. 
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There were attempts to equip the region with radar cover, but moves were hindered by the 
difficulties in financing the equipment and staff. In September 1939 the Director of 
Operations, Group Captain William Coryton, asked the Air Ministry if any dates had been 
established to supply overseas stations with radar sets, and apparently did not receive a 
reply.7 Further moves were made in 1940, but the British government showed reluctance to 
pay for either the equipment or the staff.8 The provision of high grade personnel to supervise 
the sets met with the suggestion of a compromise; on 3rd February 1940 Squadron Leader 
A.V. Hammond suggested a pool of experts could be situated in Egypt and then travel to 
Singapore to advise when repairs were required, their expenses being paid for when 
necessary.9 In March 1941 a request was made for scientific officers to be posted to the Far 
East to work with the R.A.F., but the reply on 25th March pointed out that the 
Telecommunications Research Establishment (T.R.E.) was “bone dry” of suitable men 
unless it was of the “highest priority”.10  
The arrival of R.A.F. Buffalo squadrons in March 1941 prompted the authorities to 
begin to organise an early warning system.11 The resulting structure was in place and 
operating successfully during exercises in August and September 1941, and would give 
Singapore at least 30 minutes warning of an impending raid.12 The efforts to achieve even 
inconsistent coverage, however, were considerable and it is worthwhile to examine these 
attempts to understand the level of difficulty. 
An Air Ministry report dated 17th June 1941 stated that the radar station at Tanah 
Merah Besar was working whilst the stations at Mersing, Bukit Chunang and Tanjong 
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10 TNA, Avia 7/1301, Radar in the Far East, 1941-1945.  
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Kupang were all in the process of being installed.13 Remaining equipment was to be 
despatched to the area at the rate of two per month commencing in August, but there would 
be no Chain Overseas Low (C.O.L.) sets available before the 31st October. For Burma it was 
a different matter and following a radar survey of the area a subsequent report made it clear 
that providing cover was a difficult task. Burma’s main target areas for an enemy attack 
would include Rangoon’s dock, Syriam’s oilfields and Lashio’s supply depots.14 The radar 
plan accepted that stations could be established in the Rangoon and Syriam areas, giving 
“cover against aircraft flying above 3,000 feet... [and] cover against low flying aircraft and 
aircraft minelayers operating over the Rangoon River.”15  However these areas appeared to 
be the exception as the report stated the Moulmein area was “not ideal for R.D.F. cover, but 
good results can be expected over certain areas”, while of the Lashio area it said:  
The terrain in this area is unfavourable for R.D.F. but the limited cover 
provided by a station near the aerodrome is worthwhile in view of the 
importance of the target. A G.C.I. type station is proposed for this area.16  
The oilfield was “unsuited to R.D.F. and poor results only would be obtained. At present it is 
not proposed to erect a station in this area”. The unsuitability of the terrain in the region was 
clearly an obstacle to creating an adequate early warning system and would present technical 
challenges when radar cover was required from June 1942 onwards. 
 On 16th September 1941 the Air Ministry reported: 
Sufficient equipment has been allocated to the Far East pool to meet the 
requirement of Malaya and also of an A.C.O. station at Rangoon and the 
T.R.U. at Syriam… Units are being despatched at the rate of 2 per week and 
the priority as between Malaya and Rangoon will presumably be decided by 
the C. in C. Far East.17  
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However the C.O.L. equipment allocated to Syriam could not be despatched before 
November as it was not yet available, and the G.C.I. for Lashio and Tavoy was unlikely to 
be available before the “early spring of 1942.”18 By 18th November the situation was 
deteriorating and the Air Ministry contacted Far East Headquarters expressing concerns that 
the “present R.D.F. plan gives little protection for Penang and Kota Bharu against aircraft 
approaching from Inland” and requesting information whether siting portable A.S.V. sets on 
hills would be feasible.19 Far Eastern command replied on 19th November that the area 
between Penang and Kota Bharu was “almost impenetrable, communications not existent” 
and said it would report as investigations progressed.20 Events overtook these investigations 
and supply of equipment to the region. On 8th December as Japanese forces attacked Malaya, 
the Air Ministry reported that, “It has been decided to form the following A.M.E. Stations 
for despatch to the Far East” and proceeded to list a number of units and personnel for 
deployment.21 However three of the units’ technical staff were still training and would not be 
available for despatch until 20th January 1942. Similarly on 9th December, the Director of 
Operations reported to the Chief of the Air Staff that the remaining sets intended to fill the 
gaps in both high and low coverage would be despatched by the end of April 1942. A total of 
six G.C.I. sets were still required, three of which would be despatched from Great Britain in 
January, whilst the other three could be made available “at the expense of the Middle 
East.”22 On 24th December the Air Ministry informed Far East Headquarters that further 
equipment and staff were being despatched to Singapore, Malaya and Ceylon, and on 
Christmas Day an additional message was sent regarding equipment for Burma.23 In every 
case the units would not be in position until the end of January 1942. It was a matter of too 
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little, too late and despite requests for additional radar sets, by the time the campaign started 
little could be done.24  
Previous studies of this period suggests that the Far East command had to face the 
Japanese with what equipment was in place but attempts to reinforce the region had been 
made. Throughout 1941 moves were made to supply the area with more radar equipment, 
but owing to demands from other theatres the sets were offered essentially too late for use. It 
was not merely a matter of sending radar sets for deployment either, as each site required 
careful surveying to gain the maximum cover against enemy aircraft. However, there were 
other important factors that impacted on the early warning coverage. 
The size of the frontier to be defended, over 700 miles, meant that many more radar 
sets than were possible to supply would be needed to copy the “overlapping floodlight 
system” that was used in Britain.25 In addition there was the crucial factor of 
communications. There was a shortage of cable material in the area, and the cable laying 
procedure took a long time even in good conditions. In the Far East both construction and 
maintenance were seriously affected by the region’s topography and violent weather 
conditions. It was practically impossible in these conditions to lay even temporary landlines, 
and radio sets were in short supply and were unavailable for early warning purposes.26 The 
British network depended on secure telephone lines which connected radar stations with 
Operations Rooms and fighter airfields, but in the Far East there were too few lines, each of 
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which passed through a telephone exchange.27 These lines were vulnerable to enemy damage 
as well as sabotage by fifth-columnists.  
Similar problems affected the Observer Corps. At the end of 1940 there was no 
Observer Corps in Malaya, and when units were formed there was little time left to train the 
personnel for their wartime duties. The topography also made it “impossible to establish 
observer posts in the mountainous country of central Malaya which caused serious gaps in 
the early warning system.”28 Landlines were non-existent, radio sets were in short supply 
and alternative methods were not always successful as Sergeant Don Purdon, a Blenheim 
navigator, remembered: 
For warning we had to rely on an outpost in the hills manned by Burma 
Frontier Force soldiers who spoke little English – communication was by 
heliograph. I don’t think any of us could read it so we had to rely on a Burma 
Frontier Force counterpart first to read it and then translate from Burmese! 
One never knew if the flashes from the hills meant an air raid under way or 
whether it was a call for rations or other mundane needs!29 
However it must not be thought that the Observer Corps were totally unprepared though as 
will be seen later the coverage varied from area to area as there was no common standard. 
India and its pre-war quest for radar 
 The establishment of the early warning system in India has not received detailed 
attention from historians; some works make no mention of the establishment at all, whilst 
others refer to the efforts in varying levels of detail. Pearson and Kirby make no mention of 
the systems, while Richards and Saunders deals with the matter in one paragraph.30 Probert 
does give the subject more attention pointing out that from having no radar sets in March 
1942 India had 52 operational sets by the following December with seven filter rooms in 
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use, together with a functioning Observer Corps.31 There the detail finishes, Probert 
acknowledging the effort, “A bland statement this, concealing a vast amount of work, often 
highly skilled, under usually very difficult circumstances.”32 But the background to the 
establishment of an early warning system in India has its roots three years earlier in 1939. 
The allocation of radar sets to India met with the same difficulties as Malaya and 
Burma owing to low priority, cost and technical problems. During 1939 the Air Officer 
Commanding (A.O.C.) India, Air Marshal Sir Philip Joubert de la Ferté requested allocation 
of a mobile set either by purchase or loan.33 The Air Ministry opined that the requirement in 
India was “slight” and there were no sets available for the next twelve months.34 The 
frustration of repeated delays prompted Joubert to write in April: 
Admit our requirements appear unimportant but will not be able to organise 
effective A/A defence North West Frontier unless we obtain this essential 
unit.35  
However the Air Ministry stuck to its position and Joubert suggested a plan to loan a radar 
set pending payment as it was hoped funds would be made available from the Chatfield 
Commission’s report on the defence of India.36 The Chatfield Commission to examine 
India’s defences was chaired by The Lord Ernle Chatfield in 1938 and recommended India’s 
defence should concentrate on sea communications, the modernisation of the Indian Army 
and re-equipment of R.A.F. squadrons, whilst spending less on defending the North West 
frontier. The plan to loan a radar set floundered through cost questions as the Committee was 
exploring how reorganisation and re-equipment costs could be spread over five years as it 
believed more than one radar set was required for India’s defence. After being asked to 
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explain his position Joubert wrote to Air Vice-Marshal Richard Peirse who was Deputy 
Chief of the Air Staff (D.C.A.S.): 
I consider myself the best judge of what is required out here, and I merely ask 
the Air Ministry to order this material and send it out in advance of the 
implementation of the Chatfield Report. I am rather cross about this, and I 
hope you will be able to help me. Time-wasting of this nature is more than 
irritating.37 
At the beginning of October 1939 it was agreed to loan one set to India, but the war in 
Europe meant supplies to India and elsewhere lacked priority, the India Office being 
informed on 22nd October that the delivery estimate was “a good deal too optimistic.”38 
However there were signs that an observer system equipped with wireless to complement the 
radar was being considered, and this approach would eventually become an integral part of 
the overall early warning plan in areas where radar would not work.39 
 Although the provision of three radar sets for India was acknowledged on 18th 
December 1939 the provision had to take its turn “in the order of priority for supply of 
equipment to ports abroad.”40 To assist the Governments of India and Burma to decide what 
types of radar they required a survey would examine various factors; details of current 
available radar sets; their costs; the rate of production; and the situation regarding 
reconnaissance and “execution of works of installation for ports abroad.”41 However there 
were difficulties as a mobile radar set would not be available before the second half of 1940 
and: 
The production of the expensive C.O. sets is high and the limitation of supply 
will be the various work surfaces needed for their installation. The cost of this 
set including work surfaces would be 10 Lakhs, but while it is the set 
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recommended for ports it seems little doubt that weaker and less expensive 
sets would in some cases be sufficient.42  
A further difficulty was finding suitable R.A.F. staff to operate the sets, and those operatives 
supplied by India would have to be trained in Britain at additional cost. 
 1940 heralded a new round of discussions about Indian radar requirements. The 
Signals Branch enquired on 1st January what types of sets (and cost) were recommended for 
the defence of the Indian ports and what set was of likely use for the detection of surface 
vessels.43 Edmund Dixon of the Radio Detection Committee replied that the problem had 
been “tentatively considered” with different types of radar (mobile, ordinary and low) 
probably being suited for the various locations, whilst the cost of the equipment was “not 
known as a fact”, but the estimates made “were sufficiently good for [your] purposes”.44 The 
optimism was tempered when Joubert (now back in Britain as an R.D.F. advisor) 
realistically dealt with priorities: 
Much depends, however, upon whether – as is the case at the moment – we 
are to be faced continually with a state of emergency in this country. 
Continuance of these emergencies will naturally add to the already 
considerable delays in production.45 
Moreover on 18th January comprehensive results of the R.D.F. committee’s enquiries were 
published and the report covered the types and cost of equipment: 
No definite rate of production can be given at present. The rate is altered as 
emergencies arise and as the production of one type is advanced and of others 
retarded when the present home emergency programme has been 
completed.46  
If these emergencies did not occur, the MB2 mobile set would be available in May 1940. 
The mobile MB1 set would be sent to Egypt in February and the C.H.L. set would be 
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available for overseas deployment in June. Radar equipment’s siting was vital to its 
efficiency and whilst the report made reference to site surveys in Malta, Aden and Egypt, 
India is notable for its absence. However there were still questions relating to the types of 
radar set, their costs and the numbers of operating staff.  For example, in January 1940 the 
Director for Training was asked if he could supply an estimate of training costs and he 
replied that it was unlikely he’d “be able to supply an estimate for some time as we’ve not 
had a regular course at a training establishment”, indicating that overseas stations had not 
been considered for radar deployment.47  
On 3rd February 1940 the Air Ministry reported that the Chiefs of Staff had 
completed a review of military rearmament policy in the Middle East and India.48 It was 
clear that force increases depended on the strategic situation and ultimately it would be “a 
long term policy and we cannot at present foresee when it will be possible to send the 
additional squadrons to India”49 In terms of radar:  
R.D.F. would be a valuable asset if it would work satisfactorily in vicinity of 
Frontier mountains. Technical possibilities are being considered and 
arrangements are being made for an R.D.F. expert now proceeding to Egypt 
and Aden to go on to India to carry out investigations.50 
Before the expert arrived, the Air Ministry contacted the A.O.C. India, Air Marshal Sir John 
Higgins, to state that the mobile set as previously ordered was “not recommended for use on 
the Frontier owing to echoes off hills” and two inexpensive alternative sets were to be 
ordered for experimental purposes.51 
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 India’s ports were visited by Flight Lieutenant J.F. Atherton between 29th March and 
13th April 1940, and he filed his report to the A.O.C. India on 18th April 1940.52 Atherton 
visited Karachi, Bombay, Cochin, Madras, and Calcutta and he reported that the radar 
system was to provide cover from air and sea attacks: 
The first four ports require protection against enemy shipping and ship-borne 
aircraft. In the case of Calcutta, only detection of aircraft required, as the port 
is some considerable distance up the HOOGLY RIVER [sic].53 
Atherton made general recommendations that Karachi, Bombay, Cochin and Madras would 
be best served by the C.O.L. equipment that would give cover to a distance of 50 to 60 
miles, but was not adapted to give an aircraft’s height, whilst assisting coastal guns to detect 
shipping in conditions of bad visibility; the report stressed that in the latter case it would 
only be an additional aid and not take the place of a seaward patrol. For Calcutta a full C.O. 
station was suggested which would detect aircraft flying at 10,000 feet at a range up to 80 to 
100 miles, the height being determined to plus/minus 2,000 feet. Cost had to be balanced 
against efficiency: 
The cost would be in the neighbourhood of £60,000 to £70,000. Should this 
cost be prohibitive, an M.B. (Mobile) set could be employed at about a tenth 
of the cost. This would give the same facilities as a C.O. but with a range of 
approximately only 35 miles.54   
Atherton reported a number of technical problems, for example Karachi was deemed 
unsuitable for a C.O. station, “since there might be considerable difficulty due to fixed 
echoes from the mountains in the North”.55 Topographical difficulties were noted at Bombay 
as the most suitable sites on Malabar Hill or Cumbatta Hill were rendered unsuitable by the 
“numerous buildings.”56 Cochin provided difficulties as the terrain was very flat and not 
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much above sea level, which posed a technical problem as the contemporary C.O.L. set 
required a height of “at least 60 feet above sea level” for it to work. Atherton did note that a 
new type of tower mounted equipment would eventually become available, but the cost of 
providing solid foundations for towers of 340 or 360 feet on waterlogged land a considerable 
distance inland was high: 
There would be no such difficulty for a C.O. station in the Cochin area but I 
have presumed that the cost of such a station would be considered too high 
for the port.57 
Madras had three possible sites: the roof of the Navy Office; the Pallawava Hills which had 
good range against aircraft but not ships; and the North end of Madras which was low lying. 
Here the radar equipment would work better if it was mounted on towers. The terrain around 
Calcutta was also flat but, for Atherton, there were no “technical difficulties” selecting a 
suitable site for either C.O. or mobile stations, but the “problem of siting a station in this 
district is, however, tactical rather than technical, being a question of communications, 
power supplies, internal security, etc”.58 Problems were not confined to the Eastern coast as 
the threat to India in 1940 was perceived as coming from the Soviet Union in the North West 
and two other reports show that the frontier had similar technical difficulties siting 
equipment in mountainous regions.59 The T.R.E. were researching the problems, but a 
solution was not likely to happen quickly as various trials had failed to produce a satisfactory 
set for overland use and further research was unlikely to bear results for another six 
months.60  
The delay would carry on into 1941 when radar sets were in short supply owing to 
the increasing demands of the Middle East and Soviet Union: 
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It is understood the India Stores Dept. have now ordered the necessary 
equipment for these four stations. They appear so low on the list of priority of 
R.D.F. requirements in general, that it is unlikely that the materials will be 
forthcoming for many months to come.61  
By 20th June 1941 the likelihood of India receiving radar receded when the Air Ministry told 
A.H.Q. India that although R.D.F. cover was to be provided at Hong Kong and Ceylon, “The 
provision of equipment for India has been postponed until 1942.”62 Atherton wrote that his 
surveys had been limited by: 
1. The comparatively undeveloped state of plans for the air defence of India. 
2. The reluctance of the Government of India to spend any money on R.D.F. 
3. The then limited knowledge of the performance of different types of R.D.F. 
equipment.63 
 
Atherton’s findings require comment. The plans for the defence of India had assumed attacks 
were going to come from the North West rather than from the North East or East and the 
early warning system was based on the assumption that possible attacks were likely to come 
from this direction. Radar technology worked well over Britain, or in Malta, but India’s 
mountainous regions presented a different situation, thus giving scientists new challenges. If 
Atherton was fundamentally correct, he was partially mistaken in his statement that India 
was reluctant to spend any money on radar. India had to construct its conventional forces 
and a brief examination of the situation following the Chatfield Commission will show 
India’s dilemma.  
The Chatfield Commission of 1938/9 had proposed a contract, along with 
recommendations to increase the size of India’s armed forces, which would have increased 
India’s air defence units.64 However no judgement had been made on the size of the air 
forces. This decision was to wait until the C. in C. India visited Britain in 1939 but the visit 
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never took place. From 1939 to 1941 India started a rapid programme to modernize its 
armed forces and in particular its army for overseas service in the Middle East and Iraq. The 
bulk of India’s resources therefore went to increase conventional technology such as artillery 
and tanks, whereas radar was not seen as a priority. It was in its infancy and did not work in 
certain geographic locations. Moreover it was expensive, not only to purchase, but also to 
staff with personnel from Britain. This was undoubtedly a pragmatic approach, but one 
which eventually resulted in India being left bereft of any radar equipment until the Spring 
of 1942.  
 As the Japanese attack was starting on 8th December the Air Ministry decided to form 
eleven A.M.E. Stations; five C.O.L.s; three T.R.U.s; and three mobile units all of which 
were going to be allocated to a Far East pool.65 The A.O.C. would deploy the sets to meet 
requirements in Malaya, Burma, Ceylon and possibly the Dutch East Indies and Manila. The 
Air Chiefs in Britain were obviously confident of India’s security as it was not mentioned in 
the memo. Two days later a memo referred to India’s radar provision, recalling Atherton’s 
1940 report to install equipment at the Eastern ports, but India would have to wait: 
In view of the present situation in the Far East, it is considered that a review 
of the R.D.F. requirements has become necessary… The Director of Plans 
stated in a memo dated 29/11/1941 that the Chief of Staff had decided that the 
Far East was to take priority over India as regards the supply of equipment.66 
This reinforced the decision of June 1940 that India’s radar would be delayed until 1942, but 
as the situation deteriorated in Malaya, A.H.Q. India were told on 23rd December that the Air 
Ministry were sending R.A.F. technical officers “for preparation of the R.D.F. plan for India 
and Burma” and these officers’ presence was to be hastened.67   
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On Christmas Eve 1941 A.H.Q. India were informed that two Mobile Radar Units 
(M.R.U.s) were being sent to Calcutta and two more M.R.U.s to Madras, together with 
personnel from Britain at the end of January 1942. Four days later the deployment was 
reinforced when six stations were to be forwarded with their staff by 15th January 1942 to 
India Command; Colombo and Trincomalee each were to receive one station, and two 
stations each were being sent to Calcutta and Madras.68 The latter two moves were 
significant as there is nothing to suggest that these stations were being sent to either location 
as staging posts, and therefore it can be assumed they were going to be established in an 
early warning role. However despite these intentions the sets were still in Britain in 
February.69  
 
Japan attacks 
 The Japanese invasion of the Far East has been described many times and it is not 
intended to repeat it again here. It is, however, pertinent to examine how the early warning 
system in the region had a direct effect on the subsequent outcome. The first Japanese 
daylight attacks on 8th December on Malaya were not detected. After a sustained day of 
attacks the Japanese destroyed 60 out of 110 operational Allied aircraft and “the British air 
effort had almost ceased within twenty-four hours of the opening of hostilities.”70 When 
warnings were given they were inconsistent either because of technical problems or the 
ground controllers misreading information. 21 Squadron R.A.A.F. were placed on immediate 
readiness at 06:45 hours on 8th December; ten minutes later five Japanese bombers appeared 
over their airfield. No order to scramble having been received it was left to the squadron to 
take-off on its own initiative as Squadron Leader Bill Allshorn later recalled: 
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As the pilots were putting on their parachutes and the aircraft were being 
warmed, I looked up to see a stick of bombs leave the enemy formation and 
realized it was too late for take-off.71  
There were also communication problems:  
There were practically no signals specialists available to us, and very little 
equipment. We had to rely on asking assistance from the local AA unit for 
our telephone equipment... which literally must have been some of the first 
that were ever made, were totally unreliable. The observer system which I had 
to use had been organised by fighter ops Kallang, and under it we were 
unable to get reports on enemy aircraft direct from the observer posts, but got 
them through the railway station master at Kuala Lumpur. Owing to the 
delays attendant on this system, we usually got our warnings that the Japanese 
were 40 miles away, just as the raid was on.72   
By 16th December early warning cover became so poor that air patrols had to be flown to 
provide warning against surprise attacks.   
 In Singapore the situation was better at first as the radar stations were giving at least 
30 minutes warning of attack. However the R.A.F. Brewster Buffalo fighters, with their slow 
rate of climb, were “taking all that time to climb to 25,000 ft, the bombers’ normal height, 
and without V.H.F. they could not be informed of the raiders’ movements.”73 After 15th 
January the situation deteriorated when the radar station at Mersing withdrew in the face of 
the Japanese advance and the reduction of warning time led to aircraft either being caught on 
the ground, or being late taking off. When Hurricanes arrived in January the available 
warning time left them, even with a superior rate of climb, struggling to reach height to 
engage raiders. Eventually the weight of Japanese numbers matched against the attrition and 
maintenance difficulties of the R.A.F. told and Singapore fell on 15th February. 
 Before Singapore had fallen, British forces had withdrawn to Sumatra to re-organize 
on two airfields known as P1 and P2. The island had no radar units and had to rely on a 
group of Dutch Observer Corps whose efficiency was questionable. They were:   
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Stationed at points on concentric circles around the town with a radius of 50-
100 kilometres. The volunteer observer corps was full of enthusiasm but 
lacked experience, and warnings were consequently erratic.74  
The Japanese attacked Allied airfields on Sumatra in the same manner as Malaya and 
Singapore. Even though some successes were achieved by Allied aircraft flying from P2, the 
overwhelming weight of Japanese attack proved too much for the defenders and the island 
was evacuated on 18th February. The campaign moved to Java where two radar sets were 
quickly erected in Batavia and a warning system was soon established: 
Efficient operation and filter rooms were quickly connected to the Dutch 
Observer Corps, the fighter airfields, the anti-aircraft defences of Batavia and 
the air operations room in Bandoeng. The Dutch did everything they could to 
help and even staffed the filter and operation rooms with volunteer youths 
and women whose alertness and enthusiasm... could hardly have been 
better.75 
This was an improvement on previous events as a Hurricane pilot, Sergeant Terence Kelly, 
recalled: 
Apart from the operations room now running well, there were to the North, on 
the myriad islands in the Sunda Straits, watchers who reported the approach 
of enemy aircraft. Thus, for the first time, there was fair warning and the 
chance of climbing high enough to engage the enemy if not in equal numbers, 
at least otherwise on reasonable terms.76 
Despite this improvement the defenders were short of aircraft and spares and were in no 
position to sustain consistent and repeated losses which the air fighting caused, and 
eventually the Hurricanes were reduced to untenable numbers against a numerically superior 
enemy.  
 In Burma there was a familiar story of early warning deficiencies when Japanese 
attacks commenced at the end of December 1941. The terrain in Burma had made 
establishing radar and observer posts difficult as there was only one radar set in Burma 
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situated to the East of Rangoon which supported a chain of observer posts linked by 
unreliable telephone lines.77 It was not ideal as: 
Its efficiency may be judged by the fact that only on one occasion did the 
warning which it gave of the approach of enemy aircraft arrive earlier – and 
then only by a few minutes – than that given by the men of the Observer 
Corps.78 
Unlike Malaya and Singapore’s Observer Corps, in Burma the Observer Corps were a well 
trained and established organisation which represented an early defence provision by the 
Burmese Government. For example, at Rangoon various listening posts were linked by Post 
Office telephone lines via a central exchange to a combined operations room, which was 
reminiscent of the British model. The warning situation improved from mid-January 1942 
when the radar set was moved from Moulmein to Rangoon and notable successes were 
achieved in the period from 23rd to 29th January when R.A.F. and American Volunteer Group 
(A.V.G.) pilots claimed 50 Japanese fighters and bombers destroyed. Air Vice-Marshal 
Donald Stevenson, A.O.C. 221 Group, wrote that the warning had been good from both the 
radar and the Burma Observer Corps, with the R.A.F. and A.V.G. being well controlled.79 
However “there were limits to what one set could do”, and the Japanese ground and air 
advance forced the Allies’ meagre numbers of aircraft to withdraw to Magwe.80 This airfield 
would receive a radar set and cover from the Observer Corps but the system could not cope 
under sustained attack: 
The observer posts did all they could but amid growing confusion and 
damage to communications the system could not cope, and the radar not only 
suffered from a very low rate of serviceability but was incorrectly sited... 
under such a weight of carefully planned attack Magwe was always going to 
be overwhelmed.81  
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Magwe was the precursor to actions over the island of Akyab. Some aircraft were at Akyab 
and were joined by a few survivors from Magwe, but owing to a lack of early warning and 
repeated Japanese raids over a 72 hour period from 27th March, their destruction meant the 
air forces in Burma virtually ceased to exist. 
 The final major action took place in Ceylon at the end of March 1942 and only 50 
serviceable Hurricanes and two Fleet Air Arm squadrons of Fairey Fulmars were available 
for fighter defence.82 Three designated Ceylon A.M.E.S. stations remained unpacked on the 
dockside and technical staff faced a huge effort to get a system working.83 When the 
Japanese attacked on 4th April the radar station at Ratmalana was not working and as a result 
the defenders received no warning. Despite being at a tactical disadvantage the Hurricanes 
and Fulmars claimed 27 Japanese aircraft destroyed (an exaggerated claim) for the loss of 
fifteen Hurricanes and four Fulmars. The action left sixteen Hurricanes serviceable and “It 
had not been a good day for the rapidly improvised defences, though the enemy had failed in 
their main object, namely to inflict a ‘Pearl Harbor’ on the Eastern Fleet.”84 On 9th April the 
Japanese launched an attack on Trincomalee, but the enemy were spotted by a patrolling 
Catalina flying boat, and the radar station at China Bay was able to direct British aircraft to 
engage the Japanese with an advantage. Although outnumbered and sustaining eleven losses, 
the British claimed 24 enemy aircraft destroyed, again an exaggeration, but enough to cause 
some consternation to the Japanese, who admitted their losses had been higher than the 
British claims. The radar had made an obvious and important difference despite the control 
system being improvised: 
At the time of the raids no filter room had yet been established in Ceylon and 
the two radar stations reported direct to the temporary Fighter Operations 
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Room at Colombo and the Gun Operations Room at Trincomalee 
respectively.85 
Both actions on Ceylon demonstrated how crucial an early warning system was to the 
defenders in terms of allowing them to gain sufficient height to engage their enemy.  
Reinforcements 1941-1942 
 Priority plans were made to rectify the deficiencies in early warning coverage in the 
Far East. The Air Ministry stated their intention to form five C.O.L.s, three A.C.O.s, and 
three mobile G.C.I. stations for use in Malaya, Burma, Ceylon, and possibly the Dutch East 
Indies and Manila.86 There were soon problems with the proposed time scales. Personnel 
required for the mobile G.C.I. stations were being trained in Britain and would not be 
despatched to the Far East until 20th January 1942. Similarly the technical equipment was 
being made in Britain and the target date for its assembly was 20th January, arrangements 
being made “for shipment in the first available convoy after that date.”87 Transport times 
meant the equipment would not reach the region until the middle of February. Furthermore 
the C.O.L. and A.C.O. stations’ sites remained to be selected, which was a complex task 
even when not undertaken under enemy fire. This was indicative of British problems for the 
next few months. Firstly the equipment were not standard items and had to be specially built 
or transferred from other theatres; secondly, personnel had to be trained; and thirdly there 
was the logistical difficulties of transporting the units from Britain to the Far East. Moreover 
the Japanese advance was so rapid as to negate any attempt to reinforce the early warning 
organisation. 
 Attempts to reinforce radar units during this period were problematical. Messages 
show the numerous units that were to be despatched, and these convey the difficulties 
unfolding. On 24th December four radar units were listed for despatch to Calcutta and 
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Madras at the end of January 1942, but the Air Ministry made it clear that “No, repeat no, 
diversion R.D.F. equipment from Middle East can be made.”88 By 13th January 1942 
permission was sought to divert number 258 A.M.E.S. which was en route to Iraq, from 
Bombay to Rangoon to assist its defence. Furthermore on 8th February the Director of 
Operations acknowledged that radar cover in Burma was lacking as “the hills [are] said to 
make it impractical; NORGROUP asked for diversion of the Wireless Observer Units now 
en route to Iraq”.89 The urgency was obvious, but the difficulty was that despatch and 
production was linked to high demand and it is clear that there was little if any chance that 
the equipment would arrive in time. This can be demonstrated by examining what happened 
to some of the units intended for service in the region. 
 The 8th December 1941 report listed four C.O.L. stations, two A.M.E.S. and three 
G.C.I. stations which would be despatched for Far East service on 20th January 1942.90 
However on 15th March 1942 none of these units had reached their destination; all but two 
were still in transit to the Far East, whereas the remaining two had been diverted to 
Australia. On 24th December four stations were designated to be despatched to Calcutta and 
Madras respectively by the end of January 1942. However on 15th March only two were en 
route, whereas the other two had not yet been despatched from Great Britain.  These two 
examples are typical of the efforts to equip the region with radar for the next few months as 
despatch and delivery dates were routinely delayed. Equipment would take three or four 
weeks to arrive and, except in the case of mobile units, another few weeks to establish; but 
the Air Ministry gave an estimation that the mobile units could go into operation within four 
to seven days of arrival. By 28th March there was only one working radar unit in India, 
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number 258 A.M.E.S. based at Mathurapura, South of Calcutta, while seven further A.M.E. 
stations were in situ in Ceylon.   
 While the reinforcement of radar units to the region had been too late, there was a 
bonus as all the units intended for the Far East were diverted to India where they would 
eventually be used to establish an air defence system. Reports from 15th and 30th March 1942 
show a total of 37 units of all varieties being either despatched, diverted, or en route by sea 
to the Indian ports of Madras, Calcutta, Karachi and Bombay.91  It is apparent that the 
authorities had started to recognize the importance of India’s air defence as on 26th February 
Edmund Dixon wrote to the Radio Defence Committee: 
It becomes clear that the defence of the Far East is to be centred on India… 
The Air Staff has already recognized the new importance of India by 
appointing a Radio Officer and a Scientific Officer from the Middle East, 
DCD party to make surveys for R.D.F. ground stations at the main defended 
areas and ports in India, Ceylon and Burma. Meanwhile a Radio Installation 
and Maintenance Unit has been started at the R.A.F. depot at Karachi.92 
A memorandum dated 4th March 1942 acknowledged that some form of early warning was 
essential in all defended areas, whilst the installation, maintenance and administration of 
such systems required “considerable skill” as well as an intimate knowledge of the 
“workings of… fighter defence and air raid warning controlled in the United Kingdom by 
Fighter Command.”93 The siting of radar equipment was acknowledged as being of supreme 
importance to obtain the best results and Squadron Leader J.W. Findlay, an expert in siting 
radar equipment, was despatched from the Middle East to India.94 It is unclear from the 
report or its background whether Burma was expected to fall, but the document makes clear 
provision for equipment to be pooled in India prior to deployment, or to be transferred there 
in the event of territories being overrun.   
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 In April 1942 early warning units were beginning to arrive in India and Ceylon, and 
further target dates for the arrival of additional equipment were in August and September. 
The monsoon period between June and October gave the Allies time to rebuild and for 
equipment to arrive resulting in 52 radar sets being operational in India and Ceylon in 
December 1942.95 In the meantime an early warning policy was formulated. 
 On 22nd June 1942 A.H.Q. India informed its command of its policy of providing 
early warning cover to target areas.96 The long term policy was: 
  (i) R.D.F coverage along the length of the coast of India and of Ceylon, 
  (ii) Extension of inland coverage making the maximum use of R.D.F., 
(iii) Ground Observer systems for the reporting of low flying aircraft and 
where high cover only exists, 
(iv) Ground Observer system for reporting aircraft in areas uncovered by 
R.D.F.97 
 
Based on figures from the experience of the Air Defence organisation in Great Britain the 
report quoted the minimum distance between a hostile aircraft being detected and its target 
was 80 miles for a successful interception to occur. In India: 
[I]t will not be possible for some considerable time to provide anything 
approaching complete coverage, either oversea or overland.98  
The reasons for this were given as: a lack of R.D.F. equipment; lack of communications for 
the ground observer system; lack of Wireless Observer Units; and a shortage of trained 
Indian Observer Corps personnel. The report concluded that all elements of the early 
warning system would have to be integrated to make the best possible use of resources and 
that the establishment of effective ground control and filter rooms were vital. 
 A.V.M. Stevenson added to the policy on 8th July issuing the Fighter Directif 
Number 2.99 The defence of Calcutta was paramount and Stevenson pointed out that if 
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invasion happened, “it would be a military disaster of the first magnitude.”100 Intelligence 
sources led the British to believe that the scale of Japanese air attack from the land and sea 
on Calcutta was approximately 300 to 400 aircraft and would have to be countered by a 
determined defence. It was considered that the Japanese range of attack was at least 300, if 
not 600 miles from the port which would give the Allies some degree of early warning.101 
Stevenson reported that overland the R.A.F. would receive 200 miles warning from the 
Observer Corps, whilst high raids routed over the sea would give 70 miles warning from the 
radar equipment supported by Observer Corps and local plotting procedures. This figure was 
obviously at odds with the minimum distance quoted in the A.H.Q.’s report in June. The 
provision for high level radar cover did not pose as big a technical difficulty as that of 
providing low level cover, as Stevenson admitted such cover would only give a likelihood 
of: 
[A]t least some minutes’ warning… to get our fighters off the ground to meet 
the scale of attack... we may expect to get sufficient warning to enable us, in 
emergency, to get our fighters off the ground.102  
The installation of three chain stations to cover Calcutta from attack from the South and 
South-East was in progress, and as the report was being written one became operational. The 
effort to establish an early warning chain was immense and in order to gauge the difficulties 
it is pertinent to analyse aspects of the establishment process before assessing how effective 
the system was by the end of 1942. 
 As the radar organisation was being established in India in 1942, the Indian Observer 
Corps (I.O.C.) was expanded to support the early warning system. Formed in 1940 to face a 
possible threat from the Soviet Union in the North West, the I.O.C. consisted of railway staff 
reporting through their station masters who passed the information on by telephone to an air 
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defence centre.103 This was unsatisfactory as the railway staff had their own duties to 
perform, and this led to time lags of “great length”.104 There then began a period where the 
I.O.C. was bedding in as a separate organisation which met problems of recruitment, class 
and pay, but by the beginning of 1942 it was starting to become formalised. In April 1942 
plans were formulated to construct five observer belts around the East and South of Calcutta 
and its industrial areas, linked by wireless and telephone to the control rooms. In addition 
some observer posts were to be placed on boats in the mouth of the Ganges. The posts 
provided an essential addition to the early warning system at low level. In trials carried out 
by an aircraft flying between 1,000 to 1,500 feet, plots were accurately made at 75 miles to 
the North East and 50 miles to the South East by the I.O.C.105 For the rest of 1942 the 
observer cover was refined although obstacles such as low telephone line priority and poor 
communications had to be overcome.106 For example in October it was reported that the 
reports received over the Kharagpur to Barang railway telephone line were “generally 
worthless”.107  
 The survey process that preceded that of the radar units covered 40 technical, 
geographical and administrative aspects ranging from soil composition and drainage to 
expected direction of attack, to medical facilities and defence to transport, emphasising the 
point that planning was essential if radar equipment was to operate effectively. A typical 
report for a T.R.U. site on Grubb’s Island on 11th April 1942 showed the exact location, 
radar coverage and even the scale of rainfall, for weather conditions were to play a 
significant part in determining how radar would work in such a hostile climate. If weather 
was one problem, electrical supply could be another. Pilot Officer Sarwate surveyed Calicut 
for an M.R.U. on 29th August and reported that as the power line was a mile away from the 
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proposed site the possibility of obtaining a mains supply had to be considered. He 
recommended: 
The 11 Kv supply could be brought up to domestic site stepped down there 
and ½ of I.t. line run to supply the station. Mr Raja Iyengar of the W.C.E.S. 
Co Ltd has been asked to supply the estimate.108  
This question of paying for facilities should not be overlooked. In the same report Sarwate 
wrote, “Land value in Calicut is extremely high. Hence the area for the domestic site is 
restricted to 2½ acres only.”109 Another consideration was the local population and their 
living conditions. Sarwate surveyed a site in Nagercoil on 20th August and considered the 
impact on rice paddy fields and holy areas around Nagercoil and Kanyakumani.110  
The same process for each site had to be conducted and as an example of the 
difficulties which often had to be faced it is pertinent to examine a report from November 
1942.111 A team of six were tasked to survey a site around Hingol firstly for an R.D.F. site, 
and then to determine whether transport could reach the area. The expedition started from 
Karachi and passed along winding roads with sheer drops, followed by small tracks which 
only allowed speeds of eight to ten mph. As the track became smaller and less accessible so 
attempts were made to find access to the site across what was thought to be a dry river bed 
but one of the trucks sank six inches into the soft bed, and it took six hours to extricate the 
vehicle. Following a night in camp the party continued its journey and three more attempts 
were made to find an accessible track going West this time with the help of native guides 
but, “this also failed and information obtained from villagers indicated that the track had 
been lost in sand and shrub.”112 The party was forced to turn back as their rations and petrol 
were running out. Another attempt to find the track was made on the return journey, but it 
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was found to be impassable owing to soft sand dunes. The report’s conclusion stated that 
there was “no approach to Hingol by road to convey the M.R.U. type equipment.”113  
Apart from surveying radar sites during 1942 there were a number of technical and 
administrative problems which made the establishment of a viable early warning system 
harder to achieve. The British Chiefs of Staff had recognized the technical difficulties of 
using radar in mountainous regions in 1940 stating a mobile set was “not recommended for 
use on the Frontier owing to echoes off hills.”114 The mountains surrounding radar sites 
created ‘permanent echoes’ which caused distortion and interference on radar screens and 
when these problems arose solutions were sought from the scientists at the T.R.E. in 
Malvern. In June 1942 a request for help to deal with ‘permanent echoes’ was forwarded to 
the T.R.E. who replied that a number of solutions were available to counter the difficulties, 
notably using specific types of G.C.I. radar and portable sets sited on flat ground in the 
centres of “saucer shaped regions.”115 This solution represented theoretical research work 
but there were only two pieces of suitable equipment manufactured with five under 
construction. The sets were experimental and would not be ready for operational use for six 
to eight weeks, raising concerns: 
The experiments we have done on reducing the effects of permanent echoes 
by the use of coherent pulses are not considered sufficiently advanced to 
promise any applications for this in India within a year.116 
Furthermore, staff at the Ministry of Aircraft Production (M.A.P.) thought the best solution 
of dealing with permanent echoes was the careful siting of the correct choice of equipment 
and warned that an operational light-weight set suitable for transportation by mule would be 
unlikely to reach India until early 1943. Atherton’s visit to Indian towns in 1940 had also 
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raised doubts as to whether the radar units would work in some areas without costly high 
aerial towers.117 Construction of towers and gantries to assist the low level coverage faced 
both supply and technical problems. Wood and local specialized labour were in short supply 
and a proposal was made to use steel to erect the structures. However, it was quickly 
identified that the I.F.F. interrogator signals could be adversely affected by the towers’ steel 
construction. It was admitted that “the whole question of fitting I.F.F. aerials for tower-type 
C.O.L. stations had been overlooked and they had no scheme for even the timber tower 
C.O.L.”118 Ultimately, and largely due to there being no guarantee when a solution was 
forthcoming, the towers were built of a mixture of steel and wood.   
  In addition there were the harsh weather conditions. In Bengal at 8am in June the 
temperature was recorded at 83 degrees Fahrenheit (F), with a relative humidity of 91% 
whilst the maximum day temperature in the shade reached 103 degrees F. A priority was to 
redesign the equipment as two major components, the condenser and transformer, failed 
under such conditions. The radar equipment had to be able to withstand 90% humidity and 
100 degrees F. Air conditioning units would have provided a solution to the problem but 
they were in short supply in India: 
A large number of faults due to dampness and tropical conditions are 
recorded. This points to the need for air-conditioning plants, but owing to the 
priority given to hospitals there seems little chance of obtaining plants for 
AMES.119 
The situation did not improve as the year continued; of the 47 radar stations in service in 
India in November 1942 only nine had locally sourced air-conditioning units.120   
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 An important element in ensuring radar equipment worked to its best advantage was 
the use of aircraft to calibrate the devices. It was recognized by the Far East command on 4th 
March 1942 that it was “vitally important” for height-finding radar to have aircraft 
calibration: 
a number of aircraft will be required to be made available specifically for the 
purpose. No action has yet been taken to establish the necessary calibration 
flights and recommendations are awaited after investigations, but operational 
aircraft can be used.121 
On 29th April India Command recommended that nine Blenheims should form three flights 
to serve India’s purposes, while a Catalina should be used for calibration duties over the 
Indian Ocean.122 However, there was a conflict between using aircraft for calibration when 
there were shortages in the Far East: 
The supply of aircraft to India will not be sufficient for a considerable time to 
equip Operational Squadrons and there is therefore no point in establishing 
calibration flights. If A.H.Q. India considers it essential to have calibration 
flights they will have to form these from their own resources.123 
Operational necessity took priority with the inevitable result:  
Very few stations are calibrated. The number of calibration flights is 
negligible. This is due to difficulties in obtaining aircraft.124 
Progress was thus extremely slow in establishing calibration flights and radar efficiency 
suffered until the middle of 1943 when specific flights were formed.  
As 1942 ended, and in spite of the various problems, there were 52 radar stations 
covering Ceylon and India, particularly Calcutta. The system was not perfect. The lack of 
designated calibration flights resulted in height discrepancies, whilst it was admitted that the 
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low level cover, despite the I.O.C., was “extremely weak”.125  The monsoon period had 
given the Allies time to establish an early warning system and as it ended in September 
R.A.F. squadrons were scrambled daily to investigate unidentified aircraft detected by the 
early warning organisation. From September to the end of the year the majority of 
interceptions resulted in friendly aircraft being found either because they had strayed away 
from planned routes or had failed to activate their I.F.F. equipment. The frustrations of 
intercepting friendly aircraft rather than hostile ones, together with occasional controlling 
inexperience showed in squadrons’ operations books. For example, 135 Squadron’s diarist 
wrote on 19th November 1942: 
The Squadron was scrambled at 11.05 hrs together with the remainder of the 
wing for ’15 plus bogeys’ 10 miles South of base, angels 20. Hope runs high 
– Hurricanes tore around the sky – R/T ‘mutterings’ filled the air – finally at 
11:10hrs plots faded – so what??126 
All fighter squadrons had similar entries in their record books and while there were obvious 
frustrations the fact that aircraft were being intercepted showed that the system was starting 
to work.  
In August 211 A.M.E.S. encountered problems from operator difficulties, storms, 
flooding and insects shorting out electrical components. During the last week in August the 
station had been missing aircraft and plots because their tracking had been completed on the 
reciprocal heading which had not been realized: 
This came as a considerable shock when we were beginning to pride 
ourselves on our plotting, having passed 1004 plots at an average of 3 per 
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minute over the last week. Faulty plotting found mainly due to W/T errors 
and plotting on the reciprocal probably due to faulrt [sic] relay switching.127 
258 A.M.E.S. also reported that “native cross talk was heard on the line during the day” 
when plots were telephoned to their filter room.128 Despite these early difficulties things 
improved for the radar stations as exemplified by 544 A.M.E.S. based at Dum Dum who on 
8th, 18th and 23rd November 1942 were congratulated by filter room staff on their “excellent 
tracking” of test flights or friendly aircraft.129 
 The system’s efficiency was tested when the Japanese began a series of attacks on 
Chittagong in December 1942 and it is pertinent to examine five occasions on which 
Japanese aircraft were intercepted. On 5th December a mixed Japanese force of 50 Ki-43 
Oscar fighters and 25 Ki-48 Lily bombers attacked Chittagong where six R.A.F. Curtiss    P-
36 Mohawk fighters from 155 Squadron were at readiness. Six Mohawks were scrambled 
but their squadron diarist recorded that the flight was “warned late, our pilots [were] not able 
to inflict much damage.”130 The late warning resulted in the fighters being met at a 
disadvantage by the Japanese escort, albeit during the ensuing fight an Oscar was shot down. 
Five days later Hurricanes from 135 Squadron were scrambled to counter another mixed 
force of fighters and bombers raiding Chittagong, and although another Japanese fighter was 
destroyed there is no mention in the Squadron’s record book that radar was involved in the 
interception. The raid was actually detected by staff from the I.O.C. as recalled by Sergeant 
Bill Davis, a 136 Squadron pilot, “There was no radar of course; warning came from local 
observer corps people, and the warning on this occasion was just too short.”131 The late 
warning put the defenders at a disadvantage and the Hurricanes were caught climbing losing 
four aircraft and two pilots.132 On 15th December a Japanese fighter escorting a raid on 
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Chittagong was shot down by Hurricanes from 79 Squadron, but there is no mention in 
either the Squadron’s Operations Record Book or Daily Air Summary if radar detected the 
raid. It was not until the night of 22nd/23rd December that radar and the control organisation 
played a significant role in detecting and controlling a successful interception. At 00:15 
hours six Hurricanes were scrambled when enemy aircraft were detected approaching from 
the South and according to 17 Squadron’s record book, “Wing Commander O’Neill was 
flying with the Squadron on a G.C.I. control.”133 During the course of the attack the 
Hurricanes were guided to their targets by the ground organisation and attacked two 
bombers; Japanese records show both crash landed.134 248 A.M.E.S. diarist recorded: 
Three enemy aircraft plotted from South East; taken over Calcutta and out 
due East. Informed by filter room that there were two tally ho’s [sic].135 
544 A.M.E.S. diarist recorded: 
[I]nstructed by Filter officer to log following message, ‘Particular praise 
given to Diamond Harbour for the very satisfactory plotting, as a result of 
which two “Tally Hos” were made.’136  
The feat was repeated the following night when Hurricanes from 293 Wing were 
successfully guided to counter night bombers raiding Calcutta, and a Japanese aircraft was 
successfully destroyed. The interceptions over the two nights were of particular note as the 
Hurricanes were guided to the raiders purely by the ground control organisation as they did 
not carry their own Airborne Interception (A.I.) equipment. 
 Finally as 1942 closed Calcutta’s air defences consolidated with an early warning 
system that was starting to show signs of efficiency, which would increase with experience 
and technical improvements. Some of the problems, such as those posed by the weather and 
the topography, would not be completely solved by the end of hostilities in 1945, and this 
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made the provision of early warning difficult as the campaign moved from defence to 
offensive operations in 1944.  
 
1943  
 1943 was a further year of re-building as the Allies were not strong enough to invade 
Burma until 1944. Two early Allied campaigns of 1943 had mixed success. Firstly the 
limited campaign to strike along the West coast of Burma from November 1942 to retake 
Akyab failed in its objective as superior Japanese land forces were able to push the Allied 
advance back into India. The second campaign was Colonel Orde Wingate’s first penetration 
raid into Burma between February and May 1943 with the Long Range Penetration force, 
which later became known as the ‘Chindits’.137 While there is debate as to whether the raid 
had any strategic value, it did prove to be a morale boost as it showed what ordinary troops 
of the line could achieve, and it demonstrated the value of air supply. The development of air 
supply would be an essential part of Army commander Lieutenant General William (Bill) 
Slim’s future strategy, and this would depend on Allied air superiority and a reliable early 
warning system over the supply zones.  
R.A.F. Defensive Operations 
 The air defence of North East India at the beginning of 1943 started to improve from 
the previous year. There were more Allied fighters, Hurricanes were starting to be equipped 
with V.H.F. radios and the early warning system was slowly improving. The effectiveness of 
the early warning system was demonstrated during two Japanese night raids on Calcutta in 
January 1943. Japanese air raids at the turn of the year lacked the magnitude of raids on 
European cities, but were enough to terrify the civilian population into evacuating the city, 
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“which led to considerable disruption of public services.”138 A flight of A.I. equipped 
Beaufighters had arrived from the Middle East and on 9th January one aircraft was vectored 
to intercept a Japanese raid on Calcutta.139 Expertly directed to the raiders’ vicinity by 
ground controllers, the R.A.F. crew used the aircraft’s A.I. set to detect and shoot down three 
Japanese bombers, the destruction of all three being confirmed. The feat was almost repeated 
on 15th January when another Beaufighter intercepted another night raid on Calcutta and shot 
down one Japanese bomber. As the civilian population returned to their city the effect of 
these radar-equipped fighters on Calcutta life was profound: 
The four Beaufighters had more than earned their keep; their presence had 
effectively denied the enemy the right to bomb the most important strategic 
target in India. It would be another year before they reappeared.140 
The combination of radar, ground controlled interception, experienced crews and high 
performance radar equipped aircraft had been highly successful, but the same was not yet 
true of the day fighter effort. 
 During the first six months of 1943 the J.A.A.F. raided Indian ports, notably 
Calcutta, and Allied airfields engaged in supporting the First Arakan offensive. Whilst some 
Japanese aircraft were successfully intercepted the radar problems encountered during at end 
of 1942 were still present.  On 27th January 136 Squadron were scrambled six times during 
the day finding nothing, and on 20th March the squadron diarist recorded, “Ten aircraft were 
scrambled at 09.00 and seven aircraft at 11.30. No enemy aircraft were encountered in the 
2½ hour flying involved.”141 135 Squadron experienced similar difficulties; on 6th January 
their diarist recorded that the Squadron, “were scrambled for supposed bogeys. The usual 
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myth.”142 However, on other occasions Japanese aircraft were intercepted and destroyed 
following radar detection. A notable success was achieved on 27th March when a force of 
Hurricanes from 79 and 135 Squadrons destroyed nine unescorted Lily bombers during an 
attack on Cox’s Bazaar.143 The defenders had sufficient warning of the raid and were able to 
climb to an advantageous height at which the bombers could be successfully attacked. 
However this advantage was not always provided and squadrons complained that they were 
warned too late. On 1st April 67 Squadron were scrambled to intercept a raid against Feni 
airfield but took off “too late to be in a good position to attack” whilst on 9th April with only 
five minutes’ warning they were caught by 16 Japanese fighters whilst climbing.144 Pilots’ 
views were mixed: 
By about March 1943, we had some radar and it wasn’t so bad. The usual 
thing was to climb away to the North and get to 20,000 feet then turn round 
and start to take an interest in what was going on. Height was always a 
problem with radar and quite often Control would suddenly change the 
enemy’s height by 10,000 feet – above or below! There was a lot of guess 
work – it was more of an art than a science.145 
There was obviously some work to be undertaken before the early warning system was 
satisfactory and the next section will analyse what steps were taken to overcome the various 
problems, and how successful they were by the year’s end.    
Problems and Solutions 
Apart from the perennial supply difficulties, the effects of extreme weather, high 
humidity and topography had already been experienced throughout 1942 as the radar system 
was established. None of these physical factors could be eliminated and it was therefore the 
scientists’ task to find workable remedies to the various problems.  
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New questions emerged as radar equipment became operational. For example, in 
1942 it was found that both temperature and humidity affected radar readings, but in 1943 it 
transpired that while there was an effect on normally sited stations, placing a set on higher 
ground resulted in an even greater error.146 The problems raised questions for the 1944 
campaign. Reports showed that in country similar to the Imphal plain long-range permanent 
echoes made the detection of high flying aircraft “less secure.”147 It was subsequently 
suggested that one remedy would be to increase the number of radar sets guarding a target, 
but this would have an obvious supply implication as radar equipment was in such high 
demand.148  
 The introduction of the Operational Research Section (O.R.S.) early in 1943 
helped to identify difficulties and suggest practical remedies. Whilst some solutions could be 
addressed locally, India Command relied on scientists and radar experts in Britain to provide 
the necessary research and advice. In India the situation warranted sending a radar expert, 
Squadron Leader J.W. Findlay, to Britain between April and July 1943 to visit radio and 
radar establishments. There were three purposes for his visit; to study new R.D.F. equipment 
and techniques; to collect information for the manufacture of R.D.F. components and spares; 
and liaison with establishments to provide better inter-change of information.149 It can be 
also assumed that Findlay researched available light-weight radar sets in view of Allied 
plans for the 1944 campaigns.150 The trip was relatively successful in finding solutions to 
technical difficulties. One reoccurring problem had been caused by permanent echoes on 
ground sited radar equipment, and the T.R.E. scientists developed a device which resulted in 
a ‘coherent pulse method’ which eliminated the phenomena. However Findlay reported, 
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“The project is unlikely to be in the production stage (if production is decided upon) in less 
than eighteen months.”151 The supply of other equipment presented further obstacles as the 
categories of radar Findlay examined had long delivery dates. For example, a contract for 
132 Type 11 radar sets, which offered a possible solution to reception in mountainous 
country would not start production until November 1943 and then would be supplied at a 
rate of only eight per month. Furthermore, Findlay’s mission to find a light-weight set ran 
into difficulties. He saw a set which could be housed in a tent or mounted on a variety of 
vehicles which good crews could make ready for action in two hours, and normal crews in 
up to eight hours.152 However he concluded that further research was required on this light-
weight set as it was: 
[C]urrently unsuitable owing to its weight and should be modified so that its 
weight was less than 1000lbs, 60 lbs weight per unit and the total number of 
units were less than 20.153 
Plans to carry these sets into action to cover the advanced landing grounds during the 
advance into Burma were important to the planning staffs’ considerations and in a later 
section it will be examined how it was proposed to transport the sets by mule. 
 Finlay had been successful in his objective to establish closer communications with 
the establishments in Britain and he wrote the visit was, “very satisfactory… good 
interchange of information… agreed further exchanges would take place”.154 Secondly the 
fact that Findlay had been present at planning discussions made a difference when dealing 
with the scientists and technicians engaged in solving the region’s problems, as records show 
subsequent regular, friendly correspondence between the establishments regarding technical 
difficulties. Lastly he was able to describe the various solutions and have an input into new 
radar sets in developmental stages that would not have been sent to the region as prototypes. 
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The drawback was the speed at which research and production of new devices could be 
carried out.  
Although radar could not be said by 1943 to be still in its early infancy, it was held 
back by a number of demands being made on radar scientists by different theatres and units. 
The bombing campaign in Europe demanded developments in blind bombing and navigation 
devices such as H2S, Oboe, and Gee. The campaign against German submarines also 
involved intensive research to develop and improve Air to Surface Vessel (A.S.V.) 
equipment for Coastal Command. The Far East added to the research programme as it had 
identified new phenomena connected to extremes of temperature, humidity and topography 
that radar scientists in the late 1930s had not envisaged. Furthermore given the complexity of 
radar equipment and the limited manufacturing base in Britain it would take time for the sets 
to be developed, tested and manufactured.155 Thus although India’s problems could not be 
solved immediately there were solutions available for the future. There is an important point 
to be made however. Findlay’s visit and the subsequent correspondence between the 
establishments showed the Far Eastern Theatre of operations had not been forgotten by the 
scientists as is often thought. Research and development was clearly in hand to solve the 
technical difficulties, but circumstances dictated that the remedies would take time and India 
Command had to remain patient.  
The Human Factor 
 Technical problems were not the only obstacle to developing an early warning 
system as operator errors in operation and filter rooms were highlighted during O.R.S. 
investigations throughout 1943.  
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 One difficulty lay with the accuracy of estimating and reporting aircraft heights and 
in May the O.R.S. wrote: 
It is readily apparent… that the accuracy of estimating is low. While 
operators cannot be expected to estimate numbers of aircraft with mechanical 
accuracy, a higher degree of accuracy should be obtainable if proper 
instruction were given; this could possibly be arranged with Supervisors 
where they are available.156 
and in June: 
It appears… that Stations are not following existing instructions re frequency 
of height readings and it is suggested that the position be reviewed and fresh 
instructions issued, taking into account the type of station and, in the case of 
M.R.U.s, the type of height switch fitted.157 
Furthermore there were inaccuracies counting aircraft numbers and investigations showed 
differences between stations, for example: 
Counting of single aircraft in the Chittagong Filter Room area is not so 
accurate as in the Ballygunge Filter Room area. The percentage inaccuracy is 
8.5% as compared to 5.7%.158   
Solutions were not technical ones but required better training and adherence to accepted 
operational methods. Wing Commander J.F. Wright commented on these points on 8th June 
1943 writing, “There is room for considerable improvement in operations at some of the 
R.D.F. stations”.159 He also made reference to two recent conferences where the delegates 
“decided that Operator Supervisors are essential to raise the operational efficiency of the 
system.”160  Wright pointed out that plotting by Wireless Telephony (W/T) in the Bengal 
area lost about 50% of plots whereas in Ceylon only 10 to 20% was lost and concluded, 
“The difference in the efficiency of the two areas is due to DRILL. (The procedure is the 
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same in both areas.)”161 The importance of increased training and practice in procedures was 
to be demonstrated later in December when the Japanese raided Calcutta in force and the 
interception failed owing to procedures breaking down. 
1943 - Defence to Offence  
 In January 1943 the threat to North West India from Germany in the Caucasus began 
to decrease as the German Army Group B was in the process of defeat in Stalingrad and was 
in danger of being “bottled up in the Caucasus” by Soviet forces.162 This diminished threat 
led to the acknowledgement by Far Eastern commanders that: 
[I]ncreased Russian resistance and the development of definite counter-
offensives together with our successes in North Africa have greatly reduced 
the threat of German land or air operations against Karachi. It has indeed 
become so remote that even assuming German successes during 1943 against 
Russia towards the Caucasus, it could not materialize earlier than April 
1944.163   
Simultaneously the Japanese fleet was occupied in the Pacific and the threat to Ceylon and 
the Eastern coast of India was considered to be similarly reduced.164 Combining this reduced 
level of threat with a shortage of trained personnel and a need to install more radar stations 
in the North East of India, radar deployment was revised. Some stations would be reduced to 
a care and maintenance basis, other stations under construction were left to be completed but 
no equipment would be installed, whilst other stations were cancelled. As equipment and 
staff became available plans were formulated to utilise radar and the early warning facility 
further afield.  
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Observer Developments and 1944 Plans 
 Throughout 1943 the I.O.C. continued to evolve efficiently with early plans to form 
20 mobile wireless companies for advance warning which eventually would be experienced 
enough to work without R.A.F. assistance.165 In May the first four Indian Mobile Wireless 
Observer Units (M.W.O.U.) took over from the R.A.F. W.O.U.s in the Manipur area freeing 
the airmen for duties further afield.166 The M.W.O.U.s would play a significant role when 
the Allies fought in Eastern India and some observer units were withdrawn to furnish posts 
East and South East of Imphal: 
Although the Army had been well East of Imphal since December, we were 
only just getting wireless unit posts deployed East of Imphal in late April, 
early May. Wireless unit personnel for the screen East of Imphal had been 
sitting at Imphal since January.167  
The work of the W.O.U.s was extremely dangerous as small groups were sent many miles 
ahead of the front, occasionally with Ghurkha guards, to report by Morse code the passage of 
aircraft. Leading Aircraftman Ron Collis wrote of his time with 2/3 W.O.U. in 1943: 
The posts were set at intervals of about 15-20 miles and as high as possible. 
My post, Thenzawi, sat at about 6,000’ [feet] spectacular views but murder to 
get to. There was a march of at least 60 miles to be undertaken and not a 
single yard was flat.168  
 
Each post consisted of three ground observers and three wireless operators, one of the former 
nominally a corporal and in charge of the post. Collis’ post was eventually taken over by the 
Indian Army observers in June 1943 to relieve R.A.F. personnel for duties elsewhere, Collis 
eventually being posted to the mobile radar unit in Tamu. Observer posts such as these will 
feature in the siege at Imphal which will be described later. 
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 Plans for the 1944 campaign to re-take Burma depended on air transport to deliver 
supplies, men and materiel to the battlefront, and therefore Advanced Landing Grounds 
(A.L.G.s) would be essential to provide forward airstrips for transport aircraft. Air supply 
would be vulnerable to enemy fighter attack and it was imperative that the A.L.G.s were 
defended by ground based anti-aircraft guns and fighter aircraft assisted by an early warning 
system, but its implementation was to prove difficult. 
 One question was how an early warning system could be provided to protect 
A.L.G.s: 
Apart from a few ports and railheads without adjacent airfields, the problem 
can in effect be reduced to that of the aerial defence of advanced landing 
grounds… particularly in the second phase of assault during Combined 
Operations.169   
Securing an A.L.G. would take place in two phases: the initial landing would be protected by 
continuous fighter cover, and the second, a consolidation phase, would involve fighters 
operating from local, possibly captured, airfields.170 An effective early warning system 
would therefore be necessary to avoid standing patrols once the second phase had been 
achieved, but there were drawbacks. High level raiders up to 23,000 feet could be detected 
with reasonable accuracy, but: 
There is no simple solution for the problem of detection of low-fliers in 
mountainous country unless it is possible to deploy R.D.F. sets or W.O. Units 
in advance of the vulnerable point.171 
Thus the danger to the A.L.G. was from low-flying raiders which would evade detection 
until above the geometrical skyline.172 The report had no illusions as to the threat as, “the 
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problem of the provision of adequate warning of a low-flying attack on an A.L.G. 
surrounded by hills will generally be insuperable.”173 To counter the threat radar sets 
required to be positioned at least 20 miles ahead and for W.O.U.s 40 to 50 miles which, in 
the latter case, was thought to be impossible and would result in the “greater part of the 
responsibility… fall[ing] to R.D.F. raid reporting.”174 But if it was deemed impossible to 
station men with radios 50 miles ahead of the A.L.G.s there was little chance to position a 
radar set, albeit light-weight, 20 miles ahead. It will be remembered that while the subject 
was being debated in April 1943, Squadron Leader Findlay was in Britain and he concluded 
that the current light-weight set was too heavy and needed to be broken down into smaller 
units. It was considered that in order to detect low-flying raiders a powerful set employing a 
very narrow radio wavelength and capable of detecting aircraft up to 50 miles would be 
suitable. Such equipment had transport implications: 
The necessary aerial would be of such a size and its turntable in consequence 
so massive that its transportation by anything except a heavy vehicle would 
be out of the question.175 
Equipment of this size obviously could not be carried by air, and would rely on being 
brought by ship to a convenient port, and then transported, if possible, by road. Furthermore 
there were the factors of weather and accessibility. Heavy rains would reduce most roads to 
muddy tracks unsuitable for heavy vehicles and therefore the heavier the radar equipment the 
less chance there was of moving forward. 
 Here were the planners’ difficulties. Firstly a multi-functional radar set which 
possessed the ability to detect high and low level raiders, and was light enough to be 
transported relatively easily did not exist. The Type 11 which was hoped would fulfil these 
factors was being developed in Britain, but its production would not start until November 
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1943 at the earliest.176 This date would have been good news to the planners who actually 
expected the equipment not to be ready until the autumn of 1944.177 Secondly, because there 
was no suitable radar set available, a system had to be devised using four fundamental types 
of set mobilised to varying degrees in seven different forms. There was also the problem of 
how to transport the various types and sizes of set given the topographical and climatic 
factors.  
 Transportation of the radar equipment would have to take place in various stages, 
firstly from the supply camps in India to the A.L.G.s, then to the operational site, and then, if 
necessary, from one operational site to another. The latter stage was important to consider 
firstly if the Allies’ advance progressed and secondly if the Japanese overran a forward radar 
base. The initial stage of moving large and small radar equipment did not present a problem 
as it could be flown into the A.L.G. by transport aircraft and once there the light-weight set 
(L.W.S.) could be used temporarily while the heavier G.C.I. equipment was assembled and 
installed. After that the L.W.S. could be moved as far forward by mule or by jeep to provide 
the necessary defensive early warning. Both modes of transport would depend on the 
equipment being small enough to be carried by mule team on suitable roads for a vehicle, 
even as small as a jeep, to traverse, but more than one jeep would be necessary:  
We have found that at least five jeeps are required to carry one crated L.W.S. 
with its W/T R/T set and spares and test gear excluding crew and barrack 
equipment.178   
There was also the question of whether the equipment would provide the warning required. 
India Command reported that as a result of their research with correctly sited G.C.I. sets in 
Imphal the equipment could give fair cover against high-flying aircraft but negligible cover 
against those at a lower level. The L.W.S. was not considered to be suitable in its present 
state, “Light Weight Set has the neither range, necessary interception facilities nor the 
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proven operational performance of G.C.I.”179 It was therefore necessary to find a method to 
transport the more efficient G.C.I. equipment to forward areas and some work had begun. In 
February 1943 A.H.Q. India reported to Whitehall that G.C.I. equipment had been installed 
on an 80 foot barge with a further intention to install three C.O.L. sets: 
[F]or use Arakan coast or similar region. Intention is to overcome 
transportation difficulties thus enabling station to be sited on inland water in 
localities when road access impossible.180 
By April the plan had advanced sufficiently to include the barge mounted radar sets in the 
first planning stages to secure A.L.G.s as the light-weight sets, G.C.I. and mobile C.O.L. 
equipment would either be established on land, or mounted on barges offshore.181 
Furthermore throughout the year work was carried out to install light-weight sets on a jeep 
for greater mobility and G.C.I. sets onto a D.U.K.W. for use either offshore or on the inland 
waterway system as an alternative to the barge concept.182 These developments showed 
ingenuity which would eventually assist in the provision of a radar screen over forward 
areas. 
The Spitfire Arrives 
 The Spitfire’s contribution to attaining air superiority in the Far East will be 
discussed in Chapter Two but the introduction of the fighter version in October 1943 
provided an essential element in providing an efficient air defence capability in conjunction 
with the early warning system.183 The lack of an appropriate fighter during 1942 and 1943 
had been identified by the O.R.S. who reported in June 1943: 
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The comparatively poor performance of our fighter aircraft has a decisive 
influence on the difficulties of interception, and the provision of improved 
fighters would be the most important single contribution towards a successful 
fighter defence.184 
 The difference between the Spitfire and Hurricane to air defence was significant; the Spitfire 
had a service ceiling of 38,500 feet and a rate of climb to 20,000 feet of 7 minutes 48 
seconds, whilst the tropicalised Hurricane, on paper, would only attain 34,000 feet and reach 
20,000 feet in 8 minutes 20 seconds.185 This difference was observed in an eight day period 
from 8th November 1943 when a series of reconnaissance missions flown by Ki-46 Dinahs 
were intercepted by Spitfires following ground detection and control by radar; three Dinahs 
were destroyed.186 The height ranging problems were still a problem and Sergeant Guy 
Watson later recalled a 10th November interception: 
The radar was very bad on height finding, extraordinarily bad. We always 
seemed to be 1000 feet or even 2000 feet below them, whereas we should 
have been above them.187  
However another pilot engaged in the same interception reported that he had reached 30,000 
feet and the Dinah was 1,500 feet below him.188 Despite the height problems, in a matter of a 
few days the Japanese reconnaissance capability had been nullified by the combination of 
the early warning system guiding the Spitfires to advantageous interception heights in a way 
not previously seen during the Hurricane’s service as front line defender.  
  Despite these early successes engagements at the end of 1943 suggested that there 
was still work to be done in terms of radar accuracy, operator proficiency and fighter control. 
On 23rd November a formation of Japanese fighters flew an early morning reconnaissance 
against Chittagong in the hope of engaging some of the newly arrived Spitfires. Sixty-six 
Hurricanes and Spitfires were scrambled to engage the raiders, but virtually no contacts were 
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made as the lead squadrons had failed to receive correct radio channels and the radar plot 
had been confused by the Japanese formation splitting into two.189 On 28th November 12 
Japanese bombers with their escort of six fighters attacked Feni from 30,000 feet but the 
defending Hurricanes and Spitfires were below the raiders’ height and did not catch them 
until they had turned for their bases. One day later radar detected an enemy formation of 12 
plus aircraft flying at 20,000 feet towards the Arakan and five squadrons of Hurricanes and 
one Spitfire squadron were scrambled to intercept, but the fighter controllers’ mistakes, 
combined with radar deficiency, misinterpreted the raiders’ height. Only a few of the 
defenders made contact with the enemy; 67 Squadron’s Hurricanes were attacked out of the 
sun as they were too low whilst the Spitfires from 615 Squadron were too high, “The height 
was all wrong. Our controller had got us in position and we found the Japs were well below 
us; they were just specks in the distance.”190 Owing to the Spitfires’ superior speed they 
were able to catch some of the Japanese fighters and during the engagement claimed one 
fighter probably destroyed and four damaged.191 Apart from the problems of establishing 
accurate height readings, the controllers had to adapt to the Spitfire as a much faster 
climbing aircraft than the Hurricane, but experience and practice would eventually make 
control more efficient. However a defining moment for the fighter control organisation 
occurred during the Japanese raid on Calcutta on 5th December. 
 The Japanese planned a major raid on Calcutta which was given the codeword of ‘Ry 
Ichi-go’ (Dragon First) and included fighters and bombers drawn from the J.A.A.F. and the 
J.N.A.F.192 Approximately 128 Japanese aircraft flew towards Calcutta docks and 65 
Hurricanes and Spitfires were scrambled to intercept, but the Japanese route took them to the 
South of Chittagong and the defending aircraft lacked the range to make contact; only one 
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Spitfire engaged the enemy and its pilot had to force-land when he ran out of fuel. When 
Japanese bombers reached their target only two squadrons of Hurricanes were left to engage, 
but the defenders could not get through the Japanese fighter screen and the bombers went 
unmolested. An hour later another Japanese raid arrived over the city and the defenders were 
on the ground refuelling after the first raid; a flight of specially adapted night-fighter 
Hurricanes was scrambled and as a result eight of them were shot down when Japanese 
fighters attacked from above. This is a simplified account of the raid’s engagement as the 
interception was both confusing and difficult to relate, however the outcome was “an 
unhappy episode for the R.A.F. and a tactical coup for the Japanese.”193  
The Japanese had raided Calcutta at extreme range and caused damage and disruption 
to the city which was out of proportion to the weight of bombs they dropped; within a day of 
the raid a squadron of Spitfires returned to Calcutta for its defence. The O.R.S. investigated 
the raid and reported its initial findings on 31st December 1943, criticizing the way the raids 
had been picked up by controllers in the first instance, and how the second raid had been 
treated as a mass attack spread over heights between 10,000 and 20,000 feet when it was 
known from radar reports to consist of a few aircraft all flying over 25,000 feet.194 The 
fighter controllers were criticised for the use of the night-fighter Hurricanes to intercept the 
second raid, as they had been patrolling at too low a height while the other aircraft had been 
refuelling and did not have time to gain sufficient altitude. A further criticism was levelled at 
the controllers who made no use of 79 Squadron’s aircraft as they were on ‘command guard’ 
and were only scrambled to get them out of the danger area.  
 Human error in detecting and controlling the raid was the only reason given for the 
interception’s failure, no blame apportioned to the operational radar equipment. In a later 
report submitted by the O.R.S. on 12th March 1944, plotting stations were said to have 
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shown “preferential treatment” of hostile tracks to the detriment of friendly tracks which 
may not have given the controllers a true picture of where formations of aircraft, particularly 
friendly, were placed.195 It was concluded that the stations had not adhered to their standing 
instructions by failing to report all tracks, friendly and hostile, and the duty filter controller 
should have warned them to “adhere to normal procedure.”196 It will be recalled that similar 
observations had been made in May 1943 and clearly the lessons had not been learned at the 
end of the year. Furthermore on 26th December during a raid on Chittagong confused 
controlling had resulted in some Spitfires failing to make contact with the enemy formation 
whilst others had been sent too far to the East.197 Additional training and practice would be 
necessary if operational efficiency was to be improved. It was fortunate that Spitfires were 
arriving in the region during this period to assume the interception role from the Hurricane 
as the Calcutta raid had shown it had reached the end of its life as an interceptor.  
The value of the Spitfire with better control was demonstrated on New Year’s Eve 
1943 when one squadron intercepted a mixed Japanese force of six bombers and nine 
fighters who were attacking the Arakan. 136 Squadron had climbed to 30,000 feet and their 
controllers successfully vectored them to a position 9,000 feet above the Japanese formation, 
which suited R.A.F. tactics and the Spitfires’ capability. Consequently three bombers were 
shot down, two force landed, one was heavily damaged, and one fighter was lost; R.A.F. 
losses amounted to one Spitfire whose pilot was rescued.198 The action showed the power of 
such aircraft if the radar and control system could operate efficiently. 
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1944 
 The first six months of 1944 proved crucial for Allied air superiority in Burma. Three 
major engagements at the Battle of the Admin Box, the two sieges at Kohima and Imphal, 
and the second Chindit operation required air superiority to protect vulnerable transport and 
close air support sorties in Burma. In February 1944 Japanese air strength was 
approximately 270 aircraft, by the end of June this figure had been reduced to 125 aircraft of 
all types.199 The reduction is explained by a combination of factors; air-to-air combat 
attrition, a programme of interdiction raids against Japanese airfields, and transfer of 
Japanese aircraft to other theatres of operation. These elements will be examined in depth in 
other chapters of this thesis. This section will focus on analysing radar developments during 
the first half of 1944, and discussing the contribution the early warning system made to air 
defence. 
 Spares, Transport and Personnel 
 Even though great efforts had been made to improve the early warning capability in 
1943, difficulties persisted. Weather and topography, permanent echoes, delayed equipment 
supply, spare parts arriving late and damaged, remaining transport problems, and trained 
personnel were scarce.  
 During 1943 T.R.E. radar developments designed to improve equipment for Far East 
operations had proved encouraging, but delivery dates had mainly been scheduled for early 
to mid-1944. As equipment arrived, the R.A.F. experienced an acute shortage of spares to 
maintain sets already in the theatre. In February 1944 Air Command South East Asia 
(A.C.S.E.A) radar experts reported: 
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Air Ministry Harrogate… stated that a critical stage in the production capacity 
had been reached, and that a delay of about three months was anticipated 
before any further issue of the required spares could be expected.200 
 
The situation in India was so serious that fully functioning radar sets were “robbed” of vital 
components in order that both operational and training units could be kept working.201 The 
relevant spares had been ordered in December 1943. A.C.S.E.A. brought the situation to 
Whitehall’s attention in May 1944 who replied in August, “There seems to be no valid 
reason why they were overlooked but the matter is now being pursued with vigour by the 
Equipment Branch concerned.”202 In June A.C.S.E.A. reported that a number of Type 57 sets 
had been delivered without the full pack of six months’ spares originally planned. 
Furthermore spares shortages were not restricted to radar equipment as A.C.S.E.A. reports 
show deficiencies in spares for portable generators vital for use with light-weight portable 
radar sets.203 
 One overriding reason for the spares’ shortage was the decision at the ARCADIA 
Conference in January 1942 to make Germany the first priority. This decision can be 
demonstrated by reference to the provision of test equipment for the friendly aircraft I.F.F. 
system. Early in 1944 A.C.S.E.A. had indicated that no test gear had been received for its 
I.F.F. equipment and there was “considerable difficulty… maintaining the full efficiency of 
the equipment as a result.”204 Their only solution was to ‘borrow’ some equipment from a 
newly arrived mobile unit for use at existing stations. A month later the command stated: 
The position regarding deficiencies remains substantially unchanged. It has 
recently been drawn to this Headquarters’ attention that test gear already in 
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the command is rapidly deteriorating and will become unserviceable through 
fair wear and tear.205  
A similar warning followed in May, but it was not until August that Whitehall replied: 
At present their [sic] are large demands by A.E.A.F. and Ninth Air Force 
which first must be met. The rate of production of test gear is not sufficient to 
meet the existing large demands. In general after the requirements of 
A.E.A.F. have been met, India receives a share of all arising off contract.206 
Whitehall continued by listing a number of pieces of equipment that were en route and those 
which were remaining to be sent, but it is clear that none of it was likely to arrive quickly.  
 An additional problem existed with spare parts arriving either broken or damaged. In 
March out of 204 items shipped to India 38% were found to be defective, in May 84 valves 
out of 110 were found to be broken and in June 56 valves out of a possible 195 were 
delivered damaged.207 These breakages were due to two main factors; poor handling over the 
long passage from Britain and inadequate packing for delicate spare parts. Even though 
moves were made to improve matters breakages continued to be a problem throughout the 
year; in December the lack of spare valves for the Type 57 station was so acute that 
A.C.S.E.A. warned that a number of stations were in danger of being closed. 
 Additionally there were problems with material imported from the United States. 
Despite the equipment being efficient and relatively plentiful it did not always arrive on 
time, spares were broken and ancillary equipment did not work properly. In April A.C.S.E.A 
received notification that 22 American sets were allocated for delivery to the Far East 
between May and June, with two years’ worth of spares accompanying each set.208 However 
when the first of seven much anticipated air transportable sets arrived in June, they were all 
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delivered incomplete and not one constituted a working station.209 The sets had to be 
checked and overhauled at a Base Signals Depot (B.S.D.) instead of being transported 
directly to the forward operating areas; during the checking process waterproof seals had to 
be removed which caused damage and ultimately, further delays.210 The portable power 
supply was bedevilled by difficulties caused by the extreme climate and an inherent design 
fault. The generator’s engine ran at high temperatures resulting in greater wear and tear on 
its moving parts. Furthermore when the generator was operated in forward areas it had to be 
situated in a pit firstly to shield it from enemy shrapnel, and secondly to reduce noise from 
its loud engine. However, placing the generator into a pit resulted in the engine running at an 
even greater temperature and ultimately a larger requirement for spare parts.211  
Transport 
 Providing radar cover in Burma and its surrounding regions proved a challenge given 
its inhospitable terrain and adverse weather conditions. Even when suitable equipment 
existed there was the additional problem of transporting it to suitable sites to provide 
efficient early warning. 
 Fitting radar sets to water-borne vessels gave favourable reception from the good 
reflecting surface open expanses of water would provide. It was ideal to fit efficient G.C.I. 
equipment onto the bows of a Landing Ship Tank [L.S.T.]. This had been successful in 
North Africa, but it needed to be tested in Burma. Such a test would, of course, depend on 
the provision of a L.S.T.212 Progress slowed dramatically owing to every type of landing 
craft being requisitioned from around the world for the proposed invasion of France in June 
1944. However, more success was achieved by fitting light-weight warning sets to 85 foot 
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steel barges, the first of which (5048 A.M.E.S.) became operational in February 1944. 
Moored off St Martin’s Island, the C.O.L. was near to the area of land operations and 
detected enemy aircraft that did not come within range of other stations.213 But there were 
some difficulties; the engine system interfered with the radar equipment, and operating in an 
off-shore swell adversely affected the reception. These faults aside the barges proved 
extremely useful and 5048 A.M.E.S. played a vital role during the land battles at 
Buithidaung and Maungdaw during the battle of the Admin Box. 
 
                              5048 A.M.E.S. Barge 
Radar was also fitted to a variety of different motor vehicles and trailers to move the 
equipment ahead of advancing troops. The vehicles were given a series of code names and 
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each combination showed both invention and ingenuity. ‘Turkey’ was a G.C.I. set which was 
carried by transport aircraft to an A.L.G., and then transported up to five miles further by 
jeep. This could be operational in 48 hours and was used at Myitkyina airfield after the 
Americans’ occupation on 24th July 1944.214 ‘Mountain Goat’ was a light-weight set carried 
by jeeps and was designed for use in inaccessible forward areas; in April 1944 nine sets were 
available for operation.  
 
    
                                                 Mountain Goat 
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’Hawk’ consisted of a G.C.I. station using light-weight components and V.H.F. and I.F.F. 
facilities, all of which were housed in one covered vehicle; but after operational trials in 
September 1944 only four were ever completed. ‘Falcon’ was a transported aerial with 
equipment taken from surplus anti-aircraft gear which was found particularly valuable 
during the campaign in central Burma in April 1945. During the spring of 1944 trials were 
carried out by fitting a light-weight set with wireless equipment onto an amphibious DUKW 
vehicle to enable radar cover to be transported on inland waterways; the DUKW was thus 
transformed into the ‘Goose.’  
 
     The ‘Goose’ 
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The ‘Buffalo’ consisted of a light-weight set mounted on a Ford vehicle which was large 
enough to carry all the radar technical equipment and wireless communications, with an 
additional jeep attached for general purposes.  
    
                           Rear of a ‘Buffalo’ 
 
These schemes were developed through the necessity of providing radar cover, but 
there were delays in production. In April it was reported that delays were being encountered 
with radar vehicle construction because of lack of production facilities, material supply 
difficulties or delays in design approval.215 Despite hopes that the building programme 
would proceed, out of these systems only the ‘Buffalo’ and the barge mounted set were in 
operational use in time to make an impact during the first six months of 1944.216 They all 
became useful during the latter stages of the campaign in Burma, but by that time the 
J.A.A.F.’s operations had reduced in intensity, and the rate of Allied advance had become so 
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rapid that the mobile radar units could not keep pace with the army’s progress.217 
Furthermore, radar units would solely rely on motor transport to carry the radar sets into 
action despite earlier experiments with alternative methods. It will be recalled that during 
1943 a proposal was made to break a light-weight set into small enough parts to carry by 
mule. In May 1944 it was discovered that the packages could not be reduced into small 
enough parts without “considerable modification” and the project was abandoned.218  
Personnel 
Problems affecting supply, spares and transport were exacerbated by the shortage of 
trained radar personnel from operators to mechanics. As the radar system in the Far East 
expanded, greater numbers of personnel were required but policy dictated that Germany was 
to be defeated first and personnel were kept in the European Theatre. The Air Historical 
Branch narrators give additional reasons for the shortages.219 These were: inevitable war 
casualties; distances from Britain for reinforcements to travel; internal distance and transport 
problems within the Command’s boundaries; and sickness peculiar to the region.220 
Deficiencies in British personnel were made up by recruiting and training officers and men 
of the Royal Indian Air Force to act as operators and mechanics which proved successful. 
However the lack of trained personnel, particularly at the beginning of 1944, coupled with 
equipment shortages, forced a decision to close down unnecessary stations to free both staff 
and equipment for re-deployment. Radar stations in Western Bengal were considered to be 
worth placing on a care and maintenance basis, whilst stations on India’s West Coast could 
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be closed completely owing to the lack of threat.221 This logical policy of closing radar 
stations as the advance moved East continued until August 1945.  
 
Air Defence January to June 1944 
 From January 1944 the campaign moved away from ports and airfields to the 
battlefront where air superiority would prove decisive in allowing air transport and ground 
support aircraft to carry out their tasks. The early warning system would play a role in 
obtaining and maintaining air superiority with varying degrees of success. The next section 
will analyse the contribution of the early warning system during the battle of the ‘Admin 
Box’, the initial stages of Major General Orde Wingate’s second Chindit operation 
(Operation THURSDAY), and the sieges of Kohima and Imphal. All four actions overlapped 
and ran concurrently, so to maintain clarity each will be dealt with separately. 
The ‘Admin Box’ 
 The Allies planned to capture the airfield on Akyab Island which would be an 
important acquisition for air operations when the Allies moved towards Rangoon. A sea-
borne landing was unfeasible owing to the lack of suitable shipping, the alternative was an 
advance along the Western Burmese coast through Maungdaw and Buthidaung which was 
undertaken by soldiers of the 5th and 7th Indian Divisions; on 9th January 1944 both Divisions 
were in Maungdaw. The Japanese decided to invade India with a two-pronged thrust towards 
the major supply areas around Imphal, and the campaign’s approval was signed two days 
after the Indian Divisions had occupied Maungdaw. On 4th February the Japanese 55th 
Division moved North and split the 7th Indian Division East of Buthidaung, and from there a 
defensive position was formed around the village of Sinzweya. This position was known as 
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the ‘Admin Box’, owing to the numbers of clerks, typists and other support troops who 
fought during the siege.222 
 The eventual victory at the ‘Box’ was notable in that it was the first time the 
Japanese Army had been defeated by Allied forces in Burma. Previously the Japanese 
encircled Allied troops, cutting them off from lines of communication and supply before 
inflicting a defeat. Lieutenant-General Slim planned to turn these encircled positions into 
strongholds capable of withholding enemy pressure while other forces moved in to attack the 
Japanese. Vast amounts of supplies had been stockpiled in rear areas as a precursor to this 
tactic and once the Japanese had circled the 7th Indian Division orders were issued to supply 
the troops by air.223 The achievement and maintenance of air superiority was a vital factor in 
protecting largely undefended transport aircraft and vulnerable ground attack aircraft from 
the Japanese fighter force which had sufficient numbers to cause problems. Furthermore, 
R.A.F. fighters would need the early warning organisation to provide warning of 
approaching enemy aircraft and avoid costly standing patrols. 
 The area around Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Sinzweya was fortunate in having 
established radar coverage which spanned from Agartala in the North to Ramu and Cox’s 
Bazar in the South. The radar units consisted of a mixture of Mobile Radar Units, (M.R.U.s), 
Ground Controlled Interception units (G.C.I.) and Chain Overseas Low units (C.O.L.).224 
The system had been tested on 15th January 1944 when a series of Japanese fighter sweeps 
flew over the Maungdaw-Buthidaung area in retaliation for Allied ground attack operations 
against Japanese troops.225  
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The early warning system detected the enemy formations in sufficient time to allow Spitfires 
to scramble and reach a height to attack the Japanese aircraft. After what was described as 
“excellent controlling”, the Spitfires destroyed five Japanese fighters and damaged a number 
of others; this was the largest single loss of Japanese fighters over Burma to that date and 
three of the Japanese pilots were experienced veterans.226 On 16th January a Dinah 
reconnaissance aircraft was detected, intercepted and destroyed by Spitfires from 615 
Squadron and on 20th January a formation of 100 Japanese fighters stacked at heights from 
10,000 to 24,000 feet were successfully attacked from 30,000 feet by Spitfires. Whilst only 
one Japanese aircraft was lost following a forced landing from this engagement it 
demonstrates the early warning and control systems were adequately prepared to deal with 
medium to high flying enemy aircraft flying over the area. 
 The air battle in support of the ‘Admin Box’ took place between 4th February to 22nd 
February and during that time Japanese sorties consisted of large scale fighter sweeps, 
escorted bomber raids and ground attack sorties in support of Japanese troops by fighter 
aircraft equipped with bombs. On nine out of eighteen days of the battle R.A.F. fighters 
intercepted Japanese aircraft, and on the remaining days both air supply and ground support 
operations were allowed to continue free from aerial interference, even though they ran 
considerable risk from ground fire.  
 The early warning and control organisation in the Arakan acquitted itself well during 
operations in this period. On 4th February 70 Japanese fighters were engaged on a sweep in 
support of ground troops but radar units detected the incoming aircraft in time to give two 
Spitfire squadrons time to make height before the formation was intercepted. Similarly on 5th 
February a high flying Dinah was detected, intercepted and destroyed, while later in the 
morning Spitfires were scrambled to 28,000 feet to meet a formation of 70 Oscars. The 
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Japanese aircraft were spotted flying 15,000 feet below the Spitfires and this gave the R.A.F. 
an advantage in their attack. Similarly on 15th February an 81 Squadron pilot recalled that 
“Our interception at 2000 feet above and up sun was ideal.”227  The value of the system was 
demonstrated on 8th February when a formation of Dakotas was escorted by twelve 
Hurricanes of 134 Squadron during a supply drop. The Hurricane pilots heard by radio of the 
approach of “15 plus bandits” heading in their direction which gave some aircraft time to 
escort one formation of transports back to Chittagong and some to stay with the others whilst 
they dropped their supplies.228 However despite the Hurricanes’ attempting to fight off the 
Japanese fighters, a Dakota was lost when the screen was penetrated, thus demonstrating the 
vulnerability of transport aircraft.229 
 Despite these successes for the radar system there were some indications of future 
problems. It will be remembered that a reoccurring problem for the system had been height 
reading and prediction. On 10th February while 81 and 607 Squadrons had been placed in a 
good position to attack, Flying Officer Bill Andrews, 615 Squadron, wrote in his diary: 
Scrambled down South again near Buthidaung at 22 grand [22,000 feet] ran 
into about 40+ Jap fighters at about 25 grand. Shattering! … We must have 
the height or we have had it. We could have had it but control gave them at 
18,000 feet – someone boobed!230 
 
Flight Lieutenant Jimmy James, 607 Squadron, later remembered, “the Ops. people were 
picking up the Jap aircraft a lot earlier although they were not always too accurate with the 
height.”231 Apart from equipment deficiencies or operator error, the difficulty in height 
reading was hindered by the Japanese adopting new tactics of stacking their formations from 
                                                          
227 Flight Sergeant Albert Swan quoted in Franks, Spitfires over the Arakan, p.180. 
228 TNA, Air 27/947, 134 Squadron Operations Record Book, 8th February 1944; Shores, Air War for Burma, 
p.157. 
229 Shores, Air War for Burma, p.158. The transport crews were disconcerted by the appearance of the Japanese 
fighters in strength and it took the Commanding Officer of Troop Carrier Command, Brigadier- General 
William Old to personally lead a flight of transports in a supply drop to raise morale.  
230 Franks, Spitfires over the Arakan, p.169. 
231 Ibid p.207. 
77 
ground level to 20,000 feet. This would counter the R.A.F. tactic of gaining height before 
their dive and zoom manoeuvre, and would make the fighter controller’s task harder to 
accurately position fighters to attack. Previously, with the exception of occasional low level 
activity, the Japanese fighters and bombers had not chosen to fly at low level against Allied 
territory giving the radar a detection advantage. Later during the sieges of Imphal and 
Kohima the Japanese altered their tactics and flew low under the radar cover giving the 
defenders little time to respond effectively. This resulted in the defenders not totally relying 
on the early warning organisation. Standing patrols were carried out during the period and 
the Dakotas were escorted by Hurricane squadrons during their supply operations as a matter 
of course.232  
 The air defence of the ‘Admin Box’ lasted for eighteen days and even though, 
according to Japanese records, only five of their aircraft were destroyed and a few more 
damaged, it had been ultimately successful.233 In that time the ground troops had been 
supplied by air and R.A.F. fighters had largely kept Japanese aircraft away from interfering 
with the supply dropping operations. The established early warning and control system had 
played an important role in detecting incoming raids giving sufficient time to allow fighters 
to gain a height and attacking advantage. However the Japanese had flown at heights which 
radar was very capable of detecting in good time but subsequent events over Operation 
THURSDAY’s landing grounds, and over Imphal and Kohima, would prove a bigger 
challenge for the system. 
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Operation THURSDAY 
 The problem of providing early warning in a forward area was encountered during 
the initial stages of Operation THURSDAY, the second Chindit expedition. Unlike the first, 
the majority of Wingate’s troops, 10,000 out of 12,000, flew into advanced landing grounds 
in gliders, and once on the ground engineers established landing strips for subsequent supply 
operations by transport aircraft.234  
 Operation THURSDAY began overnight on 5th/6th March 1944 but the original plans 
to fly into two strips, codenamed Broadway and Piccadilly, had to be altered at the last 
minute when it was thought Piccadilly had been blocked by the Japanese. Broadway was 
chosen as the only site to accept the incoming gliders until 6th March when a second strip at 
Chowringhee was opened. The scale and importance of the air supply operation were 
immense: 
By 11th March the two strips had seen the landings of 579 C47s and Dakotas, 
and 74 gliders. 9,052 personnel, 187 mules and 175 ponies, and 254.5 tons of 
stores had been delivered.235  
The landings came as a complete surprise to the Japanese and it was not until 10th March that 
their bombers and fighters strafed and bombed Chowringhee after flying over Broadway; 
ominously this formation had not been detected. There had been no provision in the plan to 
take radar sets to Broadway, but the Japanese attack combined with a reconnaissance flight 
over Broadway prompted A.V.M. Sir John Baldwin, Air Commander Third Tactical Air 
Force, to write to A.C.M. Pierse on 10th March suggesting some fighters were deployed.236 
Following a survey on 10th March a detachment of six 81 Squadron Spitfires was sent to 
Broadway together with a servicing party, some signal personnel and a light-weight radar 
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set. However Broadway was not in the best position to site radar equipment, being 
surrounded by 1,000 feet high hills, and trees over 100 feet high which affected the radar’s 
reception, whilst the set could only give warning of aircraft flying due North or South at a 
range of 25 miles. Flying Officer Alan Peart later recalled: 
From an air defence viewpoint it was most vulnerable being close to the 
enemy fighter bases and having no early warning except for a small mobile 
experimental radar with a short range.237 
 The Spitfires arrived on Broadway on 12th March and on the following day 40 Oscars 
attacked it. The radar had given some warning, but during the scramble one Spitfire only just 
left the ground when it was shot down and its pilot killed. The remaining Spitfires managed 
to climb and engaged the Japanese fighters, destroying one and causing another to force 
land.238 Air Commodore Stanley Vincent, A.O.C. 221 Group, had personally witnessed the 
Japanese attack which destroyed three American light aircraft and wounded some soldiers. 
Vincent concluded that the order to scramble had taken too long to reach the fighters once 
the raid had been declared hostile by U.S.A.A.F. personnel manning the operations room.239  
Whatever the reason for the delay the result was the Spitfires had taken off late: 
Today 30 plus enemy fighters tried to strafe our new base. R.D.F. was very 
bad, only got five minutes warning. Sergeant Campbell and I were last to 
scramble. Bounced over ‘drome – Campbell killed immediately.240  
Despite Vincent praising the quality of the British aircraft and their pilots, if the system 
could not provide adequate warning, neither the advantage of man nor machine could be 
capitalized upon.241 
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The detachment of Spitfires to Broadway ended on 17th March following a raid by 15 
Oscars on the landing ground.242 The first warning was of 4 plus aircraft approaching the 
area travelling fast and low at a distance of 25 miles which was on the edge of the set’s 
detection limit. Squadron Leader William Whitamore, the commanding officer of 81 
Squadron, had experienced false alarms in the past and decided to wait for further 
information. A second warning gave the Japanese position as 15 miles away and at this the 
pilots strapped themselves into their aircraft. The final warning gave the Japanese as 10 
miles away and at this two aircraft (piloted by Whitamore and Peart) took off, the rest of the 
detachment being held on the ground. There was insufficient time for the Spitfires to take off 
and make height before they engaged the Oscars, and subsequently Whitamore was shot 
down and killed, Peart’s aircraft was badly damaged, and the rest of the aircraft on the 
ground were either destroyed or badly damaged; one pilot was killed as he sat in his aircraft 
waiting to take off. Peart recalled: 
Whitamore and myself had only just left the ground when the Oscars 
arrived. We had no height, little airspeed and were definitely with our pants 
down in a rather helpless position to stop the first attack.243 
 
and according to Flying Officer Larry Cronin: 
At last the Japs have woken up to the fact that if they come in low enough 
over the hills our Radio Location won’t be able to pick up them up until it’s 
too late.244 
  
It was decided that the detachment was to end and in future the squadron would remain at 
readiness at their airfield waiting for a telephone call when an enemy attack was expected.245 
It was anticipated that the Spitfires could be over Broadway in 40 minutes, and if fitted with 
overload tanks they would be able to intercept the Japanese fighters as they made their 
escape. This plan’s obvious drawbacks were demonstrated on 18th March when Japanese 
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fighters raided Broadway completely destroying what was left of the light-weight set without 
being intercepted by 81 Squadron whose diarist recorded, “our efforts to intercept from this 
range were fruitless.”246  
 Plans were proposed to use the three landing sites at Piccadilly, Broadway and 
Aberdeen as radar bases to give a triangulation effect for better coverage; a mobile 
operations room would be established at Aberdeen and all three bases would be linked by 
V.H.F. radio sets.247 Following siting surveys at the end of March, 221 Group reported with 
“regret” their findings.248 Broadway was considered unsuitable for resident fighters owing to 
their vulnerability to low level attack, whilst as there were no plans to turn Piccadilly into a 
stronghold it was not possible to place a radar set there. Aberdeen had been carefully 
surveyed and had been declared unsuitable for radar as it would only give limited cover to 
the South and South-West, with even less cover to the North. The defence of Broadway and 
Aberdeen would therefore have to rely on local anti-aircraft guns and Spitfires flying from 
Imphal or Kangla.   
 Probert described the radar and fighter detachment to Broadway as a “gallant effort” 
but in essence it was a failure.249 The three Japanese raids received short warning from radar 
leaving the fighters insufficient time to take off and climb to height. This came as no surprise 
as Flight Lieutenant Atherton had pointed out how hills affected radar signals in 1940, and 
similar problems had been encountered during the siting surveys during 1942.250 It will also 
be recalled that during the A.L.G. investigations in 1943 the O.R.S. had stated a light-weight 
set would need to be placed 20 miles ahead of the point to give defenders sufficient 
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warning.251 Given that the set had a range of 25 miles the O.R.S. recommendation would 
give the defenders 45 miles of warning, whilst at Broadway they had only 25 miles. The 
interceptions on 13th and 17th March had both been delayed, firstly by indecisive controllers 
and then by an experienced squadron commander who was waiting for firm evidence of the 
raid, but while it is possible to place some blame on these factors, the root cause of the raids’ 
successes was the lack of efficient early warning.  
 
Imphal and Kohima 
 The Japanese advanced Westwards towards Imphal and the garrison at Kohima 
where troops were instructed to remain and fight whilst their supplies were brought to them 
by air. The sieges at these locations have been well documented in various publications such 
as those written or edited by Louis Allen, Jon Latimer, John Colvin and Woodburn Kirby, 
but the role played by the early warning system in combination with the fighter defence has 
received little analysis in these books.252 The next section will analyse how the early 
warning system performed in the defence of the transport and close support effort. 
The Area and its Early Warning System   
 The topography and situation within both areas were different. The battle area at 
Kohima measured 700 x 900 x 1,100 yards and the battle at times resulted in fierce hand to 
hand fighting, famously across the width of the Governor’s tennis court. There was no room 
to operate conventional aircraft to take off and land, so supplies had to be dropped by 
parachute. There was no opportunity for reinforcements to be landed or casualties evacuated. 
Imphal Plain covered 700 square miles, its valley was 25 miles long and 10 miles at its 
widest point. There were six airfields within the boundaries, two being all-weather strips, 
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which allowed supplies to be brought directly to the valley and wounded and non-essential 
personnel to be evacuated. Furthermore offensive aircraft were able to fly close support 
sorties from these airfields whilst Spitfires operating from the same bases provided air 
defence. The Imphal Plain was covered by a well-established early warning system 
consisting of radar, observer posts, filter and control rooms, the majority of which had been 
in place since late 1943. For instance 857 A.M.E.S., operating a G.C.I. set which played a 
significant part detecting Japanese aircraft during the siege, had been in Buri Bazar on 1st 
September 1943 before moving to Mungai on 7th December and Moirag on 21st January, 
finally returning to Buri Bazar on 1st April.253 In addition to these stations advanced radar 
sets were situated to the East, for example, 6168 A.M.E.S. at Tamu, 383 at Ukhrul and 857 
at Moirang.254 This established system was strengthened by mobile wireless units stationed 
in the hills to the East of the advanced radar units. From the middle of 1943 W.O.U.s had 
been deployed to the East of Imphal to give additional early warning cover, in particular 
against low-flying aircraft: 
In view of recent Jap tactics – low altitudes and under radar cover – you are 
asked to consider advisability of deploying a certain number of W.O.U. posts 
as far forward as possible. This would assist the controller in passing 
information to his fighters and the possibility of effecting an interception on 
these low attacks.255  
In March the W.O.U. companies had 50 posts established but as will be discussed shortly, 
their effectiveness was diminished when the Japanese advanced Westwards. 
Despite the area having relatively good coverage there were familiar problems which 
reduced the early warning. The mountains surrounding Imphal created permanent echo 
difficulties and to counter this, radar stations were sited in locations which attempted to 
provide compromises between overlapping cover and solving technical problems. However 
                                                          
253 TNA, Air 29/184, 857 A.M.E.S. Operations Record Book, 1st October 1942 to 31st October 1945. 
254 TNA, Air 26/267, 181 (Signals) Wing, Operations Record Book, 1st June 1943 to 31st December 1944; Air 
29/178, 383 A.M.E.S. Operations Record Book, 1st February 1943 to 31st March 1945; Air 29/184, 857 
A.M.E.S. Operations Record Book, 1st October 1942 to 31st October 1945.   
255 TNA, Air 23/2037, Raid Warning System, memo 3rd T.A.F. to 224 Group, 9th February 1944. 
85 
the scale of the country resulted in stations being spread thinly providing weak spots where 
there was little or no coverage. Furthermore there was no radar equipment to detect low 
flying raiders. As a result, even though the G.C.I. sets could cope adequately with high-
flying aircraft as Japanese reconnaissance aircraft discovered to their cost, it was “practically 
impossible to track enemy aircraft if they flew in at a sufficiently low altitude.”256 The 
Japanese raiders capitalized on this deficiency by splitting their formations into high and low 
sections, composed of multiple or single aircraft, thus making the fighter controllers’ task 
harder to keep track of friendly or enemy aircraft given the difficulties with I.F.F. equipment. 
To compound these problems some of the R.A.F. mobile wireless units had been replaced by 
inexperienced sections from the Indian W.O.U. Corps which resulted in a lower standard of 
detection.257  
 Potentially the greatest threat to the air security of Imphal and Kohima resulted from 
the loss of the advanced radar stations to the East. During the Japanese Army’s advance 
Westwards units had to be withdrawn and re-sited, or moved back into the security of the 
Plain. For example 569 A.M.E.S. at Wabagai had to move its location owing to the 
proximity of the Japanese advance on 18th March. Once in Senjam Khuhou the staff erected 
their technical equipment in 36 hours before being forced to move again on 7th April.258 
When 569 first moved on 18th March it had been replaced by a light-weight set operated by 
6168 A.M.E.S. which in turn had to withdraw inside the Plain at Moreh before succumbing 
to artillery fire on 27th March.259 This was typical of events which were replicated at various 
sites over the March to April period.260 Furthermore nearly all of the 50 observer posts had 
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to be evacuated and redeployed sometimes with the loss of their equipment, leaving serious 
gaps which aircraft could penetrate.261  
The eventual success of the air defence of Imphal and Kohima can be attributed to 
various interlinking factors. Interdiction raids on Japanese airfields, conservation of Japanese 
aircraft strengths, and Japanese aircraft not flying in poor weather gave Allied transport 
aircraft time to fly supplies in and casualties out. All these factors played a role in clearing 
the skies over Imphal and Kohima, and often overshadowed the part played by the air 
defence fighters operating over Allied territory, with the result that the part played by the 
early warning system has been overlooked or misrepresented. The Air Historical Branch 
authors suggest that the loss of the advanced radar sites was offset by the long range 
American interdiction raids on Japanese airfields.262 Similarly the Official History states: 
The interception of enemy aircraft proved difficult owing to the withdrawal of 
the wireless observer screen covering the plain, and to the blanketing of radar 
by the surrounding hills. There was therefore little warning of incoming raids 
and interceptions were infrequent.263  
 
Both these statements are not totally accurate as the early warning system, despite its 
deficiencies, performed reasonably well and assisted defending fighters to intercept Japanese 
formations.   
The Early Warning System in Action  
 The lack of advanced radar posts, observer posts and low level radar resulted in weak 
spots which Japanese aircraft exploited. On 17th April Kangla airstrip was attacked without 
prior warning and four days later on 21st Kangla was attacked again without warning, the 81 
Squadron diarist writing: 
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In the late afternoon there was some excitement when 8 Oscars suddenly 
appeared over Kangla Strip. Without due warning 3 bombs were dropped but 
none landed near the airstrip or aircraft.264 
On 22nd April 20 Oscars attacked Tulihal airfield at 0700 hours damaging a section of 
Beaufighters; one was destroyed and two were damaged, but anti-aircraft gunners claimed 
one Japanese aircraft destroyed and others damaged.265 The low level attacks were 
complemented by Japanese aircraft roaming over Allied airspace practically immune from 
detection. On 11th April three Spitfires were escorting six Dakotas on a sortie to Aberdeen 
strip and were attacked by a number of Japanese fighters without warning from the ground. 
The Spitfires were able to fight off their opponents and despite no losses to the Japanese no 
transport aircraft were lost or damaged. On 23rd April a 62 Squadron Dakota was returning 
from a supply drop over Sapam and was attacked without warning by two Oscars; 
fortunately the R.A.F. pilot was able to evade his attackers and the aircraft was only slightly 
damaged.  
 The danger of allowing Japanese fighters to break through to the vulnerable transport 
aircraft was demonstrated on 25th April during a supply drop to troops at Sapam. The early 
warning organisation correctly identified a number of Japanese aircraft heading towards 
Imphal and Spitfires were scrambled together with some American P-38 Lightnings which 
were returning from an interdiction sortie. The Japanese aircraft were intercepted and the 
Allied pilots claimed two destroyed, two probably destroyed and five damaged, but the 
action had not prevented some Japanese fighters breaking through to attack the Dakotas.266 
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Three R.A.F. Dakotas were lost, and two U.S.A.A.F. transport aircraft were reported lost 
making the overall loss five valuable aircraft and crews.267  
Protecting transport aircraft from enemy interference presented A.C.S.E.A. with a 
dilemma; clearly the early warning organisation could not be totally relied on to detect 
roaming Japanese fighters, whilst those flying at low level were practically undetectable. At 
the same time aviation fuel was in short supply on the Plain so that constant air patrols were 
potentially wasteful particularly when it is remembered that the Japanese did not fly on 
every day of the siege. The solution was the establishment of a designated air corridor along 
which transport aircraft would fly and fighters patrol during the hours of daylight when 
transports were flying. While this can be regarded as a compromise between constant air 
patrols and interception, it proved successful. After the corridor’s introduction only one 
Allied aircraft was lost to enemy fighter action within its confines. This was on 17th June 
when a 99 Squadron Wellington ‘cut the corner’ rather than flying along the air corridor with 
its patrolling fighters and flew into the path of a number of Oscars.268  
 Despite the problems with gaps and low level cover, the early warning system 
performed quite well during this period when raiders were flying at medium to high 
altitudes. On 12th April Spitfires were scrambled to meet a formation of Oscars over Imphal 
which No 4 Filter Room reported as 12 plus aircraft at 20,000 feet; a successful interception 
resulted although no Japanese aircraft were lost.269 On 17th April 30 Spitfires were 
scrambled to meet a combined formation of 62 Japanese bombers and fighters en route to 
Imphal at approximately 25,000 feet. In addition to the Spitfires, 12 P-51Mustangs of the 
American Air Commando Group were diverted from a bombing raid to intercept the 
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Japanese formation. The subsequent interception was successful starting with detection by 
radar. Number 4 Filter Room reported “tracking and station performance excellent” whilst 
Flying Officer Peart recalled: 
We climbed hard under instruction from the controller and intercepted a large 
force of the enemy. There were six bombers at a medium altitude, say 15,000 
feet, with covering fighters up to 30,000 feet. We positioned ourselves and 
then attacked the top cover.270 
Four Japanese fighters were destroyed and a fifth was seriously damaged when the pilot had 
to force land at his airfield.271 On 6th May No 4 Filter Room tracked a formation of 9 plus 
aircraft which grew to 20 plus aircraft flying at 10,000 feet towards Imphal; 12 Spitfires 
were scrambled and following the interception a Japanese Oscar was lost. The radar system 
was of particular value when high flying reconnaissance aircraft flew towards Imphal; on 
26th April, 28th April and 1st May, 857 A.M.E.S. with its efficient mobile G.C.I. equipment 
detected and controlled the interceptions and on each occasion the interception was 
successful with Spitfires destroying three Dinahs.  
 The value of the advanced observer posts despite so many being withdrawn and 
overrun during the Japanese advance was demonstrated towards the end of the Imphal siege. 
On 29th May No 4 Filter Room reported that Post 146 M.W.O.U. at had made visual contact 
with six enemy aircraft at 9000 feet and there had been “no radar warning”.272 Spitfires were 
scrambled but failed to find the raiders, but when 857 and 383 A.M.E.S. detected the 
Japanese aircraft Spitfires were successfully directed on to the enemy fighter sweep.273 On 
8th June Post 146 M.W.O.U reported a visual sighting of “15 hostiles… [which] circled 
Bishenphur area and went out low. Not seen outside the valley by radar.”274 These aircraft 
were not tracked or detected by any radar units in the area with the result that they attacked 
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Hurricanes engaged on tactical reconnaissance duties; no warnings were given and one 
Hurricane was lost, three more damaged.275 Nine days later Post 146 again reported a visual 
sighting of 20 hostile aircraft at 8,000 feet flying North and fortunately a Spitfire was 
airborne on an air test as were patrolling Spitfires in the air corridor. The air test Spitfire 
found the Japanese fighters first and called other R.A.F. fighters to the area where a 
successful interception resulted in five Japanese aircraft being destroyed, one of the pilots, 
Sergeant Major Tomesaku Igarashi, being an experienced ‘ace’.276 
Failure and Successes 
 It must be acknowledged that Japanese tactics had been largely unsuccessful as their 
aircraft had not flown every day or overwhelmed the air defence system despite the fact that 
continuous low level or free roaming attacks could have caused chaos among transport 
aircraft and forced them to fly at night with the inevitable result of decreased supply tonnage. 
One reason was that Japanese commanders were aware of potential shortages that such 
operations could result in and followed a conservation policy. However whilst these factors 
may be used to explain Japanese tactics they overshadow the part played by the air defence 
fighters and in particular the early warning system over Imphal and Kohima. With the 
wisdom of hindsight it is clear that the Japanese could have made more efficient use of its 
resources to disrupt the Allied air operation, but nevertheless it is important to analyse the 
part played by the early warning system in relation to the attacks it faced during the period 
rather than in the context of what the Japanese failed to do.  
 Imphal Plain was similar to the Admin Box in that it had an established early 
warning system and was similar to the landing ground at Broadway in that it could not detect 
low level raiders with any kind of success. One reason for this was that the radar equipment 
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was still lacking in technology appropriate for the topography of the country. The Chief 
Radar Officer reported a 24th May raid as follows: 
Six enemy aircraft were reported at 3000 feet by an O.P. and were not seen by 
5071 A.M.E.S. This failure is attributed to P.E.s and the low altitude at which 
the aircraft were flying.277  
Low level cover was improved by wireless observer units and the obvious benefits of this 
organisation were demonstrated in the raids in late May and early June. However the early 
warning cover was not helped by the advanced radar units and observer posts withdrawing 
into Imphal to avoid capture or being overrun by Japanese land forces, with the remaining 
observer posts being thinly spread out along a wide and inhospitable terrain.  
 If the low level cover was difficult to provide, radar warning of Japanese raids at 
higher altitudes proved more successful. The need to provide protection for transport aircraft 
has been discussed at length earlier and the loss of five aircraft on 25th April showed their 
vulnerability against fighter attack. This action saw the introduction of an air corridor which 
fighters patrolled which was in addition to regular escort duties carried out by R.A.F. 
squadrons. The presence of these patrols and escorts provided an important deterrence as 
between 29th March and 22nd June there were just two occasions on 11th and 26th April when 
Dakotas were attacked by Japanese fighters whilst being escorted by Hurricanes and 
Spitfires respectively. Furthermore there is no record of any aircraft being attacked whilst 
flying within the protection of the air corridor. To complement these defensive patrols, the 
early warning system gave fighters warning to scramble or divert from other tasks in each 
successful interception during the siege period. For example, on 26th April Hurricanes were 
escorting Dakotas on a supply drop when the radar organisation warned of the approach of 
enemy fighters whilst also scrambling Spitfires from ground bases to intercept, and on 17th 
June ground observers from a M.W.O.U. provided warning of an incoming raid which 
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assisted firstly an aircraft performing an air test and then patrolling fighters to intercept the 
Japanese aircraft.278 During the interceptions of this period there were some familiar 
problems of height prediction and ground controlling, but the interceptions resulted in 
Japanese aircraft being engaged and prevented from reaching the transports. Research in 
Japanese records for Shores’ Air War for Burma shows that between 29th March and 22nd 
June approximately 20 Japanese aircraft were destroyed as a result of the air fighting over 
Imphal and Kohima. This might not be a large figure, but the primary aim was to keep the 
Japanese fighters away from the transport aircraft and maintain local air superiority over the 
battlefield. This was achieved by the defending fighters assisted by the early warning 
system, for without it costly air combat patrols would have had to be flown with deterorious 
effects on fuel consumption, airframes and pilot fatigue.     
 
June 1944 to August 1945 
 After Imphal was relieved the Japanese retreated Eastwards short of supplies and 
manpower, and although there remained much bitter ground fighting before the war ended, 
the J.A.A.F. in Burma had been numerically reduced by attrition and aircraft withdrawn for 
use elsewhere. From September 1944 until May 1945 the Japanese air effort was limited to 
reconnaissance sorties and a series of nuisance raids which caused minor damage, but 
ultimately had little effect on Allied operations. The next section will analyse the 
contribution of the early warning system in the Far East from June 1944 to August 1945. 
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Technical Problems, Old and New 
 The technical problems posed by topography, weather, humidity and mountain 
ranges described in this chapter continued to pose difficulties for the rest of the war and in 
many cases would not be solved until years later. Shortages of trained staff were resolved by 
training courses or by the closure of radar stations in rear areas and the re-deployment of 
staff. Closure of radar stations began in September 1944; 180 Signals Group reported in 
December 1944 that three A.M.E.S. stations were to close, three more to be placed in care 
and maintenance, whilst two more were to be reduced to a two-watch system.279 This was 
typical as demands for staff and equipment increased, and the threat of Japanese air attack 
diminished. Supplies of equipment caused familiar difficulties with sets arriving incomplete, 
broken or not arriving at all.280 At some stations equipment and training were still found to 
be deficient. During an inspection visit to the Sambre filter room on 1st May 1945 it was 
found that some equipment was obsolete whilst some staff were ill-equipped to deal with 
signal interference.281  
New research units were established in an effort to solve the technical difficulties. In 
June 1944 a Radio Experimental Unit was set up to carry out research duties previously 
carried out by the Base Signals Unit. It would: 
[U]ndertake and coordinate research and experimental work on Wireless and 
Radar problems which arise within the command, and on the adaptation of 
radio equipment existent in the command to meet the specialised 
requirements of this theatre of operations.282 
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On 7th March 1945 there was a proposal to form a Radio Development Unit in Ceylon. It 
was recognised that future operations in tropical and sub-tropical climate conditions would 
require “quick improvisation” as the campaign continued.283 Attempts to solve the 
permanent echoes problem had been carried out in Scotland’s mountainous regions and the 
Far East from mid-1943, but by March 1945 trials were still inconclusive and no answers 
would be available by August 1945.284 It was recognized that the humidity and rainfall likely 
to be encountered as the forces moved through Burma would penetrate radar equipment, and 
great efforts were carried out to tropicalise the kit.285 Remedial work to waterproof radio and 
radar equipment in the field was undertaken and this led to the formation of the Mobile 
Waterproofing Unit in 1945.286 
 By the end of 1944 it was recognised that more experimental work needed to be 
carried out in respect of the Far East’s particular demands. Between 2nd December 1944 and 
13th January 1945, Group Captain W.C. Cooper of the Ministry of Aircraft Production, 
(M.A.P.) and Mr Watson of T.R.E. visited the area to establish whether there was an 
opportunity to reinforce the influence of the Controllerate of Communications Equipment 
(C.C.E.) and they concluded that it “became increasingly evident that radio development 
effort in the theatre was essential”.287 Pointing out that the distances from the United 
Kingdom and United States and vast distances within the theatre were not assisting 
development, they reported that the operation to liberate Burma required “technical 
preparations to serve a number of D-Days.”288 They found the theatre: 
[H]as necessarily had to accept radio equipment chosen for it in the United 
Kingdom and the United States taking second place to the needs of the 
European Theatre… no evidence was forthcoming of a detailed study of 
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operational requirements in relation to radio equipment which should be 
made available as distinct from that which is being supplied.289 
Cooper and Watson recommended that a developmental effort be made in the Far East and 
United Kingdom, taking into account the “continuing demands of the European Theatre” and 
this needed to be started within five months from February 1945 prior to the monsoon period 
beginning. The findings were enough to convince the Air Ministry that the organisation 
would be worthwhile and its approval was granted in February 1945. From the end of March 
1945 radio and radar scientists, technicians and R.A.F. experts were recruited either 
voluntarily or by requisition.290 Many of the staff volunteered to travel to India on short 
service commissions from research establishments and the T.R.E. with appropriate 
adjustments to their service conditions. The requirement to send suitable personnel to the Far 
East is demonstrated by the case of Flying Officer W.J. James of the 2nd Tactical Air Force 
in Europe who received a posting to India on 9th April, less than a month before the end of 
the European war: 
We have decided to select you for duty as a ground radar specialist for the 
Calcutta section of the C.C.E. organisation in India… you should try to 
complete your tour of duty with the 2nd T.A.F. before the end of this month 
since we are planning for you to leave this country for India between the 
middle and end of May, and you will, of course, need to undergo a medical 
examination, be vaccinated and receive various inoculations before leaving 
for India.291 
However, many of the staff recruited for the venture never arrived in India and those that did 
continued their research at a slower peacetime pace. 
There was no indication in March 1945 that the war would end in August, and no 
assurances that the J.A.A.F. would cease to be a threat by May that year, let alone that the re-
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capture of the Burmese West coast ports would be virtually unopposed.292 This organisation 
was at least twelve months late in its conception and might have produced answers to 
problems which the O.R.S. on their own could only report on, or the smaller units investigate 
without access to better scientific equipment. The organisation was recognized as being 
needed in the theatre, but by the time the personnel and equipment arrived the radar 
organisation was beginning to get smaller and disband owing to the lack of Japanese air 
threat. 
 The speed of the Allied advance through Burma posed new challenges to the early 
warning organisation. Defence of static targets such as cities or strongholds had previously 
been the main priority, but from July 1944 the Japanese retreated with Allied forces in close 
pursuit and its front line assets had to be defended.  Both air transport and close support 
operations required warning against enemy air attack, as did their defending fighters, and to 
provide effective early warning radar equipment had to be placed in advance of the fighter 
base. This cover ideally required a light-weight radar set and a method to transport it. A true 
light-weight and portable set having the capability to detect high and low flying aircraft in 
the difficult terrain had long been a desire of the Command, and some sets started to become 
available during 1945.  
 
Transport and the Light-Weight Set 
 There were two methods by which radar sets could be transported to their positions, 
by air in the case of equipment such as the ‘Turkey’ or by road as in the case of the 
‘Mountain Goat’.293 Although a helicopter had been used for the first time in the theatre it 
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was neither big nor powerful enough to lift a series of radar components over long 
distances.294 Lifting equipment by air proved successful for captured airfields and advanced 
landing grounds. 6178 A.M.E.S.’ light-weight radar set and crew had been flown into 
Mawlaik by glider on 29th November 1944 and the station gave “excellent service” until 
being withdrawn the following February.295 Similarly a ‘Turkey’ was flown into the 
captured airfield at Myitkyina by the Americans on 24th July 1944 and gave a reasonable 
range of warning. Transporting these devices by air was ideal if there were airfields for 
aircraft or gliders, but other methods were necessary and principally this involved fixing the 
set to a motor vehicle and transporting the unit by road. The bad road conditions which 
prevailed in some Burmese regions were suited for the ‘Mountain Goat’; 6171 A.M.E.S. was 
able to move its vehicles at Sittang on 19th November and this deployment was found to be 
“very useful”.296 The ‘Hawk’ light-weight G.C.I. equipment mounted on a covered vehicle 
was reported to be “very promising” but only four were ever built following its operational 
trials in September 1944.297  
 Despite the relative promise of vehicle mounted equipment there were still problems. 
The majority of the equipment was not light enough to traverse the poor road network and 
many vehicles bogged down following the monsoon period. Even during the dry season, 
radar vehicles struggled to maintain the pace of the advancing armies. During the advance on 
Rangoon the mobile equipment advanced with the Army on the outer flanks’ main roads and 
railways but the plan was unsuccessful, “This scheme of deployment was not a success, and 
some units were left idle while waiting information as to where they should be deployed.”298 
This confusion was brought on by the requirement to provide early warning cover in a 
situation where the equipment was unsuitable for the circumstances. As will be discussed 
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later, the provision of effective and alert anti-aircraft artillery able to keep pace with the front 
line troops would have provided a good defensive substitute.   
 Transport was one difficulty and early warning equipment was another. Light-weight 
sets had been required for over two years, and even though technology was improving, a set 
which fully met the needs of the Far East Command was slow to arrive. A series of radar sets 
were trialled or introduced from August 1944 and whilst some were adequate others did not 
represent a significant advance over existing equipment. For example the Type 63 set was 
considered to be of “considerable value” but was not thought to be the “final answer to 
problems of light-weight coverage in mountainous country.”299 In November it was reported 
that trials on a light-weight Type 61 set had not shown it to be significantly different than the 
earlier Type 57, but even so it was considered to be of great value for light warning cover 
against low flying aircraft.300 Lastly the ‘Falcon’ air transportable light-weight set which 
started trials in October 1944 and by April 1945 was described as being “most useful” for its 
range of deployments.301  
 From the end of 1944 the rate of Fourteenth Army’s advance presented the command 
with the problem of how to supply early warning. The December 1944 Senior Radar 
Officer’s report stated: 
Radar cover near the front lines is not as satisfactory as it should be for the 
following reasons: 
  1.  Speed of Forward Movement 
  2.  Difficulties in Transportation 
3.  Reluctance to cut down number of ‘elaborate static establishments’ in rear 
areas and no release of personnel to man units in the forward areas.302 
 
The front line was 150 miles from the Allied air bases and this made it difficult for fighters 
to mount ‘loiter’ patrols over the front line. The alternative was an early warning system that 
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could be transported with the front line troops. From January 1945 the Radar Officer’s 
monthly report regularly contained requests for light-weight radar and in January stated     “ 
requirement for the newer types of LW set are increasing” whilst describing the success of 
the light-weight set flown into Akyab after the landing, “results were excellent. This incident 
illustrates the value of light-weight, robust sets under the conditions of this theatre.”303 The 
conditions at Akyab looking over water were different to those in the Burmese jungles and 
mountainous regions and the light-weight sets had a limited usefulness in the latter.  
Operations and Difficulties Providing Low Flying Defence 
 The difficulties provided by the lack of specific radar equipment, and its means of 
transportation were to play a part in how effectively the Allies’ front line was defended 
against air attack. As the relationship was close the next section will analyse the elements of 
air defence and early warning as one rather than in isolation. 
 The period from the end of the monsoon in 1944 until the last aerial combat on 29th 
April 1945 saw the Japanese engage in high and low attacks. As in late 1943 and early 1944 
the Allied early warning system was enhanced by the introduction of the Spitfire and any 
incursion by medium to high flying raiders was likely to result in a successful interception. 
On four occasions between 24th September and 7th October 1944 Spitfires intercepted and 
destroyed four Dinahs at high altitude directly as a result of successful detection by radar.304 
Furthermore on 5th November Spitfires intercepted a formation of Oscars over Palel at 
12,000 feet and destroyed one of these aircraft.305 However at lower levels the results were 
not as good. During the morning of 8th November Oscars were en route to strafe front line 
positions and encountered Dakotas on supply operations; despite some Spitfires being 
scrambled no interception was made. Later the same day, Oscars entered the same area 
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finding more transports and once again attacked at low altitude. As a result of both these 
attacks six R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. Dakotas were lost, and on neither occasion were the 
attackers detected by radar.306 In December a series of low level attacks began against Allied 
airfields and front line positions which the early warning system could not cope with. On 
13th December six Oscars attacked Kalewa airfield without detection, but worse was to 
follow in January 1945. The distance from the Allied fighter bases to the front line gave the 
J.A.A.F. an opportunity to attack in greater numbers since the Imphal siege in June 1944.307 
Although the attacks were described as nuisance raids they still were unpleasant for the 
troops and caused occasional losses among transport supply aircraft.308 On 11th January Lilys 
attacked Ye-U airfield, whilst later in the day Oscars attacked a road convoy on the Shwebo-
Ye-U road without detection. The following day Oscars en route to Shwebo found an airstrip 
at Onbauk where Dakotas were dropping supplies or unloading on the ground; two Dakotas 
were lost in the air and two on the ground; the attack was not detected by any early warning 
units.  
 Such attacks caused damage on a small scale but did not seriously affect the Allied 
advance as the “land battles continued unimpeded by the Japanese 5th Air Division.”309 
During the first months of 1945 there was a feeling of resignation that little could be done to 
counter the low-flying threat as, “The ground radar system was in general unable to give 
assistance in dealing with these raids.”310 The alternative to providing early warning cover 
was to provide patrols over the battle area which increased in intensity as the Allied advance 
continued and this table shows the increased patrolling sorties in comparison with the 
scrambles recorded in March 1944: 
                                                          
306 Ibid, p.282. 
307 Ibid, p.302. 
308 TNA, Air 20/1519, A.C.S.E.A. Ground Radar Reports, 1944-1945, November 1944 report. The report 
states, “Japanese air activity increased again over the previous month and reached a nuisance level”.  
309 TNA, Air 41/64, The Campaigns in the Far East Volume IV: South East Asia November 1943 to August 
1945,  p.217. 
310 TNA, Air 20/1519, A.C.S.E.A. Ground Radar Reports, 1944-1945, January/February 1945 report. 
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                                                                    Scramble           Patrol              Escort 
March 1944     334  469  210   
1945 
January     8  1755  312 
February     51  2063  144 
March      47  2330  156 
April      7  1667  80 
May      7  1192  35 
June      4  616  15 
July       11  10  19 311 
The increased patrol figures from February 1945 clearly show how the R.A.F. tried to 
counter the remaining Japanese air threat in lieu of a viable early warning system. However 
the work of the W.O.U.s continued to provide a measure of early warning from the ground. 
By 1st November 1944 there were no static civilian observer posts left, the organisation 
becoming an entirely military entity relying on wireless communications and total mobility. 
As the Allied advanced progressed, the W.O.U.s were regularly re-positioned over a 400-
mile land front, as well as in marine craft which doubled in an air sea rescue role.312 The 
warning these units gave was important in local defence, “In practically every case, the 
warning was delivered in time for the Ack-Ack crews to be quite ready to receive the 
enemy”. This is an important point because as fighter defence became harder to provide, 
local anti-aircraft defence assumed greater responsibilities, and this will be discussed shortly. 
The Allies were now on the offensive. The J.A.A.F. was depleted by a combination 
of air-to-air combat, unit transfers, and the continuing interdiction raids on their airfields by 
long-range American fighters which had been complemented by raids by carrier launched 
Fleet Air Arm aircraft. By March 1945: 
                                                          
311 TNA, Air 25/910, 221 Group Operations Record Book, 1st January 1944 to 30th September 1944. 
312 TNA, Air 23/5420, History of the I.O.C., 1943-1945. 
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So considerably had the 4th Hikodan been affected by this attrition, that 
offensive fighter sorties, which had numbered 100 in January and 54 in 
February, had fallen to only 22 in March, and those all by night.313  
The inability to provide low level early warning coverage over the front lines was not so 
serious owing to a lack and weight of Japanese opposition, for if they had possessed more 
aircraft and had chosen to pursue a low level attack strategy the Allied advance may have 
been delayed. That is of course conjecture as there were many factors at play during the last 
eight months of the war, but the question of whether it was possible to provide low level 
early warning was recognized by the Air Ministry. 
 During May 1945 representatives from the Central Fighter Establishment (C.F.E.) 
visited the Far East to examine the fighter defence organisation and their report’s second 
conclusion reads, “There is a need in Burma for the development of low radar cover”.314 
This could not have caused any surprise as this subject had already been brought to the 
attention of the Air Ministry and the T.R.E. in 1943. The difficulty of providing cover over 
the battlefront in Burma caused Wing Commander E. Drew, Senior Radar Officer, to write a 
paper issued on 10th August 1945 entitled ‘Low Radar Cover and Fighter Control’.315 Drew 
argued that there was no requirement for low level radar cover in places where airforces 
operated in direct support of the Army: 
Low Cover radar equipment is unsuitable for the control of offensive 
operations and the provision of defence against low flying aircraft imposes 
conditions on the fighter organisation of the force which is incompatible with 
an offensive conduct of Air Operations.316  
Drew made his comparison with the conditions in Southern England during 1943 when 
German low level attacks were countered by a system which involved radar stations having 
the advantage of operating over sea and based on high ground and directly communicating 
                                                          
313 Shores, Air War for Burma, p.347. A Hikodan was an Air Brigade. 
314 TNA, Air 64/29, Visit to South East Asia by the Tactics Branch of the Central Fighter Establishment,           
1st February to 7th April 1945, Report No. 27. 
315 TNA, Air 23/2112, Provision of Low Radar Cover in Burma 1945. No first name is available for Drew. 
316 Ibid. 
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with fighter squadrons on readiness. The success of the system was due to two factors; 
operating over sea gave better radar results than over land, and communications between 
elements of the organisation was “first class.” Drew pointed out that aircraft in this situation 
had to be kept on a high state of readiness, which in a battlefield scenario was not possible as 
it was more profitable to act offensively. A parallel was drawn with the North African 
campaign where Air Marshal Arthur Coningham, Officer Commanding 1st Tactical Air 
Force, withdrew the defensive element of his fighter force from the battlefront reasoning that 
low level nuisance attacks were difficult to defend against, and the damage and casualties 
they caused were small. Coningham therefore left the defence against low level raiders to 
mobile anti-aircraft batteries.317 There was clearly a judgement as to whether the effort 
expended to provide cover over a battlefront was worthwhile, particularly in such a harsh 
environment as Group Captain T.F. Maloney, Drew’s senior officer, made clear: 
The warning to be obtained from low cover over land will vary with the 
terrain but is not likely to be early in hilly country. The decision therefore 
rests on the balancing of the effort expended against the results obtained.318 
Maloney considered the C. F. E.’s representatives had undertaken their task incorrectly as 
their enquiries had been made with the “operational staffs of the Groups” rather than with 
the specialist signal staff. This was disingenuous as various signals staff had been 
highlighting the deficiencies with low level capabilities since 1943 and their views were 
identical to those expressed by their operational colleagues.319 Providing low level radar in 
the Far Eastern conditions was too difficult for 1945 technology as offensive operations in 
the Middle East and Europe had demonstrated and the better option was to provide an anti-
aircraft artillery facility. Until radar could be placed ahead of the front line, or even in 
aircraft flying above the battlefield, commanders had to accept the risk of nuisance air raids.  
                                                          
317 Coningham continued this strategy when he commanded the 2rd T.A.F. during the Normandy campaign in 
1944. 
318 TNA, Air 23/2112, Provision of Low Radar Cover in Burma 1945, loose minute sheet. No first name is 
available for Maloney.  
319 TNA, Air 20/1519 series for Radar Officer’s Reports for this period. 
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Conclusion 
 The contribution of the early warning organisation in the Far East has been 
discussed, usually in the context of the failure in Malaya and in the Chindit insertion in 
1944. However this chapter represents a fuller evaluation and analysis of how the system 
failed in 1942 and how it became an effective organisation by the beginning of 1944. It has 
also demonstrated the importance and contribution of the early warning organisation to the 
air superiority campaign despite technical and supply challenges. 
  When the Japanese attacked in 1941 much of the Far East was not covered by an 
early warning organisation based on the British model. Due to the low priority of the region, 
financial constraints and equipment shortages, very few radar sets were sent there and were 
in place prior to the initial attacks. Similarly the Observer Corps were not properly organised 
to one standard throughout the region, which exacerbated early warning deficiencies. 
However early warning failures were not the only reason for the loss of air superiority. The 
British model had shown that the system had to be fully integrated, with the early warning 
organisation working with suitable modern fighters to achieve successful interceptions in the 
defenders’ favour. The Buffalo did not possess sufficient performance to make use of the 
available warning, even when the radar and observer systems were working correctly. Thus a 
modern early warning system in the Far East would not have yielded overwhelmingly 
successful results. Furthermore, pre-war technical surveys had shown some areas, 
particularly mountainous regions, would present particular siting difficulties given the state 
of the equipment available in 1941 and this factor featured repeatedly during the next few 
years. 
 The defence of the East India ports was of paramount importance from June 1942 as 
supplies were transported into the ports, and the extensive airfield building programme was 
underway. By December 1942 52 radar sets were in operation and this marked an enormous 
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achievement by technicians in the field in the face of adverse topographical weather 
conditions. This marked a big improvement over the beginning of the year, and it assisted 
the defenders during the December raids to intercept and neutralise the Japanese night 
bomber threat. However the system was not perfect. Technical problems made height 
estimation difficult and this was made worse by the lack of a suitable fighter to complete an 
integrated air defence. Like the Buffalo before, the Hurricane did not have sufficient 
performance to quickly achieve an advantageous interception height and radar problems 
magnified its shortcomings. However when the Spitfire fighter was introduced at the end of 
1943 and controllers adapted to its performance, the early warning organisation was able to 
play a full role in a properly integrated system which, by the beginning of 1944, was 
comparable to the defence of the South East of England. Raids were routinely intercepted 
and dispersed, and the threat of reconnaissance Dinahs was neutralised.  
 However despite these successes the Allies found it harder to provide early warning 
when operating in mobile situations. The importance of protecting transport aircraft and 
close support aircraft during the first months of 1944, as well as conserving precious fuel by 
not flying standing patrols, cannot be overstated. However the action at Broadway showed 
that even the Spitfire required sufficient warning and the cover proved harder to provide at 
Imphal when the Japanese overran radar and observer positions to the East of the Plain. 
Whilst some of the early warning gaps could be filled by observer units there were never 
enough personnel to fill the recommended ten-mile gap between posts. Furthermore when 
the Allies began to advance into Burma, early warning proved extremely hard to provide 
owing to the speed of the advance and Burma’s topography.  
 While some of the difficulties can be attributed to personnel shortages, it is clear that 
scientific circumstances played a part. Radar equipment of the period worked well in the 
environment it was designed for, the coast of England looking over the reflective surfaces of 
106 
the sea, and these criteria applied to the defence of Calcutta. From the pre-war surveys in the 
Far East it was clear that technical conditions caused by the weather and topography would 
affect existing radar equipment. Research needed to be carried out to overcome these 
difficulties and provide specialist radar, such as the light-weight set that could be dismantled 
and carried by mule. Unfortunately for the Far East commanders, their research requests 
came at the same time as a limited number of scientists were faced with many requests for 
radar developments in other theatres of war. This is not to say that the Far East was ignored. 
This chapter has effectively demonstrated that scientists were aware of the problems and 
were making active steps to remedy them as the copious correspondence, personal visits and 
ingenious solutions (e.g. the Goose) show. The problems of providing a light-weight 
transportable radar set that could provide high and low cover in mountainous, high humidity 
terrain however was just beyond the capabilities of an over stretched scientific organisation 
in the middle of a world war.   
 Despite these difficulties the early warning organisation played an important role in 
achieving Allied air superiority. In combination with night-fighters in 1943 the threat of 
Japanese night bombers was neutralised for nearly a year leaving Calcutta free to get on with 
its work in the ports and manufacturing industries. Even though there were interception 
problems with the Hurricane, the early warning system provided a measure of warning 
which negated the requirement for costly standing air patrols, and the Hurricanes were able 
to disrupt the incoming raids, even at cost to themselves, thereby preventing Japanese 
aircraft from reaching their targets. The system eventually reached fruition in India with the 
introduction of better aircraft like the Spitfire and this chapter has shown the importance of 
the relationship between early warning and the aircraft employed to achieve an integrated 
defence. Furthermore even though the system experienced some difficulties during the first 
months of 1944, the warning it provided was responsible for the majority of aircraft being 
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shot down or repelled during fighter interceptions. Therefore despite the difficulties, the 
early warning organisation played a crucial role in achieving air supremacy in 1945. 
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Chapter Two – Aircrew, Tactics and Aircraft 
 The Japanese gained air superiority over the Allies in 1941 and early 1942 by 
exploiting British and American weaknesses in aircrew quality, air fighting tactics and 
obsolete aircraft. Chapter One showed how the early warning organisation was initially poor, 
and how the Allies improved the system in defence and attack. This chapter will analyse the 
initial weaknesses in aircrew, tactics and aircraft, and then show how their individual 
improvements contributed to the attainment of air superiority. 
In addition to an efficient early warning system the maintenance of air superiority 
depends on three factors: aircrew that are well trained and experienced for combat; relevant 
air tactics to engage the enemy; and aircraft of sufficient quantity that are suitable for the 
task they are engaged on. These factors are interdependent as, for example, it would be 
useless to have excellent aircraft without the pilots or tactics to exploit them, whilst trained 
and experienced pilots would be at a disadvantage without modern aircraft. From December 
1941 until June 1942, the Japanese possessed the advantage in all these factors and were able 
to gain air superiority over their opponents, whose aircraft, aircrew and tactics were 
relatively poor in comparison. 
 From June 1942 the Allies endeavoured to strengthen their resources as well as build 
on the tactics and combat experience gained through air fighting during the first months of 
the war with Japan. Allied pilots improved in quality due to better initial training, the 
transfer of experienced aircrew to India, and in-theatre training which was relevant to 
combat conditions over the Burma area. This improvement began during the 1942 monsoon 
with the influx of experienced squadrons into the theatre and continued in 1943 and beyond 
with the formation of the Air Fighting Training Unit (A.F.T.U.) in Calcutta. As Allied pilots 
improved, the quality of their Japanese opponents did not significantly deteriorate even 
though their aircraft were largely unchanged, which was in contrast to their colleagues in the 
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Pacific. Both Japanese Navy and Army pilots in the Pacific were sent into combat from 1944 
with insufficient training owing to a growing lack of training resources. This chapter will 
analyse why Japanese pilots held superiority over the Allies in the first engagements in 1941 
and early 1942, and show why the quality of Allied pilots improved whilst that of the 
Japanese fighter pilot remained constant. 
  The fundamental Allied air fighting tactic of dive and zoom had been established in 
early exchanges and was recognized as the best way to counter Japanese fighters’ 
manoeuvrability until the end of air combat in 1945. Whilst thought by some to have been an 
innovation, the tactic had its origins in the First World War and was developed during the 
inter-war years in different guises. This chapter will analyse its development from its origin 
through its use by the Luftwaffe in 1940, to its importance in the Far East campaign and the 
ways in which the Allies adapted it to counter Japanese innovations in early 1944.  
 Whilst aircrew and tactics improved from June 1942, the provision of aircraft for the 
air superiority campaign lagged behind owing to the priority given to the war against 
Germany. Initially Malaya and Burma were equipped with the Buffalo which was thought 
unsuitable for air combat against the Germans, but owing to R.A.F. over-confidence was 
considered a match for Japanese fighters. The Buffalo was replaced by the Hurricane which 
initially fared little better, but from October 1942 it remained the principal R.A.F. fighter 
albeit in later variants. The ‘Germany first’ policy resulted in the delay of a suitable 
defensive fighter, the Spitfire, until September 1943 followed by significant long-range 
offensive fighters, the Lightning and Mustang, from November 1943. These aircraft were 
ultimately crucial in both defence and attack, particularly the American long-range fighters 
which made a significant contribution to the counter-air campaign from January 1944. This 
chapter will show why the Far East was equipped with unsuitable aircraft at the beginning of 
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the war and analyse the impact better aircraft had on the campaign once they were deployed 
to the theatre and to what extent this was important in gaining air superiority. 
Part One - Aircrew 
 When the Far East war began, Japanese aircrew were highly trained and had 
considerable combat experience from their encounters with the Chinese and Soviets during 
the late 1930s. Japanese ability compared with Commonwealth pilots who had a mixture of 
flying experience varying from combat gained during the Battle of Britain to those who had 
recently graduated from flying schools. As the war progressed Allied aircrew became more 
proficient through a mixture of accrued experience and better primary and later operational 
training in which pilots were taught a variety of skills from air combat to methods of ground 
attack. Whilst Allied aircrew improved, Japanese aircrew quality in the Pacific deteriorated 
as a result of attrition and the difficulties in training suitable quantities of pilots in times of 
shortages. However as the quality appeared to deteriorate in the Pacific this section will 
determine whether it actually did so in the Far East and analyse whether Japanese efficiency 
in late 1944 was affected by pilot quality. 
 The Japanese Army Air Force (J.A.A.F.) had its roots in 1909 with the establishment 
of a military balloon association, some Army aircraft participating in reconnaissance and 
bombing operations in 1914 in China and again in 1918-1922 during their Siberian 
expedition into the Amur basin. There were various reasons for the intervention into Siberia: 
firstly to assist local groups who were resisting the Bolshevik regime that had seized power 
from the Kerensky government; secondly, to assist the European Allies who feared war 
equipment would fall into Bolshevik hands; and thirdly, to secure potential economic 
investment rights.1 The intervention brought Japan “little profit and no glory” although the 
                                                          
1 Storry, A History of Modern Japan, pp.157-159. 
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J.A.A.F. gained some experience in reconnaissance and bombing operations.2 Its first fighter 
units were established in 1919 after a French delegation visited Japan to advise the Army on 
aerial matters. They also introduced specific fighter types such as the Nieuport.3 In April 
1921 a branch of the Tokorozawa Flying School was established in Akeno to train fighter 
pilots which became an independent body in 1924, whilst the Aviation Branch itself became 
independent in May 1925.4 The Japanese Naval Air Force (J.N.A.F.) had similar roots as the 
Army with the military balloon association in 1909, but split away in 1912 to conduct its 
own investigations using foreign built floatplanes.5 Naval aviators participated in the First 
World War using floatplanes in reconnaissance and bombing missions although this was the 
only contribution Japanese Naval aircraft made during the war. However, during 1916 a 
flying unit (the Yokosuka Kokoutai) was formed at Yokosuka training aircrew and testing 
new aeroplanes. This formed the basis for an expansion of training units which had increased 
by four in 1930 with plans to organize another 17 Tais (units).6 The Navy received 
assistance from Great Britain and in 1921 a British mission visited Japan to teach new 
techniques and train pilots on new aircraft including fighters. As the 1920s and 30s 
progressed both Air Arms grew in size and the Japanese aircraft industry developed their 
own aircraft such as the Nakajima Type 91, or the Nakajima Type 3, rather than building 
European types under licence. 
 While the J.A.A.F. and J.N.A.F. were expanding and taking delivery of aircraft, 
aircrew training developed accordingly. The expansion of flying training units resulted in 
many more trained pilots, with Army schools producing 750 pilots a year at the outbreak of 
war in 1941, whilst Navy schools were producing about 2,000 a year.7 Although the Army 
concentrated on pilot training at the expense of other aircrew categories, by 1941 Navy 
                                                          
2 Ibid. 
3 Hata, Yasuho and Shores, Japanese Army Air Force Fighter Units and their Aces 1931-1945, p.1. 
4 Ibid, p.1. 
5 Hata, Yasuho and Shores, Japanese Naval Air Force Fighter Units and their Aces 1932-1945, p.1.  
6 Ibid, Footnote, p.1.  
7 TNA, Air 48/69, U.S.S.B.S., Japanese Air Power, p.34.  
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training units were designed to train 2,500 navigators, bomb aimers, gunners and flight 
engineers.8 Aircrew were specially selected for their physical fitness and academic 
excellence, Bergerud describing the former as follows: 
Cadets were put through a gruelling physical program that included hanging 
from an iron pole with one hand, swimming, holding one’s breath, walking on 
hands, standing on heads, diving off a platform onto the ground, and 
wrestling. Poor performance in this program could result in the shame of 
expulsion.9   
The flying training graduation rate could be low; J.N.A.F. pilot, Saburo Sakai wrote that out 
of his class of 1,500 in 1937, only 75 were accepted.10  Such selection and acceptance 
criteria ensured the Japanese air arms were elite bodies confident of their abilities and with 
considerable flying experience. Captain Minoru Genda of the J.N.A.F. stated the average 
flying experience of naval pilots at the beginning of the war was between 800 to 1,000 hours 
with a minimum of 200 to 300, whilst the 600 pilots engaged on the attack at Pearl Harbor 
had an average of 600 flying hours to their credit.11 The average flying experience of both 
Army and Navy pilots operating in the Philippines and Malaya in 1941 was between 500 to 
600 hours and the squadron and flight commanders much more, Genda stating about 2,000.12 
This was in contrast to R.A.F. fighter pilots trained in Britain: 
[P]ilots still, during the winter of 1940 – 1941, went forward to squadrons 
after only 10 – 20 hours flying at the O.T.U., and Fighter Command found 
that at the end of January that some 300 out of 1461 pilots in the first line 
were unfit for operational duties.13   
                                                          
8 Ibid. 
9 Bergerud, Fire in the Sky: The Air War in the South Pacific, p.324. 
10 Sakai, Samurai, p.25. 
11 Bergerud, Fire in the Sky; The Air War in the South Pacific, p.525. Genda planned the Pearl Harbor attack.  
12 TNA, Air 48/69 U.S.S.B.S., Japanese Air Power, p.35 and Bergerud, Fire in the Sky; The Air War in the 
South Pacific, p.325. 
13 TNA, Air 41/4, Flying Training, Aircrew Training 1934-1942, p.505. 
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Moreover, 50 per cent of the J.A.A.F. pilots had combat experience against the Chinese and 
Soviets, whilst 10 per cent of the J.N.A.F. pilots had similar experience fighting the 
Chinese.14 The Army’s experience against the Soviets was particularly important: 
Japanese Army Air Force officers now attribute a considerable part of the 
skill of Army pilots during the first days of the war to the lessons learned 
while fighting the Soviets.15 
This combined experience was to prove beneficial in the early fighting against the British 
and Americans in 1941/42. 
 On 7th December 1941 the Japanese possessed two elite, highly trained and well 
armed air forces and their performance over the next few months surprised the British and 
Americans. Pre-war propaganda gave Allied pilots an erroneous view of the Japanese: 
On the quality of Japanese pilots, we had been told and we had read – in 
rather silly articles – that they couldn’t fly and they couldn’t see! But we 
quickly found out that we were up against some of the most experienced 
pilots in the world.16  
and: 
[V]ery misleading rumours were current about Japanese pilots and their 
capabilities... we were told that a Japanese pilot could not fly over 20,000 
feet!17 
Intelligence relating to Japanese pilots’ abilities had not been passed to R.A.F. pilots as 
Flight Lieutenant Tim Vigors later recalled: 
  I am of the opinion that many aircraft and lives were lost during the  
  first weeks of the war owing to the complete absence of any sound   
  intelligence reports on the performance of Japanese fighters and the  
  ability of their pilots.18 
                                                          
14 Ibid, p.35. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Pilot Officer Jack Storey quoted in Franks, Hurricanes over the Arakan, p.19.   
17 Squadron Leader Frank Howell quoted in Cull, Buffaloes Over Singapore, p.94.  
18 TNA, Air 41/63, The Campaigns in the Far East, Volume II, Malaya, Netherlands East Indies and Burma 
1941-1942, p.62. Vigors had previously fought in the Battle of Britain. 
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Senior British officers expressed disbelief at the Japanese abilities as A.V.M. Donald 
Stevenson, A.O.C. 221 Group, wrote, “The performance of the Japanese aircraft of all types 
and the accuracy of their high level bombing had come as an unpleasant surprise.”19 A.V.M. 
Paul Maltby, Deputy A.O.C., R.A.F. Far East, doubted the Japanese were responsible: 
My general impression at the time was that either the Japanese pilots had 
reached a suspiciously high standard of training, or that German pilots were 
leading these flights.20  
The perception that Germans were leading the attacks was assisted by some Japanese aircraft 
being misidentified for German types as there were various sightings of Ju87s, Bf109s, 
Bf110s and Heinkel bombers, whilst there were reports that some captured airmen were 
wearing German uniforms. Brian Cull quotes correspondent Cecil Brown writing later that 
Lieutenant Peter Court of a Dogra regiment said: 
[O]ne of the planes shot down had a German pilot, wearing a Luftwaffe 
uniform... everyone I talk to say there are German pilots, but I can’t find 
anyone who’s actually seen and talked with one.21 
Toland wrote that Stalin believed some Japanese pilots had been trained in Germany whilst 
others engaged in the attacks were German: 
Curiously, he was convinced that Japanese air successes would not have been 
possible without the Germans, who – according to one secret report – had 
contributed fifteen hundred aircraft and hundreds of pilots.22 
There is no evidence to suggest either German aircraft or aircrews were involved in these 
early and successful attacks, and it is now clear that Japanese aircrew were experts in their 
own right. Their Commonwealth opponents in 1941 did not match this expertise. 
                                                          
19 TNA, Air 2/7787, Operations: Far East; Air Operations in Burma, January to May 1942; Despatch by 
A.V.M. Stevenson, 1942-1948, p.47. 
20 TNA, Air 23/2123, Operations of the R.A.F. during the campaigns in Malaya and Netherlands East Indies: 
report by Air Vice-Marshal P.C. Maltby, 1st January 1941 to 31st December 1942, p.6. 
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22 Toland, Rising Sun, p.248. 
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In contrast to the Japanese at the start of December 1941 the British and 
Commonwealth pilots had a patchy record of experience. Whilst squadron and flight 
commanders were ex-Spitfire and Hurricane pilots with experience fighting the Germans in 
Europe and the Middle East, many pilots had no combat experience and limited flying time. 
When the Buffalo arrived in the Far East in February 1941 its squadrons were formed from 
scratch with some experienced pilots, some inexperienced, and others who had transferred 
from other squadrons.23 The first two Buffalo squadrons, 67 and 243, drew selected pilots 
from Blenheim units, whilst some pilots transferred from flying the Vildebeest biplane.24 
488 Squadron R.N.Z.A.F. was composed of New Zealand pilots of “fundamentally excellent 
material, but with a low standard of flying experience” some of whom had arrived from 
flying training school having trained on biplanes and with no operational training.25 
Furthermore not all the pilots were suited for fighter operations. A.V.M. Maltby wrote of 21 
Squadron R.A.A.F. which had originally flown Wirraways: 
It will be observed, therefore, that the pilots of this squadron had not been 
selected originally for fighter aircraft and some were not in fact entirely 
suitable for this role.26 
Sergeant Rex Weber wrote in his diary, “So eventually I finished by volunteering for 
fighters, but I might say that I have little faith in myself as a fighter pilot.”27 Squadron 
Leader William Harper commanding 453 Squadron R.A.A.F. later recalled: 
The aircrew personnel of no. 453 Squadron, with the exception of the Flight 
Commanders, were pilots straight from F.T.S., and some of them told me 
when I questioned them, that they had no desire to be fighter pilots and had 
been given no choice in this matter.28 
                                                          
23 TNA, Air 2/7787, Operations: Far East; Air Operations in Burma, January to May 1942; Despatch by 
A.V.M. Stevenson, 1942-1948, p.40. 
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25 Cull, Buffaloes Over Singapore, p.44. 
26 TNA, Air 23/2123, Operations of the R.A.F. during the campaigns in Malaya and Netherlands East Indies: 
report by Air Vice-Marshal P.C. Maltby, 1st January 1941 to 31st December 1942, paragraph 78. The Wirraway 
was an armed version of the Harvard trainer. 
27 Cull, Buffaloes Over Singapore, p.19.  
28 Ibid, P.23.  
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 The newly posted squadron pilots entered an intensive and difficult period of 
training. There was a lack of experienced flying instructors to train the new pilots to an 
Operational Training Unit (O.T.U.) standard. As a result they were often trained by their 
squadron and flight commanders. The Buffalo squadrons suffered, in Maltby’s view, from a 
poor standard of gunnery, and he concluded this was due to too few and slow target drogue 
towing aircraft, lack of cine-gun equipment and the shortcomings of the aircraft’s guns. 
There was: 
Continual trouble with the .5 gun and synchronising gear. This was largely 
overcome by local modification by October 1941. Nevertheless many pilots 
were still not altogether confident about their armament.29 
The combination of inexperienced pilots and new aircraft resulted in inevitable flying 
accidents and whilst some of the accidents were the result of pilot error, others were caused 
by engine failure or other mechanical defects.30 
 On 8th December 1941 these combat inexperienced pilots met the Japanese air forces 
with its combat ready aircrews. Despite the disparity, the Commonwealth pilots’ 
inexperience cannot be used as the only reason why the Japanese were ultimately successful 
in Malaya and Singapore. This thesis has demonstrated the lack of an effective early warning 
system, and the quality and quantity of Japanese fighter aircraft must also be taken into 
consideration. It is clear that many of the pilots had flying ability, but there was no substitute 
for combat experience against a determined foe especially when the other factors are 
considered. Furthermore during the period between the opening of hostilities and the 
Hurricanes arrival in January 1942 there was insufficient time to train replacement pilots: 
Our reinforcements consist of nine Australian Sergeant Pilots; unfortunately 
they were not operational and we were apparently expected to train them all 
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in one Buff on a bomb-torn aerodrome. So now do you wonder why 453 is 
getting properly brassed off?31 
Things did not improve when Hurricanes arrived. On 15th January 1942 51 Hurricanes were 
delivered in crates to the Far East and after assembly and test flights were put into action 
against the Japanese. Within fourteen days these aircraft had suffered severe losses: 
  17 had been written off 
7 damaged but repairable 
2 damaged and reparable by the squadrons 
21 available for operations immediately 
4 serviceable within 24 hours32 
Given that these aircraft should have “swept the Japanese from the sky” there was clearly a 
problem and Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal (Chief of the Air Staff) contacted Maltby 
on 8th February: 
At a time when so much depends on you and those under you, who are 
fighting a historic battle against great odds and under tremendous difficulties, 
I am most reluctant to add to your labours. I should nevertheless be glad to 
receive privately from you some indication of the causes of the very moderate 
success of the Hurricane against the Japanese on occasion when interceptions 
are made.33 
Portal displayed some ignorance of Japanese capabilities: 
Intelligence here do not credit Japs with high performance and we hoped on 
arrival of more experienced fighter pilots that you would make tea with them 
if only you could make interceptions. We all feel that at least occasional 
infliction of really heavy casualties on Jap Air Force such as Hurricanes 
achieve in Burma is to be expected and would have enormous effect.34 
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Maltby attributed some of the problems to poor morale, the lack of adequate early warning, 
the weight of Japanese bombing and mounting battle casualties.35 However he made clear 
that pilot quality played a significant part: 
First squadrons not homogenous units but collection of individuals, great 
majority from O.T.U.’s who could not shoot and not well trained in fighting 
tactics... Later squadrons had majority experienced pilots withdrawn before 
sailing and replaced by O.T.U. trainees.36   
Maltby’s message prompted Portal to instigate an enquiry into the allegation that better 
pilots had been removed, telling Prime Minister Winston Churchill: 
It does not surprise me to learn that those of them who were but newly trained 
when they left England should have been found weak in air gunnery when 
first sent against the enemy on their arrival.37 
This was corroborated by Pilot Officer Jerry Parker who later recalled that after initial 
training he had arrived at the O.T.U. in Usworth in February 1941 and after flying solo on 
the Hurricane had only one lesson in wartime flying on the aircraft owing to bad weather.38 
After posting to 232 Squadron he flew convoy protection roles but found there were 
restrictions on non-operational flying: 
Such restrictions were probably the cause of our not practising aerial gunnery; 
we were allowed one short burst apiece using one of our eight guns at a 
ground target and another at a towed drogue target.39  
Portal’s enquiry into the allegation that better pilots had been removed revealed a number of 
unfortunate events.40 Whilst examination of the squadrons’ rosters revealed that no pilots 
had been exchanged before sailing, some less experienced pilots had gone by sea instead of 
making a long overland flight. Of the original 24 pilots sent to Singapore, consisting of four 
flight commanders and 20 pilots from 17, 135, 136 and 232 Squadrons the enquiry stated, 
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“The pilots sent by ship would be immobilised for a long period at sea and were probably 
not the pick of the bunch.” Similarly 14 more pilots from 242, 258 and 605 received the 
comment, “Here again, the least well-trained pilots were probably sent on the long sea 
route.”41 The report makes an important point as the emergency in Singapore occurred after 
the squadrons had set sail for its Middle East destinations where it was likely the pilots 
would have had more time to acclimatise to combat condition: 
All these 38 pilots were at sea before the need to reinforce Singapore arose 
and there was nothing very much we could do about improving their 
quality.42 
Furthermore, Maltby later observed that the situation in Malaya was so desperate that there 
was no time to form the Hurricanes into defined units, or to acclimatise to the conditions and 
Portal confirmed to Churchill:  
In the Far East emergency there was nothing to be done except to try to get 
what pilots and aircraft we could to Singapore in time. This alone was the 
reason for the unfortunate mixture fragments from various sources.43  
Portal’s report to Churchill was an accurate summary of the inquiry’s findings but failed to 
mention the fact that 232 and 258 Squadrons: 
[H]ad done a journey half way across the world and would have arrived in 
Singapore at a time when conditions were going bad. Even if they had 
contained crack pilots they would not therefore have had much chance to 
show what they could do.44 
This reinforces the point that the inexperience of Commonwealth pilots was only one factor 
in explaining Japanese superiority, others being the lack of early warning and inadequate 
aircraft. 
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 While pilots gained experience in combat against the Japanese, many of them, 
including more experienced pilots, were lost in action, therefore leaving a partial vacuum. 
The situation did not alter significantly until the defence of Rangoon. By that time some 
experienced pilots had reached Burma with 17 and 135 Squadrons and the Allied effort 
included the American pilots of the A.V.G. with their P-40s. The Americans were basically 
mercenaries employed by the Chinese government and some of the pilots had been recruited 
from non-fighter units. Colonel Claire Chennault, air advisor to the Chinese government, had 
recognized the importance of intensive training and put the recruits through training 
consisting of five to eight hours per day on aerial combat theories, section attacks and 
knowledge of their aircraft.45 In air fighting between 23rd and 29th January the R.A.F. and 
A.V.G. claimed 50 Japanese bombers and fighters destroyed, and between 24th and 25th 
February 37 Japanese aircraft destroyed.46 Conditions over Burma had changed for the 
fighter pilots. Whereas neither the Hurricane nor P-40 were ideal, they were better than the 
Buffalo, and took advantage of the improved early warning system to gain height. However 
although pilot and aircraft quality improved during this period, the gradual reduction in 
aircraft numbers and removal of sufficient early warning coverage eventually resulted in the 
Allied air cover diminishing before the fall of Burma.  
 R.A.F. pilot and aircrew training improved as the war progressed. At the beginning 
the expansion programme concentrated on increasing numbers; in 1934 the R.A.F. trained 
300 new pilots, whereas in 1941 the number had increased to 22,000 thanks to an expansion 
of training schemes at home and also in the Commonwealth and America.47 The scramble to 
train aircrew experienced various problems such as lack of facilities, insufficient instructors 
and a lack of suitable aircraft, and in the race to train more pilots quality was initially 
sacrificed for quantity: 
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A pilot’s pre-squadron flying experience rose from 150 hours in 1934 to 350-
450 in 1942. The quantitative expansion came first, and lack of reserves made 
it necessary to sacrifice quality to quantity in 1940 and 1941, but quantitative 
expansion and a solution to the problems of operational training made 
possible a great qualitative expansion at the beginning of 1942.48   
Whilst the quantitative expansion began at the start of 1942 the Far East experienced some 
difficulties establishing a fighter O.T.U. with a number of aircraft including Hurricanes and 
Mohawks, which were short of spare parts.49 Designated 151 O.T.U. on 28th July 1942, its 
18 allotted aircraft resulted in its only being able to train 20 pilots at a time, but with nearly 
300 more requiring tuition. Between July and March 1943 the unit concentrated on training 
pilots from the Indian Air Force, but in June 1943 following a review of fighter pilot 
requirements it was planned to expand the O.T.U. to train 100 pilots per month, with shorter 
course times, but the planning depended on deliveries of aircraft from Britain. The plan was 
not expected to reach fruition until early 1944, but in the event all O.T.U.s were transferred 
to the Middle East. Despite these problems all pilots and crews were arriving fully trained 
and after jungle training were ready to join their squadrons.50  
The American experience was similar to that of the British. At the outbreak of war, 
training organizations were placed on a war basis and initially shortages of aircraft and 
instructors had to be overcome which eventually succeeded owing to its resources and great 
pool of aircrew recruits. For example, at the end of December 1942 93,000 men were 
awaiting aircrew classification prior to training and in April 1943 over 60,000 were in 
aircrew colleges at over 150 institutions.51 In December 1943 the Americans had 74,000 
pilots in various stages of training on 55 week courses, 45 of which were spent flying. This 
eventually resulted in a vast pool of well trained pilots reaching operational units.52  
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In addition to better pilots and training, many of the Allied reinforcements brought 
combat experience to the theatre. In late 1942, the newly arrived 79 and 607 Hurricane 
Squadrons brought extensive combat experience from Europe, and Beaufighter crews which 
arrived in January 1943 to counter the Japanese night bomber operations had considerable 
experience from combat operations in the Middle East. Furthermore in early 1944, 81 and 
152 Squadrons, equipped with Spitfires were posted to India from the Middle East and Italy, 
bringing combat experience gained against German units. Similarly the Americans were able 
to bring in experienced pilots. For example the fighter pilots of the 1st Air Commando Group 
(A.C.G.), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Philip Cochran and Colonel John Allison, were 
hand-picked: 
The lure of combat duty and the secret nature of Project 9 made recruiting 
simple. Lieutenant Colonel Cochran said, “We were allowed to bring in from 
anywhere – if we knew a man’s name, we’d send for him. We knew them 
through our time in the Air Force.”53 
So there was an influx of experienced pilots and aircrew reaching the Far East, but together 
with their comrades already in the theatre the majority undertook important additional 
operational training.54 
 Operational training for aircrews in the Far East was carried out at the Air Fighting 
Training Unit (A.F.T.U.) at Armada Road, Calcutta. The unit was formed in April 1943 
under the command of Wing Commander Frank Carey, an ex-Battle of Britain pilot who had 
recent experience fighting the Japanese over Burma in 1942. The unit was quickly in 
operation and on 10th July: 
Air Fighting Training Unit Amarda Road now training 60 pupils comprising 
of 16 pilots on pilot gunnery instructors course plus 2 possible attachments 
from USAAC – 3 weeks, 30 bomber aircrew on refresher course – 3 weeks, 6 
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navigators on bombing leaders course – 6 weeks and 6 air gunners on 
gunnery leaders course – 6 weeks.55 
The unit’s importance was recognized: 
Our main operational success coming winter will depend upon tactics and 
firing of our very rapidly increasing SE fighter force. 4 squadrons will come 
from Middle East and need training on tactics against Japanese. 3 squadrons 
are converting to Spitfires. Air fighting, and tactical instruction our success 
depends very largely on the AFTU which must therefore operate and train 
and be administered by the best men we can put into it.56 
Fighter pilots were instructed in facets of air fighting such as gunnery and deflection 
shooting, and also in the essential dive and zoom tactic. Shortly after receiving its Spitfires 
in September 1943, 615 Squadron attended the A.F.T.U. between 16th and 31st October and 
its Operations Record Book shows the course contained deflection shooting, range 
estimations and drogue and cine-gun attacks.57 Furthermore, American pilots attended the 
unit to learn the essentials of air fighting in the Far East; 459th Fighter Squadron (F.S.) 
Lightning pilots attended Amarda Road in February 1944 and impressed the instructors with 
the rapid development of their new skills.58  The importance of this specialized and on-going 
training cannot be over-emphasised. A.C.M. Pierse wrote, “the A.F.T.U. is doing very good 
work and has led to considerable improvement in the standard of shooting and fighting 
efficiency of fighter squadrons.”59 Similarly American General Howard Davidson wrote to 
Carey on 12th March 1944 following the 459th first attack, “We are indebted to you for the 
fine training you have given them. Accept our sincere thanks.”60 A.V.M. Thomas Williams, 
A.O.C. Air Headquarters Bengal, expanded on the American’s message, “Positive rules in 
combat are what we are striving for and I am satisfied your course is accomplishing this.”61 
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This was clearly an important training attribute which provided theatre pilots with expert, 
and relevant, knowledge of their enemy. 
 As the Allies developed their training organization the Japanese similarly increased 
their programme firstly by forming 18 new training units with the intention of providing a 
year’s flying training for officers and enlisted men. As the pace of war increased the 
Japanese formed another two new training groups, one late in 1942 and another in early 
1943, this expansion providing the J.A.A.F. with 2,700 pilots in both 1942 and 1943, 
whereas the J.N.A.F. produced 2,300 in 1942 and 2,700 in 1943.62 Although there was a 
steady stream of new pilots, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (U.S.S.B.S.) 
pointed out that during those two years both Japanese Army and Navy pilots suffered a 
decline in their flying hours prior to entering combat due to the necessity of quickly 
replacing pilots lost in the early encounters. Replacing mounting losses after the early 
Pacific battles became a priority and in 1943 the Japanese decided to re-organize and expand 
pilot training by increasing the number of intermediate units from 18 to 48, and by forming 
new units specifically to provide primary training.63 Similar re-organization occurred in 
1943 when operational training units were formed to give new pilots specific training for 
their role, as the equivalent R.A.F. units did. Until that time Japanese operational squadrons 
provided their pilots with this necessary training, but this had the potential of interfering with 
combat operations.  
The Japanese expanded training programme was designed to produce 30,000 pilots 
per year, but this rate was not attained owing to shortages of fuel, aircraft and attacks on 
Japanese training bases by Allied aircraft. Between 1st January 1944 and 1st January 1945 the 
J.N.A.F. and J.A.A.F. each trained 16,000 aircrew. As this figure was not broken down into 
classifications it is therefore safe to assume that the figure of 30,000 pilots was not 
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achieved.64 Pilots suffered from a reduction in accrued flying hours before entering combat 
which, depending on sources, ranged from between 100 to 400 hours. In an intelligence 
report written in April 1945 a figure of 200 hours was quoted; in another 1945 intelligence 
report 300 to 400 hours was quoted; and in the U.S.S.B.S. report of 1946 the pilots are 
supposed to have reached their combat status with only 100 hours.65 The lack of relevant 
flying experience could make the difference between life and death in combat. For example 
at the Battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944 the main body of the 1st Air Flotilla were 
new graduates from flying schools with 100-150 hours in their logbooks to replace 45% 
losses suffered over Bougainville and Rabaul the previous November.66 In the subsequent air 
battles American pilots claimed over 500 Japanese aircraft destroyed, many of these as a 
result of Japanese pilots’ inexperience and the action became known as the ‘Great Marianas 
Turkey Shoot.’ Consistent pilot losses were experienced throughout the Pacific Theatre as 
Japanese aircrews and pilots fell behind that of their American opponents, but did this 
deterioration play a part in damaging Japanese operations in Burma? 
Firstly the J.N.A.F. can be discounted from the Far Eastern analysis as they were 
withdrawn to other areas after the 1942 monsoon and, apart from occasional operations, such 
as the joint raid on Calcutta on 5th December 1943, were not encountered again. The 
departure left the J.A.A.F. as the Allies’ opponent but a reduction in its pilots’ quality is 
questionable. The authors of the Air Historical Branch (A.H.B.) narrative wrote: 
There is no doubt, however, that his air forces in Burma felt the impact of 
poor long term planning in his training organization for his replacement pilots 
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and aircrews were generally inferior in quality than those who took part in 
their initial offensives.67 
However the narrative does not identify when the deterioration occurred, and it does not give 
any specific evidence of Japanese aircrew inferiority. Analysis of commanding officers’ 
despatches from such as A.C.M. Sir Richard Pierse, A.C.M. Sir Keith Park, A.V.M. Thomas 
Williams and Major-General George Stratemeyer, particularly those from late 1943 until 
May 1945, reveals nothing to indicate a deterioration of Japanese aircrew quality which 
would have been apparent from their pilots’ combat reports.68 Similarly an analysis of all 
Spitfire squadrons’ Operations Record Books from October 1944 to May 1945 reveals no 
comments about their adversaries’ abilities at a time when other theatres, for example the 
Pacific, were reporting a decline. In the U.S.S.B.S. report on air operations in Burma the 
authors wrote of Japanese aircrew between 1st June 1944 and 1st June 1945, “Japanese pilots 
and air crews, with the possible exception of those based in the extreme rear areas, were 
tough, experienced, and resourceful fighters.”69  In December 1943 S.E.A.C. asked the Air 
Ministry and the Americans in the South West Pacific if there was a deterioration in 
Japanese aircrew standard as a result of training deficiencies or the lack of first class pilots. 
The Americans answered that there was a general deterioration in standards owing to the 
heavy combat losses endured by Japanese forces, but the Air Ministry replied; “Reports 
reaching us suggest that pilots are below standard prevailing at breakout of war but that there 
is not yet any serious deterioration of quality.”70 Furthermore, during the first crucial six 
months of air fighting in Burma in 1944 the Allies apparently encountered a skilful and 
respected enemy and if there was a deterioration in quality it was not mentioned by pilots in 
books such as Norman Franks’ The Air Battle of Imphal.71 The Allied Weekly Intelligence 
                                                          
67 TNA, Air 41/64 The Campaigns in the Far East; Volume IV South East Asia November 1943 to August 
1945, p.44. 
68 Stratemeyer was the Air Commander, Eastern Air Command. 
69 R.A.F. Museum, Hendon, U.S.S.B.S. Report, Air Operations in China, Burma, India, p.13. 
70 TNA, Air 23/7674, Air Command South Sea Asia. Japanese Air Forces; organisation, report 14th December 
1943.  
71 Franks, The Air Battle of Imphal.  
127 
Summary makes no mention of aircrew quality until 9th April 1944 when the report mentions 
the withdrawal of Japanese bomber units following recent losses for replacement and 
training.72 Similarly on 4th June 1944 medium bombers were withdrawn after experiencing 
serious losses, but the analysts believed that the forthcoming monsoon would give the units 
necessary time for training as it was “believed many crews are very inexperienced.”73 
Crucially, however, the intelligence summaries give important clues about the fighter pilot 
quality in Burma. On 8th October it was reported that the 50th and 64th Sentais were “old and 
experienced units which have operated in this theatre for well over two years, while 204th 
made its first appearance in December 1943 in the combined raid on Calcutta.”74 On 29th 
October the summary reported on the 19th October Fleet Air Arm (F.A.A.) attack on Sumatra 
when 12 Oscars were encountered. The intelligence officers thought a small fighter unit had 
been based in the area for some weeks. The F.A.A. pilots made reference to: 
The seemingly ill-trained pilots and poor showing of the intercepting aircraft, 
it does seem more likely that they were drawn from this unit rather than from 
the well-trained and experienced units in Burma.75 
 There were various factors to explain why Japanese pilot quality did not deteriorate 
in the Far East. Firstly the tempo of their operations was much slower, for example, than 
those in the South West Pacific; Japanese air activity tended to be at a high intensity for a 
few days followed by up to a fortnight when no operations were carried out. This inactivity 
was due to a policy of aircraft conservation and to the weather conditions over Burma which 
precluded aerial operations by both sides, and gave the aircrews time for rest, recuperation 
and local training when practicable. Furthermore there was no air activity during the two 
monsoon periods of 1942 and 1943 which gave the aircrews additional time away from 
operations. Whilst some Japanese fighter pilots were sent away to other theatres on 
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detachment during the monsoons, there is no evidence to suggest entire squadrons were 
redeployed. 
 Crucially there was the additional factor of aircrew attrition which appears to have 
been lower than in the Pacific Theatre. Dr Yasuo Izawa and Hiroshi Ichimura researched 
Japanese records for this period and Christopher Shores used their findings in Air War For 
Burma. Using the figures as a minimum statistic for Japanese fatalities in air-to-air defensive 
operations gives this table: 
Against the RAF     
1943   1944   1945 
Fighter Pilots   8   17   4 
Bomber Crews  24   4   2 
Reconnaissance Crews  4   9   3  
Against the USAAF 
Fighter Pilots   22   4   3 
Bomber Crews  8   8   0 
Reconnaissance Crews  0   1   076  
These figures are for the entire year and it can be assumed that such losses could be easily 
replaced. The statistics above are from air-to-air interceptions, but aircrew attrition during 
counter-air operations did not yield any more significant results. For example during the 
intensive counter-air campaign between 1st January and 31st July 1944 Japanese aircrew 
fatalities during Allied action over their lines were 23 pilots and one bomber crew killed 
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which demonstrates the difficulties in attacking the enemy on his own territory.77 Whilst 
aircraft could be destroyed when parked on the airfields, unless the aircrews were in the 
machine or in close proximity they would escape injury or death; many of the fatalities 
reported were as occupied aircraft were taking off, landing or taxiing.  Allowing for these 
numbers only representing fatalities and not those aircrews who were injured, the losses do 
not appear to have impacted adversely upon Japanese aircrew quality which was still high 
during the first half of 1944. 
 In October 1944 the J.A.A.F. started to transfer units away from Burma to other 
theatres, including the defence of Japan itself. As these units withdrew there is no evidence 
that aircrew quality diminished as aircraft quantity gradually reduced to negligible numbers 
by April 1945. Therefore it would appear from the available evidence that the Allies fought a 
resourceful enemy whose skill was undiminished during the Far East campaign.      
 
Part Two – Air-to-Air Tactics 
 
 From October 1942 the quantity and, eventually, the quality of Allied aircraft 
improved and this will be described in the next section. Throughout the war Japanese fighter 
aircraft remained dangerous adversaries owing to their light design and high manoeuvrability 
at low speeds. The Oscar remained the principal Japanese fighter in the Burma Theatre until 
1945 but even then it was regarded with respect by Allied pilots. To counter their 
manoeuvrability Allied pilots adopted the dive and zoom tactic where the attacker gained the 
advantage of height before diving at high speed through the enemy formation, and then 
‘zooming’ up before repeating the action. This was a fundamental air fighting tactic and was 
still taught to British and American pilots in 1945. However the tactic as employed 
specifically in the Far East is overlooked. Mike Spick’s Fighter Pilot Tactics, for example, 
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which mentions dive and zoom in other conflicts fails to mention the Far East separately.78 
This section will analyse the background to the dive and zoom tactic from the First World 
War and discuss its significance for Allied combat operations in the Far East.  
 During the First World War Anthony Fokker had devised interrupter gears which 
allowed a machine gun to fire through the propeller arc without damaging it and this 
equipment was fitted to the Fokker E-1, a monoplane of “clean design and good 
performance” which had an “ability to make long, almost vertical dives”.79 This ability was 
exploited into a tactic which Jones described as drawing “inspiration from the hawk”, but 
can be recognized as the dive and zoom attack.80 Jones described how the German pilot 
cruised at height above the German lines awaiting his victim, before swooping down from 
behind, firing a long burst of fire before continuing to dive past out of range, “If the British 
aeroplane was not shot down... the German pilot would climb again and continue his swift 
diving attack.”81 With the German introduction of the machine gun equipped fighter it was a 
logical for tactics to be devised for its use and it was natural for its pilots to develop methods 
to make the best use of the fighter’s capabilities. After testing the Fokker E-1 Oswald 
Boelcke became aware of its advantages devising four basic principles of air fighting, 
“height advantage; attacking out of the sun; the use of cloud for concealment; and close 
range.”82 These formed the basis for all future air fighting.  
 
 During the inter-war period the lessons of the First World War were developed. In 
1925 a former Royal Flying Corps (R.F.C.) pilot, Major Oliver Stewart, wrote The Strategy 
and Tactics of Air Fighting, which was based on the experiences of First World War pilots. 
It contained the essentials:  
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[T]he value of surprise, gained by height and a position up-sun; how to 
quarter the sky; the use of the bounce (called the dive and zoom attack); the 
need to turn into the enemy if attacked.83 
As Boelcke and his contempories had discovered, the main essentials of air fighting, height 
and surprise, would require the aircraft to be at height above the enemy which must 
necessarily impact on aircraft design and operation. For example in 1934 the Design and 
Tactics of Air Defence of Great Britain Fighters prophetically stated: 
The rate of climb demanded for fighters also has to be increased with every 
improvement in the speed of enemy bombers... it may be that the time is 
approaching when we must modify the method of handling our fighters and 
get them off the ground earlier than at present. It may even be necessary in 
very special circumstances to establish standing patrols; this will involve the 
use of aeroplanes with much greater endurance.84 
This was written before the introduction of an integrated early warning system but gives a 
strong indication of the importance of height advantage, and in the absence of an early 
warning system, a fast climbing aircraft. It was reinforced in the R.A.F.’s 1937 Manual of 
Air Tactics as was the importance of surprise: 
Surprise is the most potent of the incalculable factors in air fighting. The 
chance of achieving surprise always exists. Superiority in armament or in 
performance will not save a pilot from almost certain destruction if he allows 
himself to be surprised.85    
The 1937 Manual was concerned with attacking bombers in tight sections of three fighters in 
the ‘number one’ and ‘number two’ attacks, but whilst the dive and zoom attack is not 
specifically mentioned, reference is made to ‘pecking attacks’. In this the attacking fighters, 
taking advantage of the enemy’s blind spots with diving and converging attacks, would 
“withdraw to a position from which he can repeat the manoeuvre.”86 Once again this 
manoeuvre could be quickly adapted into a dive and zoom to take advantage of the fighter’s 
height and performance. 
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With the advent of the Second World War the two main European protagonists 
started with different tactical formations. The RAF flew in rigid sections of three aircraft 
which necessitated the two wingmen concentrating on flying in formation with the leader 
rather than keeping a watch for enemy aircraft. However as a result of their experiences in 
the Spanish Civil War, the Luftwaffe adopted a more flexible formation of four aircraft 
(Schwarm) which were split into two pairs of aircraft called a ‘Rotte’. The Rotte was the 
basic fighting unit and enabled the leader to concentrate on fighting whilst his wingman kept 
a vigil 200 yards above, behind and slightly to one side in an extension of Boelcke’s 
tactics.87 When the R.A.F. and Luftwaffe met over France and Britain in 1940, the 
superiority of German tactics soon became apparent and their aircraft formations were 
adopted by the British at first on an ad-hoc and then official basis. While the British and 
German formations may have differed, the fundamental principles of height advantage and 
surprise were equally important to both.  
Following extensive combat during the Battle of Britain the South African ace, 
Squadron Leader Adolphus ‘Sailor’ Malan, devised ten rules for air fighting, which were 
published by the R.A.F. to assist other pilots and rule number four was “Height gives you the 
initiative.”88 Paramount to gaining the height initiative was the early warning and control 
system employed by the RAF in 1940 which prevented costly standing patrols, whilst 
ensuring the defending fighters had sufficient time to be manoeuvred into advantageous 
attacking positions. While these were both fundamental factors, tactics had to be adapted to 
take advantage of the fighter’s capabilities. For example, during the Battle of Britain the 
Luftwaffe found the Bf109 could be out-turned by the Spitfire and Hurricane in combat and 
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“countered [this] by using dive and zoom tactics.”89 Sixteen months later, the R.A.F. used 
these same tactics against the Japanese. 
Whilst these lessons had been learned and developed into, for example, wing 
formations by the end of 1940 in Europe and the Middle East, at the end of 1941 British and 
American pilots in the Far East had to adapt their tactics to suit a different and dangerous 
enemy. However, the potential of Japanese fighter aircraft and their pilots had been 
recognized during the late 1930s during the Chinese-Japanese war. Colonel Claire Chennault 
had firsthand experience of Japanese fighter aircraft and their pilots and he later wrote of the 
high quality of the Japanese pilots’ training and cocky aggressiveness.90 Furthermore he 
observed that Japanese fighters sacrificed armour to achieve greater manoeuvrability in 
comparison to U.S. fighters, which made them dangerous to dogfight, “In a turning tail-
chasing dogfight they were poisonous.”91 As Chinese pilots were engaging their Japanese 
enemies, four Soviet fighter squadrons arrived at the end of 1937 equipped with a mixture of 
the manoeuvrable Polikarpov I-15 biplane and fast Polikarpov I-16 monoplane. In response 
to the Japanese aircraft the Soviets used their powerful fighters to dive away from their 
opponents and, offensively, to attack using the dive and zoom.92  
Observing and participating in the aerial combat gave Chennault a respect for the 
Japanese pilots’ capabilities which complemented their aircraft, and he was able to pass his 
experience to the American Volunteer Group pilots in 1941. The A.V.G. were equipped at 
the time with an early version of the Curtiss P-40 which was heavily armed, fast and robust 
but was not capable of matching the high manoeuvrability of Japanese aircraft. Lecturing to 
his pilots Chennault said: 
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You can count on a higher top speed, faster dive, and superior firepower. The 
Jap fighters have a faster rate of climb, higher ceiling, and better 
maneuverability. They can turn on a dime and climb almost straight up. If 
they can get you into a turning combat they are deadly. Use your speed and 
diving power to make a pass, shoot and break away... Close your range, fire 
and dive away.93    
One of Chennault’s pilots confirmed his leader’s instructions: 
Chennault told us that we had a sorry airplane, as fighters go. That it had two 
things; diving speed and gunfire. If we used those, we could get by with it. If 
not, we were going to get shot up, cold turkey. He told us: never stay in and 
fight; never try and turn; never try to mix it with them. All we could do was 
to get altitude and dive on them and keep going – hit and run tactics.94   
One unidentified A.V.G. pilot was interviewed on his return to America after combat in 
October 1942: 
If he was above me my first movement would be away from him and down. 
There’s nothing you can do to combat those fellows, when they have the 
advantage... After you’ve got out of the proximity of the battle, climb up to 
altitude, and come back into the fracas again.95  
The Americans took advantage of the tactic and took it into the Pacific Theatre as will be 
shown later and together with their adoption of R.A.F. formations, were in a reasonable 
position to engage the Japanese.96  
When R.A.F. squadrons engaged the Japanese from 8th December 1941 many pilots 
had not experienced aerial combat whilst some had fought the Germans and Italians. In 
Europe and the Middle East it was customary to climb into the formation and then engage in 
a turning dogfight exploiting the Spitfire or Hurricane’s manoeuvrability. However as 
described earlier, this tactic could not be used by the Buffalo against the Nate, Oscar or Zero. 
The R.A.F. pilots were quick to realize their opponents’ capabilities: 
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The Army 97 [Nate] could turn right inside the Buffalo and I was a little too 
long in realizing the extent of their manoeuvrability.97 
 
and:  
If you were mixed in a dogfight with a Zero, the outcome was very clear. 
Very quickly you were a dead man.98 
It is not clear whether the R.A.F. pilots were aware of the dive and zoom tactic at this time, 
but the prerequisite for its implementation was height and owing to the lack of adequate 
early warning and the Buffalo’s slow climb rate it would have been difficult to use. Other 
methods of countering the Japanese fighters were tried. Sergeant Ross Leys remembered a 
First World War tactic whereby if a pilot found himself within a circle of attacking fighters 
he would fly inside the circle in the opposite direction and break up the enemy formation.99 
Flight Lieutenant Mowbray Garden recalled trying an unusual method: 
There were three of them in formation on my tail and I could not out-turn 
them. I was dying for an excuse to bail out, until I remembered the advice of 
Flt Lt Tim Vigors, which was to the effect that when you think all is lost and 
death and destruction are imminent, just shut your eyes, work the rudder left 
and right, open the throttle to maximum and ‘pudding basin’ the control 
column. I did just that and when I opened my eyes there was not an aircraft in 
the sky.100 
Both these measures showed the pilots using a previous generation’s experiences or a tactic 
born out of necessity, but neither involved the dive and zoom technique. However when 
height was attained the dive and zoom was used. Sergeant Geoff Fiskin shot down five 
Japanese aircraft in a week over Singapore in a Buffalo and later attributed his success to the 
dive and zoom tactic: 
The only thing to do was to get as much height as possible above any Japs 
before making an attack – preferably two or three thousand feet – when you 
could make the initial attack and have enough speed created in the dive to get 
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round for a second go, even if it meant putting your feet on the dash board 
and blacking out slightly. This did not always work as the Jap planes 
outnumbered us by 10-20 to one, but when it did we got victories. When it 
did not we got out and lived to fight another day.101 
The timing of Fiskin’s experiences is important in tracing the evolution of the dive and zoom 
tactic in the Far East. The fifth of his victories was scored on 21st January over Singapore 
which was a couple of months before the R.A.F. and the A.V.G. shared an airfield whilst 
defending Rangoon. It is not recorded if the Americans had been in contact with the R.A.F. 
to share their tactic, or whether the latter had not been able to implement it owing to the 
Buffalo and lack of early warning. It is possible that individual pilots remembered past 
accounts of the stories of First World War pilots’ tactics as Sergeant Leys had, or been 
forced to adapt tactics as learned in the pre-war years, e.g. the pecking attack and there were 
enough serving pilots trained in the 1938 Air Fighting Manual. Furthermore, experience was 
a vital element in addition to taking advice. For example, after the first Hurricanes saw 
action over Singapore in January 1942 casualties were sustained even though their pilots had 
been advised of the “inadvisability of getting involved with ‘dog-fighting’ owing to the navy 
‘O’s [Zero] small turning circle”.102 An unidentified Buffalo pilot reported: 
The R.A.F. boys flying them [the Hurricanes] began to mix it with the Zeros 
which we knew was practically impossible. The Zero was just about the 
nippiest, most highly manoeuvrable fighter in the world. They buzzed around 
the Hurricanes like vicious bees.103  
However, later in January, even though the Hurricanes were outnumbered, the pilots 
achieved better results using the dive and zoom tactic as, “with the realization that ‘dog-
fighting’ did not pay, the revised ‘in and out’ tactics adopted gradually gave increasing 
success.”104 
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 As the air fighting subsided over Singapore, Malaya, Java and Sumatra the Japanese 
focus switched to Burma and for the Allies the defence of Rangoon. For the first time R.A.F. 
and A.V.G. squadrons shared the same airfields at Mingaladon (Rangoon) and benefitted 
from an exchange of their combat experiences: 
Many of the A.V.G. pilots were fine and exceptionally good and experienced, 
but they all had the mark of the mercenary about them – which of course they 
were. They did, however, impart what experience they had to the R.A.F. 
pilots which was very welcome.105 
The R.A.F. and A.V.G. pilots achieved better success against Japanese raiders over Burma 
due to an improved early warning system which gave the squadrons more time to climb to 
height to make the full use of the dive and zoom tactic which, together with more powerful 
aircraft, demonstrated the viability of the tactic.106   
The first months of fighting the Japanese had taught the British and Americans 
several basic lessons that remained relevant for the rest of the war. Japanese fighters were 
extremely manoeuvrable and were not to be engaged in traditional dog-fights by the heavier 
Allied fighters such as the Hurricane and P-40. The basic First World War doctrine of height 
and speed was still relevant when intercepting the Japanese and the former could be best 
achieved by an efficient early warning system giving defenders ample time to climb higher 
than the raiders. Lastly the best tactic to engage the Japanese was the dive and zoom method 
which exploited the rugged Hurricane and P-40’s high diving speed and superior armament. 
This was also applicable to the Spitfire on its introduction to India in late 1943 and 
American types in 1944 as, despite their superior rate of climb and performance, they could 
not match the Oscar’s manoeuvrability. It must also be remembered that during 1942 the 
lessons taught by Chennault had been reinforced by action in the Pacific where the 
manoeuvrability of the Zero and Oscar at low speeds had caused American flyers concerns, 
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and as a result the dive and zoom was soon advocated, but as late as January 1945 the 
following was deemed necessary to be included in an American instructional book: 
Since it has been obvious that our planes could be outmaneuvered by 
Japanese planes such encounters have been avoided. “DON’T DOGFIGHT 
WITH THE JAP” has been a repeated warning to our fighter pilots, and this 
admonition is still appropriate... When attacking Jap fighters at slower speeds, 
Allied pilots have been using “hit-and-run” tactics, making single attacks then 
breaking away in a high speed climb or dive.107  
The tactic was reinforced by a cartoon: 
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The instruction not to dogfight but use ‘hit and run’, bounce or dive and zoom tactics is 
repeated in most tactical documents published between 1942 and 1945, but putting it into 
practice was not always straightforward.  
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 Typically on 19th March 1943, 43 Squadron, flying Hurricanes, were scrambled to 
intercept a raid on Feni but the ground control gave the raiders height as 25,000 feet and the 
interceptors were at 20,000 feet thus failing to engage.109 More height led to better results. 
For instance on 1st April 1943 Hurricanes from 615 Squadron were scrambled to intercept a 
mixed force of bombers and fighters attacking Feni airfield and quickly reached 27,000 feet 
before diving on the enemy formation. The attack was successful and the Hurricane pilots 
claimed two bombers destroyed, two probably destroyed, five damaged and one fighter 
damaged, for the loss of one Hurricane.110 The importance of height was recognized in 
Tactical Memorandum No 33 of 22nd April 1943: 
[I]n order to inflict casualties on the enemy fighters, our fighters must have 
the height advantage. This should be exploited because on all occasions when 
our fighters have gone into the attack from above the enemy, they have 
scored outstanding victories and the enemy casualties have been high.111   
The memorandum continued: 
Controllers must get the fighters off the ground at the first warning. They 
should not wait to have a raid identified as hostile. It is much better to have 
several false alarms than miss a big raid.112 
However, even though the radar cover improved during 1943 the Hurricane was unable to 
climb quickly enough and it would require a better fighter to counter the Japanese.  
 The Spitfire arrived in India in September 1943 with a powerful and superior rate of 
climb which gave the Allies a defensive edge. Capitalising on the improved early warning 
system the Spitfires were able to intercept the reconnaissance Dinahs, and once the 
controllers were used to manoeuvring the Spitfires into position, the pilots were able to use 
the dive and zoom tactic to good effect. On 31st December 1943, 136 Squadron was 
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scrambled to intercept a raid on Chittagong and the ground controller was able to manoeuvre 
the Spitfires into a favourable position at a height of 30,000 feet: 
For me it was one of those days when everything went right. Using maximum 
combat revs and full throttle I made a series of dive and climb attacks on the 
fleeing formations, making use of my superior speed from my dives to elude 
the fighters.113  
The pilots claimed a total of eight bombers and three fighters destroyed for the loss of one 
Spitfire and, although these Japanese losses are probably an over-estimate, this clearly 
showed the value of the tactic.114 For the next few weeks through January 1944 similar 
successful interceptions took place with Spitfire squadrons inflicting losses on Japanese 
raiders, but the tally began to slow as circumstances worked against the Spitfire. There were 
only four operational Spitfire squadrons defending a large front against superior Japanese 
numbers, for example on 5th February 12 Spitfires intercepted over 100 aircraft over Bawli 
Bazaar. Despite these odds the defenders were still able to break up the formations and use 
their dive and zoom advantage on occasions where possible. However, the Japanese had 
started to develop tactics intended to negate the Spitfire’s advantages. 
 Basic Japanese fighter formations were of a v-shape (vic) of three aircraft similar to 
the British formation but they did not fly in such a rigid pattern. Later in the war the 
Japanese adopted the Allied four aircraft formation in the Pacific when their aircraft 
improved in performance, but for the slower Oscar the three aircraft formation was more 
common. When engaged Japanese aircraft flooded the sky as recounted by an unidentified 
A.V.G. pilot: 
Because once you made contact with them the sky looks as if you have hit a 
beehive. They’re all over the place, and you will never find one of them close, 
I mean, very seldom.115 
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Similar experiences from the Pacific Theatre defined the formation: 
[F]ighters made large circles at different altitudes, one above another. If one 
of the lower fighters were attacked, it dived to avoid contact. The next high 
fighter immediately dived same action. Usually the Japanese fighter 
attempted to attack from behind and slightly below.116 
Furthermore, the American Pacific ace, Major Richard Bong, wrote in February 1944, “The 
Japs darned near always outnumbered us, and it seemed we were always finding ourselves in 
a mess of enemy fighters.”117 The Japanese brought these tactics to the Far East at the 
beginning of 1944 and this was reported in a Tactical Extract: 
New gambits such as the defensive circle and the use of separate formations 
which appear to have been disposed with the idea of enticing Spitfires to 
‘mix-it’ at medium and low levels... at layers between 18 to 24,000 feet ... 
They later began flying in different directions and executing defensive circles. 
Many more aircraft appeared to be flying between ground level and 10,000 
feet and it is considered that in all roughly 100 enemy aircraft were 
airborne.118  
Spitfire pilots were now faced with a counter to the dive and zoom; if the Japanese fighters 
were stacked at varying heights it meant the Spitfires would fly through one layer of 
Japanese fighters and then continue to encounter others in their dive and subsequent climb. 
For example on 9th February 1944 three sections from 615 Squadron reported intercepting 
over 50 Japanese aircraft “at all heights from 15,000 feet to deck level.”119 Whilst Japanese 
formations could be disrupted and disorganised their tactics made it difficult for the R.A.F. 
pilots to shoot down their adversaries and new tactics were required. 
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 In September 1944 Japanese tactics were categorised by Allied tacticians and counter 
measures devised by the A.F.T.U. were published for instructional use.120 The first Japanese 
formation was described as the ‘Beehive’ where a “formless conglomeration of Jap. fighter 
aircraft” flew at heights between 17,000 feet and ground level, their random directions 
giving the impression the formation was disorganized.121 Second was the ‘Squirrel Cage’ 
where Japanese fighters performed a variety of aerobatics which took them in different 
directions, which also filled the sky with aircraft giving the impression that a dogfight was in 
progress. Lastly was the ‘Decoy Ducks’ where a Japanese fighter was painted in a bright 
colour (usually silver) which stood out against the jungle background, its purpose was to lure 
unsuspecting Allied fighters into a trap, as other Japanese fighters would be ready to 
pounce.122 To meet these formations the Allied pilots were left with two options, either to 
engage or leave the vicinity. If the Japanese had the height advantage then the advice was to 
dive away at 400 mph before climbing in a right hand turn as the pursuing Japanese fighters 
could not cope with such a manoeuvre. However if the Allied pilots had the height 
advantage then their formation should consist of three boxes of four aircraft, line abreast 
with 700 feet height differences between each box.123 On engaging the enemy the middle 
box containing the formation leader would attack one Japanese aircraft, and when the rest of 
the Japanese formation dived or climbed the other two boxes would attack them from above. 
In addition Spitfire pilots were taught the ‘rolling attack’ which made use of their height 
advantage when a Japanese aircraft was directly below. As the Japanese aircraft disappeared 
under the Spitfire’s wing the pilot would turn his aircraft in the opposite direction whilst 
performing a barrel roll to bring his guns onto the target when the manoeuvre was 
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completed. Despite the intricacies of these manoeuvres the document made it clear that even 
in September 1944 pilots “entering this theatre of war from the Middle East or Europe... 
[had] to make radical changes to their outlook” by disregarding any preconceived ideas 
about the Japanese being poor pilots or shots, and imagining they could use the same tactics 
they used against the Germans against the Japanese, “The exact opposite is the case.”124 The 
dive and zoom attack was the fundamental tactic from which all else was founded, but: 
Whereas the Hun used to dive and climb or “bounce” our aircraft as a set 
method of attack, this is the only correct method of attacking the Jap. This 
point is illustrated in the 2 cartoons which are attached. The effect of them is 
DON’T DOG FIGHT THE JAPS BUT BOUNCE HIM.125 
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Although these tactics had been presented and developed by the A.F.T.U., Allied squadrons 
in the field were also finding solutions to the Japanese tactics as the Tactical Memorandum 
refers to both Lightnings and Spitfire pilots working out “counter-measures which have been 
effective” to the Beehive and Squirrel Cage formations.126 As with the pilots in 1941 and 
1942 practical experience at squadron level was vital to solving immediate problems during 
combat conditions. 
 By April 1945 the J.A.A.F. had withdrawn from Burma to other areas and theatres 
closer to Japan leaving air supremacy to the Allies. As this withdrawal continued a party 
from the Tactics Branch of the Central Fighter Establishment in Britain visited India and 
Burma. The subsequent report admitted that recent air-to-air combats had been infrequent 
and that their findings were based on past experiences but continued, “As the principles have 
remained constant it is reasonable to assume they will prove of use in the future.”127 The 
report is an accurate summary of not just what happened in the few months around their visit 
but also what had occurred for the preceding three years and serves well as a conclusion to 
this section. Although most Allied fighters had the advantages of straight and level speed, 
dive and zoom they were unable to match Japanese fighters at low speeds for 
manoeuvrability and so the “basis of Allied Tactics is avoidance of infighting with the 
Japanese whose manoeuvrability gives them a clear advantage.”128 To counter this: 
Allied fighters employ a high speed attack, if possible from above and astern, 
breaking away after the attack at speed to a sufficient distance away from the 
enemy to allow unmolested positioning for another attack.129  
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This is another way of describing the dive and zoom, which amounts to a vindication of the 
tactic and the pilots that adopted it during the first few months of the Japanese war.   
 Thus the formulation of relevant air fighting tactics played an integral role in 
attaining air superiority over the Japanese. Air fighting tactics used against German 
adversaries were clearly irrelevant against highly manoeuvrable Japanese fighters and the 
adoption of the dive and zoom manoeuvre proved effective for the rest of the war. 
Furthermore it was vital that pilots were instructed in its application, particularly those who 
transferred from other theatres, and the A.F.T.U. was central to this. However the air 
fighting tactics cannot be viewed in isolation. The success of dive and zoom depended on an 
effective early warning system to allow fighters to attain superior height but, in turn, the 
tactic required high performance fighter aircraft that could capitalize on the height and the 
tactic. Whereas the Buffalo and Hurricane had struggled to achieve height even when the 
early warning system was working, the Spitfire capitalized on improved warning facilities 
and its superior performance to make effective use of the dive and zoom.   
 
Part Three - Aircraft 
In December 1941 Japan’s aircraft, particularly their fighters, were better in many 
respects than their Allied counterparts. The Japanese had been fighting over China since the 
mid-1930s and their aircraft had been adapted and improved during operational use. The 
Nakajima Ki-27 Nate was a monoplane fighter that first flew in 1936 and following testing 
entered service against the Chinese in 1937. The Nate typified Japanese fighter design which 
placed manoeuvrability above armament or armour protection; equipped with two .303 
machine guns it was both light and compact.130 Nakajima used its experience of the Nate to 
improve the design which led to the Oscar which became Japan’s main fighter over Burma 
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between 1941 and 1945. The Oscar was a low wing monoplane powered by a radial engine 
and had fully retracting main wheels. It was fitted with two .303 machine guns and had no 
armour protection, but this reduced the weight and, combined with its compact size, ensured 
the aircraft was extremely manoeuvrable.131 The final main fighter type encountered by the 
Allies was the J.N.A.F. aircraft carrier based Mitsubishi Type 0 known to the Allies as the 
Zeke or Zero.132 Similar in appearance to the Oscar, this aircraft was another example of the 
Japanese philosophy of manoeuvrability at the expense of weight and size although as 
opposed to the Oscar’s meagre armament, the Zero carried two .52 machine guns and two 
20mm cannons.133 The first prototype was flown in April 1939 and after further development 
saw service against the Chinese in 1940 where its outstanding performance was first 
witnessed.  
 Despite these aircraft seeing service in China during the years before December 
1941, their operational capabilities came as an “unpleasant surprise” to the Allies.134 The 
Nate and its Naval counterpart the A5M Claude had a fixed undercarriage which looked like 
outdated technology in Western eyes and may have “blinded the powers-that-be to the 
truth”.135 Despite its showing against the Chinese Air Force over Chongqing in August 1940 
where six Japanese Navy pilots claimed 57 Chinese aircraft destroyed, the Allies did not see 
the Zero as a threat.136 Colonel Claire Chennault, air advisor to Chiang Kai-shek and later 
commander of the American Volunteer Group in 1941, had, however, warned the Americans 
of the Zero’s capabilities and General George Marshall (U.S. Army Chief of Staff) conveyed 
the message to the “army commanders in Hawaii and the Philippines, but they paid no 
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attention.”137 Chennault wrote that he had warned the American War Department of the 
Japanese aircraft types but later found that the information on the Nate was missing from 
official files and that the U.S. technical dossier in use at the time of Pearl Harbor contained 
no information about the Zero.138 The British Air Ministry received reports of the Zero from 
various sources. These had allegedly been passed to A.H.Q. Far East but the reports either 
did not arrive or were lost among other intelligence reports.139 Probert wrote: 
Minds long conditioned to a belief in Japanese inferiority were not to  
 be so readily changed. Indeed the performance data about the Zero…  
 was not circulated to stations; apparently a senior officer strongly   
 denied the possibility of the Japanese possessing such an aircraft and  
 took no action.140  
 In May 1941 a Zero was shot down in China and intelligence reports of its performance, 
tankage, range and armament were forwarded to Singapore and London in September, but a 
lack of staff, “resulted in the technical information not being passed to the R.A.F. 
squadrons.”141 This was to prove a disadvantage to operational pilots in combat as Flight 
Lieutenant Tim Vigors later recalled: 
  I am of the opinion that many aircraft and lives were lost during the  
  first weeks of the war owing to the complete absence of any sound   
  intelligence reports on the performance of Japanese fighters and the  
  ability of their pilots.142 
Another operational squadron commander reported that some of his pilots “were astonished 
to meet monoplane fighters.”143 However, by the time the R.A.F. squadrons met Japanese 
fighters in December 1941 the British had sent its fighter defence to the Far East but the 
aircraft chosen did not match Japanese fighters. 
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 The American Brewster Buffalo had been designed in 1935 to a U.S. Navy carrier-
borne fighter requirement. The aircraft had a short fuselage, mid-set wings and retractable 
undercarriage, with an armament of four .5 inch Colt machine guns, two in the wings and 
two in the aircraft’s nose. The British placed an order for 170 Buffalos in 1940 but after 
three were trialled in Britain in September 1940 it was found that they were unsuitable for 
European service owing to their poor performance and weak armament. The aircraft was not 
thought suitable for carrier use by the Royal Navy as Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal 
(Chief of the Air Staff) wrote to Churchill on 21st January 1941, “It appears that the Brewster 
does not fold and does not possess arrester hook. It is therefore unsuitable for embarking in 
carriers.”144 The remainder of 167 aircraft were sent to Malaya where 76 and 243 Squadrons 
were formed in February 1941, joined by 453 Squadron R.A.A.F. and 488 Squadron 
R.N.Z.A.F. in October 1941.145  
Although the Buffalo’s dimensions were comparable to Japanese fighters its 
operational performance did not match that of its adversaries. In July 1941 a test report 
compared the Buffalo’s performance with what was known about the Zero:  
      Zero   Buffalo 
Rate of climb to 13,000 ft   4.3 minutes  6.1 minutes 
Speed at 10,000 ft    315 mph  270 mph 
Speed at 20,000 ft    295 mph  292 mph146 
It was found, however, that 292 mph could not be obtained in Malaya and a maximum speed 
of 280 mph was considered a truer figure. It was thus at a disadvantage against Japanese 
bombers as Flight Lieutenant Jack Mackenzie later recalled, “It was difficult to even catch 
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up with the enemy bombers – it was just too slow and completely unsuitable for the job it 
was given to do.”147 An unidentified Australian pilot added, “Bombers outpacing fighters – 
you’ve got to f***ing well laugh!”148   
The Buffalo’s weight combined with its underpowered engine gave it a poor rate of 
climb which was crucial in fighter operations against the Japanese. Tactics evolved to 
counter the Japanese fighters’ high manoeuvrability in December 1941 called for Allied 
aircraft to climb above the attackers and use their speed to dive through formations before 
zooming up to height for another dive. However owing to the unreliability of the early 
warning organisation in giving adequate warning, the Buffalo was forced to fight at 
unsuitable heights whilst climbing to meet enemy formations. Over Singapore the Buffalos 
needed at least 30 minutes warning to reach 24,000 feet at which the Japanese flew, but this 
time was identical to that given by the early warning system, “The air defence was thus 
handicapped by the short warning received as well as by the poor performance of the 
Buffalos compared with the Zero fighters.”149  
 Did the British have any alternatives to the Buffalo? Intelligence sources had warned 
of Japanese fighter capabilities and whether these warnings were mislaid or misinterpreted 
there was an over confidence in the Buffalo’s abilities. At a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff in 
London in 1941: 
[The] Vice Chief of the Naval Staff advocated the despatch of Hurricanes to Malaya, 
but his opposite number on the Air Staff insisted that “Buffalo fighters would be 
more than a match for the Japanese aircraft that were not of the latest type.”150 
 
Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, C. in C. Far East, wrote to Air Marshal Sir 
Arthur Tedder on 4th August 1941, “I like the Buffalo as a fighter especially its armament 
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which is four guns.”151 However there were aircraft shortages in 1940 and 1941 to consider. 
On 8th November 1940 Portal wrote to Churchill: 
Last week there were more than 425 Hurricanes and Spitfires in the  
  Storage Units… This surplus is falling fast… Will you please stop   
  shipments abroad now? Production is falling too.152 
Spitfires and Hurricanes were in short supply and were required for the defence of Great 
Britain, European operations, Middle East and Greek operations, and could not be spared for 
the Far East. Furthermore after the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, 240 
Hurricanes were promised by Churchill to Stalin in addition to 200 P-40s taken from 
American deliveries, both suitable for Far Eastern service. The deployment of Buffalos to 
Malaya was therefore the product of a number of factors: an acute fighter shortage; an 
aircraft unsuitable for operations against German types; and a misguided optimism that the 
Buffalo was a match for Japanese aircraft. Even so it was the most modern R.A.F. aircraft 
stationed in the Far East which included the torpedo carrying Vildebeest, a fabric and strut 
biplane, considered obsolete in the mid-1930s. Major General Arthur Percival, G.O.C. 
Malaya, wrote: 
I was far from feeling happy when I was told that our fighters were a type 
which I had not heard of as being in action elsewhere, i.e. the... Buffalo. 
However, a fighter was a fighter and we were in no position to pick and 
choose at that time.153 
Squadron Leader Gerald Bell, commanding 243 Squadron, recalled: 
   
  However we were proud to be flying the Buffalo which was, despite its  
  obsolescence, modern compared to the other aircraft which the   
  command was equipped.154 
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  The Buffalo’s service operators had mixed views. Pilot Officer Terry Marra recalled, 
“As a combat aircraft it was hopeless. As an aircraft to fly it was beautiful – it really was.”155 
Marra listed difficulties including the engines using excessive oil, the machine guns failing 
to fire, and a ceiling of 22,000 feet on a hot day. Squadron Leader Wilfred Clouston, 488 
Squadron, remembered: 
  All of us who had been on decent aeroplanes – Spitfires and   
  Hurricanes – thought Buffalos were terrible things. They didn’t have  
  the climbing ability… They were too slow to get up to altitude and  
  were cumbersome things... It was a good aeroplane, but not for   
  fighting. The gun platform was particularly poor.156 
For those pilots used to the reliability and firepower of the Spitfire and Hurricane the 
armament of the Buffalo was poor. Kapitan Pieter Tideman of the Royal Netherlands East 
Indies Army Military Air Service stationed in Java and Sumatra, for example, wrote that 
“our armament was too little and too light.”157 Additionally the .5 inch Colt machine guns 
fitted to the Buffalos of 21 Squadron R.A.A.F. were prone to corrosion in their electrical 
systems and the solution was to replace the .5 inch guns with .303 inch machine guns.158 
Groundcrews’ opinion was unfavourable as Leading Aircraftman (L.A.C.) James Home 
recalled: 
  I always said this aircraft was a disaster and now I was seeing further  
  confirmation. It was short, fat and stunted like a beer barrel fitted with  
  an engine, and when the engine started up it couldn’t make up its mind  
  whether to continue running or cough up its innards and report sick… I  
  hated to think how any of our Buffalo pilots felt when they faced the  
  Zero – one thing for sure, he needed to be brave.159 
Mechanic, L.A.C. Helsdon Thomas remembered: 
  Spot welds would break on the box section undercarriage. Rivets were  
  discovered in the fuel lines, fuel pumps and carburettors. Big-end   
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  bearings had a habit of cracking up and depositing white metal into the  
  scavenger filters.160   
Many of these faults were discovered during training in 1941 and before the Japanese attacks 
of December and also later, when as a result of air fighting, the disparity between Japanese 
aircraft and the Buffalo became apparent modifications in the field were made.  At the end of 
December 1941 the aircraft stationed at Sembawang (Malaya) had been reduced in weight 
by 1,000lbs by removing two of the four guns and halving the ammunition, whilst further 
weight reduction was made by lightening the radio equipment, removing the external radio 
mast and removing any non-essential equipment such as the Verey pistol and cockpit heater. 
Furthermore, the aircraft was filled with 80 gallons of fuel rather than the usual 130 gallons, 
but the pilot still had to pressure the fuel system by means of a hand pump from the cockpit 
at above 18,000 feet.161 Nevertheless the total weight reductions improved the fighter’s 
performance by 30 mph, giving it more manoeuvrability with the result: 
  That with these improvements our Buffalo fighters were able to   
  almost match the Zeros in performance. Now our fighter pilots were  
  gaining confidence after initially having been given a hard time in   
  battle.162 
These modifications did not however solve the problems of attrition. By the end of 
December 1941 the numbers of serviceable Buffalos had decreased substantially and those 
remaining aircraft faced greater numbers of Japanese fighters. Buffalos had been lost during 
the squadrons’ training period in 1941 as a result of flying accidents, whilst approximately 
21 were lost in the initial attacks on British aerodromes on 8th December. As air fighting 
progressed through December and January 1942, aircraft continued to be  lost during air and 
ground operations; for example, on 14th December 453 Squadron did not have a single 
serviceable aircraft available and later on the evening of 22nd December out of 15 aircraft 
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which had started the day only four were left serviceable.163 By 18th January 1942 only 24 
Buffalos in Malaya were still serviceable.164   
   Despite the Buffalo’s faults not every pilot was dissatisfied with the aircraft. Kapitan 
Tideman flew the aircraft in Java and recalled: 
  The Brewster was a good, sturdy fast fighter, with two half-inch   
  armour plates behind the seat. She would take a hell of a beating. My  
  view is that our drawback during the fighter actions was not an inferior  
  aeroplane, but that we had too few of them and also our armament was  
  too little and too light.165 
Tideman’s views may have been influenced by the fact that the Dutch Buffalo was a newer 
variant with a 1,200 hp engine rather than the R.A.F.’s 1,100 hp motor and this improved its 
performance. Similarly R.A.F. pilot Sergeant Geoff Fisken test flew every Buffalo that left 
the assembly area in Seletar in 1941 before flying operationally with 243 Squadron and later 
recalled: 
  We did hours and hours of it [testing]. That was the main thing, we  
  built up more hours. We had about 150 hours in Buffalos before the  
  war started, so we knew what they would do and what they were like. I  
  got a couple of trips in Hurricane Mk IIBs that 488 Squadron had in  
  Singapore and I didn’t think the Hurricane was as good as a Buffalo.166 
Sergeant James Macintosh of 488 Squadron was in a dogfight with Zeros on 18th January 
and remembered, “I proved twice in the course of this combat that the Buffalo was equal to 
the manoeuvrability of the Zero.”167 On 1st February 1942 a mock dogfight was staged 
between a Hurricane flown by Wing Commander Frank Carey and a Buffalo from 67 
Squadron flown by Sergeant Gordon Williams. At heights above 20,000 feet the Buffalo was 
found to be superior, at heights around 16,000 feet the aircraft were evenly matched, and 
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below that height the Hurricane had the edge.168 Furthermore in July 1941 during handling 
trials at the Royal Aircraft Establishment in Farnborough the Buffalo’s aileron handling was 
found to be “exceptionally effective” whilst test pilots “considered them to be a definite 
improvement on the Hurricane and Spitfire fabric covered ailerons”.169 The report does not 
mention what heights these trials were carried out at but it would seem likely that it was at 
over 20,000 feet which gave a misleading impression as the Japanese fighters chose to fight 
at below those heights. However despite these favourable comments the Buffalo did not 
perform well in the theatre for a variety of reasons discussed earlier and as fighting 
continued plans were made to send better aircraft to the region. 
 After the initial Japanese successes on 8th and 9th December 1941 the decision was 
taken on 10th December to reinforce the R.A.F. in the Far East. Pre-war reinforcement plans 
called for aircraft to be sent from the Middle East at the end of 1941, but fighting there 
initially precluded any diminution of its fighter strength. Early plans to send P-40s were 
cancelled as it was felt the aircraft was too new in British service as there was little 
operational experience with the aircraft as well as a shortage of spare parts.170 It would also 
take too long for fighters to be sent from Britain, but a solution was found in diverting two 
fighter wings, each equipped with Hurricanes, which were destined for service in the 
Caucasus and Northern Persia. 51 crated Hurricanes with 24 pilots drawn from 17, 135,136 
and 232 Squadrons together with enough maintenance equipment and staff for two 
squadrons were diverted to the Far East. But the reinforcement plan was problematical. The 
decision to send the Hurricanes had been made on 10th December, but they would not arrive 
until 15th January.171 Following a superb effort by ground crews to assemble the aircraft, the 
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first Hurricanes were ready to fly within 48 hours of their arrival but air superiority in 
Malaya had already been lost to the Japanese during the preceding six weeks. Moreover, 
these Hurricanes could not be regarded as reinforcements but rather as replacements for the 
Buffalos lost during December 1941 and within days many of the Hurricanes were lost. On 
29th January Portal told Churchill of the fate of the 51 Hurricanes: 17 had been written off 
and nine were damaged; four could be serviceable within 24 hours; and only 21 available for 
immediate operations.172 An additional 48 Hurricanes taken from the Middle East arrived 
during the next week but again they were replacements for losses rather than reinforcements. 
Sergeant Terence Kelly, a Hurricane pilot with 258 Squadron, thought the 98 Hurricanes 
which arrived at the beginning of 1942 should have been held back until all were available to 
fly in mass formations against the Japanese rather than in “penny-numbers”.173 A.V.M. Paul 
Maltby, Deputy A.O.C. Malaya, was aware of the implications of using the pilots and their 
aircraft as soon as they had been assembled but: 
[E]vents had moved too fast and the stake was too high for delay to be  
 accepted; and the Hurricanes had to be used immediately they had   
 been erected and tested.174   
Aircraft were put into action as soon as possible with the effect that numbers began to 
diminish with every operation. For example in eleven days 232 Squadron lost 18 Hurricanes, 
at least seven more damaged in combat, with two more destroyed on the ground; nine pilots 
were killed and four seriously wounded.175   
There were also various technical problems with the Hurricanes which affected its 
performance. The original 51 Hurricanes diverted to the Far East were Mark IIBs, but the 
performance figures in the aircraft manual were not matched by its performance in Malaya 
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and Burma. The IIB was equipped with twelve .303 machine guns which, with their 
ammunition, added nearly 1,000lbs to its overall weight compared to the Mark I which had 
eight guns.176 Furthermore as the Hurricanes had been destined for Middle East service they 
were fitted with a large sand filter in a cowling underneath the aircraft’s nose which could 
not be removed. These two factors reduced the aircraft’s speed by 30 mph and pilots 
considered the handling and manoeuvrability were affected detrimentally. Pilot Officer Jerry 
Parker, a pilot with 232 Squadron, recalled: 
  We never got a good performance from our Hurricanes in Singapore.  
  Although for marksmen of our calibre a congregation of machine guns  
  was desirable, the extra four guns must have weighed at least half a  
  ton. The Hurricanes became not only slow, particularly in the climb,  
  but also very heavy and unwieldy in manoeuvre.177  
Following their early combat with the Japanese A.V.M. Conway Pulford, A.O.C. Singapore, 
wrote to Portal on 23rd January 1942 to state the Hurricane was struggling to match Japanese 
aircraft and informed him that four guns were to be removed to improve performance.178 
Portal’s reply on 24th January shows a misunderstanding of the realities: 
  Strongly recommend you should not remove your four guns from the  
  Hurricanes. Actual experiments here have shown that effect on the   
  total ceiling is only 300 feet and rate of climb negligible.    
  Manoeuvrability is unaffected.179  
Furthermore, on 2nd February Portal wrote to Pierse advising him that Hurricanes were en 
route to him from the Middle East despite them being “hard pressed” and added, “Hurricanes 
should do well against JAPANESE aircraft whose performance is not very high.”180 Despite 
Portal’s recommendations, individual squadrons did remove four guns from some of their 
Hurricanes which improved the aircraft’s abilities. In addition there was also a concern that 
the Far East had not been sent the best aircraft available, particularly in later consignments 
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from the Middle East. Percival wrote of the original Hurricanes, “These machines were not 
the most modern type of Hurricane” whilst part of the later Middle East shipment of 
Hurricanes included some Mark I aircraft which were obsolete.181 Of the original ‘Burma’ 
Hurricanes Franks wrote: 
  Most had been ferried in from the Middle East and not all were new  
  aircraft! It was suspected that new aircraft for the Far East were   
  ‘pinched’ by various senior people along the way, and substituted for  
  ‘war weary’ types. Several arrived with their Form 700s noted ‘For  
  training use only’.182  
Ten Mark I Hurricanes had been sent with some Mark IIBs on H.M.S. Indomitable in 
February 1942 with an additional 26 flying by air to India, and later in the month the Far 
East command was informed that 50 more Hurricane Mark Is were being sent.183 These 50 
aircraft were largely untropicalised but were sent specifically to India to train fighter 
squadrons. It was perhaps understandable that older aircraft were sent from the Middle East 
as they were engaged in their own fighting, but once in India there was every possibility that 
some of these aircraft would be used for operational duties when shortages prevailed. 
 Hurricane squadrons found fighting the Japanese as difficult as the Buffalo 
squadrons. The continuing lack of adequate early warning against Japanese air attack 
resulted in their being caught on the ground or whilst climbing to meet the enemy 
formations. On 27th January an unheralded raid on Kallang (Singapore) cost the newly 
arrived 488 Squadron four of its Hurricanes destroyed and another nine written off as 
unserviceable, all whilst being refuelled.184 On Sumatra on 7th February a late warning for an 
air attack on Palembang 1 airfield resulted in three burnt out Hurricanes and a further 11 
damaged, while the Hurricanes taking off faced difficulties as Air Commodore Stanley 
Vincent, A.O.C. 226 Group, reported: 
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  Once again the warning came late, and once again the inexperienced  
  pilots found the Japanese more than a match. The Hurricanes were   
  unable to gain height in time and were attacked in ones and twos   
  immediately after taking off.185  
These were common incidents during the retreat from Singapore through Java and Sumatra 
and although the early warning system did improve slightly when Burma was invaded and 
gave the defending Hurricanes and P-40s from the American Volunteer Group some degree 
of time to respond.  
The pilots also showed varying degrees of experience which gave rise to suspicions 
that the best pilots had not been sent with the original 51 Hurricanes. After investigation 
Portal wrote to Churchill on 24th February: 
  Of the four squadrons, you will remember that the first to arrive   
  consisted of the least experienced pilots of the four squadrons destined  
  for Iraq and South Russia. Not very much was expected of them.186  
When the situation deteriorated experienced pilots who should have gone to the Soviet 
Union and Iraq were diverted to Burma where Portal reported, “they seem to have done quite 
well.”187 Portal’s comments reflected the necessity of using the pilots without time being 
allowed for training or to instil an esprit de corps. It was important to get aircraft and pilots 
to Singapore as quickly as possible in the circumstances: 
  This alone was the reason for the unfortunate mixture of fragments  
  from various sources. If we could have delayed the Japanese advance  
  for the time necessary for these squadrons to shake down and train   
  together, they would have undoubtedly have given a much better   
  account of themselves.188  
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This echoed Maltby’s observation that there was no time for the pilots to acclimatise to the 
local conditions, although in his despatch he pointed out that some of the pilots had gained 
experience in the Battle of Britain.189  
 The need to reinforce the Far East during those months reached desperate lengths. 
The experiences with the Buffalo and latterly with the Hurricane showed that it was not 
merely a matter of throwing any aircraft into the fighting as the J.A.A.F. and J.N.A.F. were 
resourceful, well equipped and well trained. Moves were nevertheless made to send numbers 
of Gloster Gladiator biplane fighters to Malaya from the Middle East. As early as 23rd July 
1941 General Archibald Wavell, C .in C. Middle East, wrote to Tedder about a visit he made 
to Risalphur in India: 
  Found R.A.F. Squadron training as fighter squadron with Audax   
  machines. Most modern aircraft possessed in India. Does this not make  
  your heart bleed? Could you not now spare some Gladiators, as many  
  as possible, to enable pilots this squadron to be trained in comparatively  
  modern machines.190 
Wavell appeared to be asking for Gladiators as training machines rather than operational 
aircraft, but Tedder’s reply on 25th July made it clear that the aircraft were unsuitable for 
transfer, “It does but my heart’s blood does not produce fighters. Do not think flight of our 
very part worn Gladiators practicable from here to India.”191 In February 1942 Portal 
exhorted Tedder to send as many Hurricanes as he could spare to Pierse, adding he had 
noticed that 46 Gladiators were stationed in the Middle East. Portal added: 
  Propose offering these to ABDAIR as they are desperately short of  
  fighters and Gladiator manoeuvrability may prove useful against   
  Japanese aircraft.192 
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Tedder replied that of the 46, only 26 were serviceable, with five additional aircraft 
serviceable in a fortnight but the remaining were unserviceable. Of those that were in flying 
condition some had been given to the French, others were unarmed and used for 
metrological flights, whilst others were used for communication purposes in the desert and 
their removal would create additional problems for his command as they would have to be 
replaced by precious Hurricanes. Pierse entered the debate, writing: 
  Grateful for your proposal but even if Gladiators available consider  
  them to be completely outclassed by enemy fighters who even now  
  meet Hurricanes and P-40s on equal terms.193 
This seemed to have ended the matter, but on 19th March A.V.M. John D’Albiac, A.O.C. 222 
Group, wrote to Pierse and the Middle East A.H.Q. that if Hurricanes and Spitfires were not 
available for transfer to his command he would accept the 46 Gladiators Tedder had 
previously offered.194 Pierse intervened by advising against the Gladiators firstly on the 
grounds they were part worn and secondly because “another type… will complicate already 
overstretched maintenance organisation.”195 Fortunately no Gladiators were ever sent to the 
Far East, but the episode shows firstly how desperate the theatre was for fighters and 
secondly how this desperation manifested itself in senior commanders who should have 
understood the situation better.   
 Buffalos and Hurricanes were not the only Allied fighter engaging Japanese aircraft 
during this period. The Americans had a number of P-40Bs, a monoplane which had similar 
dimensions to the Hurricane and was armed with two .5 inch guns in the fuselage and four .3 
inch guns in the wings. Used against the Japanese in Java and the Netherlands East Indies by 
17th Pursuit Squadron (Provisional), the aircraft acquitted itself well despite a shortage of 
numbers but it found the Japanese aircraft’s manoeuvrability challenging: 
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  It [P-40] could outdive the Japanese fighters, was faster in level flight,  
  and was better armored.  But the enemy plane seemed to have more  
  range, could outclimb the P-40, and was more maneuverable. For the  
  American pilot to risk a dogfight was to flirt with suicide.196 
During the early part of the Burma campaign the P-40 was used by the American Volunteer 
Group (A.V.G.), which consisted of U. S. Army and Navy pilots employed by contract by 
the Chinese Government and commanded by Claire Chennault. At first only 43 of the 
original 100 aircraft delivered were serviceable whilst Chennault found half of his 100 pilots 
had never flown fighter aircraft and a dozen had not even seen a P-40.197 An intensive 
training programme was initiated based on Chennault’s experiences of advising Chinese 
pilots against the Japanese during their air battles in the late 1930s. When the battle for 
Burma began Chennault rotated his squadrons between China and Burma, but he ensured 
that one squadron alone was based in Burma and resisted demands that all his aircraft should 
be deployed there. On 23rd and 25th December the A.V.G. and 67 Squadron (Buffalos) 
claimed 36 Japanese aircraft destroyed; between 23rd and 29th January American P-40s and 
R.A.F. Hurricanes claimed 50 Japanese fighters and bombers destroyed; and on 24th and 25th 
February 37 more Japanese aircraft were claimed destroyed.198 Although probably over-
estimates these were potentially better results than previously achieved, but were the aircraft 
the prime factor? The P-40 was a similar aircraft to the Hurricane and its pilots were slightly 
more experienced using the dive and zoom tactic as taught by Chennault to counter Japanese 
fighter capabilities. However the deciding factor was the efficiency of the Burma Observer 
Corps and the radar unit based at Rangoon which gave the defenders a better chance of 
achieving sufficient height. Both the P-40 and Hurricane had a high diving speed which 
suited the dive and zoom tactic which the advantage of height made possible but only if 
sufficient warning could be achieved: 
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  If a man got off the ground thirty seconds before his mates, he could  
  grab an extra 500 to 800 feet of altitude before the Japanese arrived –  
  an edge that could mean the difference between living and dying.199  
During the early months of attacks against Burma the early warning system coped well 
providing the defenders with sufficient warning, but once the radar equipment was forced to 
move from Rangoon and the Japanese air forces moved into the evacuated airfields in large 
numbers the conditions in Malaya were replicated.200  
 Once the 1942 monsoon was over there was, at first, little Japanese aerial activity 
over the Burmese front but in December regular attacks began on the airfields at Chittagong 
and Feni. These continued into 1943 when the Japanese raided targets that had a direct 
bearing on the Allies’ first Arakan campaign, in particular seeking to disrupt the support 
given to the ground forces by Allied aircraft. From then the Hurricane held the line against 
Japanese attacks until better aircraft were available, and the Beaufighter was introduced to 
make a significant impact in the air superiority campaign as a night-fighter.  
Despite the Hurricane’s shortcomings against Japanese fighters in the absence of a 
reliable early warning system, it became the principal R.A.F. day fighter in the Far East 
Theatre from May 1942 until the beginning of 1944. As R.A.F. reinforcements arrived from 
May 1942 onwards they were equipped with either the IIB or IIC variant, many of which had 
already seen service in the Middle East. Three of the squadrons, 79, 607 and 615, had flown 
Mark IIBs in Britain whilst their Operations Record Books show them re-equipping with 
IICs in India between June and August 1942.201  
 The Hurricane IIC was not a significant advance on other versions of Hurricane in 
the theatre other than in terms of its armament; both the IIB and IIC had the Merlin XX 
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engine as its powerplant and the IIC was longer than the IIB by one inch in length.202 
Whereas the IIB was initially equipped with twelve or eight .303 machine guns, the IIC was 
fitted with four 20mm cannons which gave greater hitting power, but added to the 
Hurricane’s performance problems. The IIB, with twelve guns, had a maximum weight of 
7340 lbs whereas the IIC, with cannons, had a maximum weight of 7640 lbs, some 300 lbs 
heavier.203 The cannons’ weight, in Sergeant Bill Davis’ opinion, made the Hurricane IIC 
challenging to fly in combat. After fighting a Japanese fighter he recalled: 
As I was spinning down I wondered whether the aircraft had any damage but 
it came out of the spin all right. The Hurricane IIB was pretty good at 
recovery from a spin, but the IIC with cannons wasn’t so clever.204 
 The additional weight increased the time it took the IIC to climb to 20,000 feet to 9.1 
minutes as compared to the IIB’s time of 8.4 minutes.205 These figures are taken from 
official sources but in addition the Hurricanes had transferred from the Middle East equipped 
with heavy sand filters and they had already completed a number of combat flying hours. 
Combined together, these factors reduced the aircraft’s manoeuvrability and its rate of climb 
still further. The Hurricane’s overall speed caused additional problems not only when 
intercepting enemy fighters and bombers, but also whilst escorting friendly aircraft such as 
the Vengeance dive-bomber: 
I think this was the first time Vengeances operated, or at least it was our first 
escort to them. It was rather embarrassing for us, because once they’d dive-
bombed and pulled up their dive brakes, and cleared the area, they left us 
behind. We couldn’t keep up with them in our old Hurricanes.206  
 
                                                          
202 TNA, Supp 9/1, British Types, 1941-1945.   
203 See Appendix 2 
204 Franks, Hurricanes over the Arakan, p.93. 
205 TNA, Supp 9/1, British Types, 1941-1945.  
206 Sergeant Bill Davis quoted in Franks, Hurricanes over the Arakan, P.171. 
167 
The combination of a low rate of climb with a relatively slow speed made it difficult for the 
aircraft to intercept the high flying and quick Japanese reconnaissance aircraft, the    Ki-46 
Dinah. Flying Officer Gordon Conway (136 Squadron) later recalled: 
One of our difficulties was our inability to get to height in time to intercept 
Japanese high-flying recces; they would fly with impunity over our bases 
providing the target material for the next raids.207 
Sergeant Barney Barnett remembered, “Scrambled to 27,000 feet at noon. Jap recce... passed 
800 yards off, couldn’t catch the bugger!”208 The Hurricane therefore needed much 
assistance from the early warning organisation but this was not always forthcoming. 
 Whilst the Hurricane had not improved as a fighter, the early warning organisation 
had advanced from the early days of December 1941. In December 1942 there were 52 
operational radar sets stationed from Ceylon to North East India, but despite the increase in 
radar coverage it was not enough to assist the Hurricanes in achieving sufficient height 
during interceptions. Conway recalled: 
Our success was limited by poor early warning, the lack of precise radars, and 
the comparatively poor performance of the Hurricane at the height the Zeros 
chose to fight.209 
Flight Lieutenant Paddy Stephenson, 123 Squadron, remembered: 
The 42/43 ops were not the most brilliant pages of the history of the 
Hurricane. We were controlled at maximum range and seldom had height 
advantage, so essential when the Jap fighters had manoeuvrability.210  
However, the early warning system occasionally gave the Hurricanes sufficient time to attain 
height. On 1st April 1943 17 Hurricanes from 67 and 615 Squadrons were scrambled to meet 
a raid on Feni by 27 Ki-21 Sally bombers which were escorted by Oscars from the 50th and 
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64th Sentais.211 Good early warning gave the Hurricane pilots the chance to climb to 27,000 
feet thereby gaining a significant advantage to use their dive and zoom tactics on the 
Japanese formations.212 The six Hurricanes from 67 Squadron had taken off too late to get 
into a good position to attack, claiming only one Japanese fighter as damaged, but 615 
Squadron had been in a perfect position and claimed three destroyed, two probable and six 
damaged bombers and fighters.213 A few days earlier, on 27th March, the early warning 
system gave four Hurricanes of 79 Squadron and seven of 135 Squadron sufficient time to 
climb to 20,000 feet and intercept a raid of between 15 to 18 Lilys on Cox’s Bazaar. The 
Japanese fighter escort failed to rendezvous and the Hurricanes were left to attack the 
bombers without enemy fighter interference. Flying Officer Robert Windle later recalled: 
On the 27th we caught about 25 bombers and really did them over. I 
remember being surprised how fast their bombers could go. They took quite a 
bit of catching and didn’t have anything in the way of escort. They kept their 
formation in spite of what they were copping from us.214  
Despite the bombers’ speed they were no match for the Hurricanes; the squadrons claimed 
eight destroyed, five probably destroyed and four damaged.215 These two engagements 
demonstrate what the Hurricanes were capable of in favourable circumstances provided they 
had adequate early warning, their superior armament allowing them to be effective against 
Japanese bombers.  It must also be recognized that the Hurricane’s four cannons could also 
prove devastating against the lightly built and mainly unarmoured Japanese fighters as 
Conway recalled: 
I gave this Oscar a burst of cannon and he literally fell apart. He seemed to 
stop in mid-air. His port wheel came down, his flaps, and with pieces flying 
off all round, he flicked and spun vertically into the sea just by the airfield.216  
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The Hurricane could pose a serious threat to the Japanese given the right circumstances and 
it was clear that its heavy armament could take advantage of light Japanese fighter 
construction. Nevertheless it was clear that a better day fighter was required to take air 
superiority from the Japanese. However before the Spitfire arrived the R.A.F. took delivery 
of an aircraft which made a significant effect on the air superiority campaign by night. 
However this is much less well known and seldom discussed.   
While the Hurricane was holding its own against Japanese fighters during this period 
it did not substantially alter the balance of air superiority. The first aircraft type which 
significantly altered the course of events was the Bristol Beaufighter night-fighter variant 
which arrived in January 1943. The Beaufighter was a twin-engine monoplane that carried a 
crew of two and a powerful armament of four 20mm cannon and six .303 inch machine 
guns.217 The aircraft had proved itself as an excellent long-range interdiction aircraft in the 
Middle East and significantly as a very efficient night-fighter when equipped with Airborne 
Interception (A.I.) radar over Britain from early 1941. The first squadron (Number 27) had 
arrived with its Beaufighters in India during December 1942 in an interdiction role but 
owing to technical difficulties was not able to attain full operational status until February 
1943.218  27 Squadron was the only Beaufighter unit in this role until 177 Squadron arrived 
in October 1943 but owing to the numbers of tasks allotted to it was unable to make a 
significant effect on Japanese strength during the counter-air offensive as will be discussed 
later. However in its night-fighter role the Beaufighter made an impact within a few days of 
its arrival in India. 
 Between 20th and 27th December 1942, the Japanese conducted night bombing raids 
on Calcutta which, while not on the scale of European bombing raids, had a significant effect 
on the city’s life. Calcutta’s port was receiving supplies important for building up Allied 
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strength in the Far East, whilst its factories were producing material for the war effort. The 
raids caused 25 killed and 139 injured but no buildings of any substance collapsed and the 
only military target, the oil refinery, was only slightly damaged.219 Despite this over 350,000 
people left the city and although many skilled workers stayed in the mills and factories the 
public services suffered most: 
The absence of cleaners left the city with piles of rotting rubbish in the 
streets; despite mid-winter the stench grew and there was a danger of Calcutta 
becoming the centre of an epidemic.220  
It was imperative to stop the Japanese raiders before the next suitable night bombing period 
and the situation deteriorated further. A.C.M. Pierse requested a flight of          night-fighters 
from the Air Staff and he was quickly sent a flight of A.I. equipped Beaufighters from 89 
Squadron in the Middle East. These aircraft became the nucleus for 176 Squadron which 
served in the Far East for the rest of the war. 
 Eight Beaufighters arrived at Dum-Dum airfield (Calcutta) on 14th January 1943 with 
a mixture of Mark I and VI aircraft. All of which were equipped with A.I. radar and their 
crews had considerable experience of intercepting Axis aircraft in the Middle East. Within a 
day of arriving the Squadron was in action at 21.45hrs. On 15th January Flight Sergeant 
Arthur Pring and his radar operator, Warrant Officer Cyril Phillips, were vectored to 
intercept a raid on Calcutta: 
Various vectors given G.C.I. A.I. contact made 2256 by F/Sgt Pring. Three 
E/A destroyed (modified Army 97 H/B) 20 miles S.S.W. of Khuha 
Confirmed by F/O Gray.221   
The three Sallys were from the 98th Sentai and all were confirmed by the Japanese as lost in 
the action.222 Four nights later on 19th January three Lilys from the 8th Sentai approached 
Calcutta whilst two Beaufighters from 176 Squadron were on patrol. Flying Officer Charles 
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Crombie and his radar operator Warrant Officer Ray Moss were controlled onto the 
incoming raiders: 
F/O Crombie and Sgt Fisher scrambled. F/O Crombie vectored by G.C.I. on 
to 4 Army 97 H/B approaching Calcutta up Hoogly [sic] River. Two E/A 
destroyed (confirmed) and a further probable.223 
According to Japanese records only one of the bombers were destroyed whilst the others 
returned to their base, whilst Crombie and Moss had to safely abandon their aircraft after it 
had been hit by Japanese defensive fire.224 In two nights the Japanese had lost four bombers 
and the obvious power of the Beaufighter operating at night caused the commander of the 5th 
Hikodan to order the immediate cessation of night raids on Calcutta.225 The interceptions had 
a dramatic effect on the night offensive on Calcutta as Japanese raids virtually ceased for a 
year and the life of the city quickly returned to normal as fears of the raids diminished. 176 
Squadron’s Operations Record Book shows a series of practice scrambles, training and 
patrols for the next few months but no actual interceptions of Japanese raiders.  
 As opposed to early actions in the theatre all the necessary factors were present for 
the Beaufighter’s success as a night fighter. The aircraft was modern, fit for purpose, well 
armed and capable of intercepting night raiders, particularly bombers. The crews were also 
well trained in their tasks and all had brought experience with them from the Middle East; 
Pring and Phillips had already shot down three Axis bombers over Egypt and Malta. Lastly 
the crews had at their disposal excellent A.I. radar which they efficiently exploited. 
Furthermore it should be recognized that by the end of 1942 radar coverage of Calcutta had 
improved significantly and this was paramount in assisting 176 Squadron’s crews: 
[I]t must be remembered that the success of the Beaufighters belonged in part 
to the greatly improved warning system without which the Beaufighters could 
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not have positioned themselves near enough to enemy aircraft to make use of 
their A.I. radar equipment.226  
The Beaufighters and their crews had shown the Japanese could be beaten at night. However, 
whilst it possessed long range, it did not have sufficient performance to engage Japanese 
single-seat day fighters, and now it was a matter of waiting until Spitfires arrived to 
complete the process by day. However it would take until September 1943 for them to 
arrive. The next section will discuss why it took so long for this fighter to arrive in the Far 
East.   
 The Spitfire is one of the most iconic fighters of the Second World War and like the 
Hurricane had the distinction of serving from the first day of the war until the last although 
its later marks were bigger and faster. Earlier in the war the Spitfire’s capabilities were such 
that German aircrew in the Battles of France and Britain claimed they were shot down by 
this aircraft rather than the Hurricane which Peter Townsend has described as ‘Spitfire 
Snobbery’.227 The first fighter Spitfire to reach India in late 1943, the Mark V, was armed 
with two 20mm cannon and four .303 inch machine guns, and crucially had a rate of climb, 
on paper, to 20,000 feet, nearly two minutes faster than the Hurricane IIC.228 Given this rate 
of climb and a service ceiling of 37,000 feet it was ideal to take advantage of the dive and 
zoom tactics as well as intercepting the high flying Japanese Dinah reconnaissance aircraft.     
 The Spitfire’s arrival in India however was delayed by over eight months as 
proposals to send the aircraft can be traced to December 1942. A.V.M. Ronald Ivelaw-
Chapman, Director of Planning, wrote on 20th December:   
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I think the time has come when we must raise the question of creating a 
Spitfire pattern in India from its present, somewhat nebulous level to one of a 
rigid programme.229  
Despite 100 Spitfires being produced per month for the TORCH landings, Ivelaw-Chapman 
proposed to eventually re-equip all the single-engine fighter squadrons in India with 
Spitfires, except those equipped with Hurricanes for fighter-reconnaissance duties. He also 
wanted to form a small “spearhead” of Spitfire squadrons for air defence before the 1943 
monsoon began in May 1943.230 The shipments would begin in January with enough aircraft 
to equip one squadron. Later shipments would increase to a level where two squadrons per 
month would be equipped.231  However by the start of the monsoon not one Spitfire was 
despatched to India let alone a squadron’s worth. The delay was mainly due to production 
difficulties as well as the commitment to provide other overseas commands and Fighter 
Command in Britain. Furthermore, at the beginning of 1943 Britain was honouring its 
commitment to the Soviet Union by sending refurbished Spitfire Vs and new Hurricanes.232 
In March 1943 a revised delivery date of May 1943 was given: 
You have recently ruled that the allotment of Spitfires to overseas commands, 
including Australia, is to be 290 a month and that 25 of these are to be sent to 
India from May onwards.233 
Despite some discussions on whether the Spitfire Vs destined for India should have different 
performance parameters as regards engine and wing configurations, May was still quoted as 
the start of the shipments to India: 
India’s quote is 25 per month beginning in May and Spitfire V production 
dies in November, so after that month the despatches to India will consist of 
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Vs (re-conditioned), VIIIs or IXs. The quota of 25 is calculated to re-equip 
about five of India’s fighter squadrons with Spitfires by the end of 1943.234  
On 16th April 1943 A.H.Q. India was informed by the Air Ministry that 25 tropicalised 
Spitfires per month were to be sent by sea starting in May and “The flow should start to 
arrive in India about mid-August.”235  However the timetable of aircraft to be sent in May 
was not adhered to despite the Mediterranean being opened for supply ships in May 1943; 
four were despatched on 15th June with a further 22 on June 28th but these aircraft did not 
reach India until the end of August and there were some additional problems. Pierse asked 
for sufficient spares to be sent in advance of the Spitfires’ arrival but according to one 
squadron pilot there was a breakdown in communications: 
I can recall the uproar when it was discovered that we had no spares so flying 
was restricted... Apparently some base type in Delhi, when all these bits and 
pieces were consigned to our theatre of war, knew we didn’t have any Spits, 
so sent them back to the Middle East. What a shambles!236 
Bengal Command reported: 
We are at present faced with a situation where we have Spitfire aircraft in the 
Command which we cannot operate as the unit equipment has not arrived, 
although warning of the arrival of these aircraft was given over three months 
previously.237 
 
 Despite these early setbacks the Spitfire eventually arrived in India with 607 Squadron 
taking delivery of their new aircraft in early September 1943 followed over the next month 
by 615 and 136 Squadrons.  
 The introduction of the Spitfire to India was clearly a planned but protracted move 
and one which brings into question another description of the deployment. In April 1943 
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Wing Commander Paul Richey, a fighter pilot with vast experience of European operations, 
arrived in Delhi and was given the job of assessing fighter tactics in India by the A.O.C. 
Bengal Command A.V.M. Thomas Williams. After visiting squadrons and assessing how the 
defenders dealt with raids on India, Richey submitted his reports in May 1943. These were 
critical of procedures and pressed for the introduction of Spitfires into the theatre. Richey 
later related the story to Norman Franks that Williams said: 
Of course there is no doubt the Hurricane is not up to the job and we must 
have Spitfires. Bill Williams called me into his office, smilingly 
congratulated me on the report, then took out a pair of scissors and said, 
“There’s just one thing I can’t let through.” He then proceeded to cut out the 
sentence about Hurricanes and Spitfires, and destroyed it saying “That’s true, 
and both you and I know it, but we must never let the boys [the pilots] suspect 
it – it would destroy morale.” As if they didn’t know it!238   
Richey submitted his report to the Fighter Operations H.Q. in Delhi and soon after, Williams 
told Richey, “Paul we’re getting Spits! How would you like to take command of the first 
Wing?”239 Franks wrote: 
As far as Paul was concerned, he had helped, by whatever means, to get 
Spitfires to the fighter pilots in India/Burma and they started to arrive in 
October 1943.240 
There is obviously a disparity in this account as by the time Richey had submitted his report 
in May Spitfires were en route to the theatre although there is no evidence to disprove 
Richey’s reports helped promote future acquisition of this valuable aircraft. 
 By the middle of September 1943 the first Spitfire Vs had been accepted into service 
and instantly impressed their pilots, “Golly – the thrust after the Hurricane! It literally forced 
me into the seat and by the time I’d settled myself I was at a couple of thousand feet.”241 
Flying Officer G. Falconer recalled: 
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We did the same work with the Spits as we did with the Hurries, a bit faster 
though! They were a real break for us, as the extra speed, manoeuvrability 
and better vision gave us a better chance to do something about the air raids 
we were getting.242 
Despite the pilots’ enthusiasm the Spitfire’s short range proved a problem in the Far East as 
it had in Europe, especially given the multiplicity of tasks allotted to it. A.V.M. Williams 
wrote: 
While the Spitfire remains an outstandingly fine fighter for defence and for 
combat within a narrow range, it cannot really pull its weight in this theatre 
unless satisfactorily pressurised jettison tanks of 60-90 gallons are provided. 
These I have asked for repeatedly, so far without result.243 
 and Pierse, on 6th November 1943: 
Spitfire or Mustangs of the latest type are what we want. I am impressed with 
reports of the latter and, if they come up to expectations, I shall press for the 
Mustangs because of their longer range.244 
But the R.A.F. never received the Mustang in India. It continued to use the Spitfire, which 
was eventually equipped with long-range fuel tanks in 1944.245  
 Although the Spitfires arrived in September they were not in proper action until early 
November as the squadrons were required to train on their new aircraft and to attend the 
A.F.T.U.. 615 Squadron participated in its first scramble with the Spitfire on 4th October 
1943 when one aircraft took off to intercept a Japanese reconnaissance aircraft, and although 
the Japanese aircraft was not found the Squadron diarist recorded the “performance of the 
Spitfire was most gratifying in climbing power, manoeuvrability and speed”.246 On 16th 
October the Squadron went to the A.F.T.U. for a fortnight’s course on air fighting and 
tactics, which included deflection shooting, range estimation and camera gun attacks on 
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towed drogues.247 It should be noted that the squadron had considerable combat experience 
with their Hurricanes but the course ensured these pilots would make the best use of their 
Spitfires, and this, of course, applied to the other two equipped units. The first three 615 
Squadron successes are indicative of the climbing ability and speed which had been long 
awaited in the theatre. On 8th November, two Spitfires were scrambled to intercept a Dinah 
flying over Chittagong. Catching it at 25,000 feet and sending it down, “they overhauled it 
easily and shot it down in flames.”248 There was further success on 10th and 16th November 
when Dinahs were once again intercepted at 29,000 and 26,000 feet respectively. Both were 
shot down.  
A.H.Q. India had stressed to 222 and 225 Groups how vital the destruction of 
reconnaissance aircraft had been in the Mediterranean Theatre stating it was of “cardinal 
importance” in India to achieve the same result.249 As the Spitfires had been able to intercept 
the Dinahs which the Hurricanes could not, they had blinded Japanese planners to Allied 
movements whose reconnaissance sorties were thereafter limited to short range flights over 
the Burma front rather than long range missions over ports and installations.250 The 
interception of Dinahs by Spitfires was thus a major contribution to the Allies’ war effort as 
between December 1943 and February 1945, 17 Dinahs were destroyed by Spitfires.  
The Spitfire Mark V began to be phased out of production in late 1943 and India 
started receiving the definitive two-stage Merlin powered Mark VIII variant in January 1944. 
The Mark IX, mentioned earlier, which did not see service in the Far East, was a stop-gap 
measure introduced to counter the German Focke-Wulf  Fw-190 in Europe until the Mark 
VIII was introduced into operational service.251 The Mark VIII was powered by a more 
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powerful Merlin engine and although it was slightly bigger and heavier than the Mark V its 
performance was improved giving it a rate of climb to 20,000 feet of 6.7 minutes and a 
ceiling of 40,500 feet.252 The Mark VIII was considered as one of the best Spitfires produced 
as it had a number of refinements such as the four bladed propeller, a retractable tailwheel 
which gave the aircraft an extra 5 mph and multi-ejector exhausts which increased speed by 
another 4 mph.253 The first two squadrons equipped with the Mark VIII, 81 and 152, had 
seen extensive service in the Mediterranean flying Spitfires and brought with them valuable 
combat experience. However flying the Spitfire VIII against nimble Japanese fighter aircraft 
was not easy as Flying Officer Dudley Barnett, a Mark VIII pilot from 136 Squadron, noted 
in his diary: 
A bad day. 81 got a completely new opinion of Japs. Reckon M.E. and U.K. 
squadrons would be very surprised. Most of their (81’s) [sic] aircraft u/s for 
rippled skins and warped engine bearings! We’ve a bit of it too.254    
This was written after air combat in February 1944, and clearly the Spitfire’s technical 
advantage over the Oscar was not enough to completely counter the latter’s advantage in 
manoeuvrability.  
 While there was a steady increase of Spitfire squadrons in the theatre there were 
never enough to satisfy demand. By Christmas 1943 there were three Spitfire squadrons in 
India, at the end of January 1944 this had increased to six, although two of these had only 
just arrived from the Middle East and one (155) was converting its Mohawks to the Spitfire 
VIII. On 5th December 1943 the Japanese mounted a series of raids against Calcutta 
comprising bombers and fighters which did not cause much damage, but did amount to a 
moral victory as few of their aircraft were shot down. The R.A.F. report of the raid was 
highly critical of the way defending fighters had been controlled from the ground. It also 
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submitted that Hurricanes were now obsolete as interceptors.255 There were no Spitfire 
squadrons available in the immediate area. All three were scrambled from distant bases 
throughout the raid; only one aircraft from 136 Squadron made contact at the aircraft’s 
maximum range before crash landing out of fuel.256 After a few more raids when ground 
controllers were criticized for their directions, the controlling began to improve significantly 
with the result that Spitfire pilots were able to intercept successfully. For example, on 31st 
December 136 Squadron intercepted a raid on minesweepers off Akyab, climbing to 30,000 
feet before diving on the Japanese formation 9,000 feet below; the R.A.F. pilots claimed 
eight bombers and three fighters destroyed.257 Clearly the Spitfire was a match for the 
Japanese but the lack of numbers was a drawback. Flight Lieutenant Gordon Conway 
remembered: 
The controllers had only three Spitfire squadrons to play with and obviously 
couldn’t afford to launch the whole force in case we were all caught on the 
ground refuelling at the same time. So their tendency was to scramble a single 
squadron in response initially, and we would normally be out-numbered until 
a second squadron was sent to help, when it became clear that the raid wasn’t 
a feint and needed more response.258   
The controllers and defenders were not assisted by the early warning system’s inaccurate 
estimates of the numbers of Japanese aircraft; on 4th February 136 Squadron was scrambled 
to meet a raid initially thought to consist of 20 aircraft, but it grew to 100. Conway 
remembered, “Our hitherto high scoring rate slowed to a trickle, for under such pressure the 
problem was how to survive.”259 This was to be a regular occurrence. On 5th February 607 
Squadron were scrambled to intercept a raid near Bawli Bazaar which grew from 12 aircraft 
to over 100; on 12th April ten Spitfires engaged over 30 Oscars and on 17th April two Spitfire 
squadrons engaged 50 Oscars escorting six bombers. Furthermore it was not merely a matter 
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of aircraft numbers because, as explained earlier, the Japanese adopted new tactics to counter 
the Allied dive and zoom. They stacked their aircraft formations from low to high level so 
that as the R.A.F. fighters dived through the ‘Beehive’ formation they would find themselves 
surrounded by Japanese fighters.260 During the 5th February raid the Japanese fighters were 
flying between low level and 18,000 feet, and on 17th April from low level to 30,000 feet 
with bombers flying in the middle at 15,000 feet. Given these circumstances the Spitfires 
and supporting Hurricanes could only hope to break up and disrupt the Japanese raids, rather 
than destroy Japanese aircraft en masse.   
 The next obstacle was the varying efficiency of the early warning and controlling 
organisation because the Spitfire, even accounting for its excellent rate of climb, required 
early warning and accurate height information. Accurate information was not always 
possible. Between November 1943 and February 1944 various raids were reported giving 
heights that were either too low or too high. Speaking of intercepting a Dinah, Sergeant Guy 
Watson remembered: 
The radar was very bad on height finding, extraordinarily bad. We always 
seemed to be 1,000 or even 2,000 feet below them, whereas we should have 
been above them.261 
 and Flight Sergeant Bill Davies recalled: 
Quite an important factor in radar controlled interceptions was the lack of 
accurate height finding. It was always disconcerting to have the target’s 
height suddenly change by the odd ten thousand feet. This was not the 
controller’s fault as interpreting their gear in those days was more of an art 
than a science.262 
However when the controllers and radar got it right, the Spitfires were able to achieve good 
results; as noted earlier on 31st December 136 Squadron was successfully directed to 
intercept the raid over Akyab, Flight Lieutenant Conway writing, “it was one of those days 
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when everything went right”.263 Similar comments were recorded in connection with 
successfully intercepted raids on 15th January, “By excellent controlling”; 5th February, 
“excellent control” and 15th February; “up sun and ideal.”264  
 As the campaign moved East into Burma it became more difficult for the Spitfire to 
operate successfully because of shortcomings in the early warning system. A detachment of 
81 Squadron Spitfires VIIIs stationed at the Chindit landing ground at Broadway was 
covered by a mobile light-weight radar set, but it only gave short warning of Japanese attack. 
On 13th March 1944 40 Oscars attacked the landing site and the radar gave the detachment 
little time to take off and meet the raid and one Spitfire was destroyed as it became airborne: 
Today 30 plus enemy fighters tried to strafe our new base. RDF very bad; 
only got five minutes warning. Sergeant Campbell and I were last to 
scramble. Bounced over ‘drome – Campbell killed immediately.265 
Two days later the Japanese attacked Broadway again and caught 81 Squadron; two pilots 
were killed, one on the ground, five aircraft were destroyed and one badly damaged.266 
Subsequently 81 Squadron withdrew from Broadway to Kangla and from then onwards the 
protection of Broadway depended on air patrols, or once the landing ground was under 
attack the squadron would be alerted by telephone.267 Once the siege of Imphal began, 
Spitfire squadrons were sent to defend the Plain but suffered from a lack of early warning 
which became progressively worse as the Japanese advanced towards Imphal and overran 
radar and observer positions.  The Japanese took advantage of the weak spots in the warning 
chain by flying low and breaking their formations into small sections of two or three which 
made both detection and interception difficult. Patrols by Allied aircraft were not considered 
to be feasible as fuel needed to be transported into Imphal and could not be wasted. The 
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Allies countered this threat in a number of ways. As soon as unidentified aircraft were 
reported approaching the area fighters were immediately scrambled to save time and if the 
weather favoured a Japanese attack aircraft were sent to known exit points to catch the 
raiders as they returned to their home bases. Furthermore squadron pilots were positioned on 
hilltops around Imphal equipped with aircraft pattern radios to report on raiders’ progress 
directly to the defending pilots.268 The eventual solution was the adoption of an air corridor 
for transport aircraft to fly along which was patrolled by Allied fighters during daylight 
hours. All these elaborate methods assisted in protecting the transport and ground attack 
aircraft, and it should not be forgotten that important attrition was being afflicted on 
Japanese units by the Americans’ counter-air offensive. 
 Between October 1944 and May 1945 Japanese raids became infrequent and 
spasmodic; Japanese assets reduced as a result of attrition and transfer, and the remaining 
raids were usually carried out at low level and in small numbers which presented the 
defenders with problems. A.C.M. Sir Keith Park wrote in his despatch: 
Even when the temporary halt around Mandalay and Spitfires were able to 
occupy the Shwebo and Monywa  airfield groups, air supply was proceeding 
over a hundred and thirty mile front which the four available squadrons of 
Spitfires were hard pressed to cover in conjunction with their other defensive 
duties.269  
As the Fourteenth Army pushed Eastwards and captured airfields the possibilities of 
providing effective early warning diminished owing to the inconsistent mobile radar sets and 
speed of the Allied advance. Fortunately as Japanese air assets reduced, their raids became 
more of a nuisance value than a serious threat. They caused some damage but never enough 
to seriously interfere with the Allied progress through Burma. Moreover the Spitfire 
continued to successfully intercept Japanese reconnaissance aircraft and provide important 
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air patrols but the number of scrambles and air activity reduced significantly in the first few 
months of 1945: 
February 1945    May 1945 
Scramble      51    7 
Patrols      2,063           1,192 
Escorts     144    35         270 
While its role as an interceptor decreased the Spitfire soon found employment as a ground 
attack fighter in support of the Fourteenth Army advance. 
Allied Aircraft engaged in the Counter-Air Offensive 
The preceding section demonstrated how the right types of aircraft in conjunction 
with other criteria made a positive contribution towards air superiority in the defensive role. 
This section will analyse the relative effectiveness of Allied aircraft types when engaged in 
the counter-air offensive role.  
 The counter-air offensive in the Far East had an important role particularly when 
effective early warning systems and defensive fighters were lacking as was sometimes 
inevitable with a front stretching over 700 miles. Following the initial Japanese attacks in 
December 1941 the R.A.F. attempted to reduce Japanese air strength by attacking enemy 
airbases with Buffalo fighters or Blenheim bombers. The twin-engine Blenheim was 
classified as a high-speed bomber before the war but by 1942 it had been rendered obsolete 
by single-engine fighters which were faster and more manoeuvrable. Most of the Blenheims 
in the Far East in December 1941 were the Mark I, which could carry a 1,000 lb bomb load. 
It was armed with two machine guns, one being located in a power operated dorsal turret, 
but its top speed of 285 mph at 15,000 feet was insufficient to protect it against enemy 
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fighters.271 On 9th December six Blenheims from Butterworth airfield in Malaya attacked 
Japanese airfields at Singora and Sungei Patani without fighter escort; three of the 
Blenheims were lost. During the same afternoon the remaining Blenheims were detailed to 
return to Singora, but as they were taking off a low level raid by Japanese aircraft destroyed 
and damaged all but one aircraft which was already airborne. The Blenheim’s pilot, 
Squadron Leader Arthur Scarf, decided to continue to the target alone where he attacked 
enemy aircraft and buildings before being overwhelmed by enemy fighters on his way 
home.272 Despite such acts of bravery this and similar attacks did little to reduce Japanese air 
strength. A counter-air offensive in 1941 was unlikely to succeed as the Allies had too few 
suitable aircraft and these were committed to too many tasks against a superior enemy.  
 The events at the beginning of December 1941 had demonstrated the attributes of a 
successful offensive fighter. For example, the Japanese Zero which had the operational range 
of a bomber, with the armament and manoeuvrability of a fighter albeit at the expense of 
armour and pilot protection. At the start of 1942 Wavell asked the Air Ministry to provide 
long-range fighters for the Eastern command but his request met with some difficulties as, in 
the main, such aircraft did not exist. The R.A.F. had long asked for a true long-range fighter 
that could escort bombers whilst retaining the ability to defend itself but nothing had been 
forthcoming. Portal told Churchill in May 1941: 
The long-range fighter whether built specifically as such, or whether given 
increased range by fitting extra tanks, will be at a disadvantage compared 
with the short range high performance fighter.273 
Both the Spitfire and Hurricane had been designed as short-range interceptors, and neither 
had the range to participate in deep interdiction operations without auxiliary fuel tanks. 
Portal was correct about the difficulty of successfully adapting the Hurricane as its 
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performance with long range tanks in the Far East did not match that of Japanese fighters, 
but the lack of any development in adapting any other fighter, such as the Spitfire, would 
eventually prove a serious oversight.274  The only operational British long-range aircraft 
available at the beginning of 1942 were the Mosquito, which was only just entering service 
in Britain, and the Beaufighter which was in demand in Europe and the Middle East as an 
interdictor and night-fighter. The Air Ministry informed A.H.Q. India on 21st April 1942 that 
the Mosquito was experiencing “teething problems” and: 
The need for long-range fighters your command already fully realized here 
and ways and means of providing Beaufighters are being urgently considered 
in consultation Admiralty.275   
The Beaufighter was introduced into Far East service at the end of 1942 but its impact on the 
counter-air offensive was minimal owing to its lack of numbers. The Americans possessed 
the P-40 which had a longer range than the Hurricane with a similar performance, but these 
aircraft were largely based in the North of India defending the transport route into China and 
were in short supply. There were therefore limited resources for a counter-air offensive at the 
end of the monsoon in October 1942.  
The only suitable aircraft the R.A.F. possessed was the American built Curtiss P-36 
Mohawk, a single-engine fighter aircraft armed, in British service, with six .303 inch 
machine guns and provision for bombs and auxiliary fuel tanks.276 Common to most 
American aircraft the Mohawk had a large internal fuel capacity which gave the aircraft a 
range of 620 miles in comparison to the Hurricane IIC’s 460.277 This long-range ability 
made the aircraft ideal for bomber escort and interdiction operations, and combined with its 
manoeuvrability made it popular with its pilots: 
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Make no mistake, the Mohawk was a good aircraft. Beautiful to fly, very 
manoeuvrable and very reliable. A number of pilots returned safely to base 
with cylinder pots shot up; a bullet anywhere in the cooling system of a 
Merlin and you’d had it. The Cyclone air-cooled engine of the Mohawk could 
take a lot of punishment and still put-put along. The weaknesses of the 
Mohawk were, of course, poor height performance and lack of fire power – 
six machine guns was not very good. But she was a real nice aircraft and did 
us proud.278 
 
However, there were only two squadrons of these aircraft in the Far East, 5 and 155, and 
they had to perform many tasks in addition to bomber escort and interdiction: tactical 
reconnaissance; ground support and air defence to accompany the Hurricane squadrons. 
Furthermore they were heavily committed at the end of 1942 and beginning of 1943 
supporting the Army during the first Arakan campaign and resisting Japanese air attacks on 
airfields and installations.  
The lack of entirely suitable aircraft in sufficient numbers resulted in a counter-air 
offensive by medium and heavy bombers which had mixed effects. The heaviest British 
bomber in India was the Wellington, a twin engine medium bomber capable of carrying a 
4,500 lbs bomb load over a normal range of 1,470 miles. From September 1942 it was joined 
by R.A.F. B-24 Liberators, an American built four-engine heavy bomber capable of carrying 
an 8,000 lbs bomb load over a normal range of 1,540 miles.279 While such ranges 
encompassed Japanese bases and the bomb loads represented lethal capabilities, if such 
aircraft were used by day they needed long range fighter escort which was lacking. Whilst 
using these aircraft (and others such as the Blenheim and Hudson) to attack the main 
Japanese bases by night may have destroyed facilities, equipment and runways, it did little to 
destroy Japanese aircraft on the ground as the Japanese dispersed their aircraft to airfields 
out of range of the attacks, or kept them on well concealed airstrips. However there were 
positive effects from the bomber offensive. By pushing Japanese aircraft to rearward areas it 
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gave Allied aircraft some room to operate in central and upper Burma without fear of 
interception. It also reduced the weight of air attack against India; and enabled Allied aircraft 
to operate from advanced airfields.280 However the effects of the counter-air offensive did 
not seriously reduce Japanese air strength. What was required were more suitable aircraft the 
first of which became operational at the beginning of 1943. 
 The Beaufighter met some of the attributes for a suitable long-range fighter. It was 
heavily armed with four 20mm cannons and six .303 inch machine guns, was capable of 
carrying a 1000 lb bomb load or eight rocket projectiles and, in addition, the aircraft had a 
range of 1,480 miles and a top speed of 315mph at 14,000 feet.281 These specifications set 
the aircraft apart from existing British types but there were operational difficulties. The 
Beaufighter whilst fast enough to outrun Japanese aircraft at full throttle was not 
manoeuvrable enough to engage single-engine Japanese fighters in aerial combat.282 The 
second problem was that between January and September 1943 only 27 Squadron was 
equipped with interdictor Beaufighters and an examination of this unit’s Operations Record 
Books shows it being tasked with a wide range of targets including rail, road and coastal 
transport.283 The lack of Beaufighter numbers combined with the J.A.A.F. being stationed in 
rearward areas resulted in only a handful of sorties being flown against airfields and even 
fewer Japanese aircraft claimed as destroyed.  
 The combination of heavy bombers and a few suitable fighter aircraft being used in 
the counter-air offensive did not produce any tangible effect on Japanese air strength and 
Craven and Cate observed, “the interdiction program in central Burma had not succeeded by 
the end of 1943”.284 Clearly long-range fighters were required which could take the fight to 
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the Japanese, and just as the introduction of the Spitfire represented a significant advance to 
air defence, so did the introduction of the American Lightning’s and Mustang’s for counter-
air operations. 
 The Lightning was a single-seat twin engine fighter that was armed with one 20mm 
cannon and four 0.5in machine guns and could carry up to 1,600 lbs of ordnance; 
significantly it had a range of up to 1,512 miles that could be increased with the addition of 
auxiliary fuel tanks.285 The 459th F.S. who flew the Lightning was activated in India in 
September 1943 with a core of experienced pilots supported by some new pilots from 
training schools. Along with their R.A.F. colleagues they attended the A.F.T.U. to learn 
about air and ground firing, their instructors becoming impressed with the rapid development 
of their techniques.286 At the end of 1943 they were joined by the 530th F.S. equipped with 
the P-51A Mustang, a single-engine fighter which was armed with four .5 inch machine guns 
and could carry 1,000lbs of bombs or rockets; crucially the aircraft had a basic range of 
1,500 miles which could be increased with the addition of two drop tanks.287 Furthermore, 
the Allies’ capability was increased at the beginning of 1944 with the arrival of the 1st 
A.C.G. also equipped with Mustangs and experienced pilots. The deployment of both these 
aircraft types would lead to a fundamental shift in counter-air tactics during the crucial first 
six months of 1944. 
 Prior to the beginning of 1944 the counter-air campaign was defined by its aircraft, 
bombers capable of attacking known airfields but with a lack of suitable long range fighters 
able to act as escorts or to attack Japanese aircraft on their airstrips. With the introduction of 
the Lightning and Mustang, Japanese aircraft were vulnerable to attack in most locations and 
by aircraft that were their equal or superiors in aerial combat. The offensive was assisted by 
the intelligence services locating Japanese airstrips and units, and the Japanese bringing their 
                                                          
285 Appendices 4 and 5. 
286 Stanaway, P38 Lightning Aces of the Pacific and CBI, p.79. 
287 The 530th were also equipped with the A-36 Apache, a dive-bomber version of the Mustang.  
189 
aircraft forward to support their Westward campaign. However the Lightning’s and 
Mustang’s importance should not be underestimated. The air defence of the various landing 
strips was compromised by an inconsistent early warning system so the capability to reduce 
and interfere with Japanese air assets was vital, but now: 
These aircraft were now able to seek out the enemy at his forward airfields 
and owing to the apparent ineffectiveness of the Japanese warning system, 
they could often destroy his aircraft before they were airborne.288  
 
Apart from airfield strikes and aggressive patrolling, tactics were also adopted to make best 
use of the Lightning’s range and capabilities. For example, on 3rd March 1944 224 Group 
issued an instruction to the 459th F.S. which had its intention, “To operate 459 Squadron 
both on offensive and defensive sorties making full use of their long endurance and high 
performance at altitude.”289 In the event of a Japanese attack half of the 459th’s aircraft 
would be scrambled for local defence, whilst the others would be despatched, with the help 
of intelligence, to intercept the Japanese aircraft as they returned to their bases short of fuel 
and ammunition. This reaped dividends on 25th March when ten Lightnings were diverted to 
Shwebo and then to Anisakan where they found 36 Oscars returning to their base; the 
American pilots claimed nine probably shot down, three damaged and two aircraft destroyed 
on the ground.290  
 As the war continued the capabilities of American aircraft increased. At the start of 
1945 the Mustang had evolved to the D variant, now armed with six 0.5in machine guns and 
powered by the British Merlin engine, which gave it superior performance, and a range, 
depending on tankage and load, of up to 2,250 miles.291 In March 1945 aircraft from 2nd 
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A.C.G. attacked the Japanese airfield at Don Muang in Siam, a trip equal to flying to Vienna 
and back from London.292 Also introduced to service in the Far East during 1944 was the 
U.S. P-47 Thunderbolt, another single-engine fighter, armed with eight .5 inch machine 
guns, the capability to carry 2,500 lbs of ordinance and a range extending from 737 to 2,100 
miles depending on its fuel capacity.293 Furthermore, the 1st A.C.G. occasionally used a 
variant of the B-25 Mitchell medium bomber on airfield interdiction operations which was 
equipped with eight fixed forward firing 0.5in machine guns and one .75mm cannon, in 
addition to its six 0.5in flexible machine guns.294 Given the capabilities of these kinds of 
aircraft it was natural that the Americans would take a larger share in airfield attacks with 
only occasional sorties being flown, by the Beaufighter and later the Mosquito. The R.A.F.’s 
main fighters did not possess such ranges and this was commented on by a delegation from 
the Central Fighter Establishment following a visit to the theatre between February and April 
1945, reporting: 
[M]ost of strategic bombing is done by long range heavies. To escort them, 
the R.A.F. in Burma has no fighter with sufficient range except the 
Thunderbolt. Escort is normally confined to airborne or supply operations... 
The lack of range of British fighters is a limiting factor on their full offensive 
role in this theatre. 295 
Apart from the Thunderbolt being used in R.A.F. service for ground attack as a 
Hurricane replacement, there was one other British type occasionally used in the counter-air 
role. The Mosquito F.B.VI was a high performance twin-engine fighter-bomber made almost 
entirely of wood which started to be delivered to India at the end of 1943. Armed with four 
20mm cannons, four .303in machine guns, a 1000lb bomb load and a range of 1,120 miles, 
the aircraft was destined to replace the Beaufighter in the long-range interdictor role, but its 
introduction and subsequent Far Eastern service was blighted by technical difficulties. It was 
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originally thought that the glue holding the airframe together was susceptible to the high 
humidity in the Far East as it melted with disastrous results, but later it was found that the 
problem was actually insufficient glue.296 By the beginning of 1945 these aircraft were being 
used for interdiction operations, one of their targets being Japanese airfields, and 221 
Group’s Mosquitos were proposed to be used in a similar role as 459th’s Lightnings; after 
Japanese raids aircraft were to be despatched to specific airfields with intelligence assistance 
to intercept Japanese aircraft as they returned to their bases.297 However by the time the 
aircraft was fully operational the Japanese air threat had reduced leaving the Mosquito to 
concentrate on communication targets. 
 The counter-air offensive had vindicated the need for a high performance long-range 
fighter capable of carrying heavy weapons and taking part in aerial combat over the enemy’s 
territory. Lack of development of British types resulted in an offensive for eighteen months 
limited to heavy and medium bombers bombing main airfields with minimal effect on 
Japanese air strength. When the Beaufighter was introduced it was in small numbers and it 
did little to reduce Japanese air assets. However the need for a long-range fighter was met by 
the American Lightning and Mustang at just the right time at the beginning of 1944 when its 
squadrons addressed the difficulties of defending airstrips by attacking Japanese aircraft at 
their bases. The first half of 1944 represented the most crucial months of the counter-air 
campaign and, although the results may not have been as severe as previously thought, it 
hindered and thus reduced the Japanese air threat. Without the long-range fighter this result 
would have been harder to achieve.  
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Conclusion 
 Although this chapter has dealt with the factors of aircrew, tactics and aircraft 
separately for clarity, it has demonstrated that they were interdependent. Furthermore, the 
chapter has shown that each of the factors needed to be addressed and to achieve the same 
high standard if air supremacy was to be gained and maintained. 
Japan achieved air superiority in 1941 and 1942 through having well trained and 
experienced aircrew flying aircraft types which were suitable for combat tasks. Furthermore 
their air tactics had been refined against Chinese and Soviet adversaries. The R.A.F. 
possessed no such advantages. Fighter pilots in Malaya were a mixture of inexperienced men 
fresh from training schools, those who had transferred from other aircraft and a small 
number who were experienced but in campaigns fought in Europe and the Middle East. 
Although their air fighting tactics were quickly adapted to counter Japanese fighters’ 
manoeuvrability, this was not made easier because of their aircraft. Owing to priorities being 
greater to other theatres combined with undue optimism or refusal to accept intelligence 
reports, the Buffalo was sent to the Far East, and although some experienced pilots achieved 
good results, the majority could not. It must also be remembered that the dive and zoom 
tactic depended on height advantage which the early-warning system could not always 
supply, and which the Buffalo could not consistently reach. Taken together these factors 
represented a dangerous weakness in air defence terms. 
 The situation did not improve when reinforcements were sent. Pre-war plans to 
reinforce the Far East from the Middle East failed because at the end of 1941 the Middle 
East command was engaged in fierce fighting, and ships and aircraft were in short supply. 
The Hurricanes that were diverted to the Far East were not of the most advanced type and, 
again, many of the pilots were inexperienced, so the reinforcements did not represent a 
significant improvement over the Buffalos and their crews. Furthermore, as A.V.M. Maltby 
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wrote, there was no time for either acclimatisation or for using the Hurricanes in mass 
formations.298 Admittedly the Hurricane units performed better over Palembang and Burma 
when the early-warning system gave more time, but attrition rates eventually reduced the 
R.A.F.’s defensive efforts. 
 This early period had demonstrated how important the relationship between aircrew, 
tactics and aircraft were. Squadrons quickly realized that tactics used against the Germans 
and Italians would not work against manoeuvrable Japanese fighters and made efforts to 
adopt the effective dive and zoom manoeuvre. However the deficiencies in early warning 
combined with their fighters’ limited performance restricted opportunities to gain the height 
necessary for capitalizing the dive and zoom tactic. This chapter has demonstrated that once 
the problem of gaining height had been addressed successfully, this tactic was accepted as 
the most relevant and effective when dealing with Japanese fighters down to the end of the 
war. Despite Japanese pilots trying to find counter-measures, Allied pilots’ responses were 
essentially adaptations of their basic tactic.   
    From October 1942 the situation improved in terms of aircrew, tactics and aircraft 
quantity. Better trained pilots started to arrive, or men with previous combat experience, and 
the formation of the A.F.T.U. ensured they were trained in relevant combat tactics. However 
while the quantity of aircraft improved, the quality did not as the Hurricane remained the 
principal day fighter until the beginning of 1944. This remained a crucial weakness. 
However, while the Hurricane fought on, the Beaufighter’s first night interceptions 
demonstrated what was achievable when aircrew, aircraft and tactics combined successfully 
together. 
 The value of the correct aircraft for the task was demonstrated in late 1943. 
Defensively the Spitfire capitalized on the improved early-warning systems in Eastern India 
                                                          
298 TNA, Air 23/2123, Operations of the R.A.F. during the campaigns in Malaya and Netherlands East Indies: 
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to intercept reconnaissance aircraft, and it proved a match for Japanese fighters. Until the 
Spitfire arrived Allied fighters were unable to intercept the Dinah, but from December 1943 
Dinah sorties were virtually neutralized and so Japanese commanders were deprived of 
important intelligence. Later, when the Japanese devised methods to counter the Spitfire’s 
performance and tactics, the R.A.F. was capable of adapting their tactics accordingly and 
this was made easier with the Spitfire’s high performance capabilities. The Spitfire’s 
introduction was thus of significant importance as it provided the missing link in the 
defensive chain. The contribution of the long-range American fighter to offensive operations 
was also of crucial importance.  
The counter-air campaign was of vital importance in supporting defensive operations, 
particularly during the siege at Imphal when the early warning capability was restricted and 
transport aircraft required protection. Until their introduction the counter-air campaign had 
achieved little except dispersing Japanese resources, but Mustangs and Lightnings had the 
performance, range and armament to successfully attack Japanese units in their own 
territory. Chapter Three of this thesis will analyse the counter-air campaign and show how 
its eventual success was achieved, but there can be no doubt that without the long-range U.S. 
fighters, the counter-air campaign would have been much harder to successfully prosecute. 
 Whilst Allied aircrew, tactics and aircraft improved, the Japanese did not keep pace 
and so lost their early advantage. Japan’s industry was unable to produce aircraft in both 
quality and quantity to match the Allied resources leaving the Oscar as the main fighter in 
Burma until May 1945. If properly handled, as it was by Japanese pilots whose quality did 
not appear to deteriorate, the Oscar was a dangerous opponent and was respected by Allied 
pilots to the end. The hindrance for the Japanese was the lack of more modern aircraft and 
replacement pilots rather than the quality of their aircrew. 
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Chapter Three - The Counter-Air Campaign 
The counter-air campaign waged by the Allies in Burma was an integral component 
of gaining air superiority. The lack of an effective bomber offensive against the Japanese 
aircraft industry until early 1945, the inconsistencies of Allied early warning, particularly in 
the sieges at Kohima and Imphal, and the difficulties of finding aircraft in the air and 
destroying them made counter-air interdiction a priority. This chapter will assess the overall 
effect of the counter-air campaign on Japanese strength and its eventual contribution to 
attaining air superiority. 
The benefits of a counter-air campaign had been first realized during the First World 
War and its doctrine developed through the formulative inter-war years before reaching 
operational maturity in the first years of the Second World War. The Japanese successfully 
used their Army and Navy air arms in pre-emptive strikes against British and American 
airbases in 1941 and 1942, rendering their enemies’ air strength impotent. From October 
1942 the Allies embarked on their counter-air campaign against Japanese air resources, but 
initially this was ineffective owing to the types and numbers of aircraft at their disposal. 
However with the introduction of American long-range fighters in late 1943, assisted by an 
efficient intelligence organisation, the Allies were able to prosecute a robust campaign, 
which destroyed Japanese aircraft and forced units to disperse. During the period between 
March and June 1944 significant claims were made by Allied aircrews of Japanese aircraft 
destroyed in the counter-air strikes, with Bengal Command quoting 96 aircraft being 
destroyed in six weeks.1 Furthermore Air Historical Branch narrators wrote that the six 
month period of air fighting in the Far East at the beginning of 1944 broke the back of 
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December 1943 and 3rd Tactical Air Force 18th December 1943 to 1st June 1944, p.7. 
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Japanese air strength.2 This chapter will examine the veracity of such claims in order to 
ascertain the role and importance of the counter- air campaign.  
 
Definition of the term, the benefits, and the offensive requirements 
 A counter-air offensive can be described as the destruction of an enemy’s air assets 
and also his ancillary organisation on the ground, which includes personnel, maintenance 
facilities, munitions stores, runways and fuel stocks. Bolkcom and Pike wrote that engaging 
aircraft in air-to-air combat is difficult as it involves fighting them in the environment they 
were designed to fight in and countering their attributes of speed, manoeuvrability and 
armament.3 In contrast the authors wrote that an aircraft on the ground is vulnerable as it is 
out of its environment. It therefore presents a relatively easy target. This can be taken further 
as aircraft are also vulnerable in two crucial stages of flight. During take off the aircraft is 
making height and flying speed, and is not in a good position to defend itself against attack 
from the air. Secondly after an operation on its approach to its home base, an aircraft is 
vulnerable to attack as it is low on fuel and short of ammunition and the crew is potentially 
fatigued.  
 There are significant benefits to be derived from a counter-air offensive either as a 
precursor to war or as part of an ongoing air superiority campaign. By attacking enemy 
aircraft over and on their bases the attackers gain the initiative as to where and when the 
encounter is fought, whereas the defender is presented with the difficulty of providing 
adequate defensive measures whilst waiting for an attack. Successful attacks have the 
capability of forcing the defenders to disperse to safer areas, thereby increasing the attacker’s 
aircrafts’ range of operations. This has beneficial effects on flying time, pilot fatigue, fuel 
                                                          
2 TNA, Air 41/64, The Campaigns in the Far East Volume IV: South East Asia November 1943 to August 
1945, p.71. 
3 Bolkcom and Pike, Attack Aircraft Proliferation: Issues for Concern, Chapter 7. 
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consumption and aircraft serviceability. Furthermore an airforce’s logistical infrastructure is 
open to damage or destruction, as essential communications present vulnerable targets. 
Highly trained aircrew, technicians and mechanics, together with intelligence and 
communications staff are also viable targets and their loss can present insuperable problems 
for the enemy as skill and experience cannot be quickly or easily replaced. Also attacking an 
air force over its own territory and on its airfields has an important effect on morale by 
promoting uncertainty and insecurity.  
 There are a variety of requirements for a counter-air offensive. Good intelligence 
concerning the enemy’s airfields, whether permanent or temporary, together with knowledge 
of ancillary maintenance establishments and supplies is a necessity. Some airfields’ location 
may be known, as in the case of those in Burma vacated by the British in 1942, but other 
airfields require finding and this can be achieved by a variety of measures from photo 
reconnaissance, clandestine intelligence gathering groups, and communications interception 
organisations. The ability to attack aircraft and their weapons system was a vital factor. 
Heavy bombers had the potential to cause more damage, but such attacks presented 
problems of protection particularly if the raids were carried out by day. Flying by night had 
the advantage of not requiring fighter escorts, but would suffer from difficulties in finding 
the target. A better option was using heavily armed fighter aircraft that had the capability of 
inflicting destruction on enemy aircraft and installations on the ground, whilst also being 
able to defend themselves against enemy aircraft and win an aerial battle. This was an 
approach often favoured by the Allies in both World Wars. 
 Tactically the attackers in a counter-air offensive have the initiative and create the 
battleground.4 However for the offensive to be successful, attacks must be concentrated and 
sustained for long enough that an effect in replacing losses can be imposed. To carry out this 
                                                          
4 Ibid, Chapter 7. 
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function the attackers must firstly have the right kind of aircraft, and sufficient resources to 
maintain concerted pressure.  
This chapter will demonstrate that whilst there was a counter-air offensive in Burma 
between 1942 and 1943, it had little overall effect on Japanese air strength. In comparison, 
during the first six months of 1944 the predominately American led counter-air offensive 
was sustained and concentrated enough to cause an effect on Japanese air strength.  
 
The Counter-Air Offensive during the First World War 
 In 1914 Winston Churchill (First Lord of the Admiralty) reported to the House of 
Commons that “Passive Air Defence against aircraft is perfectly hopeless and endless. You 
would have to roof the world to be sure.”5 Whilst the credit for counter-air strategies cannot 
be attributed to Churchill, it shall not be surprising that consideration was given to the 
prospect of attacking aircraft when at their most vulnerable and relatively easy to find. In 
September 1916 the lessons learned by the Royal Flying Corps (R.F.C.) were reflected in 
Major General Hugh Trenchard’s Future Policy in the Air, which encapsulates a counter-air 
offensive: 
An aeroplane is an offensive and not a defensive weapon. Owing to the 
unlimited space in the air, the difficulty one machine has in seeing another... 
it is impossible for aeroplanes, however vigilant their pilots, however 
powerful their engines, however mobile their machines, and however 
numerous their formations, to prevent hostile aircraft from crossing the lines 
if they have the initiative and determination to do so. The aeroplane is not a 
defence against the aeroplane; but... the aeroplane as a weapon of attack 
cannot be too highly estimated.6   
 
                                                          
5 TNA, Air 41/64, The Campaigns in the Far East Volume IV: South East Asia November 1943 to August 
1945, p.72. 
6 Jones, Official History of the War, Volume Three, The War In The Air, p.472. At the time Trenchard was 
Officer Commanding, R.F.C. in France.  
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It is clear that the aeroplane cannot defend a territory against aeroplanes across a wide front 
in the absence of an effective early warning system and it follows that one defence against 
attacking aircraft is an attack on its source.   
 During the First World War the theory was put into practice. After the Zeppelin raids 
on Britain bombing raids were carried out on their hangars, and in September 1917 the 
R.F.C. bombed the German Gotha airfields at Gastrode following their attacks on London.7 
On 19th July 1916 aircraft from the R.F.C. attacked the German aerodrome at Douai where a 
petrol store and hangars were set alight.8 In April 1917 the German fighter dominance was 
such that the month was termed ‘Bloody April’ by the R.F.C and to counter this R.F.C. 
aircraft were fitted with one-pounder quick firing pom-poms, “they succeeded in wrecking 
hangars and buildings on Richthofen’s aerodrome at Douai, keeping Richthofen out of the 
air for a day or two.”9 The R.F.C.’s day to day summary shows the efforts to fight the 
German fighters during offensive patrols; on 26th September: 
It was impossible to bring the fast German scouts... to fight today as they 
continually dodged in and out of clouds, and except in the case of the Gothas 
and their escorts there were practically no German machines above the 
clouds.10 
The Germans also participated in counter-air activity; on 17th November 1916 they bombed 
the French aerodrome at Cachy and “21 of their machines were put out of action, eight of 
which… were completely destroyed.”11 However, although both sides attacked aerodromes 
neither offensive was concentrated or sustained enough to make a significant difference to 
the respective air strength. Furthermore, because each side’s aircraft industry was able easily 
to replace damaged and destroyed machines and aircrew training was uncomplicated, any 
counter-air offensive was only likely to result in temporary inconvenience.  
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8 Jones, Official History of the War, Volume Three, The War In The Air p.259.   
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Inter-War Thinking  
The inter-war period is associated with strategists advocating the use of heavy 
bombers to destroy an enemy’s army, its means to wage war and its population’s morale.12 
However Guilio Douhet, the Italian air power advocate, wrote that as the aircraft had no 
limitations to its movement it was therefore was the offensive weapon par excellence.13 
However because of this freedom, “There is no practical way to prevent the enemy from 
attacking us with his air force except to destroy his air force before he has a chance to strike 
at us.”14 This was written before radar had been invented, but the basis of a counter-air 
offensive is unmistakable: 
  This is the logical and rational concept which should be recognized,  
  even for simple defence – namely to prevent the enemy from flying or  
  from carrying out any aerial action at all. Achieving command of the  
  air implies positive action – that is offensive and not defensive action,  
  the very action best suited to air power.15 
and: 
The one effective method of defending one’s own territory from an offensive 
by air is to destroy the enemy’s air force with the greatest possible speed.16 
 
Douhet did not mention how this offensive would be carried out or specifically what kind of 
aircraft would be used, but a fellow air power advocate argued for the use of fighters. 
 American General William Mitchell had spent time with Trenchard, the first Chief of 
the Air Staff, during the latter stages of the First World War and, whilst appreciating the use 
of strategic bombers, he saw the importance of first neutralising an enemy’s air resources. In 
1920 he wrote: 
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14 Ibid, p.21. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid, p.94. 
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  The principal mission of aeronautics is to destroy the aeronautical   
  force of the enemy, and, after this, to attack his formations, both   
  tactical and strategical, on the ground or water.17   
  
In 1921 Mitchell wrote: 
  As a prelude to any engagement of military or naval forces, a contest  
  must take place for control of the air. The first battles of any future war  
  will be air battles. The nation winning them is practically certain to  
  win the whole war, because the victorious air service will be able to  
  operate and increase without hindrance.18 
 
Mitchell’s themes were developed by Major William Sherman, an officer at the Air Service 
Field Officers’ School, who wrote that the first duty of the air force was to, “gain and hold 
control of the air, by seeking out and destroying the hostile air force wherever it may be 
found.”19 Agreeing with Mitchell that the answer lay with fighter aircraft he wrote that the 
“backbone of the air forces on which the whole plan of employment must be hung is 
pursuit.”20  
Despite this and Mitchell’s books, United States theorists debated the best use of air 
power throughout the 1930s.21 A bomber’s potential superior speed and defensive fire power 
was repeatedly seen as the key to attacking enemy’s lands, and furthermore the use of 
bombers was the best way to destroy enemy aircraft on the ground. However it is important 
to recognise that the Americans knew a key to air superiority was to destroy the enemy’s 
aircraft at source rather than in the air. Significantly in 1935 the Air Corps Board 
recommended that defences against hostile aircraft should be developed in the form of quick, 
cannon equipped fighters that were 20 per cent faster than the bomber aircraft they were 
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likely to encounter. One of the fighters subsequently ordered in 1937 became the P-38 
Lightning, which was to play a significant role in Allied attacks on Japanese airfields in 
1944. 
 In Britain the creation of the first independent air force had strategic bombing as one 
of its raisons d’être. The inter-war period is remembered for Britain debating the idea of the 
bomber being always able to get through, but it is also clear that thought was given to how 
the enemy’s airforce could be effectively neutralised.22 In the 1922 R.A.F. Operations 
Manual the basis of a counter-air offensive was made clear: 
The destruction of his air forces at their bases on the ground is the most 
effective method of attaining the main object, to it must be subjected all other 
independent uses for aircraft until this destruction has at least partly 
accomplished.23  
  
and:   
  [T]he tactical offensive in aerial war is a continuous policy; to seek out  
  and destroy the enemy’s air forces by a continuous and unremitting  
  offensive is the guiding principle of tactics in the air.24 
 
First World War lessons had been learned as the manual writes of moving aircraft closer to 
the enemy as circumstances dictated, moving the point of contact from airfield to airfield so 
as not to give the enemy a chance to consolidate a defence, and the importance of offensive 
patrols, “The object of these patrols is to seek out and destroy enemy aircraft, thus securing 
the necessary degree of security for co-operative and independent aircraft.”25 Thus the 
                                                          
22 Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin told the House of Commons on 10th November 1932 “I think it is well also 
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24 Ibid, p.62. 
25 Ibid, p.63. 
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British, like the Americans, had recognized the importance of eliminating an opponent’s 
airforce and the theory was about to be put into practice in 1939.  
 
The Second World War 
 The first counter-air offensives of the Second World War demonstrated the attributes 
of the strategy. In Poland and the Low Countries the Luftwaffe’s superior aircraft types and 
numbers proved too strong for the defending fighter forces when encountered in aerial 
combat. In France, German numerical superiority in frontline aircraft combined (in some 
cases) with superior aircraft types and anti-aircraft artillery fighting over a sustained period 
eventually wore down the British and French fighter forces. However German losses were 
significant: 
On 10th May, the Germans lost 83 aircraft (not including Ju52s) including 47 
bombers and 25 fighters, equalling the worst losses for a day in the Battle of 
Britain. On the following day, the Germans lost a further 42 aircraft, 
including 22 bomber, 8 dive bombers and 10 fighters.26 
Ultimately it was Luftwaffe numbers which counted as Buckley writes, “by engaging the 
fighter strength of the Allies in attritional battle the Luftwaffe consigned the attempts by the 
Allied bombers to disaster.”27 The relentless weight of German attack in the air and on the 
ground had a decisive effect on Allied air strength which could not be sustained. 
 Within two months of the fall of France, Britain was threatened by Germany and the 
pre-requisite for invasion was air superiority. Here the Luftwaffe did not possess superior 
aircraft and its sustained attacks did not reduce the R.A.F.’s strength as factories replaced 
lost aircraft at an acceptable rate. Similarly attacks on airfields caused some disruption and 
subsequent discussions about moving airfields away from the South East, but they never 
fully inconvenienced the defenders. However the Luftwaffe’s offensive caused profound 
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difficulties because the number of R.A.F. fighter pilots steadily decreased and those that 
were not killed or wounded quickly became fatigued as a result of the sustained air attacks.28 
Missing or fatigued aircrew were much harder to train and replace. However the important 
factor to consider was the damage sustained by the Luftwaffe whilst carrying out their 
offensive.  
The Germans had entered into the battle weakened by serious losses from the 
offensive in the Low Countries and France; Murray shows that between May and June 1940 
Luftwaffe single-engined fighter losses amounted to 19% of its strength, whilst 30% were 
damaged in the same period. For bomber aircraft the figures were 30% and 41% 
respectively.29 The fighting over Britain was hard and caused severe losses to Luftwaffe 
aircraft as, for example, between July and September, 47% of single-engine fighters were 
destroyed and 64% were damaged.30 Furthermore in August out of 229 Bf109 aircraft 
written off, 57 pilots were killed, 41 injured, 3 were captured, 84 were missing and 47 listed 
as uninjured.31 This was an important lesson. The other offensives had been relatively short 
campaigns. The Battle of Britain had shown that attackers, if undertaking a long term 
offensive, had to have sufficient material and personnel resources to carry it out.  
Pre-emptive strikes were a prelude to the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 
Operation BARBAROSSA and the Luftwaffe was able to surprise the defences and catch 
unprepared Soviet aircraft lined up on airfields. Those Soviet aircraft which managed to get 
airborne were soon despatched by German aircraft of superior capabilities. During June 1941 
German records claimed 800 aircraft destroyed on 23rd; 557 on 24th; 351 on 25th; and 300 on 
26th:   
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The Luftwaffe claimed to have destroyed 1,489 aircraft on the ground on the 
first day; a first attempt to retaliate by bombing German targets cost the 
Russians 500 aircraft. On the day after the battle opened one commander of a 
Russian bomber group committed suicide after losing 600 aircraft to only 
twelve German.32 
By the end of August the Soviets had lost approximately 5,000 aircraft and as Murray points 
out, whether the Germans had actually destroyed that many aircraft is beside the point as, “a 
defeat of immense proportion had overtaken the Red Air Force.”33 However catastrophic 
these losses, their effects only lasted for a limited period as the Germans lacked the strength 
to cover the whole Soviet front which covered 2,000 miles or to destroy the Soviet aircraft 
manufacturing capability. The inability to stop Soviet aircraft being replaced whilst at the 
same time failing to adequately replace their own losses resulted in German aircraft strength 
dropping from about 4,300 to 1,500 at the end of 1941 whilst in the Moscow sector alone the 
Soviets had assembled twice as many aircraft.34 Therefore while the initial offensive had 
successfully allowed the German land forces to progress Eastwards without undue 
interference from Soviet aircraft, in the longer term the Soviets were able to make good their 
losses and eventually meet the Luftwaffe on equal terms. 
 
Japan attacks and the Allied response 
 The first Japanese attacks from 7th December 1941 employed all the requisites of a 
counter-air campaign: surprise; economy of force; momentum; and shock effect.35 In 
addition the qualities of their aircraft were superior to almost anything the Allies possessed 
in the theatre. It was not likely to cause a long lasting effect as there was no possibility of 
destroying the American or British aircraft industry, but it resulted in Japan seizing air 
superiority for their island invasions. For the Americans the first Japanese attacks were 
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devastating. During the initial attacks on Pearl Harbor J.N.A.F. pilots took advantage of 
U.S.A.A.F. aircraft parked wing to wing on Oahu airfield for security against sabotage 
attempts, whilst the U.S. Marines’ aircraft were similarly parked on Ewa airfield. 
Furthermore the Japanese were assisted by American early warning deficiencies and 
warnings which were ignored or dismissed by operations staff. The resulting attacks cost the 
Americans 188 aircraft destroyed and 159 damaged.36 Similarly on the Philippines’ Clark 
Field, American aircraft were lined up undergoing servicing and refuelling following a 
morning alert. The Japanese subsequently destroyed nearly 100 aircraft in the air and on the 
ground, including much of the American heavy bomber force at Clark Field, as well as 
fighter aircraft at Iba and Del Carmen.37 The success of these raids ensured the Japanese 
bomber and torpedo carrying aircraft could carry out their attack on Pearl Harbor without 
interruption, whilst their invasion of the Philippine islands was able to take place with virtual 
air superiority. Similar Japanese attacks in the Far East were to prove highly successful. 
 During attacks on the British airfields in the Far East the Japanese enjoyed similar 
advantages: surprise; superior numbers; superior aircraft; and an opponent whose early 
warning system was inefficient. On 8th December Japanese aircraft attacked airfields in 
Northern Malaya in concentrated bombing attacks using anti-personnel and fragmentation 
bombs. These attacks caused considerable damage to aircraft and personnel without damage 
to the runways which would be required for future operations once captured. Covert 
intelligence assisted the Japanese attacks as their attacks were coordinated to occur when 
aircraft were landing or taking off and were therefore at their most vulnerable.38 The 
Japanese attacks were effective and devastating; out of the 110 serviceable aircraft available 
at the start of 8th December, only 50 remained serviceable at the end of the day, a reduction 
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in strength of 55%.39 Individual squadrons were decimated; for example at Alor Star only 
two Blenheims remained serviceable, whilst at Sungei Patani only four Blenheims remained 
operational. This tide of events continued as the Japanese continued their assaults on 
Singapore, Sumatra and Java, their counter-air strikes giving them the initiative, and forcing 
R.A.F. fighters onto the defensive. When Buffalos were replaced by Hurricanes, the 
Japanese strength in numbers and superiority at their optimum operating heights resulted in a 
steady attrition rate which the British were not able to sustain. The latter point became 
crucial in Burma. The intelligence organisation estimated that the Japanese possessed 
between 450 and 500 aircraft in Burma and Siam, whereas the R.A.F. had only 42 
operational aircraft on 21st March 1942.40 A.V.M. Donald Stevenson admitted that the 
Japanese long-range fighters were able to fly great distances, destroying Allied fighters on 
the ground: 
  [T]he enemy fighters achieving surprise, would come in and by   
  deliberate low flying attacks and good shooting could be relied upon to  
  cause great damage to first line aircraft, if not destroy them all.41  
Furthermore it was not just low level raiders which caused destruction to Allied aircraft. On 
21st March 1942 a Japanese force of 59 bombers and 24 fighters attacked Magwe in three 
waves and succeeded in destroying six Blenheims and a Hurricane on the ground, whilst two 
further Hurricanes were lost in the air.42 In addition a 1,000 gallon oil dump was destroyed 
and all telephone communications were put out of action. The Japanese returned on 22nd 
March with 27 bombers and a fighter escort; the raid caused damage to ground installations 
and the warning system, and three more Blenheims and an American P-40 were destroyed on 
the ground. The Blenheim losses were particularly severe; out of 20 Blenheims, nine had 
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been destroyed, five were damaged and the remaining six were operationally 
unserviceable.43 Stevenson wrote that these actions, “effectively terminated the R.A.F. 
activities based in Burma” and Richards agreed, “These two disasters virtually wiped out the 
air force in Burma” with the remaining aircraft being withdrawn to India.44  
 The Japanese air offensive against the Allies in the Far East between December 1941 
and May 1942 had been as effective as the Germans’ offensive in Europe in 1940. Using a 
mixture of sustained high and low level attacks they had destroyed or severely damaged 
many R.A.F. aircraft and in some instances forced units to withdraw to safety. Airfields had 
been rendered unusable or captured, whilst important ancillary facilities such as fuel dumps 
and communications had been destroyed. Undoubtedly their successes were assisted by the 
Allies’ lack of credible early warning systems, inferiority of many aircraft types, and the 
Japanese superiority in aircraft numbers and types. The Allies’ efforts through this period to 
counter the Japanese air attacks were in comparison small and ineffective.  
 Despite mounting losses the R.A.F. engaged their enemy in a limited counter-air 
offensive which sought to reduce the scale of air attack, but Allied counter-air attacks were 
likely to fail during this period as they were not sustained owing to a shortage of aircraft. 
Conversely the Japanese had sufficient resources to replace lost aircraft quickly and were 
going to succeed in a war of attrition. Furthermore the Allies’ air effort was diluted by its 
many roles of air defence, reconnaissance, and close support all of which reduced the 
number of aircraft needed to mount a counter-air offensive.45  
 On 9th December 1941 a force of Blenheims was despatched from Tengah and 
Butterworth to attack the Japanese at Sangkla and Singora. Of the Tengah force three 
Blenheims were shot down by Japanese defenders when escort fighters failed to materialise. 
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Of the Butterworth force, all the aircraft barring one were either destroyed or seriously 
damaged as they took off during a well timed high level Japanese bomber attack. The 
remaining Blenheim, flown by Squadron Leader Arthur Scarf, flew to Singora where the 
crew bombed the target although the aircraft was damaged and had to land at Alor Star 
where Scarf eventually succumbed to his injuries.46 The loss of these Blenheims was 
grievous and further showed that the Blenheim itself was unsuitable to engage in this type of 
operation as Probert wrote: 
  His sortie [Scarf] had been part of a valiant attempt to show that the  
  Blenheim could still hit back, but the lesson was clear: without fighter  
  escort such missions were doomed and AHQ ordered no more.47  
 
Various small scale attacks were carried out on Japanese airfields but none had a significant 
effect on either reducing or slowing down the Japanese onslaught. Stevenson decided to 
move some of his forces closer to the enemy where they could attack a number of target 
systems, one being Japanese airfields. However the weight of Japanese strength quickly 
overwhelmed A.V.M. Stevenson’s plans, the attack on Mingaladon providing a prime 
example. Reconnaissance had detected over 50 Japanese aircraft at Mingaladon and 
Stevenson decided to mount a raid to reduce the scale of Japanese attack. The subsequent 
raid was mounted by ten Hurricanes and nine Blenheims which Stevenson admitted 
represented all available serviceable aircraft.48 The Blenheims fought their way to the target 
where they dropped 9,000 lbs of bombs on the airfield and claimed two Japanese aircraft 
destroyed, two probably destroyed and two damaged in aerial combat. The Hurricanes 
mounted a low level attack and claimed 16 Japanese aircraft destroyed or damaged on the 
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ground and nine claimed destroyed in the air.49 This was a “small but heartening victory” but 
realistically did not inflict a decisive loss on the Japanese, because as the R.A.F. aircraft 
refuelled and rearmed in preparation for a return attack the Japanese attacked their base at 
Magwe.50 The attacks accounted for most of the R.A.F. aircraft left in Burma and they 
subsequently withdrew to Akyab where a series of attacks further reduced Stevenson’s force 
before it withdrew to India.51  
 The limited offensive had proved unsuccessful and its effects on the Japanese air 
offensive were negligible. Apart from aircraft numbers and the inability to maintain a 
sustained effort, the attacks showed the types of aircraft suitable for a counter-air offensive. 
The R.A.F. had long requested a long-range fighter aircraft for either escort or interdiction 
work, but none had been designed or were available. The Blenheim had the range and a 
reasonable bomb load, but did not have the speed or manoeuvrability to defend itself against 
fighter attacks. The Hurricane did not have sufficient range to reach Japanese airfields; the 
early versions did not have overload tanks that could be jettisoned and the extra weight and 
drag of such tanks caused the aircraft to lose performance. Squadron Leader Cedric Stone 
recalled an interception when his drop tank equipped Hurricanes were attacked by Japanese 
fighters:   
  We were promptly jumped by about ten of them. Couldn’t do a   
  damned thing with the tanks on, never got a shot while the little   
  buggers queued up on my tail and filled me full of holes.52 
Later that day Stevenson called for Stone to lead an attack with his Hurricanes on the 
Japanese airfield at Bangkok: 
  He wanted me to take some long-range Hurricanes to Bangkok and  
  strafe the aerodrome there, of all the bloody stupid ideas. I made him  
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  come up and look at my aircraft after the combat, and he thought   
  perhaps it wasn’t such a good idea after all. We whipped the tanks off  
  the other two that night.53 
 
The lessons were clear for Allied air plans; a counter-air offensive would require sufficient 
aircraft of the right type and attributes to attack Japanese airfields successfully. Such aircraft 
were not available until the end of 1943. Nevertheless the Allies carried out a limited 
counter-air offensive from April 1942 until January 1944 with unsuitable aircraft types. 
 
June 1942 to December 1943 
 By June 1942 the British had withdrawn to India and the Japanese had halted their 
Western advance. The British and their Allies began the process of re-equipping with men 
and materiel whilst the Japanese halted; having outrun their supplies they had no immediate 
plans to continue their conquests to the West. The situation was therefore in stalemate, a 
predicament assisted by the monsoon period which would hinder operations. Despite the 
limited offensive in the Arakan at the end of 1942 and Colonel Orde Wingate’s first Chindit 
expedition in 1943, the Allies were in no position to contemplate an invasion of Burma until 
1944, but they did wage a counter-air offensive throughout the period in review.  
 The Allies’ counter-air offensive during this period had the basic aim of neutralising 
the Japanese air threat by attacking their aircraft, airfields and infrastructure. There were 
good reasons for the offensive. The Allies’ air strength was below that of their enemy both in 
quality and quantity. Reinforcements were on their way from other theatres but would not 
arrive quickly, so every effort to reduce the Japanese air threat with surgical, low risk attacks 
was crucial. Throughout 1942 the air defence was being established in India and to assist this 
process attacks on Japanese bases were vital to reduce the risk of aerial attack. Furthermore 
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the airfield building programme in India had to be allowed to proceed unmolested if plans 
were to succeed. It was also recognized that the Japanese air threat had to be subdued if 
future offensive plans were to have a chance of success. General Archibald Wavell, C. In C. 
India, and General Joseph Stilwell, commanding general of all U.S. forces in China, Burma, 
and India, agreed in October 1942 that the combined British and American air effort should 
be directed against Japanese airbases to gain control of the air and thereby acquire cover for 
future land and naval operations.54 Similarly at the TRIDENT conference in May 1943 one 
of the five recommendations for the Far Eastern campaign was a rigorous air offensive 
against the J.A.A.F. in Burma.55 Moreover a successful air campaign in Burma would assist 
the Americans in the Pacific by diverting Japanese resources away from that theatre. When 
Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten took charge as Supreme Allied Commander his first 
directive from Churchill on 24th October 1943 called for the wearing down of Japanese air 
strength in Burma so that “he would be compelled to divert reinforcements from the Pacific 
Theatre.”56 
 However, throughout this period the Allies were unable to fully participate in a 
sustained counter-air offensive owing to a shortage of suitable aircraft types in significant 
numbers. The R.A.F. had requested a long-range fighter while the Americans did not have 
aircraft of the Mustang or Lightning types in the Far East until the end of 1943. In the 
meantime the R.A.F. continued to reinforce the Indian Command with Hurricanes which 
were not suitable for long-range interdiction sorties whilst the more suitable aircraft, the 
American built Mohawk, was only available in limited numbers. While both these fighters 
were occasionally engaged in the counter-air offensive, they were also needed for other tasks 
such as close air support and defensive duties. The other significant British long-range 
fighter available was the Beaufighter which did not arrive in the Far East until December 
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1942; in January 1943 there was only one squadron and a flight of a night-fighter variant 
available for operations.57  By September 1943 there were two intruder squadrons and the 
night-fighter unit, and in December 1943 the number had increased by one extra night-
fighter unit.58 However, the variety of targets for attack outnumbered the amount of 
available and suitable aircraft with the result that the counter-air offensive could not be fully 
sustained.  
 In the absence of suitable fighter aircraft counter-air attack was left to the small 
number of bombers in the theatre. In early-September 1942 there were four squadrons of 
Blenheims, two squadrons of Hudsons and one squadron of Wellingtons in the Far East.59 
By January 1943 this number had been increased by one squadron of Wellingtons and two 
squadrons of R.A.F. Liberators.60 In addition, two squadrons of American Mitchells and two 
squadrons of American Liberators had arrived in India.61 This constituted a fairly weak 
bomber force and the Allied command was faced with a dilemma. If the force was to be 
conserved for future operations, the Japanese would inevitably suffer less disruption and 
would be in a position to use their resources against the Allies whilst building up stronger 
forces and reserves.62 A compromise was agreed, namely to use the bomber force against 
selected targets in suitable tactical circumstances, “Enemy occupied airfields and airfield 
installations in Burma therefore became first priority for R.A.F. light and medium bombers, 
and Rangoon for heavy bombers.”63 However the types of available aircraft would pose 
difficulties as these bombers required fighter escort if attacking by day, as they could not 
adequately defend themselves against Japanese fighters. The solution was to have 
Wellingtons and Liberators attack Japanese airfields by night, whilst the Blenheims, with 
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their better speed and manoeuvrability, attacked by day and night. However there was a 
serviceability problem with Blenheims and Wellingtons. The Blenheim was largely obsolete 
by the end of 1942 and posed maintenance problems for Far Eastern ground crews owing to 
spares shortages and ageing airframes. The Wellingtons were also obsolete and the tropical 
climate did not suit the aircraft or its engines resulting in inconsistent service rates. This 
situation was summed up by 99 Squadron in December 1942: 
It would not be possible to maintain in India that same high operational 
serviceability that prevailed in England. This was due firstly to the very tight 
supply position in India, and secondly to the variety of technical difficulties 
encountered in the new climate, not all of which had been fully overcome by 
the end of this month.64   
As a result 99 Squadron was rarely able to have eight or nine Wellingtons out of 16 
serviceable machines available for operations at any time which posed an additional problem 
of how to keep 31 operational aircrews occupied. The planned and important counter-air 
offensive against the Japanese in Burma from June 1942 to December 1943 was therefore 
bedevilled by two basic problems; lack of aircraft quantity and unsuitable aircraft types. 
However the offensive did have an effect on Japanese air operations. 
 As the monsoon began in June 1942 the British and American air forces embarked on 
a counter-air offensive against Japanese airfields in Burma. The task was daunting as a 
report estimated the Japanese had 134 aerodromes, landing grounds, emergency landing 
grounds, seaplane stations and seaplane alighting areas in the region.65 Nevertheless during 
June, Blenheims and Wellingtons raided Magwe four times, Akyab three times, and 
Myitkyina once but with limited effects.66 Following a 1st June raid on Magwe the Daily Air 
Summary reported, “Bombs fell in target area. One petrol fire started”, whilst a return visit 
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on 20th resulted in, “Bombs seen to burst on runways and aerodrome.”67 On 22nd June 
Magwe was raided again and the Daily Air Summary states, “Photos showed one direct hit 
on aircraft, one near miss. Runway hit.”68 In July Myitkyina was raided four times by 
American Mitchells and the attacks elicited familiar results, “Barracks claimed obliterated”, 
“6 hits on recently paved end of runway”, and “direct hits on aerodrome.”69 While the 
attacks were regular they were only made by two aircraft on each occasion and it is unlikely 
any damage was inflicted on Japanese aircraft. The offensive continued after the monsoon 
period in August for the rest of 1942 in a similar fashion. Akyab and its satellite airfield 
were raided in bomber attacks seven times, Myitkyina four times and various other Japanese 
airfields once or twice. In August Mohawk fighters joined the offensive with armed 
reconnaissance patrols and interdiction attacks on Mawlaik, Myitkyina, Dabaing, Akyab, 
and Mawdaung, but the number of raids throughout the final six months of 1942 was not 
large and the effect on Japanese air strength was minimal. 
 Japanese records are unreliable for this period, but Japanese records suggests 
between August and December 1942 only three Japanese aircraft were destroyed in the air 
over Burma, whilst four were destroyed on the ground.70 The largest single Japanese loss 
resulted from an overnight raid by Wellingtons on Toungoo airfield on 19th/20th December 
during which two Dinahs and one Oscar were destroyed.71 The minimum loss of seven 
aircraft in a six month period was negligible, and the Allied intelligence organisation’s 
estimates of Japanese air strength only showed one marked decrease when 120 aircraft were 
moved out of the theatre prior to the monsoon in July 1942.72 Intelligence estimates for the 
rest of 1942 shows an increase of Japanese aircraft from 182 in July to 279 on 1st December 
1942. Clearly the offensive had had little effect on aircraft strength but did have an effect on 
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Japanese air operations as the Allies’ bombing effort forced them to withdraw aircraft into 
Siam. The regular Allied bombing concerned the Japanese who had little defence against 
night attacks and their shortage of reserves “forced the Japanese to adopt the uneconomical 
policy of bringing forward squadrons to mount attacks and to retreat back to Siam again.”73 
A.H.Q. Bengal reported on the bombing success and the scale of Japanese aerodrome 
construction: 
  Enemy air activity for October to December 31st was on the increase,  
  but did not reach the scale that had been anticipated. Possibly our   
  constant bombing of his forward aerodromes by day and night made  
  things difficult for him, although his aerodrome and pen    
  construction had been so widespread and thorough that he had   
  accommodation for over 1000 aircraft in Burma by December.74  
Japan never had 1,000 aircraft in the theatre, but it did mean that all these airfields were 
available for dispersal during operations against Allied forces which would be a feature of 
the counter-air offensive during the next two years. However these first attacks did establish 
an important pattern for counter-air operations for the next twelve months as attacks on 
airfields resulted in the J.A.A.F. being dispersed and only brought forward when operations 
were mounted. 
 Essentially the counter-air offensive in 1943 was a continuation of the series of 
attacks carried out in 1942. Despite the Allied commanders’ recognition of the campaign’s 
benefits the Allied air forces were handicapped by aircraft types, serviceability problems and 
dilution of effort. However the limited campaign continued to force the Japanese to 
withdraw aircraft to distant bases to avoid attack in the front lines. By October 1943 the 
Allies’ air strength was considerably improved particularly in terms of long-range fighters 
which would prove important in the counter-air operations in 1944.  
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 January 1943 saw the resumption of the counter-air offensive, notably beginning 
with a series of daytime attacks carried out by Hurricanes and Mohawks in conjunction with 
light and medium bombers. These aircraft were able to attack the Japanese airfields thanks to 
an airfield building programme nearer to the borders which reduced the flying distance to 
their targets. From January to the middle of March Japanese airfields at Magwe, Akyab, 
Prome, Toungoo and Heho were attacked during the day by fighters but this had little 
material effect on Japanese air strength. On 2nd January, Hurricanes strafed Magwe and 
claimed two aircraft on fire; on 22nd January Mohawks attacked Prome and claimed a Sally 
probably destroyed; and on 13th February Hurricanes were engaged on an offensive patrol 
over Akyab when Oscars were engaged, two being destroyed in combat.75 During this same 
period R.A.F. night bombers attacked main Japanese aerodromes at Akyab, Magwe, Heho, 
Maungdaw, and Tennant. The effects of these attacks were not substantially to reduce 
Japanese air strength, but they forced the Japanese to move aircraft to and from bases in 
Siam especially for operations.  
From mid-December 1942, Calcutta had been attacked by Japanese night bombers 
whose effect on the civilian population was out of proportion to the attacks. Following the 
destruction of four Japanese bombers by Beaufighters in two nights the Japanese commander 
ordered that the night raids on Calcutta should stop at once.76 However the Air Historical 
Branch narrative suggests the reason why such attacks did not stretch into 1943 was the 
counter-air attacks on Japanese aerodromes.77 The Japanese aircraft had flown from Magwe 
which was attacked four times at day and night before the end of January along with a 
number of main airfields, so it is possible that the combination of airfield attack and efficient 
night-fighters had proved too much of a disincentive.78 Interdiction Beaufighters were also 
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assigned to airfield attacks, but during sorties against Heho on 17th February and Prome on 
21st February a Beaufighter was lost on each occasion demonstrating the risk of low level 
airfield attacks. While the combined day and night attacks continued to put pressure on the 
J.A.A.F., events on the Arakan coast would serve to reduce the R.A.F. counter-air effort. 
 At the end of 1942 British forces started a campaign along the Western coast of 
Burma (Mayu Peninsula) principally to drive the Japanese out and to recapture Akyab Island 
and its airfield. At first the operation went well but as the first months of 1943 progressed 
the Japanese used their familiar tactic of encircling the advancing forces and this eventually 
pushed the British back into India. Throughout the operation, and particularly when the 
British were in retreat, the R.A.F. were engaged in close support sorties. Single-engine 
fighters and light bombers were assigned to support the Army and provide battlefield air 
superiority cover, and as there were not enough aircraft in the theatre these were taken away 
from the campaign against airfields. Nevertheless although the Allied day effort was 
reduced, R.A.F. bombers continued to attack main Japanese bases mainly by night from 
January to April.79 The raids were carried out by all the available bombers in the command; 
Wellingtons, Liberators, Blenheims and Hudsons, the latter two regularly used in a light 
bomber role in this period during the day. The bombing raids were frequent, every two or 
three nights, a planned tactic. A.V.M. Thomas Williams, A.O.C. Bengal Command, reported 
that 99 and 159 Squadrons were to attack enemy airfields on two nights out of three, whilst 
34 Squadron would attack on the third night.80 However Williams acknowledged that this 
was not always possible due to poor serviceability rates. The raids were usually carried out 
by six or seven aircraft, although overnight on 25th/26th January 10 Wellingtons attacked 
Heho, on  14th/15th 10 Blenheims attacked Shwebo, and on 15th/16th February 10 Wellingtons 
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attacked Heho again.81 These raids were exceptions rather than the norm. Other raids 
showed fewer aircraft involvement. On 25th/26th February three Liberators attacked 
Toungoo; on 23rd/24th March three Wellingtons attacked Magwe; and on 6th/7th March three 
Hudsons bombed Meiktila.82 Lack of aircraft numbers combined with serviceability 
problems placed a heavy restriction on operational availability; at the beginning of 1943 the 
average availability in Bengal Command for night attacks was four heavy bombers 
(Liberators) and 13 medium bombers (Wellingtons), whilst there were 50 light bombers 
(Blenheims) available for day attacks.83 The Americans had more at their disposal, 30 heavy 
bombers and 34 medium bombers, but these were quickly reduced when some were diverted 
to the China Theatre.84 Furthermore the Americans had their own supply and maintenance 
problems caused by low priorities allocated to the theatre and difficult lines of 
communications: 
But nowhere were the advantages of a highly industrialized society close at 
hand, as they were for air forces operating out of England or Italy... The 
stories of ingenious improvisations in maintenance and modification have 
become almost legendary; but there were times when, in spite of Yankee 
ingenuity and the plentiful use of baling wire and tin cans, an uncomfortable 
number of planes were inoperable.85  
 
Despite these difficulties the raids continued on Japanese airfields with such typical post-raid 
comments as, “Bursts seen on runway and dispersal”; “Four bursts on runway” and “Hits 
observed on N.E. and N.W. of dispersal and extreme end of runway.”86 What then were the 
effects of the attacks? 
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 The aim to reduce Japanese air strength was essentially a failure as the Japanese 
mounted a series of well supported raids during the First Arakan Campaign initially against 
Allied airfields. On 25th February 1943 a mixed force of 30 Oscars and nine Sallys raided 
Northern Assam; on 2nd March 30 Oscars raided Feni; and on 4th April 15 Lilys and 15 
Oscars raided Dohazari.87 These numbers were indicative of many of the raids of that period 
and while not large by European standards they were enough to cause trouble for defending 
R.A.F. fighters which were inferior in certain conditions to their opponents. The counter-air 
attacks were thus at best only causing damage or destruction to one or two aircraft, whilst 
some Allied defensive day fighter actions were destroying more aircraft during Japanese 
raids. The Allies were aware that Japanese aircraft numbers were not reducing despite the 
heavy fighting as their own intelligence estimates of Japanese air strength showed that on 1st 
January 1943 there was a total number of 260 aircraft of all types in the Burma/Siam area of 
operations. On 1st May this number had reduced to 216, largely due to Japanese units leaving 
the theatre for the monsoon rather than attrition.88 Furthermore an indication that the 
counter-air campaign was unsuccessful was the marked increase in Japanese air activity 
during April and May, which A.C.M. Pierse acknowledged.89 However while Japanese air 
strength was not significantly reduced, the counter-air attacks did force the Japanese to move 
their air strength around Burma and Siam to avoid either attack or detection. This dispersal 
caused precious fuel to be wasted and potential aircraft losses in a country where flying 
conditions were harsh and flying accidents common to both sides. 
 The monsoon period beginning in May saw a marked reduction in air activity over 
Burma. The Allies continued a limited air campaign in support of ground forces with 
virtually no opposition from the Japanese air forces but this was not due to attrition:  
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  By June 1943 the Allied air forces did, in fact, rule the skies over   
  Burma  but this situation was really the result of the Japanese custom of  
  retiring for the monsoon rather than the result of the air battles fought  
  during the dry season.90 
 
The Japanese had withdrawn to replenish aircraft numbers, in some cases updating older 
types, and to prepare for the forthcoming dry season operations with training exercises.91 
Richards and Saunders also point out that some Japanese units were utilized during the 
monsoon period to reinforce Japanese units fighting in the Pacific campaign. In the case of 
the 50th Sentai which was withdrawn in June to Java and Singapore, detachments were sent 
to New Guinea, but in August they returned to Burma with the main body of their 
squadron.92 However, some Japanese units still remained active in the Far East Theatre 
defending sea transportation off the Burmese coast and defending Rangoon against Allied 
bombing attacks. 
 For the Allies the monsoon season was a period of reinforcement with greater 
numbers being made available and also new aircraft types that would play an important part 
in the counter-air offensive at the beginning of 1944. The R.A.F. began a programme of 
replacing the Blenheim types with Hurricanes, which were becoming available from other 
theatres, as well as increasing the number of Beaufighters and heavy bombers, particularly 
the Liberator. In September, the first fighter Spitfires were introduced to India which 
heralded the beginning of a defensive capability the Allies had been seeking for over a year. 
Important though these new arrivals were, it was the expansion of American aircraft 
strength, in particular long-range fighters, which started to tip the counter-air balance in 
favour of the Allies. The following table shows the increase of American aircraft in the 
Indian-Burma Theatre: 
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20th June 1943                            15th November 1943 
  Assigned Combat Ready Assigned Combat Ready 
   Liberator     47          36            58          51 
   Mitchell     47          38                     55          40 
   Apache       0            0                     30          24 
   Mustang       0            0                     22          20 
   P-40      76           67                     80          62 
   Lightning      0              0                       8             8 93 
From a counter-air view the introduction of the Apache, the Mustang and the Lightning 
would give the Allies a long-range, heavily armed fighter capability which would prove 
valuable in the forthcoming year. The arrival in Assam in September of the 80th Fighter 
Group with its three P-40N squadrons and its Lightning squadron together with the 311th 
Fighter Bomber Group and its three squadrons, two Apache and one Mustang, meant that: 
  The fighter strength of the Tenth Air Force was greatly increased   
  in the space of a few weeks. The number of squadrons jumped from  
  two to seven, and instead of having old model P-40’s for every   
  conceivable kind of mission, P-40N’s, P-51A’s, A-36’s and P-38’s  
  were available.94 
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Thus as 1943 progressed the numbers increased, and they were to receive a substantial boost 
at the beginning of 1944 with the introduction of the 1st A.C.G. which was principally to 
support Major General Wingate’s second expedition as it possessed a long-range capability 
with its Mustangs. 
 As the monsoon ended in October the Allies were better equipped to conduct a 
counter-air offensive. In addition to better equipment, the Allied forces in the theatre were 
reformed at the start of December into a united Anglo-American organisation called South 
East Asia Command (S.E.A.C.) under the overall command of Admiral Lord Louis 
Mountbatten. The orders he issued to the air forces were that their objectives were to guard 
the air route to China, to interfere with enemy communications and to deliver supplies by air, 
all of which were paramount in preparation for support of the 1944 land campaign. To allow 
the bombers, transports and ground support aircraft to do their jobs protection against enemy 
interference was vital, “To accomplish these objectives with the maximum speed and 
minimum loss, [and] it became necessary to neutralize the Japanese Air Force as effectively 
as possible.”95 Again it was recognized that a counter-air offensive should be pursued but it 
would be a few months before the new American aircraft were available for these operations. 
The Apaches and Mustangs were initially used in a close air support role against Japanese 
troops moving South towards the Ledo Road and were not in action against Japanese 
airfields.96 The 459th F.S.’s Lightnings did not fly their first operations until 20th November 
1943 on a bomber escort mission to Kalewa. They mainly continued in this role until 
February 1944 when they were withdrawn for gunnery training.97 However the P-40s of the 
80th Fighter Group participated in a number of bombing and strafing raids against the 
Japanese airfield at Myitkyina throughout October, November and December to reduce the 
risk aircraft based there posed to U.S. transport aircraft flying over the ‘Hump’ into China. 
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This series of attacks was only one measure designed to assist the transports but it is possible 
that it had an effect: 
  It is impossible to determine which of the precautions was most   
  effective in stopping depredations on the Hump flyers, but in   
  November no transports were shot down, and in December only two  
  were lost to enemy action.98 
 
 The Allied counter-air offensive in 1943 had hardly been more effective than in 1942 
and it is likely that more Japanese aircraft were destroyed and damaged as a result of 
defensive air-to-air combat than on the ground. Given that Japanese records are incomplete 
and inaccurate, analysis of the figures quoted in Shores’ Air War for Burma suggest that 
approximately 46 Japanese aircraft were destroyed in defensive air battles over the entire 
year, with only about 13 being positively recorded as destroyed on the ground.99 These 
figures do not include those aircraft destroyed during bomber escort sorties or those lost due 
to mechanical fault or accident whilst in flight, but it is doubtful that counter-air losses 
matched those in the air.  
At the beginning of the year, the few operational Allied aircraft suitable for counter-
air attacks were required for a multitude of tasks, but principally in close support roles to 
assist the Army in the First Arakan campaign. The counter-air effort was therefore largely 
handed to medium and heavy bombers who, despite causing disruption and damage to 
Japanese airfields, had little material effect on enemy aircraft strength. It must be stressed 
that the raids did have a positive effect on forcing the Japanese to move aircraft to bases in 
their rear areas to avoid the attacks and this had a potential of increasing aircraft flying 
hours, fuel consumption and risk of flying accidents. When the monsoon began in June, 
Japanese air strength had not reduced fundamentally from January 1943, despite aerial 
combat, the counter-air offensive, and some transfers to other theatres of war. The 
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maintenance of air strength can be attributed to a low level of losses which were replaced 
from available reserves. By the time the monsoon ended in October, the Japanese returned to 
the area with 380 aircraft concentrated at the Burmese airfields at Heho, Anisakan and 
Rangoon, and at the Siamese airfield of Chieng Mai, whilst others were located at airfields 
further back in Siam, in Malaya and in the Dutch East Indies.100 This figure of 380 is in 
contrast to a figure of 216 for the area in May 1943. Thus Japan was clearly able to increase 
the size of the J.A.A.F. in the Far East despite claims for increased numbers in other areas, 
and the Air Historical Branch authors point out that aircraft production actually increased 
during the first part of the war reaching a peak in September 1944.101 The ability to reinforce 
and replace lost aircraft at the end of 1943 was observed during a series of coordinated 
attacks by the R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. on Rangoon docks, industry and airfields during a four 
day period in November 1943. Referring to the Allied air forces’ claims of the destruction of 
fifty Japanese aircraft Craven and Cate wrote, “owing to [the] arrival of reinforcements 
during the operation, Japanese air strength was greater at the finish than on the first day.”102 
Even given the propensity to over-claim, the Japanese clearly had sufficient reserves and this 
was demonstrated in a series of raids against Allied bases and docks from the beginning of 
December. On 5th a combined force of 128 fighters and bombers took off to attack Calcutta: 
59 fighters and bombers attacked bases in Assam on 13th; 65 attacking Kunming on 22nd 
December; and 99 attacking Chittagong on 26th.103 The increase in Allied aircraft numbers 
was evidently forcing the Japanese to strengthen their forces in the region as a precursor to 
the planned campaign in 1944 as at the end of 1943 Japanese air strength numbered 370 in 
Burma and Siam, the majority (200) being fighters, all of which were superior to Allied 
transport aircraft. 
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  Thus 1943 ended with the Japanese in a stronger position with regard to aircraft 
strength whilst the Allies’ counter-air offensive had failed to significantly reduce Japanese 
strength owing to problems with quality, quantity and diversion of effort. However the 
prospects for 1944 were more encouraging. The combined effort had already been felt in the 
combined raids on Rangoon in November, whilst the air defence of important docks and 
establishments in India had been competently performed by Spitfires. Finally the arrival of 
American long-range fighter aircraft squadrons gave Allied commanders the ability to strike 
effectively at Japanese airfields in rear areas.  
 
1944 
 Winning and maintaining air superiority in Burma was crucial for the Allies during 
the first six months of 1944. As land forces fought during the Battle of the Admin Box, the 
sieges at Kohima and Imphal, and the second Chindit incursion, transport and close support 
aircraft required protection against Japanese air attack. Lieutenant General Slim had 
formulated plans to counter Japanese infiltration tactics which called for surrounded troops 
to remain where they were whilst being re-supplied by air and supported by ground attack 
aircraft. At the Admin Box this tactic was successful. It was first time an Allied Army had 
won in Burma and it was a psychological victory which had a beneficial effect on the 
Fourteenth Army. Slim later wrote: 
  It was a victory, a victory about which there could be no argument and  
  its effect, not only on the troops engaged but on the whole Fourteenth  
  Army was immense.104 
At Kohima and Imphal transport aircraft were vital in moving supplies into the besieged 
areas as well as transporting the 5th Indian Division which was moved from one front to 
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another by air. The importance of the transport effort can be gauged by two days’ sorties on 
14th April and 25th April at the height of the Kohima and Imphal sieges as seen in this graph 
of tactical operations: 
    105 
 
Air supply was the soldiers’ lifeline during these engagements and it must be remembered 
that the loss of any aircraft had a potentially serious effect as there was a shortage of such 
equipment not only in Burma but throughout the rest of the world in 1944.106  
 At the beginning of 1944, Allied intelligence estimated the Japanese had an 
approximate total of 277 aircraft in the Central Burma, Rangoon, Siam, Malaya and Sumatra 
area, of which 88 were single-engine fighters and 108 medium bombers.107 This figure was 
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to oscillate over the next two months reaching a peak in the week of 30th January of 333 
aircraft (117 single-engine fighters) and a low point of 234 aircraft (81 single-engine 
fighters) on 27th February.108 Some of these fluctuations were due to the attrition caused by 
Allied defensive operations and some to the arrival of extra fighter Hikosentai at the end of 
January and to the departure of other units to reinforce Japanese theatres elsewhere. Whilst 
the number of Japanese fighters was small in comparison to Allied numbers, if deployed 
correctly they posed a threat by exploiting early warning deficiencies and interrupting air 
supply operations.    
 At the end of 1943 the arrival of long-range American Lightnings and Mustangs 
promised an effective counter-air offensive, which was enhanced by the introduction of the 
American 1st Air Commando Group and its additional Mustangs. The A.C.G. was initiated 
by General Henry ‘Hap’ Arnold, commanding officer of the U.S.A.A.F., following a 
meeting with Colonel Orde Wingate during the QUADRANT conference in 1943. Appalled 
by stories of wounded troops being left behind on the first Chindit operation in 1943, Arnold 
formed the A.C.G. with the purpose of supporting Wingate with a wide mix of aircraft 
specifically chosen for the task.109 These aircraft were: 25 transports (C-47 and C-46); 225 
gliders; 100 light aircraft (for communications and casualty evacuation); 4 helicopters; 30 
Mustangs and 12 Mitchell medium bombers.110 Although principally formed to support 
Wingate in a ground attack role, the Mustangs and Mitchells could also be used against air 
targets as specified by the unit’s joint commander, Colonel Philip Cochran: 
Thirty P-51 fighters and thirty fighter pilots were assigned to the project to 
furnish primary close support assault work for the columns and in cases 
where necessary to form air protection for our own forces and to gain air 
superiority in the area in which the force operates. These fighter planes are 
equipped with rockets for close support work and the pilots are of the highest 
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caliber. Twelve B-25s equipped with 75mm cannon supplement the fighters 
for close support and assault missions.111 
 
From the Group’s inception, the maintenance of air superiority was a recognized function 
and one in which it played a part prior to and during the Chindit operations in 1944. 
However, despite its role the unit was unpopular in some quarters as it was thought of as 
Wingate’s ‘private airforce’ at a time when the theatre was short of resources and such 
resources could be used for the good of many rather than a few.    
 The first two months of 1944 continued the pattern of heavy and medium bombers 
attacking Japanese airfields by night. Wellingtons and Liberators varying from two to 27 
aircraft attacked airfields from Aungban to Zayatkuin with mixed results; whereas some 
raids reported that bursts were seen on runways and buildings, but others were much less 
successful.112 The weather conditions over targets also made it difficult for intruder 
operations flown in the early morning or evening periods. During the evening of 5th February 
four Beaufighters attacked Heho airfield but could not find the target owing to poor weather. 
On the 7th February a Beaufighter visited Heho airfield and could not find any enemy aircraft 
or the airfield’s flare path visible. The intelligence report noted that the “Visibility was bad 
throughout due to ground haze.”113 Overnight on 17th and 18th February 13 Wellingtons flew 
to Heho where only two aircraft found the target “due to very dark conditions and ground 
haze” and the results of their bombing was not observed.114 Although these operations may 
have had some effect in disrupting the Japanese air effort, they did not reduce Japanese 
aircraft numbers.  
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However new tactics were tried. In the early morning of 5th February four 
Beaufighters followed up an overnight bombing raid on Aungban airfield by flying across 
the base at 50 feet and attacking aircraft in dispersal pens; one aircraft was reported to have 
probably been set on fire.115 This tactic however was soon dispensed with because it was 
equally affected by poor visibility and ground haze.116 The raids by night or in marginal 
weather conditions were clearly not productive. Catching Japanese aircraft on the ground 
required attacks being carried out with an element of surprise, and therefore at low level to 
beat the Japanese early warning system, and in better visibility conditions, and therefore 
during daylight hours. An indication of future operations began in February 1944 when the 
A.C.G. was starting to train to operational readiness in a series of multi-role sorties from 
reconnaissance to communications attacks. On 5th February, 12 Mustangs armed with 500 
pound bombs attacked the rail junction at Wuntho and subsequently flew to Shwebo airfield, 
where no enemy aircraft were located.117  On the 12th February, six Mustangs made an 
armed reconnaissance of the Shwebo-Monywa area where they machine gunned the airfield 
target area, but “results were not observed.”118 These flights, whilst unsuccessful, began the 
link between the heavy bomber phase and the daylight long-range fighter offensive which 
became an important part of the counter-air battle during the next three months. 
 The first counter-air sorties of March involved heavy bombers and began overnight 
on the 3rd/4th when a mixed force of R.A.F. Wellingtons and Liberators attacked Mingaladon 
and Zayatkwin airfields, their crews reporting bursts on runways and dispersal areas.119 
From then until overnight on the 17th April, periodic overnight raids were carried out on 
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airfields with inconclusive damage caused to runways and dispersal areas.120 It is not clear 
how much damage these raids inflicted on Japanese aircraft but Shores writes that an R.A.F. 
raid on Zayatkwin on 4th March destroyed 70% of the 64th Sentai’s weapons and radio 
equipment storage.121   
The daytime counter-air offensive began on 3rd March 1944, two days before 
Operation THURSDAY (the second Chindit expedition) was due to commence. 12 A.C.G. 
Mustangs, followed by four A.C.G. Mitchells, attacked the Japanese airfield at Shwebo, but 
as no aircraft were located, buildings and facilities were strafed and bombed.122 A similar 
result was obtained on 7th March when ten Mustangs and ten Mitchells visited Bhamo 
airfield, East of the Broadway landing ground, where no aircraft were found, but buildings 
and runways were damaged. So far little had been achieved in terms of aircraft damage, but 
this was to change on 8th March.  
The Japanese had moved forward a number of bombers and fighters in preparation 
for a raid on Ledo and the airfields at Maymyo, Shwebo, Anisakan and Onbaik were 
crowded. Aided by an intercepted ‘live talk’ transmission heard by an American technician 
and Allied Y-Service intercepts, 22 A.C.G. Mustangs were despatched each being armed 
with a pair of 1,000 lb bombs. Initially Anisakan was attacked and on the return flight to 
their base, the A.C.G. visited Shwebo and Onbaik where both bases were covered with 
Japanese aircraft.123 After their attack the A.C.G.’s commander called for a follow up raid 
and nine Mitchells and 15 Mustangs were despatched; only two Mustangs were able to find 
Onbaik, but the Mitchells found and bombed Shwebo.  
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The claims from these raids indicate the difficulties in establishing a reliable estimate 
of Japanese aircraft attrition and this became a feature of the next few months. The 
Americans claimed 27 Oscars, six Dinahs, one Sally and an unidentified twin-engined 
aircraft destroyed on the ground, with an additional Oscar destroyed and two each probably 
destroyed and damaged in the air.124 Furthermore Wagner reported that the Mitchells’ follow 
up raid on Shwebo claimed another 12 Japanese aircraft destroyed on the ground, whereas 
both Shores and Y’Blood state only that fires and explosions were started with no further 
claims of aircraft destroyed or damaged.125  The American claim of over 45 aircraft 
destroyed was commented on by Allied intelligence analysts: 
  On WEDNESDAY, March 8th, was delivered the heaviest blow that  
  the Japanese Army Air Force has ever suffered in this theatre. The   
  wreckage of 46 enemy aircraft lies strewn over the airfields of   
  SHWEBO and ONBAUK [sic] – to say nothing of destroyed petrol  
  bowsers and installations. It was a devastating attack – Malaya and  
  Magwe in reverse!126 
46 aircraft represented approximately 22% of all Japanese aircraft in the theatre and the loss 
of 27 Oscars 33% of the Japanese fighter strength. Taken together these would have 
represented a notable victory, but the actual Japanese losses were likely to have been 
smaller. According to both Shores and Y’Blood between 15 and 18 Japanese aircraft were 
destroyed on the ground and in the air over Anisakan and Onbaik, whilst an unspecified 
number were only damaged at Shwebo, whilst Wagner makes no mention of the number of 
Japanese aircraft actually lost.127 Intelligence analysts were aware that these raids did not 
spell the end of the Japanese effort as reinforcements or replacements were expected: 
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That the Japanese will make good the losses  there can be no doubt, but it will 
be interesting to see with what rapidity this is done or whether new units will 
come to the assistance of those temporally depleted.128  
So with doubts about the actual Japanese losses and replacements expected, what had the 
raid achieved and what lessons were learned? 
  The raid had showed how future counter-air raids should be mounted. Intelligence 
about Japanese airfield and aircraft locations were crucial if the enemy was to be caught at 
its most vulnerable. The best weapon had proved to be agile, long-range, well armed 
fighters, particularly the American aircraft in the theatre. However, whilst both of these 
elements were tangible, there was clearly a problem in estimating actual losses claimed by 
the attacking fighters, which was always likely to be difficult to assess during confused 
raids. As subsequent attacks showed there was a disparity between the Japanese losses 
claimed by American pilots and those recorded by the J.A.A.F. in the area. Despite this there 
were positive results. The minimum actual loss of 15-18 Oscars represented about 19% of 
the Japanese fighter strength in the theatre which would need to be replaced. It does not take 
into account the bigger problem for the Japanese of replacing pilots who may have been lost 
with their aircraft.  
 The offensive continued in a similar manner in March with the 459th F.S.’s 
Lightnings. On 11th March 12 Lightnings attacked the Japanese airfield at Aungban and 
submitted claims of 13 destroyed and five probables in the air, with seven destroyed and two 
damaged on the ground. The actual Japanese loss was one Oscar from the 50th Sentai caught 
as it was climbing to meet the American raid.129 By now, if American claims were correct, 
the J.A.A.F. should have been severely weakened, but on the same day the Japanese were 
able to deploy 60 fighters to cover their troops crossing the Chinwin River during the 
advance on Imphal and between 12th and 17th March to raid the Allied airfields at Silchar, 
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Broadway and Imphal with formations of bombers and fighters numbering between 15 and 
72 aircraft. Evidently the Japanese had sufficient reserves and the Allied airfield attacks were 
not severely limiting enemy aircraft activity. On 25th March Japanese fighters and bombers 
flew to the Chittagong-Cox’s Bazaar area; Lightnings were scrambled to meet this threat, but 
when no interception was made the American fighters were ordered to fly to Shwebo and 
Onbaik in an attempt to catch the enemy raiders as they landed. When the two formations 
met the American pilots claimed seven aircraft destroyed in the air and one on the ground, 
with three probables and two damaged in the air, whereas Japanese records show a destroyed 
tally of three fighters in the air and one on the ground.130 
 March 1944 saw the termination of night bomber attacks against Japanese airfields 
and the start of long-range fighter attacks from, mainly, the A.C.G. and 459th F.S., with some 
R.A.F. Beaufighters playing a small part. Approximately 142 daylight sorties were flown 
against Japanese airfields by these units with aircrews claiming a tally of 63 destroyed 
aircraft in the air and on the ground. Incomplete Japanese records gives a minimum total of 
20 Japanese aircraft destroyed as a result of the counter-air attacks in March.131 At this stage 
of 1944 the J.A.A.F. had sufficient reserves to replace such losses from bases in their rear 
areas and Allied intelligence put Japanese fighter strength at 81 aircraft throughout March. 
This figure did not alter until the beginning of May. Gauging the actual attrition is obviously 
difficult when only incomplete records are available, however, it is likely that the raids 
caused some further damage to aircraft which necessitated rebuilding, or their being written-
off. In addition the losses of ancillary equipment and death and injury to air force personnel 
must be weighed in the balance.  
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 What effects had the March raids had? The Chindits’ landings had been made in 
secret without interference from Japanese fighters but this was unlikely to have been as a 
result of the counter-air strikes. Allen wrote: 
  Tazoe’s airfields had been literally plastered by Cochran’s air   
  commando before the landings began, but in spite of the planes   
  destroyed on the ground he could muster enough for a riposte.132  
  
However the Air Commandos had found no Japanese aircraft on the ground during the  
pre-5th March attacks, and had only damaged buildings and ancillary equipment. Whilst it is 
not known for certain it is more likely that the success of the Chindit landings was due to 
surprise, and the Spitfire’s superiority against Japanese reconnaissance aircraft had been 
significant in curtailing their activities. Y’Blood claims that the 8th March raid had delayed 
the “Japanese… attacking the Chindit landing zones until Wingate’s men were already in 
place” but this was, again, more likely to have been the result of the Japanese not being in a 
position to find the landing strips rather than a lack of numbers.133 On 10th March two 
Japanese bombers escorted by 20 fighters tried to find Broadway, but missed and found 
Chowringhee instead, and on 11th March 60 Japanese fighters covered the crossing of the 
Chindwin. Broadway was not discovered by the Japanese until 13th March and during that 
day 40 Oscars were sent from Meiktila to attack the landing grounds.134 The Japanese had 
therefore not been deprived of numbers, but had been deprived of eyes in the sky; on both 4th 
and 6th March Spitfires had destroyed a Dinah reconnaissance aircraft which might have 
revealed Allied preparations.135  
 The results of the counter-air offensive in March had therefore not been as effective 
as thought but had shown the necessity for future operations. The importance of protecting 
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transport and ground support aircraft would take on an added urgency in April when the 
sieges of Kohima and Imphal increased in intensity. Despite the relative strength of Japanese 
air power, their fighters were capable of causing problems to such aircraft as witnessed on 
17th March. Taking advantage of the lack of early warning cover 15 Oscars attacked the 
Broadway strip and caught the Spitfires of 81 Squadron just taking off or on the ground; one 
Spitfire was destroyed in the air and five destroyed on the ground, the remaining airborne 
Spitfire suffering severe damage.136 If these kind of losses could be inflicted on Allied 
fighters by surprise attack, then the necessity of reducing the air threat against transport 
aircraft required an efficient counter-air offensive. 
  The counter-air offensive intensified in April. The Chindits continued their 
operations behind Japanese lines depending on Allied aircraft for resupply, casualty 
evacuation and offensive air support. Whilst the Battle of the Admin Box had finished, the 
sieges at Kohima and Imphal had started and in the case of Imphal the siege would continue 
until June. Both these battlefields required close air support and re-supply from the air and 
the scale of the contribution made during the period by the Troop Carrier Command 
transport aircraft was profound as this graph demonstrates: 
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 137    
Air superiority was imperative to protect the transports and it must not be forgotten that the 
few land supply routes also had to be protected from enemy air action. The potential 
consequence is shown by a surprise attack by Oscars made on Zubza on 28th April: 
The attack highlighted the risk of using a single road to support five  brigades 
plus divisional and corps troops. Were the Japanese to make a concentrated 
effort to disrupt this thread of communication by air action, maintenance of 
the forward troops would become practically impossible.138 
 
The counter-air campaign assumed greater importance when the air defence of the forward 
areas was restricted as radar stations and observer posts were overrun and warning times 
were reduced.  
The first counter-air attack occurred on 2nd April when 14 Lightnings attacked Heho 
and found a number of Japanese aircraft in the air returning to their base. During the attack 
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American pilots claimed a total of 13 aircraft destroyed, four in the air and nine on the 
ground. Once again the American pilots over-claimed as Japanese records show only four 
aircraft were destroyed, two in the air and two on the ground.139 The next notable raid 
occurred on 4th April when 19 1st A.C.G. Mustangs attacked Aungban where they found the 
Japanese 50th Sentai’s fighters on the ground refuelling following earlier sorties. Once 
American claims had been assessed, a total of 24 Japanese aircraft were claimed as 
destroyed, 19 of which were fighters, and a number of others were claimed as probably 
destroyed or damaged.140 Although Japanese records do not mention bomber losses they 
record 15 of their fighters destroyed and the effect of this successful raid was significant as 
“the whole unit [was] obliged to withdraw to Saigon to re-equip; it would return a week or 
so later with new aircraft.”141 This was the highest confirmed number of Japanese aircraft 
destroyed in a single operation during April and it would not be repeated.   
 From 4th April onwards the airfield offensive continued largely without the 
participation of the A.C.G. which reverted to supporting the Chindits in ground support 
operations although its aircraft visited Anisakan on 16th April and Naung on the 19th. The 
long-range operations were now largely left to the Lightnings from the 459th F.S. and their 
results showed a familiar pattern of disparity between claims and actual Japanese losses. For 
example, on 15th 12 Lightnings visited Heho and claimed seven destroyed, whereas Japanese 
records show one aircraft destroyed on the ground. On 25th 28 Lightnings attacked Heho in 
two waves, one at 07:12 and the other at 11:40; the first attack found nothing at Heho but 
engaged some Japanese fighters over Imphal during their return journey. The second attack, 
consisting of 11 Lightnings, flew to Heho to catch Japanese raiders refuelling following their 
earlier attack on Allied airfield targets at Silchar and Hailakandi. Following their attack 
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American pilots claimed nine Japanese aircraft destroyed in the air and on the ground 
whereas Japanese records only show one fighter destroyed.142 Adding to the Allied air 
forces’ efforts in April was a combined attack of 83 Fleet Air Arm and United States Navy 
aircraft on the Japanese base at Sabang in Sumatra on the 19th. The pilots claimed a total of 
24 Japanese aircraft destroyed on the ground and, while there are no Japanese records 
available, an ULTRA intercepted report of 8th May sheds doubt to the claims: 
  Two out of 12 aircraft inside blast pen damaged. Outside blast pen   
  eight out of eight (including six out of six any aircraft) and rear repair  
  shop (two out of two). The remainder of the message appears to deal  
  with damage to hangars and requests direction to be given for aircraft  
  to be housed in blast pens.143 
 
Including the Navy’s attack the cumulative claims of 83 aircraft destroyed during April may 
have been good for morale and propaganda, but there were no signs that the counter-air 
offensive was having a decisive effect. 
 The first indication of the lack of success was that the weight of Japanese air attacks 
on the Allies did not substantially decrease. Even following the successful Allied attack on 
Aungban on 4th April when the Japanese lost 15 fighters, 30 Oscars from the 64th Sentai 
performed a sweep over Imphal positions on 12th, whilst on the 17th 50 Oscars and 12 Sallys 
attacked the Imphal plain. This indicated that either the Japanese had adequate reserves to 
replace losses or that the counter-air offensive was not destroying as many enemy aircraft as 
claimed. The Japanese ability to attack in such numbers and the early warning deficiencies 
around the Imphal area led to transport losses on 25th April when 30 Oscars attacked Imphal. 
There they were intercepted by Spitfires but a number of the Oscars managed to engage 
Dakotas flying in the area and five of these aircraft were lost.144  
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 The counter-air offensive in May was conducted by the American long-range fighters 
supported by a few R.A.F. sorties. During the month the 1st A.C.G. withdrew to rest and 
refit, but the American 530th F.S.’s Mustangs became operational and this unit joined the 
offensive. However, the counter-air offensive began to wane as the month progressed owing 
to deteriorating weather as the monsoon period approached. On 19th May a joint R.A.F. and 
U.S.A.A.F. attack on Meiktila was aborted owing to bad weather, as were plans for the 
Americans to attack Japanese airfields on 18th and 21st. There was also the familiar story of 
claim against actual loss. For example, on 10th May 16 Lightnings attacked Aungban in two 
waves and claimed five Japanese aircraft destroyed in the air and on the ground, whereas 
Japanese records only show three aircraft lost.145 By the end of May the Allies flew 340 
sorties on counter-air operations and claimed a maximum of 63 Japanese aircraft destroyed 
against a minimum of 20 destroyed according to incomplete Japanese records.146 This figure 
represented a one third ratio of actual Japanese loss against Allied pilots’ claims recorded in 
March and April.  
Despite these losses, claimed or actual, the Japanese were able to mount various 
heavy fighter sweeps against Allied positions throughout the month.147 On 23rd May 35 
Japanese fighters flew over the Burmese battle areas leading Shores to write, “The month’s 
raids on the Japanese by the U.S.A.A.F. fighters still did not seem greatly to have diminished 
the J.A.A.F.’s ability to strike back despite the effective demise of the 87th Sentai.”148 This 
brings into question how effective the counter-air offensive of the March to May period had 
been.   
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 The period between March and June 1944 is regarded as the important period of the 
counter-air offensive against the Japanese Air Forces in Burma. A.C.M. Pierse wrote in his 
Despatch that the 1st A.C.G. alone claimed 90 Japanese aircraft destroyed in the air and on 
the ground and the Bengal Despatch also referred to the 459th F.S.’s achievements: 
  One squadron of P-38s alone, operating from Chittagong, destroyed 96  
  enemy aircraft in this way within six weeks of coming into operations  
  in 224 Group.149 
 
and: 
  I would mention the P-38s of No 459 Squadron USAAF which   
  subsequent to the attachments to 224 Group Chittagong achieved the  
  following successes in a matter of 11 weeks, 121 enemy aircraft   
  destroyed; 21 probably destroyed and 48 damaged.150 
 
Craven and Cate wrote, “By June 1944 Allied air superiority in Burma was no longer 
challenged”.151 Despite this statement there was clearly a disparity between the claims made 
and the actual losses suffered by the J.A.A.F. during the counter-air offensive. Allied claims 
as a result of interdiction sorties against Japanese airfields alone amounted to 213 aircraft 
destroyed, whilst according to available Japanese records the minimum number of destroyed 
aircraft was approximately 66.152 Aircrew claims must therefore be considered inaccurate 
but this should not be surprising as they were made in the heat of battle.153 However the 
disparity bears detailed analysis. 
 To analyse statistically the actual scale of Japanese losses during the three months in 
review is difficult owing to the lack of Japanese military records. While there were some unit 
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records which survived most military records were destroyed leaving only Japanese civilian 
production and manufacturing tables for analysis. The post-war United States Strategic 
Bombing Survey (U.S.S.B.S.) used, “the best Japanese figures and the estimates made by 
Allied intelligence agencies” to compile their report and wrote of their difficulties: 
  All but a few Japanese Army and Navy records relating to losses have  
  been burned, and the statistics on wastage furnished by the Japanese  
  are based on almost nothing but the memory of a few Japanese   
  officers. Moreover during the war, Allied intelligence on wastage was  
  much less reliable than intelligence checks on the Japanese figures and  
  many of the loss figures contained in this report may be subject to an  
  error of 25 per cent or more.154 
 
The U.S.S.B.S. report showed Japanese monthly aircraft production rose during the first half 
of 1944 from 1,622 in January to 1,786 in July which increased the size of the Japanese Air 
Forces from 4,050 to 5,500 during the same months.155 Furthermore it concluded that the 
Japanese were able to steadily increase the size of the J.A.A.F. during 1944 until the 
Philippines campaign in August and, “Then for the first time losses exceeded the number of 
planes reaching tactical units, and overall strength fell off.”156 This would indicate that 
Japanese industry was building aircraft in sufficient quantities to replace wastage during the 
first half of 1944, and it is therefore likely that losses in Burma were replaced. These are, of 
course, post-war figures which the Allied intelligence agencies did not have and Ford shows 
that the available wartime data from signal intelligence, captured documents and aircraft 
registration plates was fragmentary and did not allow firm calculations.157 This data led the 
Chiefs of Staff Committee to deduce in May 1944 that “in spite of heavy aircraft losses, a 
rise in strength was possible thanks to increased output” whereas the Air Ministry 
representatives: 
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  were unable to put forward an educated critique, and the final   
  conclusion was based on the deduction that only a small portion of the  
  Japanese air forces had been engaged, and given their policy of   
  conservation, wastage was unlikely to be high.158 
 
   A.C.S.E.A. intelligence on Japanese aircraft strength was based principally on signal 
intelligence, captured documents and registration plates taken from crashed aircraft. 
Although work had begun to break J.A.A.F. ciphers, it was not until mid-1944 that the 
difficulties involved in breaking Japanese codes and ciphers yielded better intelligence of 
their intentions and actions. The level of accuracy can be seen in the A.C.S.E.A. Weekly 
Intelligence Summaries’ figures which show varying levels of Japanese strength which do 
not always correspond with the counter-air offensive’s claims which are themselves 
problematic.159 The Intelligence Summaries showed Japanese air strength at a constant 216 
aircraft in the theatre from mid-March until the second week of April when it increased to 
288 and continued to rise to 321 at the end of April. The total then rose to 348 at the 
beginning of May before falling to 318 at the end of the month. Despite the claims made by 
Allied pilots the intelligence assessments never put the overall strength below 216, although 
various categories of aircraft were re-assessed as wastage claims were analysed. For 
example, in May the intelligence summary reported: 
  Enemy fighter losses in Burma have been exceptionally heavy during  
  the past week, some fifty being destroyed. There is reason to believe  
  that full replacements have not been forthcoming and the fighter   
  strength in Burma is marked down from 76 to 57 a/c.160   
 
Although such adjustments were to be expected as information was collated it is also clear 
that the intelligence officers were aware of the shortcomings of their information. Typically 
in April: 
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There are indications of two or three Army air units in Sumatra though it is 
not yet known whether they are complete units nor with what type of aircraft 
they are equipped. The present assessment of 72 single engined fighters is 
therefore extremely tentative... It is estimated that the total number of aircraft 
in this area is now 270 as compared with 115 shown last week. It is most 
important to note, however, that the units comprising these increases, though 
newly identified in this area, have in fact been there for several weeks 161   
 
This would suggest that not only were the numbers suspect but that the Allies were facing 
more Japanese units than previously thought and this was actually admitted in June 1944: 
  [T]he gradual increase in weekly figures over past months must not be  
  taken as reflecting a gradual build-up by the enemy, but is due rather to  
  an irregular flow of information from this area. In fact the greater part  
  of air strength now shown is believed to have been there since early  
  this year.162 
 
This extract was taken from the intelligence summary of 25th June 1944 when the overall 
Japanese strength was assessed as 371, of which 196 were placed in Malaya and Sumatra 
undergoing rest and refitting.   
 The following graph which compares intelligence assessments with pilots’ claims is 
of considerable value but cannot be regarded as anything better than a good approximation 
as intelligence estimates were estimates rather than firm figures. It shows the effect of the 
counter-air offensive on overall Japanese air strength in the theatre which includes aircraft 
on the Sumatra and Malayan airfields. 163 
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164 
 
The blue line shows overall Japanese air strength as assessed by Allied intelligence and the 
pink line shows the assessed fighter strength. The green line shows Allied claims of 
destroyed aircraft from the counter-air offensive only, i.e. it does not include losses from air 
defence or escort sorties. The latter figure is likely to be higher than actual loss figures and 
we can assume this line could generally be two thirds lower.  It will be seen that for the first 
six weeks Japanese air strength probably remained constant despite the claims made during 
the weeks ending on 12th March and 9th April. The strength then increased by 72 fighters as 
mentioned earlier and this can be explained in two ways; either the Allied counter-air 
offensive had forced the Japanese to commit more fighters to the theatre, or, as Allied 
intelligence had stated, aircrafts’ presence was tentative. However this figure was not altered 
for the rest of the period, and given the June assessment of aircraft numbers it is likely that 
the 72 fighters had been there since the beginning of March. From mid-April Japanese 
aircraft numbers steadily increased particularly in terms of bombers and reconnaissance 
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aircraft, whereas the numbers of fighters reduced slightly owing to attrition until 21st May 
when numbers started to increase prior to the monsoon period. Allied intelligence figures 
suggest that the increase in air strength rose to 389 aircraft in the week ending 2nd July 1944 
which represents a greater figure than the Japanese had started the year with, 277. Therefore 
it must be concluded that it is probable that Japanese resupply combined with their policy of 
conservation had ensured a constant air strength within the theatre which the Allies had kept 
in check but not substantially reduced.  
 The preceding sections may give the impression that the counter-air offensive had 
failed in its objective. However the 60 Japanese aircraft that were confirmed as destroyed 
even as a minimum was greater than the approximate number of 25 aircraft confirmed 
destroyed as a result of air to air attrition and showed the value of a counter-air offensive. In 
one unit’s case the offensive had precipitated a demise and withdrawal. The 87th Sentai had 
arrived in Burma as a relatively inexperienced squadron on 8th May with its Ki-44 Tojo 
fighters which were considered an improvement over the Oscars. However on 21st May the 
unit was forced to withdraw to Sumatra following the loss of six pilots killed and many 
aircraft destroyed as a result of “encountering the best Allied long-range fighters available in 
the area”.165  
 At the beginning of this chapter the benefits of a counter-air offensive were described 
and many of these were relevant to the period under review. In addition to the 60 aircraft 
confirmed destroyed there were also the aircraft which had been damaged in the air or on the 
ground as a result of the airfield strikes. These required repair or replacement both of which 
placed a strain on the Japanese war effort. The U.S.S.B.S. concluded in 1946 that the 
Japanese failed to develop an adequate maintenance and repair organisation citing various 
problems such as over-extension of units and spare parts shortages.166 If aircraft could not be 
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repaired easily then they would have to be replaced, but the Japanese record of ferrying 
replacement aircraft was quite poor, as during the war they lost 4000 aircraft in ferrying 
operations. In comparison the Americans lost 909 in the European and Pacific Theatres 
combined.167 Furthermore there was the matter of replacing lost personnel, pilots in 
particular. In July 1944 an American MAGIC intercept showed the Japanese had set up a 
new training programme which was hoped would alleviate their pilot shortages by August 
1944 but it was being hampered by lack of materials and suitable training aircraft.168 The 
intercept showed that trainee pilots were not receiving advanced training, and that the 3rd Air 
Army in Singapore reported in May that the trainees had only 15 hours flying per month 
since leaving Japan in March. Similar shortages existed for other aircrew members and for 
the essential ground maintenance trades.169 Finally in addition to material and personnel 
losses the offensive continued to force the Japanese to disperse their squadrons to avoid 
attack as reported in April: 
  It is interesting to note that whereas not long ago the enemy had his  
  fighter strength in Central Burma almost entirely concentrated at   
  Anisakan, Heho and Aungban, he is now pursuing a policy of much  
  wider dispersal, which is doubtless due to the success of low level   
  attack by Allied fighters on airfields.170 
Dispersing aircraft to smaller airfields away from main bases had a potential effect of 
increasing attrition from flying accidents as well as the effects of increased aircraft flying 
hours, pilot fatigue and fuel wastage.   
 
 
June 1944 to June 1945 
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 The last phase of the counter-air offensive was fought supporting the Allied offensive 
in Burma which led to the defeat of Japanese forces in 1945. The land offensive began on 
21st June 1944 when the Japanese started to withdraw from around the Imphal Plain and 
continued after the road to Imphal was opened.171 The Japanese were defeated and 
disorganized and suffering shortages of food and ammunition. The Allies sought to exploit 
these factors by pursuing them into Burma notwithstanding the monsoon period. They began 
their pursuit by clearing Japanese forces out of the hills surrounding Imphal in July before 
pressing on South-Eastwards to retake Tamu on 4th August. The gathering momentum was 
maintained by two separate advances, one Eastward towards Sittaung and the other 
Southwards to Kalemyo through the Kabaw valley. Sittaung was captured on 4th September 
and Kalemyo on 14th November, before the port of Kalewa was taken on 2nd December. This 
had also been the objective of the Indian 5th Division which had fought its way Southward 
from Imphal through Tiddim. The Allied advance to Kalewa had been hard against an enemy 
who fought a furious withdrawal which necessitated regular supply drops and close air 
support operations to sustain their troops: 
It had taken 11 Division four months to cover the 100 plus miles from Tamu 
to Kalewa, and in face of constant opposition they had depended for their 
food and ammunition entirely on the transport squadrons, operating under 
conditions of almost unbelievable difficulty.172 
   
The 5th Division’s advance had “to be entirely supported by air-drop and provided with 
constant air support, again largely furnished by Hurricanes.”173 Air support would continue 
to play a vital role in the reconquest of Burma and this was taken into account in planning. 
By December 1944 the Fourteenth Army was at the banks of the Chindwin River and airfield 
construction to accommodate transport and fighter aircraft had begun, for instance, at the 
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recently captured Kalemyo. Plans such as Operation CAPITAL (the reconquest of Central 
Burma), Operation ROMULUS (conquest of the Arakan), and Operation TALON (capture 
of Akyab Island) had been formulated and all emphasised the necessity of capturing 
airfields, or constructing makeshift airstrips for supply or casualty evacuation. Whilst these 
and subsequent plans were adapted or formulated over the next eight months they all made 
provision for air support from transport and attack aircraft, and synonymous with the air plan 
was a necessity for gaining air superiority. The primary task given to 221 Group was: 
[The] Destruction of the Japanese Air Force in Burma in order to maintain air 
superiority and to ensure protection against the enemy for transport aircraft 
engaged in essential air supply operations.174 
 
Transport aircraft continued to be in short supply in the theatre whilst some ground attack 
aircraft required protection from enemy fighters. For example while many of the newer types 
of Allied aircraft such as the P-47 Thunderbolt could adequately defend themselves in aerial 
combat, the Hurricane continued to provide sterling service in short range army support and 
as Probert wrote, “For short-range work at low level in conditions of air superiority they 
remained invaluable.”175 Providing air superiority over such a vast area provided difficulties 
as it had done earlier in the campaign and as it was to do for the remainder of the Far Eastern 
war. Providing escort fighters to defend transport sorties was necessary but wasteful of fuel 
as not every flight encountered Japanese fighters. Such operations also increased wear and 
tear in airframe and pilot fatigue but there was no alternative. It was nearly impossible to 
depend on fighters being alerted from their bases in turn to intercept Japanese aircraft as the 
transports were operating a long way from Allied fighter bases, and early warning from radar 
and observer posts was unreliable owing to the distances involved, the speed of the Allied 
advance and limitations in the effectiveness of transportable radar equipment. The speed of 
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the advance in early January 1945 towards Ye-U and Shwebo was a typical example as 221 
Group’s fighters were based in the Imphal area and the front line was 150 miles away. Given 
these circumstances counter-air strikes were vital. 
 The fighting in the 1944 monsoon period differed from the same period in 1942 and 
1943 because neither side completely ceased military operations. Admiral Lord Louis 
Mountbatten ordered that fighting should continue during the monsoon as he was keen to 
exploit the Japanese withdrawal from Imphal. This strategy limited the effectiveness of air 
operations as the weather often precluded any flying and even when operations were 
mounted, targets were often not found.176 Continual Allied advances also resulted in the 
Japanese not completely withdrawing their air strength as had been the case in previous 
years and this was recognized by the Allies. In May 1944 General Stratemeyer wrote: 
  It became evident towards the end of the month that the Japanese were  
  intending to keep a force of about 90 fighters in Burma during the   
  monsoon and use them as opportunity offered.177  
 
On 4th June Allied intelligence reported: 
  As for the fighters, there is no sign as yet of any withdrawal, and it  
  does not seem likely that any move will take place until the military  
  situation becomes less acute.178 
 
At the end of June 1944 the J.A.A.F. had a total of 371 aircraft in the S.E.A.C. area. This 
represented the highest total of Japanese aircraft in the theatre up until that time despite the 
losses inflicted on its forces during the intensive period of air operations during March, April 
and May.179 On 16th July an intelligence report stated: 
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It is believed that the only operational aircraft now remaining in Burma are 
approximately 62 single engined fighters, Oscars and Tojos… The heavier 
losses which they have suffered this year would have made their withdrawal 
for rest and training desirable from the Japanese point of view, but the 
military situation did not allow for it.180 
 
Successive Allied intelligence assessments showed that for the rest of the monsoon period 
the Japanese retained a single-engine fighter presence of approximately 70 aircraft between 
Central Burma and Rangoon and they were, as General Stratemeyer had predicted, 
occasionally used. For example on 7th July what was described as a strong force of Oscars 
attacked the Myitkyina airfield where they caught the American 80th F.S. on the ground 
damaging six P-40s.181 On 17th and 18th August 20 Oscars attacked a bridge over the 
Salween near to Eitsu and although the bridge was not hit on either occasion, a Dakota was 
shot down and destroyed by the Japanese formation. Although none of these raids posed a 
significant threat they did demonstrate that the J.A.A.F. was prepared to fight, and, 
importantly, the threat it posed to transport aircraft.   
The monsoon period precluded intensive Allied counter-air operations but given the 
occasional Japanese presence over the front some attacks were mounted when the weather 
was favourable. On 6th June 459th F.S. Lightnings attacked Meiktila and Heho airfields 
claiming two aircraft destroyed and six damaged, though Japanese records only show one 
aircraft destroyed.182 Despite the Japanese strength in the area there was clearly a policy of 
conservation and dispersal as during two U.S. raids on Lashio on 11th and 13th July only five 
and two aircraft respectively were seen on the airfield.183 Weather conditions in August 
restricted wide scale operations except on the 27th August when Spitfires were sent to 
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Donbauk airfield to investigate a report that 36 Tojos were present; only one was found and 
that was claimed as destroyed.184  
Despite the inability to find and draw the Japanese into battle their presence was 
occasionally felt later in the monsoon season. On 8th September 20 Oscars attacked army 
positions at Salween and on 10th a mixed force of 33 Japanese aircraft attacked Tengchaung 
and Langling.185 Reacting to these raids 15 Lightnings flew a sweep to Rangoon on 13th 
September where an Oscar was confirmed as destroyed when it attempted to intercept the 
U.S. formation.186 None of the Allied attacks posed a serious threat to Japanese air strength 
at this time as even the numbers claimed were very small. This is unsurprising given the 
weather conditions, low frequency of raids and difficulty of finding a small number of 
Japanese aircraft dispersed over many airfields in a vast country. However, as the monsoon 
began to abate during October 1944, the situation changed as Japan had built up its air 
strength for the new campaigning season. By 29th October Allied intelligence estimated 
Japanese air strength as 485 aircraft in the Far East: 100 in Burma; 60 in Siam/French-Indo 
China; and 325 in Sumatra/Malaya.187 
 As the weather improved, air supply and ground attack operations supporting Allied 
ground troops in their advance into Burma increased in intensity. Allied intelligence 
estimated between 45 and 55 Japanese fighters were based on three airfields around 
Rangoon (Mingaladon, Hmawbi and Zayatkwin) and it was decided to mount a series of 
attacks on these bases starting on 18th October and lasting for three days.188 Importantly the 
attacks, called Operation ‘L’, would coincide with the start of the U.S. campaign in the 
Philippines and it was hoped that they would deter Japanese aircraft transfers to the Pacific 
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region.189 The first attack occurred on 18th October when a composite force of R.A.F. 
Beaufighters, Mosquitoes and Thunderbolts and U.S. Lightnings, Mustangs and 
Thunderbolts flew to the Rangoon airfields. There is some discrepancy with regard to the 
numbers of Japanese aircraft claimed destroyed. Shores writes of seven on the ground and 
three in the air, Y’Blood writes of six on the ground and three in the air, whilst Allied 
intelligence gave the figure as five on the ground and three in the air. Japanese records only 
show one aircraft destroyed during aerial combat.190 Weather conditions prevented an attack 
on 19th October but a similar composite force of British and U.S. aircraft attacked the 
airfields again on the 20th. This time pilots claimed six destroyed on the ground and one in 
the air, the latter being confirmed as lost in Japanese records.191 Over two days Allied pilots 
had claimed approximately 16 to 18 aircraft destroyed which the Eastern Air Command 
considered as a poor return for the effort expended. Some units, such as 58th F.S. and 459th 
F.S., were criticised for their lack of aggression, only the A.C.G. being praised.192  
Such raids presented a problem to Allied commanders. In October the Allies had 
approximately 1,000 aircraft of all types in the South East Asia Theatre and by the end of the 
year this figure increased to 1,500.193 The Japanese had approximately 410 aircraft according 
to intelligence estimates and this included all types from front line fighters to those relegated 
to training roles.194 The Allies were forced to expend a disproportionate effort to neutralise 
what was effectively a smaller force, but one which was still capable of inflicting losses on 
transport aircraft and the resources committed to them were needed elsewhere in the ground 
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attack role such was the nature of the advance over land and its dependence on air 
support.195  
 The disappointing consequences of disproportionate numbers of Allied aircraft being 
used to neutralize Japanese air strength became very apparent at the beginning of November. 
Intelligence noted that approximately 60 Japanese aircraft were based at the Rangoon series 
of airfields and it was decided to attack them at the same time as U.S. Liberators and 
Superfortresses raided docks and railway installations. On 3rd November Operation 
ERUPTION involved 21 459th F.S. Lightnings, 33 A.C.G. Thunderbolts and 24 R.A.F. 
Thunderbolts which attacked the airfields at Hmawbi, Mingaladon, Zayatkwin, and Heho. 
Despite the numbers involved the results were disappointing: at Hmawbi only a few aircraft 
were seen on the ground; cloud cover obscured Mingaladon; nothing was seen at Zayatkwin; 
and only a few aircraft were seen at Heho. Total claims by Allied pilots were one aircraft 
destroyed, four damaged and one probably destroyed. The following day a mixed force of 83 
R.A.F. and U.S. Thunderbolts and Lightnings escorted bombers to Rangoon where similar 
disproportionate results were recorded; in air-to-air combat the escort fighters claimed four 
aircraft destroyed and six damaged, whilst in an attack on Zayatkwin and Hmawbi only two 
aircraft were claimed as destroyed, both in air combat over the airfields.     
 Despite the claims, the Japanese ability to disrupt Allied transport activities 
continued. During the morning of 8th November, 24 Oscars attacked British artillery 
positions at Kalemyo and whilst there engaged a formation of Dakotas, whilst in the 
afternoon 25 Oscars returned to the same area and engaged Allied transports. On both 
occasions Spitfires were scrambled to intercept the Japanese aircraft and on both occasions 
failed to find them.196 During the day Allied transport losses amounted to between five and 
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nine aircraft leaving the air command little option but to provide escorts to subsequent 
transport sorties which 152 Squadron provided on 9th November.197  
The counter-air offensive continued during November on six days but on no occasion 
did Allied pilots claim more than two enemy aircraft destroyed, and according to Japanese 
sources there was only one success.198 The numbers claimed during these raids did little to 
significantly reduce Japanese air strength which was proving elusive in comparison with the 
intensive counter-air period at the beginning of 1944. For example on 15th November the 
Lightnings of 459th F.S. raided Heho airfield and failed to find any aircraft present. This 
trend was to continue in December. Counter-air operations only took place on four days and 
once again Japanese aircraft were hard to find; only four Japanese aircraft were claimed as 
destroyed overall and only one of these is confirmed by their records.199 While such raids 
were keeping pressure on the Japanese to disperse and conserve their aircraft in Burma, and 
causing by the end of December 1944 their aircraft numbers in the South East Asia area to 
fall, this was not the only reason for such a decline. 
 Allied intelligence started to record a reduction in Japanese aircraft numbers caused 
by the escalation of the war in the South West Pacific area. While a full appreciation of the 
effect the Pacific war had on the Far East will be discussed in Chapter Four it is useful to 
record how Japanese numbers gradually decreased in the S.E.A.C. area.  
 Based on intelligence estimates: 
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200 
As always care should be taken with the intelligence assessments of Japanese air strength as 
it is clear from their contents that there were continual reassessments of numbers owing to 
ongoing intelligence reports. However such a large readjustment had never been witnessed 
previously and intelligence was clearly pointing to transfers to other Japanese theatres of 
action. In an intelligence report summarising the last six months of 1944 the analysts pointed 
out that figures in Burma had remained “remarkably static” and they surmised that the 
Japanese could replace losses from rear areas and had not been called upon to transfer any 
aircraft away from the theatre.201 However the same report showed a reduction in fighter 
aircraft in Sumatra and Malaya from 263 in November to approximately 100 in December. 
Although the report concluded that the aircraft in Malaya and Sumatra were “never an actual 
threat on the Burma front” it suggested that aircraft transfers to Burma from these countries 
could have been undertaken if circumstances had dictated.202 Therefore if aircraft were 
removed from Malaya and Sumatra it presented a situation in which potential reserves for 
the Burma front were no longer available. The Burma area was split by A.C.S.E.A. into 
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forward/central and South Burma (Rangoon) but numbers should be regarded as fluid from 
week to week owing to the Japanese ability to move aircraft around the country within a few 
hours.  
Japanese aircraft in Malaya and Sumatra were ignored by the U.S.S.B.S., and were 
often dismissed in Allied documents as not being in a position to affect operations in Burma, 
but this is an error.203 As with most aircraft in the theatre, it was possible to transfer them 
within a few days via staging posts to most areas in Burma to disrupt Allied land and air 
operations. Furthermore whilst those aircraft were guarding important oil fields they 
provided a threat to any proposed Allied invasion of Malaya.  
Allied intelligence officers had been reporting on the migration since November: 
  It is very possible that with the Allied advance into the Philippines and  
  the destruction of so many Japanese aircraft both here and in Formosa  
  and the Rykus, the Japanese may have been obliged to withdraw some  
  aircraft from the Sumatra/Malaya area to bolster up their defences.204 
 
Similar weekly reports continued into December where on 10th the report stated: 
  It is believed that several aircraft, particularly fighters, have been   
  withdrawn from the Sumatra/Malaya area to assist the 4th Air Army in  
  the Philippines and Netherlands East Indies.205  
 
All the reports had only mentioned aircraft drawn from Malaya and Sumatra but this was to 
change. In the 24th December report it was stated that: 
  There is now good reason to believe that the fighter strength in   
  Burma/Siam has also suffered and now amounts to no more than   
  75 aircraft. These have recently been divided between Rangoon and  
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  Central Burma, but latest intelligence indicates that they are now all  
  concentrated in the Rangoon area.206 
 
Various intelligence sources from Y Service wireless intercepts to interpretations of 
Japanese coded messages were used to form a picture of the J.A.A.F.’s movements. On 19th 
November the reduction of 55 aircraft in the Malaya and Sumatra area was noted and 
attributed to the transfer of two units to the Philippines and Borneo.207 On 3rd December 
Japanese air strength in Malaya and Sumatra reduced by 45 aircraft as the 26th Hikosentai 
and part of the 21st Hikosentai had moved to the Philippines.208 These reports also made use 
of intelligence gathered from U.S. sources to track the movement of Japanese units as seen 
on 17th December: 
  The only change in the Burma Sumatra zone is that 204 Hikosentai (30  
  fighters) has been well identified in the Philippines and has, therefore,  
  transferred accordingly. Backdated information recently available   
  shows that both this unit and another Army unit (shown by Air   
  Ministry as having moved some weeks ago from Sumatra to the   
  Philippines) were in fact ordered to transfer as early as October 6th – ie  
  before any landings on the Philippines and even before the preceding  
  air strikes on Formosa.209 
 
There was thus clearly a transfer of aircraft away from the South East Asia area towards the 
Pacific and this would have a fundamental effect on Japanese air assets in Burma. Whilst 
such aircraft moved there was a reduction in likely reserves and whilst losses were mounting 
in all theatres it was unlikely that replacement aircraft would be available for transfer to 
Burma, which in turn placed an onus on Japanese air chiefs to conserve aircraft and not use 
them wastefully. The rate of loss of Japanese aircraft being transported from one area to 
another has been covered earlier in this chapter as an effect of poor pilots who had not been 
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sufficiently trained for their task. Intelligence analysis of Japanese aircrew returns had 
shown in July 1944 nearly 50% of pilot personnel in Burma and China were formed from 
category C crews, which were defined as unfit for operations.210 This meant front-line 
squadrons were engaged in operations whilst at the same time training new pilots. This 
problem of inexperience continued in 1945 as, for example, on 24th April four new Ki-84 
Frank aircraft of the 50th Sentai were forced to crash-land as a result of navigational errors 
which “given the shortage of aircraft remaining to the J.A.A.F., was something of a 
disaster.”211   
 Despite the reduction in Japanese aircraft numbers in the theatre, for the first few 
months of 1945 the J.A.A.F. in Burma were still fighting and inflicting damage on Allied 
resources. At the beginning of January 1945 intelligence estimates of aircraft stationed in 
Burma amounted to 75 fighters and 20 reconnaissance aircraft, and during the month the 
fighters were used in a series of attacks against Allied positions.212 The successful Allied 
landings on Akyab Island in late December 1944 together with the rapid advance in the 
Shwebo area had precipitated Japanese attacks which were larger than at any time since June 
1944 and relatively free from interception. As the Allies’ advance had been so rapid, 221 
Group’s fighters were still based on the Imphal airfields, which meant the squadrons were 
150 miles from the Army’s front line. Eventually the fighters were able to move forward to 
advanced landings grounds but until that happened in January 1945, Japanese fighters, 
“appeared in greater numbers than had been seen since June-July 1944 strafing almost with 
impunity”.213 On five occasions during January formations of between 18 and 35 Japanese 
bombers and fighters attacked Allied positions in strafing and bombing operations. Together 
with the threat posed to ground troops the raids posed problems for the transport supply 
aircraft. For example, on 12th January 17 Oscars attacked a forward landing strip where they 
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encountered a formation of Dakotas; two Dakotas were destroyed on the air and a further 
two on the ground. As fighters were unable to assist in defence, the counter-air campaign 
continued and Japanese airfields in the Meiktila and Zayatkwin areas were attacked on five 
occasions during the month by R.A.F. and U.S. aircraft. During the attacks Allied pilots 
claimed nine Japanese aircraft destroyed and surviving Japanese records show that two of 
their aircraft were confirmed as lost.214 
 According to intelligence estimates at the end of January, Japanese aircraft numbers 
in Burma had reduced to 51 aircraft of which 35 were fighters, eight reconnaissance and 
eight light bombers of which only two reconnaissance and the light bombers were in the 
forward and central Burma area.215 The 51 aircraft compares to a total of 95 (75 fighters and 
20 reconnaissance) at the beginning of January a reduction of 44 aircraft, of which 24 were 
fighters, over the month.216 Total Allied counter–air claims did not match the figure of 44 so 
the reduction in Burma based aircraft was due to some other already noted factors. There 
was some attrition caused by defensive and offensive sorties but Allied air power was 
forcing Japanese squadrons to withdraw to Rangoon airfields in the South and only to bring 
aircraft forward to their central and forward bases for specific operations. Once the missions 
were completed the Japanese aircraft returned to their Rangoon bases to avoid being caught 
by Allied fighter-bombers.217 Furthermore, Japanese aircraft also transferred to airfields in 
Siam and French-Indo-China which were considered out of range of Allied aircraft.218 The 
following graphs show that as aircraft numbers started to fall in Burma at the end of January 
1945, a corresponding increase appears in Siam and French-Indo-China.  
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It should be remembered that as the Fourteenth Army continued its rapid advance Eastwards, 
Japanese forward airstrips were captured forcing the Japanese to withdraw from the front 
line and fly from distant airfields.219    
 From the beginning of February 1945 Japanese air power in the South Sea Asia 
Theatre, particularly in Burma, continued to decline. The Japanese aircraft industry, 
airframes and engine, was beginning to suffer from falling production and the output from its 
factories were allocated to priority areas such as the Pacific and the defence of the Japanese 
homeland; this aspect will be analysed in Chapter Four. The Allied counter-air offensive in 
Burma, as A.C.M. Sir Keith Park wrote, “aggravated” the losses caused by the transfer of 
Japanese units away from the area.220 Allied intelligence officers estimated no Japanese 
aircraft were based in the forward or central areas of Burma, around the Rangoon series of 
airfields, or in Siam or French-Indo-China. Japanese aircraft were brought forward from 
these airfields for specific operations which eventually declined in both frequency and the 
number of fighters and bomber sorties flown. In February the Japanese attacked Allied 
positions on five occasions, using between 13 and 24 aircraft, in March on two occasions 
using three and 14 aircraft and in April four occasions using between 10 and 15 aircraft.221 
This activity was on a small scale and was unlikely to affect the Allied advance, but it 
caused the Allies a disproportionate effort to provide escort patrols or defensive flights to 
counter the attacks.222 The counter-air attacks continued with mixed results but did not 
achieve the level of destruction witnessed during the early part of 1944. It was difficult to 
find Japanese aircraft on the airfields as there were so few dispersed around so many 
locations and the problem was exacerbated by Japanese orders. Faced with the prospect of 
meeting large formations of superior Allied fighters, the Japanese 5th Army Headquarters 
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issued instructions on 1st March 1945 that their aircraft should only engage single Allied 
aircraft so as not to risk the loss of their precious fighters.223 In March the Allied 
determination to counter the remaining Japanese air threat increased. On 8th March Heho, 
Mingaladon and Hmawbi were attacked and three aircraft were claimed destroyed and 
hangars were strafed, whilst on 18th March the 2nd A.C.G. attacked Mingaladon, Hmawbi 
and Hlegu where three were claimed destroyed. However some visits to Japanese airfields 
resulted in no Japanese aircraft being found, for example, on 26th March when U.S. aircraft 
raided Hmawbi and Mingaladon finding no targets.224 This was the result of the Japanese 
policy of conservation and dispersal, but whilst Japanese targets were almost impossible to 
locate in Burma they were not so in Siam where the Japanese had moved their aircraft to 
save them from Allied attack. 
 Intelligence officers were aware that aircraft from Siam were brought forward to 
Burma for periodic attacks and had been watching airfield activity there with daily 
photographic reconnaissance sorties over Japanese airfields. On 4th March photographic 
reconnaissance and reports from the Thai underground revealed over 50 Japanese aircraft on 
Don Muang airfield, 12 miles North of Bangkok.225 Even though this location was 780 miles 
away from the nearest Allied airfield at Cox’s Bazaar, plans were formulated to send 40 
Mustangs from the 2nd A.C.G. with long-range fuel tanks to attack the airfield. Carefully 
flying to conserve fuel the A.C.G. attacked the airfield on 15th March and although they only 
planned to strafe on one pass, conditions were so favourable that some Mustangs made two. 
Using available sources the U.S. pilots claimed between 17 to 20 Japanese aircraft 
destroyed, 4 probably destroyed and between 6 to18 damaged. On 16th March a Mosquito 
flew over the airfield on a photographic reconnaissance sortie and the crew reported seeing 
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11 damaged or burnt out aircraft.226 There are no available Japanese records to confirm the 
losses but even if a third of them had been destroyed it represented a serious blow to 
Japanese air strength as it was considered that Japan “was not in a position to replace fully or 
quickly their losses in the S.E.A.C. Theatre.”227  
This raid did more than aggravate the reduction in Japanese air power as it had been 
conducted by single-engine fighters at a vast range which surprised the Japanese who 
thought their aircraft were safe in Siam from Allied attack. Furthermore, it reinforced the 
view that Japanese aircraft were not safe from Allied attack wherever they were based, for 
those in Sumatra and Malaya had been targeted by Fleet Air Arm aircraft. On 24th January an 
attack on the oil fields and facilities near to Palembang included an attack on the airfield, 
where claims of 13 destroyed, four probably destroyed and 10 damaged were, “remarkably 
close to the figures of aircraft apparently submitted by the J.A.A.F. as shot down”.228 While 
the exact scale of the losses is in doubt, it is clear that the Japanese would find it hard to 
replace aircraft and pilots at this crucial time. Such attacks by F.A.A. aircraft would continue 
intermittently through the remaining months of 1945 serving the dual purpose of reducing 
Japanese air strength, and preventing aircraft being sent from the Sumatra/Malaya airfields 
to Burma or the Philippines. 
 April 1945 saw the virtual end of Japanese air operations in Burma. The Japanese 
attacked Allied positions on four occasions during the month using formations of 10 to 15 
fighters with the last of these raids taking place on 29th April. This date was significant as it 
marked the last aerial combat over Burma and the last time the Fourteenth Army was 
attacked by Japanese aircraft.229 Allied attacks against Japanese airfields continued and can 
be regarded as mopping up operations. On 1st April the 2nd A.C.G. visited Mingaladon and 
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Hmawbi where no aircraft were claimed, but airfield facilities were destroyed to prevent 
their use as staging posts. On 2nd April 2nd A.C.G. raided Nakhon Sawan where they left a 
twin engined aircraft in flames and on 9th April revisited Don Muang and another airfield at 
Nakhon Pathan, the pilots submitting claims of 21 single engined and nine twin-engined 
aircraft destroyed.230 There are no Japanese reports to confirm these claims but at a time of 
severe shortage any losses added to Japanese difficulties in the theatre. However April saw 
the last of Japanese aircraft involvement in Burma and with it the end of the Allies to 
conduct a counter-air offensive.  
 In the week ending 22nd April there were no Japanese aircraft left in Burma and 
whilst a warning was given that this did not preclude the risk of air attack, a report 
emphasized that Japanese air strength was stationed in Siam, French-Indo-China, Malaya or 
Sumatra.231 The exodus of Japanese Sentais was now complete with even long established 
units such as the 64th and 50th leaving the country.232 Furthermore, the withdrawal did not 
solely involve flying units as intercepts of Japanese code messages reported a migration of 
Japanese headquarter units. In May a unit responsible for Japanese navigational aids in 
Burma had moved from Mingaladon to Lopburi in Siam, whereas during the same month the 
5th Flying Division, which was the senior command in Burma, moved its headquarters to 
Phnom Penh in Indo-China.233 The withdrawal of the 5th Flying Division left the 4th in sole 
command, but it was reported in June that this command unit had itself withdrawn to Siam to 
direct the few remaining operations against the Allies.  
Although there were occasional sightings of Japanese aircraft over the Burma 
battlefields, the small number of Japanese aircraft aided by monsoon conditions meant in 
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May 1945 that Allied air supremacy had been achieved. This meant ground forces could 
operate without disruption from the air, freed defensive fighters for ground support 
operations and gave transport aircraft the chance to operate safely. As a result some Spitfire 
squadrons were converted to the ground attack role by carrying bombs while in June 
transport aircraft flew without any fighter escorts.234 
The period between June 1944 and June 1945 had witnessed an initial increase of 
Japanese air power in the S.E.A.C. area followed by a steady decline which ended in late 
April 1945.235 While there were Japanese aircraft stationed in Siam, French-Indo-China, 
Malaya and Sumatra from May to August 1945, shortages of fuel, spares and aircrew 
prevented serious operations. The neutralisation of Japanese air power in the S.E.A.C area in 
this period had been achieved by a combination of aircraft transfers to the Pacific region and 
offensive action in the S.E.A.C. Theatre. 
 In conclusion, although the Japanese air strength during the period 1944-1945 was 
not likely to seriously affect Allied operations, its continued presence with occasional 
nuisance raids on troops and transport aircraft provided the Allies with a series of 
difficulties. The counter-air offensive played its part in reducing Japanese air power by 
destroying aircraft and creating circumstances which forced the Japanese to disperse aircraft 
away from airfields liable for attack.  
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Air Intelligence and the Counter-Air Offensive 
 Allied airfield attacks benefited from intelligence sources to identify where Japanese 
units were based. This section will describe the role intelligence played with specific relation 
to the counter-air offensive and will identify which methods of information gathering were 
available and which proved the most beneficial. 
 The Allies employed various methods to gather intelligence for the prosecution of 
their air operations: human intelligence from agents and prisoners of war; captured 
documents; aircraft identification plates; photographic reconnaissance; and signal 
intelligence. Some of these sources relied on deciphering Japanese codes particularly signal 
intelligence, which proved to be a crucial element in identifying Japanese airfields and units 
for the counter-air offensive. The activities of the code breaking organisations was kept 
secret until 1974 when Winterbotham wrote The Ultra Secret which detailed the work played 
by the staff of Bletchley Park in breaking German and Japanese Army and Navy codes.236 
The publication of this book lifted the veil of secrecy on the work of code breakers and a 
series of books have subsequently been published chronicling development of message 
interception and code breaking; authors such as Elphick, Smith, Erskine and Stripp have all 
produced informative works.237 Whilst this section will not detail the history of Far East 
code breaking, it is clear from these works that Japanese codes started to be broken in the 
1930s by British, American and Australian scientists, mathematicians and linguists so that 
by 1941 many Japanese military and diplomatic messages could be intercepted, decoded and 
read by the Allies.  
 Each piece of collected information was potentially useful. Crashed aircraft could 
provide experts with information on the vulnerability of certain types, their armament and 
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performance, whilst the aircraft identification plate could provide clues on aircraft 
production. Captured documents were prized as they would provide analysts not only with 
information contained therein, but also with corroboration that codes had been correctly 
deciphered or that intelligence assessments had been successful.  
Prisoner of war interrogations could provide a cross section of information about 
which individuals and units had been stationed at bases and about aircraft types and details 
about the airfield layout. When linked with other intelligence sources, such as photographic 
reconnaissance, an accurate picture could be made of an airfield’s layout which could be 
passed to attacking units so as to enable them to approach from particular directions to avoid 
anti-aircraft fire. In fact regular Japanese airfield reports were published using these and 
other intelligence sources which gave their layout in detail.238 Two typical Japanese prisoner 
interrogation reports from August 1944 provide great detail of all the airfields they were 
based at, together with unit numbers, aircraft and individual’s names.239 However dates of 
the prisoners’ postings were anything from three months to a couple of years old by the time 
they were interrogated which provided some information but were not immediate enough for 
an airfield attack.  
 Despite the importance of these areas of intelligence, clearly not all of it was useful 
for informing a counter-air offensive as this required timely information. It is important, 
therefore, to make a distinction between the less immediate pieces of intelligence, which 
nonetheless had a role to play, and that which could be used to organize effective strikes. 
 Keightley wrote of the necessity for timeliness of intelligence in air operations saying 
of tactical air intelligence: 
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  Accurate, timely and relevant intelligence forms the base for sound  
  planning and is essential to the conduct of air operations.240  
and:  
  [O]f an immediate nature and is directly concerned with the operation  
  of aircraft, the capabilities and immediate intention of the adversary  
  and the current environmental conditions.241 
 
To maximize the destructive effect of attacking airfields, it was essential to catch as many 
Japanese aircraft on the ground as possible at the time of attack. The more immediate the 
information the better the plan of attack, and in a pre-satellite age the three methods were 
human intelligence, photographic reconnaissance and signal intelligence.  
 Timely intelligence from human sources was the least reliable factor. Clandestine 
groups, such as Force 136, were considered to be purely operational groups dealing with 
sabotage until November 1944, and its “collection of intelligence was more of an incidental 
nature.”242 Furthermore the R.A.F.’s 224 Group did not act on Force 136’s intelligence until 
mid-March 1945 for airstrikes on tactical targets such as troop concentrations.243 Although 
there does not appear to be specific records for operations in Burma relating to Japanese 
airfields, between 1943 and 1945 Force 136 were inserted in Malaya on 12 operations, all 
bar one submitting airfield information, but there were no airfield strikes mounted on the 
strength of the intelligence.244 
 A more reliable source was photographic reconnaissance (P.R.) which had to be built 
from scratch in 1942 terms of experience, material and aircraft. Owing to the comparative 
lack of ground intelligence in the theatre the P.R. unit’s work assumed great importance and 
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“provided an indispensable factor in the maintenance of Allied air superiority.”245 Regular 
reconnaissance flights were flown over enemy airfields which provided information on 
aircraft numbers, and the imminence of Japanese air attacks.246 For example, in 1943 the 
Bengal Command reported: 
[S]pecial attention was paid to MEIKTILA aerodrome and its satellite 
KANGUANG, where P.R.U. cover has revealed a continued concentration of 
JAPANESE Fighter aircraft. MEIKTILA was raided on two occasions (5 
sorties) and KANGUANG also on 2 occasions (15 sorties).247  
Similarly at the beginning of 1944 airfields came in for a “large share of the P.R. Squadrons’ 
attention... due to the necessity of neutralising enemy air efforts against our ground forces”, 
and during January 80 airfields were covered in one day.248 Furthermore in March 1945 it 
was P.R. Mosquitos from 684 Squadron which located a number of Japanese aircraft on Don 
Muang airfield in Siam, thus precipitating the long-range attack by Mustangs from the 2nd 
A.C.G.249  
 Whilst P.R. intelligence was important it had various drawbacks. Flights were limited 
by aircraft range and enemy opposition and were only possible when weather allowed. A 
review of the squadrons’ record books shows visibility difficulties; for example, “The 
weather in operational area was cloudy with poor visibility.”250 The intelligence was limited 
to what could be seen and interpreted and often could not provide all the details required.251 
However these drawbacks were balanced by signals intelligence. 
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 Signals intelligence started with the Y-Service whose operatives listened to Japanese 
wireless transmissions and passed them to code-breakers who interpreted the messages.252 
A.C.M. Pierse wrote of their work in the early part of 1944: 
In this task the “Y” Service was employed to its full extent and proved of 
great value, eighty-one aircraft being destroyed in seven weeks as a result of 
briefing information passed from this source.253  
 
Similarly A.V.M. Thomas Williams wrote of the American long-range fighter attacks: 
Owing to the unavoidable delay between P.R.U. cover and the receipt of first 
phase interpretation reports... most of their attacks have been based on 
information passed from W.O.U. “Y” Units and I would here like to pay 
tribute to the work done and accuracy achieved by these Units.254 
The signals were intercepted by wireless units who passed them onto analysts and Stripp 
writes of the Japanese using 21 codes and six ciphers, not all of which were broken by the 
Allies.255 However one J.A.A.F. three-digit code which was read until December 1944 and 
given the codeword BULBUL provided, for example, information on unit location and 
Japanese aircraft ferrying information.256  
 Unfortunately, examples of the information decoded in early 1944 do not appear to 
be available and it is likely that it was destroyed either at the time or after the war. However 
an idea of the intelligence gathered can be seen in entries in the 358 Wireless Unit’s 
Operations Record Book from late 1944 onwards. On 4th October they demonstrated how the 
information was used for airfield attack: 
In the morning an enemy aircraft of the 81st was airborne. Meiktila asked 
Shwebo where the aircraft was going, and was informed that Heho was its 
destination. Group were informed... and despatched Mosquitoes [sic] to attack 
                                                          
252 A useful account of the British Y-Service and associated units can be found in Smith, Spies of the Airwaves. 
253 TNA, Air 23/1921, Despatch on Air Operations, S.E.A.C., 16th November 1943 to 31st May 1944,  p.13. 
254 TNA, Air 23/4681 Despatch covering operations of Bengal Command 15th November 1943 to 17th 
December 1943 and 3rd Tactical Air Force 18th December 1943 to 1st June 1944, p.20. 
255 Stripp, Code Breaker in the Far East, p.79. 
256 Ibid, p.76. 
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the aircraft on the ‘drome. Unfortunately the Mosquitoes were unable to reach 
Heho owing to adverse weather.257  
However two days later: 
On the strength of information supplied by this unit, a sortie was arranged, 
with the result that one Dinah just taking off from Heho ’drome was 
destroyed by a Mosquito.258 
Furthermore, aircraft were tracked: 
The presence of this aircraft in Heho was confirmed later today by a...  
message in which Heho indicated that the aircraft would leave for 
Mingaladon at 0630hrs BST.259 
Examination of other units’ record books for this period reveal similar information of aircraft 
movements and unit transfers which was of particular importance in 1945 in showing the 
decline of Japanese units in the theatre. For example for 7th July 1945, “From complete 
absence of 64th F.R. (fighter) activity in Siam and F.I.C. since 30th June it would appear that 
this unit has withdrawn.”260  
 The intelligence reports from photographic and signal sources provided interdiction 
squadrons tasked with counter-air operations with relevant and timely information. As Cox 
says “the most valuable sources during the war were... signals intelligence, or SIGINT, and 
photographic reconnaissance, or PR.”261 Although its mechanism is not recorded, the work 
of the intelligence organisation in analysing all these forms of intelligence whether 
photographic, signal or others must be acknowledged as this information provided forces in 
the theatre with valuable knowledge of their enemy. In a campaign where resources were 
limited and in demand, such information was vital for avoiding unnecessary waste whilst, at 
the same time, ensuring interdiction sorties had the maximum impact.   
                                                          
257 TNA, Air 29/163B, 358 W.U. Operations Record Book, 4th October 1944. 
258 Ibid. 
259 Ibid.  
260 TNA, Air 29/163A, 368 W.U. Operations Record Book, 7th July 1945. 
261 Cox, Sebastian, ‘The Organisation and Sources of R.A.F. Intelligence,’ Paper presented to the Air 
Intelligence Symposium , Royal Air Force History Society, Bracknell, 22nd March 1996.  
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Conclusion 
 The counter-air campaign played an integral part in the Allies gaining air superiority 
in Burma in conjunction with the other factors of early warning, aircraft, aircrew and tactics. 
However, like these elements the counter-air campaign faced various difficulties in the level 
of efficiency required for destroying Japanese air assets. 
 Air power doctrine had drawn upon the experience of the First World War and the 
subsequent debates of the inter-war period to show how crucial a well executed counter-air 
offensive could be. The Germans demonstrated this in the Low Countries and the Soviet 
Union by using their superiority in aircraft quality or quantity to overwhelm poorer equipped 
forces in pre-emptive and sustained attacks. However they failed in the Battle of Britain 
owing to range deficiencies with their aircraft and unsustainable attrition rates. The Japanese 
took advantage of Allied weaknesses in 1941 and early 1942 with their superior aircraft 
types and numbers to achieve air superiority in a manner every bit as dominant as the 
Germans in the Low Countries and Soviet Union. The Germans and Japanese shared both 
quantity and quality of aircraft and aircrew in their successful attacks, which the Allies, 
initially, did not possess. 
 The R.A.F. was aware of the benefits of a counter-air offensive, but their attempts in 
late 1941 and early 1942 to stem the Japanese attacks in this manner were handicapped by 
the small number of unsuitable aircraft at its disposal which were no match for Japanese 
aircraft. Whilst the attempts were undeniably gallant, they did not slow Japanese progress 
through Malaya into Burma.  
 From October 1942 until January 1944 the lack of suitable aircraft in sufficient 
numbers hindered the Allied counter-air campaign. Craven and Cate wrote that by the end of 
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1943 the airfield interdiction had not succeeded and this is a correct appraisal.262 Japanese 
air strength hardly reduced as a result of the airfield attacks and this can be attributed to the 
lack of suitable long-range fighters. Bomber attacks by day or night were relatively easy to 
defend against, and often aircraft on airfields had been dispersed before attacks commenced. 
While these attacks may have destroyed ancillary equipment and disrupted airfield life, they 
did not reduce air strength as Japanese records make clear. At best, the bomber attacks 
forced Japanese units to disperse to temporary locations or to airfields in rear areas, before 
being brought forward again for specific operations. However the dispersal was likely to 
raise the risk of flying accidents, particularly in such a difficult environment, as well as 
waste fuel and increase airframe wear and tear. In addition the aircraft that were suitable for 
prosecuting a counter-air offensive at that time, notably the Mohawk and Beaufighter, were 
in short supply and had a number of other roles to fulfil. This was demonstrated during the 
First Arakan campaign in 1942/1943 when the counter-air offensive reduced in intensity 
owing to aircraft flying sorties in support of the Army. Clearly until the Allies obtained long-
range fighters in sufficient numbers their counter-air campaign would not be fully effective. 
 The inability to equip India with long-range fighters was due to a lack of suitable 
British aircraft whilst American priorities were in other theatres. The R.A.F. did not have a 
long-range fighter of the Lightning or Mustang variety even though one had been requested 
from the Air Ministry.263 The Spitfire whilst an excellent defensive fighter had a relatively 
short range, whilst the Beaufighter, had a long-range and heavy armament, but lacked the 
manoeuvrability of a single seat fighter. American P-40s were largely based in the North 
East of India engaged on operations against the Japanese in China, but these aircraft did not 
represent an advance over their Japanese adversaries and the Americans’ priority for their 
Lightnings and Mustangs lay in Europe, North Africa and Italy rather than the Far East. 
                                                          
262 Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II ,Volume Four, p.492. 
263 Chapter Two, p.184. 
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Without the introduction of the long-range, multi-role fighter in numbers, the counter-air 
campaign would continue to only play a minor disruptive role. 
 The introduction of new Allied aircraft at the end of 1943 changed the counter-air 
campaign at the right time. Whilst the Spitfire improved defensive operations, the American 
Lightning and Mustang tipped the balance in the counter-air offensive in favour of the 
Allies. During the first battles and sieges of 1944, protection of vulnerable transport and 
close support aircraft could not be guaranteed by defensive fighters especially when the early 
warning system could not provide sufficient cover. Later working with the aid of relevant 
and timely intelligence gathered from the Y-Service and photographic reconnaissance, long-
range fighters were able to attack Japanese units at their airfields and over their own 
territory. Damage and destruction of enemy aircraft and property was caused, and the 
Japanese were forced to disperse to avoid attack. The value of high performance, long-range 
fighters which carried large weapon payloads and a clear superiority over their opponents at 
great range cannot be over-stated, and it is no wonder that Pierse had preferred receiving 
Mustangs to Spitfires in his command.264 Thus for the first time in the Far East the Allies 
had sufficient and relevant aircraft to prosecute a counter-air campaign but the results should 
be viewed with caution.    
 The A.H.B. authors wrote that the counter-air campaign of March to June 1944 broke 
the back of Japanese air power in Burma but it is clear from Japanese records that not as 
many aircraft claimed as destroyed were actually lost.265 Over claiming by Allied pilots was 
understandable on low-level high speed passes, as was two pilots claiming the same 
destroyed aircraft and intelligence officers counting it for two. Allied intelligence estimates 
never reflected severe losses even given the time delays of accrued information, and the 
Japanese were able to mount fighter sweeps throughout the period which often exceeded 40 
                                                          
264 TNA, Air 23/2153, Minutes to S.A.C.S.E.A. 1943-1944. 
265 TNA, Air 41/64, The Campaigns in the Far East Volume IV: South East Asia November 1943 to August 
1945, p.71. 
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aircraft. Furthermore, Allied intelligence reported replacements for lost aircraft were 
available from other areas of the theatre as at a time Japanese industry was reaching its peak 
production figures.     
 Despite this the counter-air campaign between March and June 1944 was important 
in reducing Japanese air operations. The minimum figure of 60 Japanese aircraft destroyed 
on counter-air operations was over two times higher than that destroyed in air-to-air combat, 
and the figure does not take into account those aircraft that were damaged. Damaged aircraft 
needed repair which put an additional strain on maintenance units and the supply of spare 
parts, neither of which the Japanese were efficient at mobilising. Long-range fighters created 
an additional problem when the Japanese dispersed their aircraft, as Allied fighters were 
harder to defend against than their slower bombers, and so the Japanese were forced to move 
units to wider locations.  
 From October 1944 until the end of Japanese air operations in May 1945 the counter-
air offensive continued but it did not have the same destructive results as obtained in the first 
months of 1944. Japanese air strength steadily reduced mainly through large scale transfers 
to other theatres of war and with those units left facing the prospect of receiving no 
replacements or spare parts, aircraft conservation became the dominant policy. Although 
Allied fighters continued counter-air sorties aided by the intelligence organisation, Japanese 
units were harder to locate as they had fewer aircraft dispersed around many airfields, 
though these started to diminish in number as the Fourteenth Army advanced Eastwards. 
However, the ability to maintain pressure on the J.A.A.F. throughout this period was crucial. 
The ground forces were heavily dependent on air transport for their supplies during the 
advance but defensive fighters were based up to 150 miles away from the front lines leaving 
transport aircraft vulnerable to attack. By maintaining constant pressure on the J.A.A.F. by 
interdiction patrols and airfield strikes, the Allies forced the Japanese to withdraw further 
279 
away, but even then they were not safe. If proof were required of the benefit of a long-range 
fighter it was demonstrated in the attacks on Don Muang in March 1945 which involved a 
round-trip of over 1500 miles and which proved the Japanese were not safe, even in remote 
locations. 
 The counter-air offensive in the Far East had positively contributed to the air 
superiority campaign’s success. The Japanese were forced to disperse valuable aircraft 
around a country where flying conditions were harsh and flying accidents common to both 
sides. During the first months of 1944 in the absence of defensive certainty, airfield 
interdiction attacks carried out by superior aircraft reduced Japanese air assets during a 
crucial period and in the last phase from October 1944 counter-air operations continued to 
put pressure on diminishing Japanese numbers and their support organisations.  
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Chapter Four – Japan’s War, Industry and Strategy 
 An air superiority campaign in any theatre of war can be divided into three elements. 
Firstly there are the events which occur in the theatre which involves attrition inflicted on 
aircrew and aircraft in air-to-air and ground-to-air operations, and this element and its 
constituent parts have been analysed earlier in this thesis. The second element is the results 
caused by actions in other theatres which have an effect. For the Japanese, fighting in the 
Pacific and in China stretched their resources so that the J.A.A.F. in Burma were seldom 
assisted by the J.N.A.F. and did not receive substantial reinforcements or newer aircraft 
types. This element also encompasses the bombing and blockade campaign against industry 
and supplies as, unlike the Allied campaign against the German aircraft industry in Europe, 
the American bombing campaign against the Japanese aircraft industry did not begin to have 
a serious effect until March 1945 by which time air superiority had been won in Burma. 
Similarly the American blockade of Japanese shipping did not begin to have a damaging 
effect on the Japanese aircraft industry until mid-1944. The third element concerns how the 
participating countries deal with their war. The Japanese had entered the war with limited 
aims of a quick victory followed by a negotiated peace settlement, but as this did not happen, 
they were forced to participate in a longer war. This affected their industrial capacity to 
produce materiel and in particular aircraft of sufficient quality and quantity. The third 
element includes how the country used its forces to their best effect. For example the 
Japanese in the Far East in late 1942 had better aircraft than the Allies but failed to make the 
most of the advantage at a time when the East coast defences of India were relatively weak. 
Furthermore these effects have an important bearing on what priority was given to a theatre. 
Japan’s priority was to prevent the Americans retaking Pacific islands or gaining ground in 
China to deny them the opportunity to establish airfields from which they could fly bombing 
operations against the Japanese mainland. This priority affected the Far East in materiel 
terms as numbers of aircraft and units were denied to the J.A.A.F. leaving them with limited 
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resources which had to be used carefully as it was unsure if and when replacements would be 
forthcoming. 
 This thesis has concentrated on various combat and technical factors in the Far East 
which affected the air superiority campaign. The early warning organisation, a robust 
counter-air offensive and air-to-air combat all played a part in the Allies eventually gaining 
air superiority in Burma during 1944. However, activities in the Burma Theatre itself were 
only part of the story as the Japanese war in other areas, notably the Pacific, and Japanese 
strategy had significant effects on the J.A.A.F.’s performance in the Far East. This chapter 
will bring together the factors and strategies which assisted the Allies in attaining air 
superiority and will analyse the impact each factor played in the campaign. Such an analysis 
will then allow a clearer appreciation of the relative value and impact of all factors in the 
winning of air superiority.  
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Part One - Japan’s War  
 The effect of the war outside Burma cannot be underestimated even though it is over-
looked. For example, in The Forgotten Air Force Probert fails to mention any external 
influences from June 1942 until October 1944 when he refers to Japanese units transferring 
to the Philippines as a result of MacArthur’s campaign.1 However the effects on the Burma 
air war started in 1942. 
 Before the war the nature of the air campaign was set when the Japanese Army and 
Navy agreed to divide their responsibilities. The Navy identified the American bases in the 
Philippines as being the greatest threat, whilst the Army established the oil fields in 
Palembang and Balikpapan in the Indies as principle targets. From 7th December 1941 this 
division continued although, as will be discussed later, the J.A.A.F. was eventually requested 
to assist the Navy when attrition became unsustainable. Following the first months of their 
campaign against Allied bases in Malaya and the Indian Ocean, the J.N.A.F. withdrew to the 
Pacific Theatre and the Japanese Navy were occupied in a series of battles on land and sea 
which would ensure their non-involvement in Burma. During the Battle of the Coral Sea, (4th 
to 8th May 1942), the Japanese lost 77 aircraft, 1,074 dead, one aircraft carrier and two other 
carriers which had to be put into port for repair.2 During the Battle of Midway, (3rd to 6th 
June), the Japanese Navy lost 332 aircraft, four aircraft carriers, and a number of its best 
pilots who went down with the carriers.3 The loss of these airmen was profound: 
These airmen, many veterans of the China Incident and years of training, 
were irreplaceable. Midway marked a turning-point in the fortunes of the 
Pacific War, and the Japanese Navy never again fought from a position of 
strength.4  
Furthermore for seven months from August 1942 the J.N.A.F. were involved in the 
attritional struggle for Guadalcanal whilst simultaneously fighting in the East of New 
                                                          
1 Probert, The Forgotten Air Force, p.242. 
2 Calvocoressi, Wint, and Pritchard, Total War, p.1057. 
3 Ibid, p.1070. 
4 Ibid. 
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Guinea. This involvement would continue through the Solomon Islands, Marshall Islands, 
Saipan, Marianas, into the Philippines and eventually to Iwo Jima and Okinawa in 1945. 
Japan’s priority was to deny the Americans access to any of the defensive ring of islands 
around Japan whose airfields would provide bases from which heavy bombers could strike 
against the Japanese homeland and industry, and the outcome of these actions was to remove 
the threat for the Allies in Burma of any meaningful participation by the J.N.A.F. 
 The J.N.A.F.’s presence in the Pacific and the defence of Japan resulted in the 
J.A.A.F. being the principle agent engaging the Allies in South East Asia, but events 
elsewhere would affect the air force’s involvement. On 18th April 1942 16 U.S. Mitchell 
bombers flew from the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Hornet to attack Tokyo in a morale boosting 
propaganda exercise. The attack caught the Japanese by surprise and although the damage 
caused was not severe, it highlighted the inadequacies of Japanese air defences and for the 
next few months four air units were either transferred to Japan or reformed from training 
units to constitute a defensive capability. For example, the 47th Independent Chutai was 
recalled from Burma in September 1942 to be placed under the command of 17th Air Brigade 
to defend Tokyo.5 The units sent to Japan were not used again until late 1944 despite calls 
from the Japanese Navy for reinforcements to the Solomon Islands and so it is doubtful if 
these units would have been made available for Burma. The J.A.A.F., like their naval 
counterparts, was engaged throughout various operational areas which stretched their 
resources and this had an effect on the Burma Theatre. In December 1942 the 11th Sentai 
transferred from China to New Guinea, and on the way took aircraft from both the Burma 
based 50th and 64th Sentais to bolster their numbers.6 After the Battle of the Philippine Sea in 
June 1944 the J.A.A.F. responded to requests from the Navy for reinforcements by sending 
                                                          
5 Sakaida, Japanese Army Air Force Aces 1937-1945, p.63 and Hata, Izawa and Shores, Japanese Army Air 
Force Fighter Units and their Aces 1931-1945, p.85.  
6 Hata, Izawa and Shores, Japanese Army Air Force Fighter Units and their Aces 1931-1945, p.27. 
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four Sentais from Japan and China between June and August 1944.7 This situation would 
continue as the war progressed with J.A.A.F. units transferring from their bases to reinforce 
hard-pressed areas in addition to their own commitments in, for example, China. The 
following table taken from Allied intelligence assessments shows the combined Army and 
Navy fighter strength in different theatres, noting that there were no Naval fighters in the Far 
East: 
     15/07/44     15/09/44     15/11/44     18/03/45 
Japan/Muriles/Manchuria/Korea        845         1060            1325     1420 
China/Haiman/Formosa/N Indo-China     260           305             459     410 
Burma/Siam/Malaya/Sumatra                             230           275             320     240             
S Indo-China      
 
Philippines/N.E.I./Bismarcks/Micronesia     545           540             595     908   
 
The figures show that the fighter strength in the Far East was clearly lower than other 
theatres and by March 1945 the fighters had moved from Burma into Malaya and Siam. 
These statistics show Japan’s priority lay in the theatres from which the greater danger was 
posed to their homelands and the potential of bombing by U.S. aircraft and raises the 
question of how Burma and the Far East were viewed by the Japanese high command. This 
factor will be analysed later in this chapter.    
The War in Japan        
The campaigns away from Burma ensured that valuable aircraft resources were used 
in areas of greater need, with the J.N.A.F. taking practically no part in the Far East after July 
1942, and the J.A.A.F. suffering from a lack of priority for resources. However, similar 
                                                          
7 Ibid, p.45. The Sentais sent were 17th, 19th, 30th and 31st. 
8 TNA, Air 24/1300, S.E.A.C. Intelligence Branch Appendices, July 1944; Air 24/1303, S.E.A.C. Intelligence 
Branch Appendices, September 1944; Air 24/1308, S.E.A.C. Intelligence Branch Appendices, December 1944 
and Air 24/1312, S.E.A.C. Intelligence Branch Appendices, March 1945.  
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direct effects on Japanese aviation did not occur as a result of the campaign on Japanese 
shipping whilst transporting raw material for the aircraft industry, or American bombing 
operations on Japanese aircraft manufacturing until late 1944 and early 1945, by which time 
air superiority had been won in Burma. 
Attacks on Japanese shipping began with a limited American submarine force which 
gradually expanded into 1944 when it was joined by land-based and carrier-borne aircraft 
and eventually these attacks accounted for 3,000,000 tons of shipping between September 
1943 and the end of 1944, an average loss of 192,000 tons per month.9 Despite the loss of 
valuable imports the Japanese aircraft industry did not appear to be affected as the graph of 
monthly production demonstrates: 
 
10 
 
                                                          
9 TNA, Air 48/183, U.S.S.B.S., The War Against Japanese Transportation 1941-1945, p.2. 
10 TNA, Air 48/69 U.S.S.B.S., Japanese Air Power, using figures on p.222. 
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The Japanese aircraft industry was not put on a wartime footing until early 1943 and as the 
graph shows, production increased monthly until a peak was reached in September 1944 
when 2,572 aircraft of all types were produced. Total aircraft production peaked in the third 
quarter of 1944 with a total of 7,391 aircraft:  
11 
 
Furthermore by the third quarter of 1944 Japanese fighter production exceeded bomber 
production as would be expected whilst the Japanese air services were fighting a defensive 
                                                          
11 TNA, Air 48/69 U.S.S.B.S., Japanese Air Power, using figures on p.222. 
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war throughout the theatres:
12 
The increase in production in 1944 correlated to the level of losses incurred by Japanese air 
services as the Americans moved Westwards towards Japan, but although the figures show 
completed aircraft were leaving the factories, they were not sent in large numbers to 
Burma.13 These figures only represented aircraft leaving the factories not all of which were 
necessarily available to operational units as there was evidence of aircraft losses during 
ferrying to the fronts. U.S.S.B.S. authors estimated that total Japanese ferrying losses 
amounted to 4,000 aircraft during the war as opposed to the total American losses in all 
theatres of 909 aircraft.14 As fuel and resources decreased there was less emphasis on testing 
aircraft before delivery resulting in the ferry flight being the test flight “and a high ferrying 
loss rate was inevitable.”15 Pilot quality obviously had an effect on these losses as training 
decreased, as did the general construction of aircraft which deteriorated as the war 
progressed: 
                                                          
12 TNA, Air 48/104, U.S.S.B.S. Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan’s War Economy, p .24. 
13 See p.283. 
14 TNA, Air 48/69, U.S.S.B.S., Japanese Air Power, using figures on p.30. 
15 Ibid. 
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The two principal weaknesses constantly encountered in the forward areas 
were landing gear and poor brakes. These constructional weaknesses were 
apparently never overcome even in the new aircraft types.16  
The figure of 4,000 aircraft lost in ferry flights amounted to approximately two months’ 
worth of aircraft during industrial output, and when combined with the poor repair and 
maintenance system represented unsustainable waste. 
 The impact of attacking raw material imports for the aircraft industry did not make a 
significant difference until late 1944 and early 1945, and the same can be said of the 
bombing campaign against Japanese industry. Japan’s aircraft industry was concentrated in 
their homeland which was outside the range of American bombers owing to the depth of the 
conquered islands’ defensive perimeter. Once those islands were seized from late 1944 the 
U.S.A.A.F. were able to deploy their long-range B-29 Superfortresses against Japan but at 
first the results were not good, as the crews’ accuracy was poor, the bomb loads light and 
opposition was “serious.”17 However a portent of the future occurred on 25th February 1945 
when explosive bombs were exchanged for incendiaries against Tokyo; 202 Superfortresses 
dropped 454 tons of incendiaries which destroyed nearly 28,000 structures and left 35,000 
people homeless.18 From March 1945 the U.S.A.A.F. changed their bombing tactics from 
high-level, daytime raids dropping explosive ordnance to low-level, night-time incendiary 
raids designed to capitalize on the inflammable nature of Japanese construction; overnight 
on 9th/10th March 1945 279 Superfortresses dropped 1,665 tons of incendiaries onto Tokyo’s 
urban areas from 4,900 to 9,200 feet. The defences and civil defence organisations were 
overwhelmed leaving a fearful aftermath: 
In ten previous attacks since November, Tokyo had sustained fewer than 
1,300 deaths. Then, literally overnight, some 84,000 were killed and 40,000 
injured. More than a quarter-million buildings were destroyed, leaving 1.1 
million people homeless.19  
                                                          
16 Ibid, p.31. 
17 Ibid, p.36. 
18 Tillman, Whirlwind: The Air War Against Japan 1942-1945, p.102. 
19 Ibid, p.153. 
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The tactic of low-level incendiary attack was obviously a success and paved the way for 
subsequent attacks on Japanese towns and main industrial centres from March until the war’s 
end with similar devastating results. The bombing attacks were joined by carrier-borne 
aircraft on transportation, particularly railways, which until February 1945 had not been 
targeted. While these concentrated series of attacks in early 1945 affected Japanese aircraft 
production in conjunction with the campaign against Japanese shipping, it was clearly too 
late to directly influence the air war over Burma and in particular, the crucial first six months 
of 1944. By the middle of 1944 the Allies began to gain air superiority owing to their 
increasing strength and the J.A.A.F.’s attrition rates, in combination with their war in the 
Pacific, which eventually led to Japanese units withdrawing to other areas in late 1944. Even 
though Japanese aircraft production rates grew in September 1944 the priority for Japan’s 
finished aircraft was despatch to the Pacific rather than Burma.   
 The war away from Burma had a clear effect on the numbers of aircraft and units 
available to the Japanese commanders in the Far East. Another factor which affected 
numbers was the inability of Japanese industry to produce sufficient aircraft of comparable 
quantity and quality to the Allies. 
 Pre-war Japan was essentially a poor country which lacked raw materials and 
depended on imports of rare metals, coal, oil and machinery for its industrial use, many of 
the products of its industry being exported and Japan depended on its exports for revenue.20 
Despite this the Japanese aircraft industry in the 1930s was able to produce sufficient aircraft 
of good quality to fight China and the Soviet Union, and in 1939 its aircraft production 
figures exceeded that of the United States by approximately 2,000 aircraft.21 In 1940 Japan 
produced 7,800 aircraft of all types which included the Zero and the Oscar which were both 
to play a leading role in the initial attacks during 1941 and early 1942. Furthermore, during 
                                                          
20 Calvocoressi, Wint, and Pritchard, Total War, p.654. 
21 Overy, The Air War 1939-45, p.21. 
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the initial 1941 attacks the Japanese were able to take advantage of their aircraft strength at 
the time British commitments in Europe and the Middle East required Spitfires and 
Hurricanes, and also American aircraft in the Pacific area which were, with some exceptions, 
largely obsolete. The quantity and quality of both the Japanese aircraft and aircrews in the 
initial attacks on Allied bases during the first few months of the war has been discussed in 
Chapters Two and Three of this thesis and it is not necessary to repeat it again.  
 Japan believed that the United States did not have the willingness to enter a long war 
and would press for a peace settlement at the first opportunity, whilst its conquest of an outer 
ring of islands, “rich in resources” provided a defensive barrier against American attack.22 
However Japan underestimated the United States’ desire for war and its actions over Pearl 
Harbor stirred a sleeping industrial giant whose resources Japan could not match. Overy 
wrote: 
Japan’s war against the Western powers possessed a strong sense of military 
unreality. It was clear that the United States would be able to use its vast 
material superiority to defeat Japan... but defeat came through the fact that 
from the outset Japanese strategy had been a gamble for which resources were 
demonstrably inadequate.23  
This material superiority was able to quickly accelerate American aircraft figures from pre-
war manufacture to full war production as the following graph shows: 
                                                          
22 Ibid, p.87. 
23 Ibid, p.85. 
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24 
(Great Britain figures includes production by Commonwealth Countries) 
 
By the end of 1941 U.S. production started to increase until it reached a peak in 1944 of 
96,318 aircraft of all types, although it must be remembered that these were also destined for 
Europe, the Mediterranean, and service with other countries. The Japanese had not planned 
for, nor anticipated, a long war and thus their aircraft production at first did not alter greatly 
from pre-war levels. However, their losses beginning at the Battle of Midway in 1942 
galvanised the Japanese into expanding the aircraft industry to produce better aircraft in 
greater numbers. Notwithstanding that production in 1943 was three times higher than in 
1941, and five times higher in 1944 it still lagged behind American production sixfold. 
Overy uses aircraft weight as a comparison; the 5,000 Japanese aircraft produced in 1941 
represented 26 per cent of the weight of total American aircraft produced, and the 28,000 
produced in 1944 only 8 per cent.25 Comparison with the Allied aircraft production output, 
and, in particular, the Americans may be unfair as the Japanese could not hope to match or 
                                                          
24 Ibid, graph drawn from figures on p.150. 
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exceed the figures involved. However, Japanese production was hindered by a series of 
difficulties which prevented larger numbers of aircraft leaving the production lines. 
 Authors such as Overy, Tillman and the A.H.B. and U.S.S.B.S. narrative writers 
since the Second World War have identified Japan’s aircraft industry problems as being the 
lack of resources, a shortage of skilled workers and an inability to mass produce aircraft on a 
large scale. However these problems had been identified by the German Air Attaché and 
visiting members of the German aircraft industry in 1944. The Allies intercepted a document 
sent by the German Air Attaché to the High Command of the Luftwaffe on 3rd November 
1944 and it is worth quoting the report’s conclusions in full: 
a) Available workingarea [sic] and manpower warrant a higher production of 
aircraft and accessories. 
b) The raw material situation, in spite of the bottleneck in steel, and despite 
transport difficulties, does not show particular cause for alarm at present 
nor in the near future. 
c) Efforts to increase the output of aircraft are greatly hindered by the 
ignorance on the part of technical designers of mass-production and 
standardization methods, by a shortage of skilled factory workers and 
special machine tools, all of which result in an antiquated production 
system. 
Since the Japanese have recognized these shortcomings, they are endeavoring 
to acquire patent rights for the manufacture of modern German machine tools 
and are enlisting the aid of German experts in the establishing of modern 
mass-production systems.26  
The inefficiency of Japanese industry has been illustrated by Overy, who wrote that the 
Japanese munitions minister Fujihara carried out an administrative inspection in the middle 
of 1943 and “calculated that the available capacity if properly utilized could produce not the 
8-10,000 currently produced, but 53,000 per year.”27 It is clear that Japan did not have the 
infrastructure to produce this many aircraft, but even if half that number had been 
manufactured it would have represented a substantial increase in Army and Navy 
                                                          
26 TNA, Air 40/2203, Production-Japanese Aircraft, Translated Report from German Air Attaché to German 
Air High Command, November 1944. 
27 Overy, The Air War 1939-45, p.155. 
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capabilities.28 The post-war Japanese view substantiates the difficulties. Lieutenant General 
Saburo Endo, a senior Japanese official, was interviewed by Allied intelligence officers in 
September 1945 and told his interrogators of the difficulties of the predominance of “hand-
work” methods in most Japanese factories.29 The spinning-mills represented practically the 
only efficient pre-war mechanized industry, but as the factories were taken over for 
munitions work the organizations were broken up and became less efficient. Crucially Endo 
stated that the bottleneck in aircraft manufacture was not in airframe production but in 
engine manufacture, “Although there was never a safe margin of engine production over 
airframe production, engines were practically always available for completed airframes until 
October 1944.”30 It will be remembered that from October 1944 as the Japanese situation in 
the Pacific was worsening and supplies were deteriorating, aircraft were transferred from 
Burma units to make up shortages in other areas in the Pacific Theatre. 
 Another significant problem was the tension between the Japanese Army and Navy 
as Endo pointed out: 
After the outbreak of war, the Army and Navy each planned a huge (aircraft) 
expansion program. However, the production rate was greatly hampered due 
to the rivalry between the Army and Navy in respect to the limited national 
strength.31 
Fundamentally the two services were two entirely separate entities that did not cooperate 
over aircraft production, raw materials and resources. Even when the Munitions Ministry 
was created in November 1943 to coordinate the services’ demands into a single production 
capability for the benefit of the war effort, both sides largely ignored the new powerless 
organization and continued as before.32 The failure to pool resources led to a diversification 
                                                          
28 Ibid, p.232. Overy makes this point in a footnote. 
29 TNA, Air 40/323, Japanese Air Force Strength and Distribution of Aircraft, Intelligence Memorandum 
Number Four, 17 September 1945. Endo held various posts in the Japanese War Ministry from 1940, being 
Chief of General Affairs of Army Air Headquarters from May 1943 to November 1943, and head of the 
Aircraft Section in the Ministry of Munitions from November 1943 to August 1945. 
30 Ibid, p.2. 
31 Ibid, p.3. 
32 TNA, Air 48/69, U.S.S.B.S., Japanese Air Power, p.28.  
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of effort at a crucial time for the Japanese war effort as both services produced their own 
types and specifications of aircraft. The two most widely produced Japanese aircraft, the 
Oscar and Zero, never served as a standard fighter for the two services and were developed 
independently of each other with separate resources and production facilities. For a small 
country with limited resources it would have been prudent to develop and produce fewer 
types of aircraft that could be used by all forces. The Americans, for example, produced 18 
aircraft models for their Army and Navy together whilst the J.N.A.F. produced 53 basic 
models with 112 variations and the J.A.A.F. produced 37 basic models with 52 variations.33  
 As the quantity of aircraft suffered so did the quality of aeroplanes developed for the 
Army and Navy. Both the Oscar and Zero served throughout the war and the basic aircraft 
types were upgraded with better engines, armament and armour plating. However, such 
improvements were counter-productive as weight increased, which therefore affected the 
high levels of manoeuvrability which categorized both types in the early months of the war. 
While the Oscar and Zero could be effective in certain circumstances, as the air fighting in 
Burma had shown, neither type could be developed to be truly effective against the 
improving Allied types such as the Spitfire or Mustang. Newer types were needed but owing 
to the belligerence of the Army and Navy, the lack of resources and the rush to bring new 
designs into service none of the later aircraft were able to make an effective contribution. 
The Army produced the Tojo, a single-seat fighter similar in configuration to the Oscar, 
which was eventually effective over Japan attacking American heavy bombers. Despite first 
flying in August 1940, developmental problems through the first types resulted in acceptable 
versions not reaching units until late 1943, but the aircraft suffered from high-landing 
speeds, high-wing loading and a violent reaction to high-speed manoeuvres which made it 
unpopular with its pilots. The Ki-61 Tony, another Army aircraft, was powered by a licence 
built version of the German Daimler-Benz engine and was found in trials in early 1942 to be 
                                                          
33 Overy, The Air War 1939-45, p.178.  
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superior in performance to the American P-40E and German Bf 109E. However, despite 
early promise the aircraft’s development was troubled by various different unreliable engine 
types, and later structural wing failure problems, resulting in a reversion to an earlier design. 
Although production continued with various armament configurations, the engine problems 
proved insurmountable and the delivery of later aircraft was delayed.34 However when the 
engine plant was destroyed by American bombing, Japanese engineers fitted a radial engine 
to spare Tony airframes to produce the Ki-100, thought to be one of the best Japanese 
fighters produced, but the aircraft only came into service in February 1945 in small 
numbers.35 Furthermore, the Army’s Ki-84 Frank, first flown in April 1943 and introduced 
into service in 1944, possessed a better climb rate and manoeuvrability than either the 
American Mustang or Thunderbolt, but owing to its success was overworked which led to 
unserviceability and maintenance problems.36 Apart from a brief appearance by the Tojos of 
the 87th Sentai in May 1944 and the Franks of the 50th Sentai in late 1944, none of these 
aircraft were deployed in substantial numbers to Burma to reinforce or replace the J.A.A.F.’s 
Oscars. Similar problems were encountered by the J.N.A.F.’s fighters. The J2-M Jack’s 
prototype first flew in March 1942, but owing to continuous design change and production 
difficulties did not enter service until December 1943. Although later versions were heavily 
armed and capable against American bombers, its unreliability due to constant design 
changes and engine problems detracted from its potential. Finally the J.N.A.F.’s N1K1-J and 
N1K2-J George aircraft possessed excellent performance and manoeuvrability, but was 
rushed into service in early 1943 before it was properly developed giving its users problems 
with unreliable engines and landing gear. However as earlier discussed apart from the Zero 
in 1941 and early 1942, none of the J.N.A.F.’s fighters served in Burma. 
                                                          
34Japanese aircraft figures taken from Mondey, Axis Aircraft of World War II, and Jane’s Fighting Aircraft of 
World War II.  
35 Because the Ki-100 was produced in small numbers and was a derivative of the Tony it was not given an 
official Allied codename. 
36 Mondey, Axis Aircraft of World War II, p.228. 
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 Fundamentally the Japanese were capable of designing and building fighter aircraft 
which could match Allied aircraft. However the rush to bring them into service, combined 
with the conflicting Army and Navy demands for manufacture ensured the later types were 
not ready for combat in large quantities. An idea of how few of these fighters were 
manufactured can be seen in this table: 
 Oscar  Army  5919 
 Tojo  Army  1225 
 Frank  Army  3514 
 Tony  Army  2666 
 Ki100  Army  371 
 Zero  Navy  10449 
 George Navy  1007 
 Jack  Navy  476 37 
In comparison with these figures the Americans produced 15,000 Mustangs of all types, and 
the British 20,351 Spitfires of all types, 6,500 Mark Vs alone.38 The diversity of Japanese 
fighters and aircraft in general, was a fundamental mistake committed by the Japanese high 
command as one centralised body earlier in the war could have identified one suitable 
aircraft for development and use by both the Army and Navy. This affected the Japanese in 
Burma as the J.A.A.F. had to continue with the Oscar in lieu of a better developed fighter 
which could match the Allied aircraft deployed in the theatre. It should be recognized that 
although Japanese aircraft numbers declined as the Burma campaign progressed there is no 
evidence that Japanese pilot and aircrew quality decreased. Chapter Two of this thesis 
showed that the majority of Japanese aircrew in the theatre maintained a high standard until 
their eventual withdrawal, gaining respect from their Allied adversaries as dangerous foes. 
 
                                                          
37 Mondey, Axis Aircraft of World War II and Jane’s Fighting Aircraft of World War II, for Japanese aircraft 
figures. 
38 Price, The Spitfire Story, p.139. 
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Part Two - Japanese Use of Air Power 
 Japanese industry could not supply sufficient aircraft for all the J.A.A.F. and 
J.N.A.F.’s requirements and fighting in priority areas took first claim on resources from the 
Far East. Despite this the Japanese at various times between 1942 and 1945 failed to take 
advantage of their superiority in aircraft types and numbers against weaker Allied airforces. 
From 7th December 1941 until May 1942 the J.A.A.F. and J.N.A.F. soundly beat two world 
powers, and their initial operations were well executed. However when the J.A.A.F. was left 
to fight the Allies in Burma from October 1942, their operations were compromised by 
doctrine, a lack of appreciation of air power, and inflexibility. This section will show how 
these factors affected the campaign in relation to the Japanese use of bombers and fighters, 
and also how Allied air action contributed to limiting Japanese commanders’ options. 
 The Japanese air services had defined roles. The J.N.A.F. was equipped to protect the 
fleet and project air power from the decks of its aircraft carriers and the J.A.A.F. was to 
provide support for ground troops.39 After the J.N.A.F. had left Asia in 1942 the J.A.A.F. 
continued alone but was hampered by its commanders’ insistence to adhere to its Army 
support role. The result was the Japanese failed to fully capitalize on their advantages of 
aircraft quality and quantity, and the Allies’ early defensive weaknesses. The J.A.A.F. was 
under the command of ground commanders at the Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo who had 
little or no experience of air operations; in post-war interrogations it emerged that many were 
infantry or artillery officers who had been transferred to the J.A.A.F..40 The result was that 
operations in support of ground troops took precedence over air operations, for example, 
strategic bombing raids on Allied targets: 
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Some Japanese air force officers did, in fact, realize the value of strategic 
bomber attack but were hampered... by the refusal of air commanders, who 
held the whip hand, to consider long-term air operations.41 
According to the U.S.S.B.S. narrative the Japanese commanders in the theatre thought things 
could have been done differently: 
The Japanese officer in charge of air operations in southeast [sic] Asia at the 
end of the war has stated that, in his opinion and in the opinion of other air 
officers, the planes used for ground support might better have been used 
against Calcutta and the Hump route. Those officers always were overruled 
by ground officers on the staff of the Southern Army which controlled air 
operations in southeast Asia.42  
Furthermore this lack of appreciation of air power also resulted in the Japanese failing to 
learn the “art of assembling large numbers of planes and attacks involving more than 100 
aircraft were few and far between.”43 The inflexibility of thought combined with piecemeal 
use of resources had a detrimental effect on Japanese air operations.  
In addition to command difficulties the J.A.A.F. was hampered with the lack of 
suitable aircraft for their tasks, “It was a force well adapted for the close support of 
advancing armies, but totally unsuited to defensive warfare or strategic bombing.”44 
Japanese fighters possessed long-range and manoeuvrability, and despite limitations with 
armour and armament proved a dangerous adversary in skilled hands to the end of the war. 
Japanese bomber aircraft such as the Lily, Helen and Sally could only be described as 
medium types fitted with two engines and bomb capacities of between 1,764 and 2,205 lbs.45 
Self-protection and armour was sacrificed for long-range, speed and manoeuvrability, and it 
will be recalled that during the first exchanges between R.A.F. Buffaloes and Japanese 
bombers over Malaya, the bombers were able to draw away from the fighters.46 No heavy 
Japanese four-engine bombers such as the Allies’ Lancaster or Flying Fortress were 
                                                          
41 Ibid. 
42 TNA, Air 48/69, U.S.S.B.S., Japanese Air Power, p.20. 
43 Ibid, p.3. 
44 TNA, Air 41/36, The Campaigns in the Far East, Volume III: India Command, p.152. 
45 The Ki-48 Lily carried 1,764lbs bomb load and the Ki-21 Sally 2,205lbs. The similar two-engined British 
Wellington III had a bomb load of 4,500Ibs. 
46 See Chapter Two, p.150. 
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developed and this would limit the destructive power of bomber operations against Allied 
targets.47 
 In order to appreciate the difficulties of rigid doctrine and unsuitable equipment, it is 
pertinent to examine the J.A.A.F.’s use of bombers and fighters separately for clarity. 
 
Bombers 
 The first indication that the Japanese failed to appreciate the significance of air power 
in Burma occurred during the Commonwealth armies’ retreat from Burma into India in May 
1942. Whilst R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. fighters maintained a degree of air superiority for the 
Army to escape, it found operations difficult owing to fatigue and a growing shortage of 
aircraft. Their task was made easier as when the Japanese could have concentrated its air 
forces on the retreating troops, they chose to mount a series of raids on towns and cities “in 
order to disrupt the public services.”48 When the 1942 monsoon ended the initiative was in 
favour of the J.A.A.F. who possessed a number of long-range bombers that carried a 
reasonable bomb load for the purpose and fighters that were capable of flying long range 
operations. The R.A.F.’s Hurricanes in 1942 and 1943 had inadequate performance for 
interceptor duties, except in the dive and at certain heights, and relied on an efficient early-
warning system in order to gain sufficient height to employ the dive and zoom tactic. 
Furthermore, the limited number of R.A.F. fighters had to defend a 700 mile front which had 
gaps in the early-warning system as the organisation was developed through 1942 and 
beyond. This represented an ideal opportunity for the Japanese to capitalize on Allied 
weakness and attack Indian cities, in particular Calcutta into which large amounts of supplies 
and troops were arriving for the forthcoming campaigns. However between October and 
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mid-December 1942 Japanese aircraft did not appear over the cities, but instead mounted a 
limited number of tactical raids against airfields in Assam. The lack of effort suggested that 
the Japanese were saving their aircraft for future operations, or were uncertain that 
replacements or reinforcements were likely to be supplied to the area. U.S.S.B.S. authors 
suggested that the J.A.A.F. was not strong enough to mount attacks against Calcutta without 
the assistance of the J.N.A.F. but this suggestion should be reviewed. The J.A.A.F. mounted 
two raids on airfields on 25th October 1942 consisting of two formations; in the first 24 
Sallys were escorted by 32 Oscars, and the second 30 Lilys escorted by 30 Oscars.49 
Therefore a potential formation of 54 bombers escorted by 62 fighters would have presented 
Calcutta’s defenders with an interception problem during October 1942. Whatever the reason 
it is clear that an opportunity to disrupt the Allies’ reinforcement plans during these months 
was missed and this was repeated in late December. Between 20th and 28th five night attacks, 
using no more than nine bombers at a time, were carried out on Calcutta which caused 
minimal damage, but serious effects to the civilian population’s morale.50 There was no 
R.A.F. night-fighter force to defend Calcutta, and the few Hurricanes engaged in visual 
searches looking for the bombers’ exhaust flames for identification had limited success. The 
Japanese did not take advantage of this potential weakness by overwhelming the night 
defences with larger raids of 20 to 30 bombers which would have provided more destructive 
and morale-threatening effects. Even after Beaufighters arrived in January 1943 and 
destroyed four Japanese bombers in two nights, mass raids could have overwhelmed the 
defences in a concentrated campaign, but instead the Japanese chose to switch focus to 
attacking Allied airfields: 
There is no doubt that successful raids on Calcutta would have paid 
handsome dividends and it was therefore surprising that the enemy made no 
further attempts to bomb targets west of Brahmaputra.51  
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 Even allowing for a policy of conserving aircraft this was a risk worth taking, but in the 
event Calcutta returned to normal within a few days. As Calcutta was ignored and air supply 
to the Chindits in early 1943 was missed, the Japanese then switched their efforts yet again 
to airfields and supporting ground troops, ignoring the oilfields at Digboi (Assam) and, for 
the most part, the ‘Hump’ air route from India to China.52 The U.S.S.B.S. authors wrote: 
Had the Japanese air force been more determined and aggressive in the early 
days of Hump operations and had it appreciated the ultimate value of the 
Hump, it undoubtedly could have inflicted far more damage than it did.53 
These general examples show various traits; a misunderstanding of air power; inflexibility of 
thought and an adherence to their role. The A.H.B. narrators wrote: 
At no time after the initial invasion of Burma were the Japanese able to take 
the initiative in the air... Indeed, in studying the Japanese air force it is 
difficult to escape the conclusion that, despite the continuous improvement of 
aircraft types, Japan remained at least twenty years out of date in her 
conception of the role of an air force in modern warfare. She persisted in 
regarding her air forces as mere handmaids of the ground and sea forces and 
in Burma, as elsewhere, she eventually paid the penalty.54 
   Japan’s use of bombers has attracted comment from historians. In 1949 the A.H.B. 
narrators wrote that the Japanese air actions of early 1942 had “exploded the theory that the 
Japanese were out of their element in the air”, whilst admitting their aircraft were useful air 
weapons.55 However, for the end of 1942 the narrators wrote, “Perhaps their greatest 
weakness lay in their air commanders who failed to make the best overall use of the 
available strength.”56 Probert added that the Japanese had concentrated their efforts on 
tactical targets and Allied airfields in the first half of 1943 ignoring strategic targets further 
afield: 
Admittedly they lacked an effective long-range bomber, but more imaginative 
use of their medium bombers might have posed the RAF and USAAF 
defences serious problems at this crucial stage of the build-up in India. As it 
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was, by concentrating their efforts mainly on counter-air and to a lesser extent 
on tactical operations they showed an inflexibility of thought which boded ill 
for the future.57 
These are valid views when applied to Japanese bomber operations. Japanese bombers were 
used largely against tactical targets and when used against strategic targets were not used in 
force or in sustained attacks. For example, the lessons of saturating defences with large 
formations at night as witnessed in Europe during this period were not learned as the raids 
on Calcutta in 1942 and 1943 demonstrated. Japanese bomber operations went through two 
phases, firstly between October 1942 and December 1943 when the J.A.A.F. held the 
advantage over the Allies but failed to take their opportunities, and secondly from November 
1943 when increasing Allied air superiority virtually nullified the Japanese bomber force 
threat. However whilst these phases may be distinct, some earlier Allied air actions affected 
Japanese bomber operations, particularly by night, for the rest of the war. 
 As most of the world’s airforces discovered in the Second World War, the key to 
successful daylight bombing operations by medium or heavy bombers was effective fighter 
escort. For example, the American Eighth Air Force in Europe with its heavily armed 
bombers failed at first against superior German fighters, but ultimately were successful when 
escorted by long-range fighters such as the Mustang. This also applied to the Japanese as 
their Oscars supplied an essential barrier of protection against R.A.F. fighters who were 
inferior until the introduction of better aircraft in late 1943. However the Hurricane had 
proved itself to be a good gun-platform whether equipped with eight or twelve machine guns 
or later with four cannons and so if Japanese bombers were attacked the advantage switched 
to the Hurricane. For example on 27th March 1943 a formation of Lilys raided Cox’s Bazaar 
without fighter escort which had failed to rendezvous with the bomber formation; eleven 
Hurricanes met the bombers and nine bombers were destroyed (one by AA fire), and two 
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badly damaged.58 Similarly on 1st April 17 Hurricanes intercepted 27 Sallys escorted by 
Oscars in a raid on Feni; the escorting screen was breached and three Sallys were lost and a 
fourth was damaged for the loss of one Hurricane.59 However for most of this period 
Japanese bombers were escorted by fighters giving the Japanese an advantage they did not 
exploit owing to choices of tactical targets. From September 1943 onwards the Allies 
introduced better fighter aircraft and the Japanese lost their potential bomber advantage. The 
Spitfire was largely superior to Japanese fighters and was able to take full advantage of the 
improved early-warning systems when used defensively over India. Furthermore the Spitfire 
squadrons were used in conjunction with the Hurricane, as in Europe, to attack the fighters 
whilst the Hurricane attacked the bombers. Also introduced at the same time as the Spitfire, 
the American Mustangs and Lightnings had the performance to deal with Japanese fighters 
and firepower to destroy bombers and these aircraft would play an important role during 
counter-air operations in early 1944.  
 While the daytime advantage did not begin to pass to the Allies until the beginning of 
1944, R.A.F. night fighters had dissuaded Japanese commanders from night attack as early 
as January 1943. Although the raids on Calcutta in December 1942 had been conducted by 
small Japanese numbers, the R.A.F.’s response had a profound effect. Overnight on the 
22nd/23rd December 1942, patrolling Hurricanes from a day-fighter squadron intercepted 
three Sallys raiding Calcutta; two of the bombers were hit and were forced to crash land.60 
The night raids on Calcutta continued into January 1943 and earlier it was described how the 
loss of four bombers over two nights to R.A.F. night-fighter Beaufighters calmed the city‘s 
populace and curtailed further raids on the city for a year. It would appear that the threat 
posed to bombers by the night-fighters persuaded Japanese commanders to curtail night 
operations, except in small numbers, for the rest of the war. Calcutta should have been 
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attacked again, probably in greater numbers, and the successful day raid of 5th December 
1943 warranted a follow-up night attack but neither was forthcoming. The reticence to attack 
strategic targets at night may be explained by J.A.A.F. commanders focussing on tactical 
targets, but the need to conserve aircraft must be recognized and, clearly, attacking at night 
proved costly. A combination of inflexibility, role adherence, and decisive R.A.F. action had 
therefore removed a valuable weapon from the J.A.A.F.’s armoury, and this was to occur 
again during the critical first months of 1944. 
     At the beginning of 1944 Allied intelligence services estimated the J.A.A.F. had 
approximately 108 medium bombers and 36 light bombers stationed in the theatre from 
Burma through Siam into Malaya and Sumatra.61 Although most of the bombers were based 
in rear areas it was feasible to bring units forward, as per the normal Japanese practice, for 
specific operations. However the non-appearance of bombers from 4th to 15th February 
resulted in this intelligence appreciation: 
Lack of any bomber offensive at such an opportune moment remains 
something of a mystery. No completely satisfactory explanation has so far 
been forthcoming. It cannot be entirely a matter of conservation of first-line 
strength for there are occasions when the Japanese must realise that offensive 
action is the cheapest in the long run.62 
Similarly, during the fifteen days from 23rd February to 9th March the Japanese “undertook 
no offensive action.”63 Examination of the Japanese air offensive during the first six months 
of 1944 reveal few occasions when bombers were used in significant numbers by day or 
night against the Chindit landing rounds, Kohima or Imphal. This represented a wasted 
opportunity for low-flying bombers, particularly at night when landing grounds were most 
vulnerable. The early-warning systems at Imphal had a reasonable ability to detect high or 
medium flying raiders by day but could not cope with attacks flown at lower heights and this 
defensive flaw was made worse at night: 
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Night interceptions were never actually attempted over the plain itself owing 
to the many blind spots in our radar devices, save on one occasion when the 
attempt was made to guide the Beaufighter to its target by means of indicator 
shell bursts.64 
However despite this, Japanese night raids were occasionally intercepted, for example, 
overnight on the 3rd/4th April four 62nd Sentai Helens were intercepted by two Beaufighters 
over Imphal and two bombers were destroyed.65 Although this was an exception, like 
Calcutta in January 1943 it dissuaded the Japanese from night bombing raids on landing 
grounds at a time when such attacks may have been profitable.  
There was a growing need for conservation. In February 1944 Allied intelligence 
considered that the Japanese reticence to use their bombers was due to logistic problems and 
conservation of resources.66 Japan faced difficulties producing sufficient aircraft to meet the 
services’ requirements and Japanese commanders were aware that aircraft replacements and 
spare parts were becoming difficult to obtain. The difficulties of logistics and the 
maintenance of complex multi-engine aircraft would be complicated by aircraft losses in 
combat and Japanese bombers had shown themselves vulnerable to modern high powered, 
and heavily armed Allied fighters. On 27th March nine Helens from the 62nd Sentai escorted 
by 60 Oscars attacked Ledo airfield and were intercepted by a mixed formation of American 
Mustangs, Apaches and P-40s; while the Oscars were engaged, the American fighters shot 
down all nine bombers which “was a further blow to the 5th Hikodan, from which its bomber 
arm was never fully to recover.”67 This Sentai had already lost five aircraft destroyed and 
five damaged in a ground strafing operation by American fighters on 8th March. Combat 
attrition was also increased by wastage during ferry operations and flying accidents; on 6th 
April one of the 8th Sentai’s Lilys crashed on take-off, whilst three more were lost 
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presumably to the “vagaries of the weather.”68 Lastly it must not be forgotten that the 
landing ground at Imphal was defended by a number of anti-aircraft guns which were able to 
put up a barrage; during a raid on Imphal on 26th April Shores writes that of the two Lilys 
destroyed and eight damaged most if not all were accounted for by the anti-aircraft 
defences.69  
 Although target selection, air-to-air attrition and conservation explain some of the 
bombers’ non-appearance during the first half of 1944, another important factor was the 
intensive counter-air campaign carried out by long-range American fighters. Initially the 
Japanese brought bombers forward from rear bases where they were relatively safe, before 
carrying out raids and then returning to their original base. This worked until the beginning 
of 1944 when the introduction of the Lightning and Mustang, supported by an efficient 
intelligence organisation which plotted the bombers’ progress to the forward airfields, 
resulted in bomber units being attacked on the ground. On 8th March 1944 a large collection 
of Japanese aircraft had gathered on Maymyo and Shwebo airfields in preparation for a raid 
on Ledo when A.C.G. Mustangs and Mitchells attacked the airfields; the Japanese lost five 
Helens destroyed, one damaged, with ten Oscar fighters lost.70 Similarly on 4th April 
Lightnings attacked Aungban and Heho airfields where a number of Lilys, Helens and 
Oscars were assembling; the Americans claimed four Helens, 19 Oscars and one Tony 
destroyed.71 This kind of attrition reduced aircraft numbers at a time when replacements 
were becoming scarce and made the process of bringing bombers forward to the advanced 
airfields extremely hazardous, as the range of the American fighters precluded such 
journeys. This resulted in a minimal use of bombers, often in only formations of twos and 
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threes in supply dropping sorties and night nuisance raids.72 As the monsoon approached 
Japanese bombers started to be withdrawn from the theatre: 
[A]fter what must have been for them a most unsatisfactory season with very 
little accomplished and serious losses which still have not been fully replaced. 
The monsoon may give them the opportunity to build up again.73 
The appreciation that the monsoon would allow the Japanese to build up their bomber force 
was mistaken. Although the intelligence service reported that the units spent their time 
training for night operations as they believed “the enemy can no longer expect to attack... by 
day without incurring severe losses”, from October 1944 until May 1945 Japanese bomber 
operations reduced to small and occasional nuisance raids.74 Intelligence reports indicate that 
bombers were brought forward from rear bases occasionally for raids, but often returned 
without carrying out a mission. There were various factors responsible for the reduction in 
sorties. The attrition caused to Japanese forces in the Philippines had become serious and 
aircraft from the Far East Theatre had begun to be transferred further East. From September 
1944, Japanese industry started to switch its production to fighters at the expense of other 
aircraft resulting in fewer bombers and their spares being available for front line use. Allied 
air power had become too dominant for Japanese bombers to operate by day or night and so 
superiority over the Japanese bomber force in Burma had been gained. 
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Fighters 
 Japanese use of fighters was hindered by the same inflexibility and necessity to 
support ground operations. However while the bombers passed through the phase of failing 
to capitalize on their advantages before entering a decline, the fighters were still capable of 
inflicting losses on Allied air power, particularly transport aircraft, through the critical 
months of 1944 and the advance into Burma in 1945. Two factors eventually affected this 
ability, the quality of the fighters and their employment.  
 At the start of the war Japan had fighter aircraft noted for their long range and 
manoeuvrability which proved superior to the Allied Buffalo, Hurricane and P-40 aircraft. In 
October 1942 the J.N.A.F. had withdrawn, taking its Zeros and Claudes to the Pacific, 
leaving the J.A.A.F.’s Oscars as the only single-engine fighter after the obsolete Nate was 
replaced. The Oscar remained in service in Burma until the end of the war undergoing 
several upgrades to the original airframe which had positive and negative effects. Although 
the first Mark had outstanding range and manoeuvrability it lacked self-sealing fuel tanks, 
armour plate and heavy armament, only being equipped with two .303 inch machine guns. 
This light armament was in contrast to the 12-gun battery of the Hurricane IIB and would 
have found difficulties dealing with the Allied aircraft’s robust airframes. However Japanese 
pilots were aware of their armament shortcomings and knew where the weak points of their 
enemy’s aircraft were: 
The Hurricane was a unique plane with twelve 7.7mm (0.303in) machine 
guns which caused deadly damage if we were shot from behind... when we 
fought with Hurricanes we attempted to counter its fire power with the better 
manoeuvrability of the 01 [Ki-43 Oscar] and tried to hit its radiator, bringing 
the engine to a stop. Even with the poor fire power (two 12.7mm guns) of the 
01, Hurricanes could be shot down merely by a hole in the radiator.75 
                                                          
75 Sergeant Yoshito Yasuda quoted in Shores, Air War for Burma, p.15. 
309 
  The armament deficiency was addressed in the Mark 1b and Mark 1c which were fitted 
with one .303 and one .5 and two .5 inch machine guns respectively.76 However improving 
the fire-power of the Oscar was insufficient to deal with improving Allied fighters and so the 
Oscar II was developed, with an improved engine, armour plating, a form of self-sealing 
tank and two .5 inch machine guns. This aircraft represented an improvement over the Oscar 
I as it was 12 mph faster and dispensed with the telescopic gunsight in favour of an internal 
sight which was easier to use and caused less drag.77 The downside of fitting self-sealing 
tanks and pilot armour was extra weight which made the Oscar II’s rate of climb and turning 
ability inferior to the earlier variant. At the end of 1943 as the Spitfire was introduced, the 
Oscar was still the main Japanese fighter in Burma and as there were no new aircraft to take 
its place, it had to continue. Oscar pilots were disappointed in the late-production Oscar II 
which was some 15 mph slower than the previous version because of the additional wind 
resistance caused by new drop tank installations.78 The final version of the Oscar to reach 
Burma was the Mark III in August 1944 which had an improved engine giving the aircraft an 
extra 30 mph over the Mark II, a shorter take-off run and extra power to maintain full 
combat throttle for 40 minutes. However compared to the Allied fighter aircraft in service, 
the Oscar was neither quick enough nor adequately armed to make a substantial difference 
although it did retain its high manoeuvrability. 
 The Oscar remained the main fighter in service although others did make 
appearances. In late 1943 intelligence sources reported sightings of the Tojo, a faster and 
better armed single-engine fighter which sacrificed the Oscar’s manoeuvrability for higher 
speed and a better rate of climb. However the higher speed resulted in a high wing loading 
and violent reactions to high-speed manoeuvres, which proved unpopular with pilots.79 The 
87th Sentai arrived with this aircraft in May 1944 in an attempt to counter the better Allied 
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types, but was forced to withdraw after a fortnight following severe losses in aerial combat 
and Allied ground attacks.80 While the Tojo did not stay long, the 50th Sentai re-equipped 
with the Frank during the 1944 monsoon and returned to Burma in October. The Frank, 
armed with twin 0.5 machine guns and twin 20mm cannons, was considered to be better than 
either the Mustang or Thunderbolt in terms of climb rate and manoeuvrability in the Pacific 
theatre. However the Frank did not possess the Oscar’s turn rate which led to the Oscar 
pilots’ ire: 
A Hayate pilot would simply drop the nose [when attacked] and be off in a 
flash. They couldn’t avoid an attack if it came from above, however, because 
of the Ki-84’s poor rate of turn. This meant that the Hayates would routinely 
head for home while we were left to dogfight with the Spitfires. 50th Sentai 
pilots became notorious for firing a few cannon bursts at the enemy and then 
fleeing the scene.81   
However despite the Frank’s potential it had arrived too late and by the end of December 
1944 the 50th Sentai had started its withdrawal from Burma to its eventual destination in 
Formosa. The last fighter worthy of mention was the Ki-45 Nick, a twin-engine aircraft 
armed with various combinations of front firing cannons and heavy machine guns depending 
on the Mark. This aircraft was especially effective against heavy bombers, such as the 
Liberator or Superfortress and was eventually equipped with airborne interception radar in 
the night-fighter role. The 21st Sentai were equipped with the Nick, but despite its potential 
as a night-interdictor, was not used offensively as a study of operations in Shores’ Air War 
for Burma shows it being used for the defence of Rangoon and Sumatra, and this was 
identified by the intelligence service in April 1944, “NICKS have still not been used in 
attack and appear to be reserved for airfield defence.”82  
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 Despite the relative failure of the Tojo and the brief (and late) appearance of the 
Frank the Japanese had a competent fighter in the Oscar which, if properly handled, could 
provide severe difficulties for the Allies. During the first six months of 1944 Oscars were 
able to break through the early warning belt and attack transport aircraft without detection, 
eventually prompting the Allies to institute the patrolled air corridor as described in Chapter 
Two. However, instead of concentrating on the transport fleet and landing grounds, the 
Oscars were routinely used against airfields and in support of ground troops with little 
benefit. Similarly the Nick with its heavy cannon armament had great potential as an 
interdictor, especially at night, against transport aircraft but the Japanese high command 
failed to grasp the advantages this aircraft could provide.  
 In earlier chapters this thesis has described the Japanese fighter superiority over the 
Buffalo, Hurricane and P-40 during the early stages of the war and it is not intended to 
repeat the events again. At the end of the monsoon in 1942 the Japanese possessed an air 
superiority advantage with their aircraft at the same time the Allies were constructing an 
early warning organisation on the East coast of India. Furthermore during the last six months 
of 1942 there were as many as four Japanese Oscar fighter Sentais operating in Burma so 
there was no shortage in aircraft numbers.83 Despite this the defences at Calcutta were not 
troubled until December and the night bomber raids, which gave the R.A.F. fighter 
squadrons at Alipore the chance to practice battle formations and combat tactics.84 In other 
areas Japanese fighters and bombers were engaged on a series of raids against airfields 
which achieved little success in air superiority terms owing to a lack of intensity which the 
Allies had been expecting.85 This was demonstrated by the Japanese conserving their 
resources by attacking for a few days and then having a week of inactivity which gave the 
R.A.F. time to grow stronger. A.C.M. Pierse reported in the Spring of 1943 that R.A.F. 
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Hurricanes had received V.H.F. radios, the early warning organisation and the ground 
control systems had improved which in turn gave the Hurricanes more time to achieve height 
for interceptions.86 During the first Arakan campaign the Japanese had dissipated their 
fighter effort between supporting their ground troops repelling the British advance and 
attacking airfields in a counter-air campaign. Whilst these were logical targets other 
vulnerable targets were left untouched. 
In February 1943 Colonel Orde Wingate’s first Chindit expedition walked into 
Burma with the intention of being re-supplied by air. At the time the R.A.F. was short of 
transport aircraft, only three Dakotas and three Hudsons being available for operations which 
subsequently flew 178 sorties, dropping 300 tons of supplies.87 The Japanese, either through 
a lack of air intelligence or a failure to appreciate from where this force was receiving its 
supplies, did not intercept any supply flights; General Geoffrey Scoones, IV Corps 
Commander, wrote, “enemy air opposition was not encountered and the R.A.F. was 
fortunate not to lose a single aircraft from any cause.”88 Providing protection for the 
transports would have been difficult given the range and the Hurricanes’ performance at low 
altitude, and so the Japanese failed to take the initiative, “Up to the point of the Arakan crisis 
in February 1944 the Japanese failed completely to understand the possibilities of air 
supply.”89 Similarly American transport aircraft flying supplies into China over the Hump 
did not receive the level of attention they merited. 
At the end of the 1943 monsoon the Japanese maintained air superiority over the 
Allies in aircraft quality and quantity, but the situation started to change from October 1943 
with the introduction of better Allied fighters. The combination of the Spitfire and an 
efficient early-warning organisation meant Oscar pilots had to develop new tactics such as 
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the ‘squirrel cage’ and ‘beehive’ to counter the R.A.F. fighter and these tactics effectively 
slowed down the rate of attrition inflicted by Spitfires.90 The initial confrontations took place 
between these aircraft during January and February 1944 when Japanese fighters attacked 
Allied airfields and supported ground operations. However from March 1944 Japanese 
commanders were presented with large scale operations which tested their command’s 
flexibility and their air power perception.  
 From March to June 1944 four significant actions took place in the theatre; the 
Battle of the Admin Box; the second Chindit raid; and the sieges at Kohima and Imphal. In 
March the Japanese had four single-engine fighter Sentais and one twin-engine fighter Sentai 
based in Sumatra and the Japanese commanders were faced with how best to use their 
fighters.91 The Chindit landing grounds and advance had to be attacked; the Japanese Army 
required close support during their westwards advance; home airfields and territory required 
defending; Allied transport aircraft carrying supplies to Kohima and Imphal required 
interception; and bombing raids had to be escorted.92 Of these targets the transport sorties 
presented the biggest threat to Allied operations because of aircraft shortages, and the 
importance of supply flights to Lieutenant General Slim’s ‘stand and fight’ strategy. Ideally 
the Japanese should have concentrated their efforts into intercepting these aircraft and 
targeting the supply dumps on the landing grounds. However Allied action prevented 
Japanese intervention. 
 Operation THURSDAY, the second Chindit incursion, started on 5th March 
1944 but it was not until 13th March that the Japanese discovered the main Allied presence at 
Broadway. Although Allied security had been tight, Japanese reconnaissance Dinahs had 
been routinely intercepted by Spitfires thereby blinding Japanese commanders to Allied 
intentions. Despite subsequent raids on the Chindit landing grounds the Japanese failed to 
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take advantage of the poor early-warning organisation and fighter cover from distant 
airfields, and the attacks on Broadway “failed to prevent the routine fly-in of supplies to the 
stronghold and supply dropping to elements of Wingate’s Special Force continued 
unhindered.”93 Priorities switched for the Japanese as their Westward advances toward 
Imphal and Kohima were in progress and their fighter force was committed to supporting the 
Army’s ground offensive. Furthermore the Japanese had finally appreciated the value of air 
supply and began a series of attacks in April against transport aircraft supplying Kohima and 
Imphal. The threat posed by fighters on the transport aircraft was profound. Earlier on 8th 
February, Dakotas flying re-supply sorties during the Admin Box battle had been met in 
force by Japanese Oscars and only 12 of the 30 transport sorties flown during the day had 
reached the drop zones. The Dakota pilots were disconcerted by the appearance of the 
fighters and to improve their morale, it took the commanding officer of Troop Carrier 
Command, Brigadier General William Old, to personally lead a subsequent flight.94 In April 
Japanese fighters flew sweeps of as many as 50 aircraft, sometimes escorting bombers, to the 
landing grounds at Imphal occasionally benefitting from the lack of radar cover following 
the capture of Tamu on 23rd March. Defending fighters had protected many Dakota flights 
up until 25th April when five Dakotas, three R.A.F. and two U.S.A.A.F., were destroyed by 
Japanese fighters who had reached the transport formations.95 The outcome was the 
formation of an air corridor from Silchar to Imphal which would be patrolled by fighters 
whenever transport aircraft were due to fly in or out of the Imphal Plain airfields.  
 If the patrolled air corridor had prevented transport losses over the battlefield, the 
intensive counter-air campaign reduced Japanese commanders’ options. The difficulties of 
destroying Japanese fighters in aerial combat had already been experienced during the first 
two months of 1944 even though the Spitfire was operational. Improved Japanese tactics 
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resulted in fewer ‘kills’ and, as described earlier, the threat experienced to transport aircraft 
in February was fully appreciated. The solution was the counter-air campaign conducted 
principally by the long-range fighters of the U.S.A.A.F. as analysed in Chapter Three. Allied 
intelligence was able to intercept Japanese radio traffic and knew the location of aircraft 
brought forward for specific raids. For example on 4th April following intelligence 
information,  459th F.S. Lightnings attacked Aungban and Heho airfields where a number of 
Japanese bombers and fighters were gathered; although no record of bomber casualties are 
available, Japanese records consulted for Shores’ Air War for Burma show the 50th Sentai 
lost 15 Oscars and had to withdraw for a week to re-equip.96 In addition to the pre-planned 
raids, American fighters flew counter-air patrols over enemy territory to catch Japanese 
aircraft on known airfields, or to intercept them in the air. Finally the 459th F.S. and ground 
controllers received instructions on 3rd March 1944 that the squadron was to be scrambled 
when Japanese raids were in progress, not to intercept over the target but to proceed to the 
known enemy airfields and catch the homeward formation on landing.97 The outcome of 
these operations caused attrition to the J.A.A.F. even though the intelligence service thought 
the losses were replaced, “Japanese fighters suffered heavily in our surprise attacks... but 
P.R. cover indicates they have since been reinforced.”98 Furthermore the attacks forced the 
Japanese to disperse their fighters over a wide area, thereby increasing flying time and 
creating logistic difficulties.99 
  The outcome of attrition and robust Allied offensive measures removed the 
initiative from Japanese commanders to deploy their fighters against the transports, landing 
grounds or other local targets directly involved with the Japanese advance. Not only did the 
supply flights continue, but Allied airfields were kept open: 
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These raids on our airfields achieved little, none of our strips was 
unserviceable for more than two or three hours, he did little material damage 
and personnel casualties were comparatively few.100  
Japanese commanders appeared to attack Allied targets in familiar ways without imagination 
or making use of the available resources thereby handing over a measure of air superiority.  
So could the Japanese in Burma have disrupted the supply operations during March to May 
1944? Much would have depended on their ability to bring aircraft forward in total secrecy 
imposing a radio blackout, and hiding aircraft from Allied photographic reconnaissance 
sorties. Firstly single-engine fighters could be used to evade the limited early warning 
coverage and attack the transport aircraft as supplies were being unloaded or as they were 
landing. Losses would have switched the daytime sorties to fly at night therefore decreasing 
the tonnage of supplies delivered as well as making the transports vulnerable to attack by the 
twin-engine Nicks acting as interdictors in the transport stream. Lastly, bomber aircraft 
could have flown at low-level under the limited radar cover bombing landing grounds and 
supply dumps. All these operations would have found difficulties in their execution 
considering Allied strength and expertise, but it is telling that not one was tried by the 
Japanese. 
 Once the 1944 monsoon was over, the J.A.A.F. fighter force suffered from a series of 
transfers to other areas of Japan’s war. At first the four fighter Sentais engaged during the 
Imphal and Kohima battles returned and appeared to be settled: 
The enemy were able to replace their losses without having to bring in new 
units, nor was Burma called upon to send any of its strength elsewhere. This 
holding force responsible for both offensive and defensive operations 
consisted of approximately 90 fighters, 35 light bombers and 15 
reconnaissance aircraft.101 
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By January 1945 three of the four Sentais had left Burma; the 33rd had gone to Sumatra; the 
50th to Siam; and the 204th to the Philippines.102 Steady attrition to the fighters in air and 
ground operations combined with their non-replacement and transfer to other theatres forced 
the Japanese commanders to conserve their aircraft and perform hit-and-run nuisance raids: 
The scale of enemy activity during the month of December and, in some 
measure the tactics employed by enemy fighters, confirm the necessity for 
conservation of aircraft imposed upon the enemy by the wastage of his 
strength in the Philippines and the consequent withdrawal of aircraft, 
particularly fighters, from the S.E.A. Theatre.103    
Despite the reducing force Japanese fighters were still capable of causing loss to the 
important transport fleet. On 12th January 1945 17 64th Sentai Oscars attacked a forward 
landing airstrip at Onbauk where Dakotas were overhead dropping supplies and on the 
ground unloading; during the attack four Dakotas on the ground were destroyed.104 
Transport aircraft were absolutely vital to the Fourteenth Army’s pursuit of the Japanese 
across Burma, and losses of supply aircraft could potentially hinder the advance. Japanese 
commanders chose instead to attack Allied ground forces to support their own retreating 
troops which brought criticism from Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park: 
Had the enemy used his fighters effectively instead of frittering away their 
efforts on infrequent low-level attacks against forward troops he would have 
been able to do great execution among our Dakotas and Commandos and 
seriously impede the advance.105  
By February 1945 the J.A.A.F. was not in a position to do more than mount nuisance raids 
which while tying up Allied resources in counter measures, did not prevent the Fourteenth 
Army’s advance Eastwards and in May the final Japanese fighters left Burma.   
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Part Three – Japanese Priorities 
 Industrial capacity, strategy and the war in other theatres affected Japan’s ability to 
wage an effective air war in Burma. Another factor was whether Japan had given a low 
priority to the Burma Theatre as U.S.S.B.S. authors suggest: 
Meanwhile, the Japanese high command had given air operations in China 
and Burma a low priority and in those theatres the Allies won air superiority 
in 1944 almost by default.106 
Later the authors wrote:  
The best replacement pilots were sent to Rabaul and New Guinea in 
preference to southeast [sic] Asia, and some of the best units from southeast 
Asia were moved as reinforcements to Rabaul and New Guinea.107 
These views were also shared by the A.H.B. authors who repeated and referred to them in 
Volume IV of their narrative in 1956.108 Whilst there is some truth in the first comment, the 
second is misleading, whilst both require analysis. This section will examine whether Japan 
deliberately gave the J.A.A.F. in Burma a low priority for aircraft and aircrews, or whether 
circumstances in other theatres defined Japanese decisions. Firstly it is pertinent to examine 
Burma and the Far East’s value to the Japanese, both economically and politically. 
 Part of Japan’s decision to go to war in 1941 had been to obtain essential raw 
materials from its neighbours: 
Japan... had never been, and never would be, self sufficient in raw materials, 
least of all those materials on which an industrial revolution, in the throes of 
which Japan laboured, most urgently depended – non-ferrous metals, rubber, 
and above all, oil.109 
Their solution for self sufficiency was simple: 
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Japan would acquire the resources it needed from its neighbours and assure 
its supply by the most direct of all methods, imperial conquest.110  
Future economic survival lay with the formation of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere which was formed from Japan, China, French Indo-China, Siam, the Philippines, 
Malaya, and Hong Kong. Despite some potential in foodstuffs other resources caused 
difficulties: 
In summary, the evaluation of potential self-sufficiency in the Co-Prosperity 
Sphere concluded there would be little to worry about in foodstuffs, difficulty 
in meeting fibre and non-ferrous metal requirements, and serious problems in 
disposing of certain agricultural surpluses, namely rubber, beans and sugar.111    
Despite that, invading and subjugating their neighbours gave the Japanese huge resources, 
for example, in 1937 China supplied 14% of Japan’s iron ore imports and in 1941 this had 
increased to 50%.112 Similar advantages were found in Burma and Siam who between the 
two countries provided Japan with rice, tin, rubber, tungsten, oil, a topping plant for motor 
fuel, oil refineries, arsenals and power plants: 
Burma and Siam... not only exported raw material to Japan but supplied 
perhaps as much as 50 percent of the food and material required by the enemy 
forces defending Burma.113  
Furthermore conquest of South East Asia and the East Indies gave Japan the bulk of the 
world’s supply of rubber, tin, antimony, jute and quinine, and vast supplies of petrol, iron 
ore, coal, phosphate, bauxite, sugar, corn and rice: 
This storehouse of raw materials, supplementing the materials and 
manufacturing capacity of the Inner Zone, gave Japan a position of strength in 
the waging of war as long as sea transport to the south remained 
unmolested.114  
Although the sea links deteriorated as 1944 progressed, retaining and defending these 
important resources was clearly an important war aim.   
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 Politically the region was also important to Japan. Burma had to be conquered in 
order to cut off supplies that were transported into China from India and Burma itself. 
Additionally Japan’s initial planning foresaw a potential link-up with the Germans after the 
fall of Singapore, Ambassador Oshima suggested to Hitler that their operations be 
synchronized: 
When Japan attacks India from the east, it will be most advantageous if 
German troops threaten India from the west.” Hitler refused to commit 
himself but did promise to drive over the Caucasus as far as Iraq and Iran.115 
The territory gained would realize another goal of a Great Asia empire. After Singapore fell 
in February 1942 Prime Minister Tojo told the Japanese Diet that Burma and the Philippines 
would be granted independence and said: 
The objective in the Great East Asia war... is founded on the exalted ideals of 
the founding of the empire and it will enable all the nations and peoples of 
Great East Asia to enjoy life and to establish a new order of coexistence and 
co-prosperity on the basis of justice with Japan as the nucleus.116   
Japan had to establish alliances with the independence parties of Burma and India, led 
respectively by Dr Ba Maw and Chandra Bose, and in return for their support grant their 
countries independence. Eventually Burma was granted its token independence by Tojo on 
1st August 1943 when the Japanese military administration was withdrawn, and on 21st 
October the Provisional Government of Free India under Bose was established. Japanese 
expansion into India in early 1944 through Kohima and Imphal was intended to “forestall an 
ultimate offensive against themselves” by Allied divisions in India and China.117 This suited 
Bose, who pressed for the rebel Indian National Army (I.N.A.) to be in the vanguard of the 
attack which, he hoped, would eventually corrupt the loyal Indian Army to rise against 
British rule. In the event not only did the Japanese lose the fight at Imphal but the I.N.A. 
failed in combat and the Indian Army remained loyal to its officers, oath of service and 
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regimental pride.118 Therefore one of Japan’s greatest failures in both Burma and India was 
its inability to win the full support of each country against their pre-war imperial masters. 
Given the economic and political importance of Burma and India to Japan’s 
expansion plans it would be logical to regard the region as deserving a high priority for 
military resources particularly defensive ones such as aircraft. Why then, did the Japanese 
give it a low priority for air resources, as U.S.S.B.S. and A.H.B. authors claim? 
 As the British had found in 1941, Burma and the Far East represented a lower 
priority to Japan in relation to threats closer to home. From June 1942 Japan and the Allies 
fought a defensive campaign in Burma, neither side being strong enough to advance into 
each other’s territory and establish a firm foothold. For the Japanese the threat to their 
homeland began in May 1942 with the disastrous engagement at Midway which precipitated 
a series of Naval and land battles from Guadalcanal in 1942 to the Philippines in late 1944 
which consumed vast numbers of Army and Navy aircraft which industrial deficiencies 
found hard to replace. Japan’s defensive perimeter consisted of a number of small islands on 
which it was impossible to base a large airforce: 
When the Allies attacked the perimeter, the Japanese... were unable either to 
assemble a large land based airforce in the threatened sector or to retire to 
land masses where such an assembly might have been possible. They 
committed and lost their best air units in piecemeal fashion on the 
perimeter.119    
In contrast with the war against this defensive perimeter, the Japanese homeland was in no 
danger from invasion from the Allies in India, although the raw materials in the Far East had 
to be defended against periodic bombing attacks, which was achieved by keeping air units 
for the defence of Rangoon and Sumatra.   
 Whilst the U.S.S.B.S. was correct, with qualifications, that the Burma Theatre’s air 
operations were given a low priority by the Japanese, issue should be taken with its 
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statement that the best pilots and units were transferred to other theatres. The statement gives 
the impression that Japanese pilots in the Far East were below standard, however as 
described in Chapter Two, the quality of Japanese aircrew in the Far East was high and this 
was corroborated in another U.S.S.B.S. publication: 
Japanese pilots and aircrews, with the possible exception of those based in the 
extreme rear areas, were tough, experienced and resourceful fighters.120 
The official United States Army Air Force historians agreed: 
The Japanese aircraft were manned by pilots and crews who were 
experienced and resourceful fighters and they were regarded as a courageous 
and worthy foe.121 
Furthermore Allied pilots fighting in Burma were in no doubt about the threat their 
adversaries posed in May 1944: 
The Oscars were very agile, very light... To dogfight with the Oscars was a 
recipe for disaster. We couldn’t keep with them in a turn, but we didn’t do too 
badly.122 
The quality of Japanese pilots was analysed in Chapter Two and so it is not necessary to 
repeat the findings at length again here, but it is clear that the overall quality of pilots in the 
Far East comprised a serious threat until their withdrawal in 1945. As described earlier in 
this chapter, if the quality and quantity of aircraft had been better the Allies would have 
faced hindrances in their advance into Burma.       
 The alleged transfer of the best Japanese units from the Far East to other theatres 
requires clarification. Japanese units committed to the area actually remained in the region 
for much of the war with minimal transfer after late 1942.123 In the case of bomber units the 
8th Sentai served from January 1942 until mid-July 1945, while the 12th Sentai remained in 
the region until late July 1944. The 34th Sentai served from October 1942 until February 
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1944 and the 62nd Sentai was sent to the area at the start of March 1944 as reinforcements, 
but was withdrawn two months later after suffering severe losses.  
 Japanese fighter units also showed a remarkable longevity. Both the 50th and 64th 
Sentais served in Burma from 1942 until their withdrawal in January and April 1945 
respectively. The 33rd Sentai flew a detachment from Tavoy, Burma from October 1943 and 
was joined by the rest of the unit a month later serving in Burma until June 1944; following 
the monsoon it moved to Siam and finally to Sumatra. The 204th Sentai was first posted to 
Burma as a training unit becoming fully operational in February 1944 continuing to serve in 
Burma until August 1944 until its move to Siam and the Philippines. Therefore none of these 
units transferred from Burma until the fighting became serious in other areas, notably the 
Philippines, in late 1944. Both the 21st and 87th Sentais were based as defensive units in 
Sumatra from late 1942 and early 1943 occasionally operating in Burma, whilst the 26th 
Sentai operated in Sumatra and French Indo-China from October 1943. The mass transfer of 
units did not occur as described by U.S.S.B.S. while Japanese operations were taking place 
in early 1944. The 1st Sentai moved from Burma in late 1942, 11th Sentai to Rabaul in 
November 1942, and the only unit to transfer in early 1944, the 77th Sentai, had moved from 
Sumatra to Burma in January 1944 and only served there for a month until transferring to 
New Guinea in February. 
 The longevity of Japanese units also applied to the aircrews. Allied aircrews flew a 
set number of operations or an agreed period of time on combat missions before being rested 
or sent to non-operational duties. The J.A.A.F., like the Luftwaffe, did not have this policy 
and continued to fly operationally. An Oscar pilot who served in Burma, Sergeant Yoshito 
Yasuda, was interviewed by Canadian historians in 2000 who wrote: 
Yasuda noted that only four of his classmates who completed flying training 
with him survived the war. Like the Luftwaffe, they continued flying until 
they were killed, or were so severely wounded or struck down by tropical 
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diseases that they were unfit for further service. They envied our system of 
operational tours and the so-called rest periods available to Allied aircrew.124 
As discussed in Chapter Two, some operational training was carried out by the Japanese 
squadrons which removed the need for sending experienced aircrew to teach at training 
schools. 
 The available evidence would therefore suggest that the J.A.A.F. in the Far East was 
a consistent force of locally well-led aircrews and aircraft who only started to transfer away 
from the region in late 1944 owing to pressures in other theatres. Whilst reinforcements were 
not received from the homeland or the Pacific, both the 33rd and 204th Sentais were moved 
into Burma in time for the Japanese advance towards India, while the 87th was moved up 
from Sumatra in May 1944 in an attempt to counter improved Allied fighters. Furthermore 
while reinforcement units were not forthcoming, Allied intelligence services indicate from 
radio and photo reconnaissance sources that the Japanese were able to quickly replace lost 
aircraft. For example in March 1944, “that the Japanese will make good the losses there can 
be no doubt” and in May, “the destructive intruder raids that continue to whittle down 
Japan’s air strength in Burma in spite of the enemy’s well-known tendency for speedy 
replacements.”125 Although Allied intelligence believed only 50% of the Sentais’ pilot 
strength were fully trained, those remaining had adequate aircraft with a capability for 
replacements when required.  
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Chapter Four – Conclusion 
 By May 1945 the J.A.A.F. had virtually withdrawn from Burma leaving the Allies 
with total air supremacy, air superiority being theirs since the middle of 1944. Whilst Allied 
air forces had played their part in establishing air dominance, events in other theatres and in 
Japan affected the eventual outcome as Shores identified: 
So, in conclusion, the campaigns in Burma may be seen ultimately to have 
represented a great success for Allied air power. However, it was a success 
which perhaps needs to be considered not on its own, but in the integral 
context of the Pacific war as a whole, for this had impacted so greatly on the 
efforts and abilities of Japan’s own air forces in sustaining the war here.126 
While Shores is correct to identify the Pacific it is clear that Japan’s problems were on a 
wider scale as the J.A.A.F.’s ability to wage an effective air war in Burma was hindered by a 
variety of factors away from the Far East and by the policy and strategy of its high 
command.  
 The root of the problems was Japan’s underestimation of the Allies’, particularly the 
Americans’, determination to fight rather than press for an early peace settlement. Japanese 
industry, even when eventually placed on a war footing, could not hope to match the huge 
industrial capability and manpower resources of the Americans and British, and even though 
great efforts were made to increase output it was never enough to reach any kind of parity. 
Outmoded industrial techniques which desperately required modernisation, even in the 
Germans’ view, linked with a squabble for resources by the Army and Navy condemned 
production to a lower level than was potentially possible to achieve. Furthermore the 
division between the Army and Navy, which would appear to have no deeper reason than 
simply rivalry, resulted in separate aircraft types for each service which diverted industrial 
effort and split basic manufacturing resources. There were no common types flying with the 
Japanese air arms, whilst, for example, the British ‘navalised’ both the Hurricane and 
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Spitfire for aircraft carrier service with the Fleet Air Arm.127 Limited resources combined 
with the urgency to bring new aircraft types into operation to match superior Allied aircraft 
resulted in further difficulties. The Frank, Tony and Ki-100 were allegedly as good as if not 
better than later American aircraft such as the Mustang or Thunderbolt, but all suffered early 
technical difficulties which had delayed their service introduction. Additionally, once in 
service their superiority over other Japanese types resulted in over-use which highlighted 
various technical problems, such as engines, which should have been identified in the design 
and test stages. The ability to test aircraft properly was hindered by the need to bring aircraft 
quickly into service as well as diminishing fuel stocks which started to reduce in mid-1944, 
and priority for petrol was given to operational squadrons. As fuel stocks started to reduce 
the Japanese experimented with fuel mixtures containing alcohol and petrol. Training units 
were using 20 per cent alcohol and 50 per cent petrol mixtures in early 1945, but by the end 
of the war the Japanese had not used alcohol mixtures in combat operations.128 Furthermore, 
there is no evidence that the quality of Japanese fuel affected J.A.A.F. operations in the 
Burma Theatre during the period between mid-1944 and May 1945.     
 The difficulties in Japanese aircraft production had an effect on air operations in 
Burma. There was never more than four single-engine fighter Sentais in the country, whilst 
Sumatra had a couple of single-engine fighter Sentais boosted by the Nicks of the 21st 
Sentai. Reinforcements or additional Sentais were unlikely to be sent while units were 
desperately required in the Pacific, and the uncertainty of replacement aircraft being 
despatched influenced the frequency of Japanese operations. Crucially the numbers of 
aircraft available to the J.A.A.F. in Burma was not totally due to manufacturing difficulties 
but where the Japanese set their priorities. Despite the Allied blockade on Japanese resources 
and their own manufacturing deficiencies, Japanese aircraft production grew steadily from 
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1942 until it reached its peak in September 1944. From October 1944 until April 1945 
Japanese units transferred away from Burma to reinforce other units fighting in the 
Philippines, Pacific and in defence of Japan itself because of the growing attrition rates. 
Japan’s priority was to protect its homeland and the defensive barrier of islands surrounding 
Japan, and this policy required the majority of its air units and the best aircraft available.  
However, at the beginning this did not matter too much. For much of the period 
between June 1942 and December 1943 Japan’s interests in the Far East were under no 
immediate threat from the Allies and although Allied intelligence services reported 
occasional sightings of Tonys and Tojos, air combat had shown the Oscars to be more than a 
match for the Hurricane. There was, therefore, no need to bring additional units equipped 
with later types of aircraft into Burma owing to the tempo of operations and the Oscar’s 
advantages. However, at the end of 1943 the situation changed when the Allies started to 
receive superior defensive and offensive fighters such as the Spitfire, Mustang and 
Lightning. Japanese Sentais were not able to counter these aircraft in quantity or quality with 
better equipped, experienced units. Moreover by early 1944 the introduction of potentially 
better aircraft came too late to make a difference. For example the 87th Sentai was 
despatched in May with Tojos to counter the Allies, but the Sentai was relatively 
inexperienced and it was their misfortune “to encounter the best Allied long-range fighters 
available in the area.”129 Whilst the quality of Japanese pilots, according to contemporary 
reports and subsequent analysis, was good and the majority of the units experienced in the 
theatre, they were handicapped against numerically superior Allied fighters. The lack of 
modern aircraft in terms of quality and quantity was an obvious handicap to Japanese 
operations in Burma, particularly after December 1943, as no air force could operate for long 
under such circumstances against a better equipped foe. However, such deficiencies must be 
balanced against how the resources were used. While Japanese aircraft were sent to priority 
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areas, the use of their available air resources in Burma has to be questioned. The intrinsic 
difficulty of a service having its own air arm was demonstrated with the J.A.A.F. being used 
almost exclusively for direct support of ground operations, operating aircraft that were 
designed principally for that purpose. Although initially successful in that role, there was 
little chance, for example, of using bombers in an effective strategic bombing campaign and 
owing to the manufacturing difficulties no opportunity to develop a heavy bomber fleet. In 
addition to aircraft types Japanese air actions were hindered by a traditional Army high 
command who failed to grasp the possibilities of air power outside the confines of ground 
support. During the 1942-1943 period they failed to identify important targets and exploit 
the various Allied air defence weaknesses in Eastern India, particularly Calcutta. Although 
commanders may have been conscious that replacements were unlikely to be sent and 
conservation of their resources was important, the inability to use their aircraft boldly at 
crucial times gave the Allies time to build their own resources and defences. Similarly by 
using fighters in ground support roles instead of concentrating on vulnerable transport 
operations during the early 1944 campaigns the Allies were handed the opportunity to supply 
their ground forces and prevent the Japanese advance towards India. From late 1944 
Japanese air power in Burma started to diminish, though even then the remaining fighters 
could have been used to hinder the Fourteenth Army’s advance by attacking the transport 
fleet, but were used, as A.C.M. Park described, in small numbers in ground support roles.130 
A concerted effort in 1945 to disrupt Allied supply flights with the few available Japanese 
fighters, at a time when the early warning systems were unable to maintain pace with the 
rapid advance, would have caused considerable supply difficulties. This factor had more to 
do with policy and strategy rather than aircraft numbers or types, as a bolder approach 
between October 1942 and May 1945 may have paid dividends in hindering Allied plans. 
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Whilst these influences played a part in reducing Japanese strengths and capabilities 
in combination with the inability or unwillingness to use their resources effectively, they 
must be balanced against Allied actions in the theatre. For fourteen months from October 
1942 the Allies held their own against Japanese air attack whilst at the same time building 
their resources and experience. Once Allied air forces had been resupplied with numbers of 
better, relevant aircraft in late 1943, they started to take the initiative from the Japanese both 
in attack and defence, particularly between March and May 1944 with the aggressive 
counter-air campaign which destroyed Japanese resources and forced their units’ dispersal. 
Once the 1944 monsoon was over the migration of Japanese resources combined with 
sustained Allied counter-air operations reduced Japanese commanders’ options further, 
although as discussed earlier, more emphasis could have been placed on attacking transport 
aircraft. Therefore, whilst the Japanese had missed their opportunities in 1942 and 1943, the 
initiative had been taken from them with the increase in Allied strength from December 
1943 leaving Japanese commanders, with their misunderstanding of air power capabilities, 
with fewer options for action.  
The Japanese commanders’ inability to use what resources they possessed effectively 
had the most immediate influence on Japan’s air war in Burma. Although they did not 
possess sufficient resources and the potential lack of replacements may have affected 
commanders’ decisions, it would have been possible to hinder and disrupt Allies’ plans at 
crucial times with the equipment they had available. This factor can only be judged on the 
available resources they had at the time, but this chapter has effectively shown that they 
failed to take advantage of Allied weaknesses with equipment and resources that were 
potentially superior given the circumstances from 1942 to the middle of 1944. Consequently, 
the winning of air superiority by the Allies was significantly assisted by Japanese passivity 
at crucial moments and evaluation of the success or otherwise of R.A.F. measures and 
activity must incorporate this into any overarching analysis.     
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Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis has been to answer fundamental questions which have at their 
core how the Japanese won air superiority in 1941 and 1942, and then how the Allies 
reversed the situation, winning air supremacy by June 1945. The thesis has shown how the 
early warning organisation was developed from June 1942, despite supply and technical 
difficulties, to becoming an efficient system in India by February 1944, and then how it 
coped with new challenges when the Allies were on the offensive. The thesis has 
demonstrated how and why the factors of aircrew, tactics and aircraft were important to the 
air superiority campaign, and how each was successfully developed. The counter-air 
campaign played a crucial role, particularly after February 1944, and this thesis has 
demonstrated why it was unsuccessful prior to then and argued why Allied claims of 
destroyed Japanese aircraft may not have been correct during the period between March and 
June 1944. The thesis has also shown that the Japanese contributed to their eventual defeat in 
the air campaign. The principle factors were difficulties in aircraft production, fighting a war 
on several fronts and the use to which commanders used their air resources in India and 
Burma.   
Since the First World War air superiority and air supremacy have been recognized as 
essential factors in allowing air, sea and land operations to be prosecuted. During the initial 
attacks in 1941 the Japanese were able to gain air superiority in a series of well planned and 
executed air raids, the R.A.F. alone losing 55% of its air strength during the first day’s 
attacks.1 The J.A.A.F. and J.N.A.F. consisted of modern aircraft suitable for the campaign, 
and aircrew that had considerable experience from air combat against the Chinese and 
Soviets during the late 1930s. This gave them an advantage over the British and Americans. 
As the Germans had found in their initial attacks on the Soviet Air Force in 1941, a pre-
emptive counter-air offensive is successful against a weaker adversary and the Japanese were 
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able to capitalize on Allied weaknesses. The British had an early warning system that was 
inconsistent, obsolete fighter aircraft, and aircrew whose courage could not be doubted but 
who largely lacked flying and combat experience. Attempting to reinforce Malaya and 
Burma with radar and aircraft once the Japanese had seized air superiority proved a failure as 
equipment could not be deployed in time and the aircraft sent there were mainly unsuitable. 
The early exchanges emphatically demonstrated the importance of an integrated air defence 
system as existed in Britain, where all the factors were in place and efficiently working prior 
to an enemy attack. 
 From May 1942 until the end of 1943, the quest for air superiority reached stalemate. 
While the R.A.F. built up their air defence system in India with an early warning 
organisation, more aircraft and better aircrew, the essential supporting factors did not 
develop at the same rate. The monumental effort to establish an effective early warning 
chain despite technical and supply difficulties was matched by more aircrew who arrived 
better trained and then received relevant air fighting training in the theatre. However, while 
the quantity of aircraft improved, the quality did not as Hurricanes were not a match for the 
more manoeuvrable Japanese Oscars they faced. The deficiency in suitable aircraft also 
affected the counter-air campaign and added to the stalemate. The lack of long-range fighters 
both in quantity and quality resulted in small numbers of medium and heavy bombers being 
deployed on raids on enemy airfields which, at best, caused some disruption to Japanese 
operations by forcing the J.A.A.F. to disperse aircraft around their network of airfields. Loss 
of Japanese aircraft as a direct result of these raids was minimal and it is possible that more 
Japanese aircraft were lost in flying accidents than during interdiction raids.  
The stalemate in the air superiority campaign also owed something to the Japanese 
failing to seize the initiative. Their aircraft were largely superior to Allied aircraft in quality 
and quantity, and from October 1942 until late 1943 the air defences in Eastern and North-
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Eastern India were susceptible to air attack. Concentrated fighter and bomber operations 
against Indian cities or against the transport operations over the Hump route into China 
could have disrupted Allied supply plans. For example, the few night raids on Calcutta in 
December 1942 and January 1943 had caused panic and evacuation of the city’s population 
and it is clear that concentrated raids by larger formations could have overwhelmed the 
defences precipitating further disruption. Similarly if day raids had been properly 
coordinated to capitalize on weaknesses in early warning and fighter defences, the Japanese 
might have severely hindered the Allied campaign. However, these operations, and those 
against the Hump, were not pursued and the Japanese missed a vital opportunity. It is not 
clear whether they failed to appreciate Allied weaknesses and their own strengths, or 
whether they were cautious because aircraft replacements were likely to be unavailable, but 
it is arguable that the Japanese could have assumed air superiority and its benefits 
throughout this period. 
 The balance in air superiority began to swing in the Allies’ favour in late 1943 with 
the introduction of better British and American aircraft. Although priorities in other theatres 
had prevented the Spitfire fighters’ arrival until October 1943, their eventual deployment 
marked the final establishment of an integrated air defence system in India and Burma. Once 
the ground controllers adapted to the fighter’s higher performance in combination with the 
improving early warning systems in Eastern India, Japanese raids were regularly intercepted. 
Moreover the Spitfire played a crucial role intercepting and destroying Japanese 
reconnaissance Dinahs that had previously flown too high and fast to be intercepted by 
existing fighters. Thus, Japanese commanders were denied vital intelligence of Allied 
ground activity which proved crucial once the Fourteenth Army began its advance into 
Burma in mid-1944. So by February 1944 the R.A.F. had a much improved early warning 
organisation, better trained and experienced pilots and aircraft that were capable of utilising 
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improved air fighting tactics. However, subsequent events in 1944 showed the Spitfire was 
not the sole answer to attaining air superiority. 
 Defending transport and ground support aircraft around the Imphal Plain and Chindit 
landing grounds in the absence of adequate early warning proved difficult. The lack of 
fighters coupled with the need to conserve fuel meant inefficient and wasteful combat air 
patrols were a last resort. The introduction of the patrolled air corridor was clearly a success, 
but represented a compromise between full combat air patrols and interceptions. Although 
successful in protecting the transport aircraft within the corridor, the tactic did little to reduce 
Japanese air strength. However, at the same time as the Spitfire changed air defence 
capabilities in India and Burma, the introduction of the American long-range Lightnings and 
Mustangs played a crucial part in the counter-air offensive. These fighters had the capability 
to strike at Japanese airfields in a concentrated offensive which had not been possible prior 
to December 1943. Although the available figures suggest that Japanese losses in the airfield 
raids were not as high as originally claimed, the offensive reduced Japanese air strength in a 
manner that air-to-air combat did not match. The minimum figure of 60 Japanese aircraft 
destroyed on counter-air operations was twice as high as those destroyed in air-to-air 
combat, and it does not take into account those aircraft that were damaged and needed repair. 
This put an additional strain on maintenance units and allocation of spare parts, neither of 
which the Japanese were efficient at. Furthermore, the interdiction attacks continued the 
earlier trend of forcing Japanese units to disperse to other airfields, thereby increasing flying 
time and the risk of flying accidents. The counter-air offensive continued to play an 
important role in the air superiority campaign as a tactic which complimented air defence, 
but it was clear it could only be effective with suitable aircraft.      
 When was air superiority and air supremacy gained by the Allies? The A.H.B. 
authors were correct to point out that it was not won in the middle of 1943 with the 
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beginning of the monsoon.2 The Allies were able to continue very limited air operations 
through the monsoon not through air superiority but simply because the Japanese had 
withdrawn for the monsoon season, as they had done in 1942, to re-supply their units and 
train their personnel. The J.A.A.F. returned to Burma in October 1943 with a potentially 
potent force that if properly handled could have caused the Allies considerable problems, but 
from that time the situation gradually changed as better Allied aircraft were introduced to the 
theatre. Most of the literature relating to the air campaign agrees that by June 1944 blanket 
air superiority had been won by the Allies in India and Western Burma with the J.A.A.F. 
never again being a credible force. However, this statement is only partially accurate. When 
the monsoon began in May 1944 Japanese air strength had not been crushed and there were 
123 aircraft, of which 54 were fighters, in forward and central Burma, and 348 in the entire 
theatre.3 When the monsoon ended in October the Japanese air strength, according to 
intelligence estimates, had risen to 485 in the entire theatre, which, if properly directed, 
could have caused difficulties for the Allies.4 Successive transfers and attrition caused this 
number to diminish so that eventually the J.A.A.F. ceased to be a credible force and this will 
be discussed later in this conclusion. However air superiority had been gained in localized 
areas as early as February 1944. 
 The introduction of the Spitfire in combination with the improved early warning 
organisation had provided air superiority over much of Eastern India by February 1944, 
ensuring ports were safe and Japanese reconnaissance aircraft were likely to be intercepted. 
Similarly, during the Battle of the Admin Box in February and March, transport aircraft were 
able to fly their vital supply sorties protected by friendly fighters that were within the range 
of the early warning systems, which included the radar units based offshore on barges. 
However providing local air superiority over the Chindit landing grounds, Kohima and 
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Imphal, proved harder owing to the perilous state of the available early warning. The 
deficiencies in air defence were successfully offset by a rigorous counter-air campaign which 
attacked Japanese airfields destroying and damaging aircraft, and forcing Japanese units to 
disperse to other locations. The combination of the interdiction programme, air defence and 
the patrolled air corridor had thus ensured localized air superiority which enabled transport 
and close air support sorties to be flown. However, it should be remembered that Allied air 
superiority during this period was assisted by Japan’s tactical inflexibility and lack of 
imagination. Given their aircraft numbers, concentrated attacks with fighters and bombers on 
the Allied transport effort by day and night might have paid dividends, particularly when the 
Allies lost much of their early warning capability to the East of Imphal. As in 1942 and 
1943, the Japanese failed to make effective use of their resources at a crucial time in the land 
battle. 
According to intelligence sources Japanese units and their aircraft returned to the Far 
East in October 1944 in greater numbers, but from November 1944 systematic transfers and 
withdrawals to other areas significantly reduced Japanese air strength. From October 1944 
the Japanese were out-matched in aircraft quantity and quality, and were not able to 
materially alter the ground or air operations in a substantial way. These months saw air 
superiority gained in Burma, as the localized superiority widened to the entire country and 
the advancing Allied operations. Air supremacy was gained by May 1945 when Japanese air 
strength had virtually vanished leaving the Allied air forces in command of the air. The 
process was complete in June 1945 when transport aircraft were able to fly on supply 
dropping sorties without any fighter escort.   
One factor which affected both the Allies and the Japanese in the Burma theatre was 
the level of priority afforded to the campaign. The R.A.F. lacked modern fighter aircraft in 
Malaya and Burma in 1941 because Spitfires and Hurricanes were required in Great Britain 
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and the Middle East. As the campaign developed this trend was continued especially when 
the Allies decided to make defeating Germany their first priority at the expense of the Far 
East Theatre. For example, India Command was denied radar equipment until other 
commands had been equipped and there was a delay in supplying Spitfire fighters to the 
theatre, with even supplying the Soviet Union being given a higher priority. Similarly it took 
the Americans until the end of 1943 to equip the forces in their China-Burma-India theatre 
with the very efficient Lightning and Mustang fighters. This thesis has thus demonstrated 
that the campaign to achieve air superiority was delayed in reaching a high level of success 
because these fighters were denied to the theatre until nearly two years after the Japanese 
first attacked. 
The lack of resources committed to the British campaign in Burma has resulted in the 
epithet of ‘forgotten’ being attached to it. Japan’s attitude to the theatre was similar. The 
U.S.S.B.S. authors pointed out that air superiority was won almost by default as the Japanese 
gave the theatre a low priority for equipment, but it is unlikely that the Japanese deliberately 
gave Burma and India such a low priority owing to their economic and political importance. 
As the British had found in 1941 when equipping Malaya with aircraft, greater priorities in 
the home islands and Middle East had taken the better Spitfires and Hurricanes, leaving only 
the Buffalo. From November 1942 the Japanese were faced with a growing threat from 
American forces in the Pacific and eventually the home islands which resulted in more 
aircraft and units being deployed to those theatres. This was exacerbated by the limited 
numbers of aircraft produced from Japanese factories which had to be shared between 
fractious Army and Navy commands.  
Air superiority in India and Burma was ultimately won by a combination of 
interrelating factors rather than one outstanding element. The campaign was not like the 
Battle of Britain where the Germans suffered high, unsustainable attrition rates of both 
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aircraft and aircrew over a period of time. It could also not be compared to the air superiority 
campaign against Germany in 1944, where a vigorous counter-air campaign was assisted by 
a strategic bomber offensive against the German aircraft industry and its supporting 
organisations. The air superiority campaign in Burma did not rely on an offensive against 
Japanese aircraft manufacturing or on high attrition rates inflicted in aerial or interdiction 
operations. Air supremacy was won by a number of factors acting together. 
While the early warning organisation only played a supporting role in the campaign it 
was still vital. The lack of an efficient early warning system during the initial Japanese 
attacks, and later in 1944 when cover over the battlefront proved difficult, had shown that 
modern air defence depended on an early warning organisation to act as a force multiplier. 
Although never completely perfect the system had assisted fighters in disrupting Japanese 
raids and then, in combination with the Spitfire, to intercepting raiders and reconnaissance 
aircraft. Without the organisation costly air combat patrols would have been flown at 
considerable cost in fuel and airframe life which the R.A.F. and its Allies, with their limited 
resources, could ill afford. Building on the foundation of the early warning organisation were 
the factors of aircrew, aircraft and air fighting tactics. Air fighting over Malaya in 1941 and 
early 1942 had shown the interrelationship between these factors. Even when the radar units 
gave adequate warning of Japanese raids, without a fighter capable of climbing to 
advantageous heights to intercept enemy aircraft and destroy them using the accepted dive 
and zoom tactic, the defenders were at a disadvantage. Furthermore the fact that many of the 
pilots lacked flying and combat experience meant another part of the overall air defence 
capability was deficient. One of the essential requirements for achieving air superiority was 
an improvement in these elements. The dive and zoom air tactic was clearly the best 
manoeuvre to counter Japanese fighters and this was recognized and taught to aircrew as 
they became operational. Although it took until the end of 1943 for the quality of fighters to 
improve, the introduction of Spitfires, Lightnings and Mustangs meant that therefore both 
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defensive and offensive operations were capable of attaining new levels of efficiency. It took 
some time for an integrated air defence system consisting of elements of early warning, 
aircraft, aircrew and tactics to bed down, but the Allies now had all the necessary factors to 
prosecute an integrated air superiority campaign, whilst the addition of the long-range fighter 
was to give operations an important flexibility.  
By February 1944 the combination of these factors gave the Allies better tools to 
prosecute an air superiority campaign, but the contribution made by the Japanese to their air 
defeat cannot be discounted. Japan’s aircraft industry was unable to produce sufficient 
aircraft for the Army and Navy and their many areas of operations even before the American 
Naval blockade and bombing campaign took effect. A combination of limited resources, 
which included aircrew, a diversion of effort between the Army and Navy, and a lack of 
central control reduced the numbers of aircraft that were produced. It is clear that a few more 
hundred, well directed, Japanese fighter aircraft could have provided the Allies with a 
number of difficulties even to the end of May 1945. Aircraft types were also a problem. It is 
clear that given sufficient resources and development time the Japanese were capable of 
producing efficient aircraft that could have matched most Allied fighters. Aircraft like the 
Frank and Ki-100 proved to be equivalent to or better than some American types in the 
Pacific, and there can be little doubt that if these aircraft had been properly developed and 
deployed in sufficient numbers, the Allies in Burma would have faced a formidable foe. 
Finally the Japanese failed to use their resources in Burma to the best effect. This thesis has 
shown that they failed to take the initiative in 1942-43, and failed to attack the Allies whilst 
at their most vulnerable in the first six months of 1944. As A.C.M. Sir Keith Park stated, 
even at the end of the air superiority campaign in 1945 the Japanese were capable of 
hindering the Allied supply operations by properly using their resources instead of 
concentrating on ground support. Ultimately the Japanese had contributed to their air 
campaign downfall in Burma and assisted the Allies in their goal for air supremacy.   
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 This thesis represents an original study of the air superiority campaign in Burma 
between 1941 and 1945. Although the early warning organisation has been covered in other 
publications, it has not been analysed in depth before and this thesis has effectively 
demonstrated its overall contribution to the campaign. Whilst the factors of aircrew, tactics 
and aircraft have been addressed separately, this thesis has discussed all three elements 
together and has shown how they impacted on the Allies’ eventual success. The thesis has 
corroborated most sources’ view that the counter-air campaign was unsuccessful prior to 
February 1944 and how and why it was successful after that date. However, it has clearly 
shown that Allied claims of destroyed Japanese aircraft in the counter-air campaign after that 
date may have been excessive, even though the effects of the campaign were still beneficial 
to the eventual outcome. This thesis has also corroborated existing evidence that the 
Japanese industry failed to produce sufficient aircraft in quality and quantity, but it has also 
argued that Japanese commanders were forced to give the J.A.A.F. in Burma a lower priority 
owing to pressing demands in other theatres. As a whole, the thesis represents an original 
contribution to current historical knowledge of the air superiority campaign in Burma during 
the Second World War. 
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APPENDIX 1  
       
        
   
Wingspan Length 
 
Maximum Weight 
 
Rate of climb 
  
Maximum Speed 
 
                 
                 
 
Buffalo 
 
35 
 
26 
 
6703 
  
Time to 10000 feet - 7.6 mins 
 
321 mph at 18989 feet (6388lbs) 
                 
 
Hurricane IIB 
 
40 
 
31.6 
 
7340 
  
Time to 20000 feet - 8.4 mins 
 
342 mph at 22000 feet 
                 
 
P-40B 
 
37.3 
 
31.7 
 
7778 
  
Time to 15000 feet - 7.1mins 
 
345 mph at 15000 feet 
                 
                 
 
Nate 
 
37.1 
 
24.6 
 
3946 
  
Time to 20000 feet - 6.6 mins 
 
292 mph at 11485 feet 
                 
 
Oscar 
 
35.7 
 
29.2 
 
5500 
  
Time to 16405 feet - 5.5 mins 
 
329 mph at 13125 feet 
                 
 
Zero 
 
36.1 
 
29.7 
 
6330 
  
Time to 20000 feet - 6.6 mins 
 
340 mph at 19700 feet 
                 
                 
  
Dimensions in feet 
            
                 
  
Weight in pounds 
            
 
 
Co         
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APPENDIX 2 
                
                
  
Comparative Dimensions of Fighters Far East May 1942  to September 1943 
     
                
                
                
   
Wingspan Length 
 
Maximum Weight 
 
Rate of Climb 
  
Maximum Speed 
                
                
                
                
 
Hurricane IIB 40 
 
31.6 
 
7340 
  
Time to 20000 feet - 8.4 mins 
 
342 mph at 22000 feet 
                
 
Hurricane IIC 40 
 
31.6 
 
7640 
  
Time to 20000 feet - 9.1 mins 
 
339 mph at 22000 feet 
                
 
Beaufighter IV 57.9 
 
41.9 
 
21322 
  
Time to 15,000 feet - 7.8 mins 
 
333 mph at 15,600 feet 
                
 
Spitfire V 
 
36.8 
 
30 
 
6737 
  
Time to 20000 feet - 7 mins 
 
374 mph at 20000 feet 
                
 
Ki-43 Oscar 35.7 
 
29.2 
 
5500 
  
Time to 16405 feet - 5.5 mins 
 
329 mph at 13125 feet 
                
                
  
Dimensions in feet 
            
                
  
Weight in pounds 
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APPENDIX 3 
              
                 
  
Comparative Dimensions of Principal R.A.F. and Japanese Fighters 
      
                 
   
Wingspan Length 
 
Maximum Weight Rate of Climb 
  
Maximum Speed 
 
                 
                 
 
Buffalo 
 
35 
 
26 
 
6703 
  
Time to 10000 feet - 7.6 mins 
 
321 mph at 18989 feet  
                 
 
Mohawk 
 
37.3 
 
29 
 
6717 
  
Time to 15000 feet - 8 mins 
 
298 mph at 13000 feet 
                 
 
Hurricane IIB 40 
 
31.6 
 
7340 
  
Time to 20000 feet - 8.4 mins 
 
342 mph at 22000 feet 
                 
 
Hurricane IIC 40 
 
31.6 
 
7640 
  
Time to 20000 feet - 9.1 mins 
 
339 mph at 22000 feet 
                 
 
Spitfire Vc 
 
36.8 
 
30 
 
6737 
  
Time to 20000 feet - 7 mins 
 
374 mph at 20000 feet 
                 
 
Spitfire VIII 
 
40.2 
 
30 
 
7800 
  
Time to 20000 feet - 7 mins 
 
408 mph at 20000 feet 
                 
 
Beaufighter IV 57.9 
 
41.9 
 
21322 
  
Time to 15,000 feet - 7.8 mins 
 
333 mph at 15,600 feet 
                 
 
Mosquito IV 54.1 
 
44.5 
 
22300 
  
Time to 15,000 feet - 8 mins 
 
362 mph at 5,500 feet 
                 
                 
 
Nate 
 
37.1 
 
24.6 
 
3946 
  
Time to 20000 feet - 6.6 mins 
 
292 mph at 11485 feet 
                 
 
Oscar 
 
35.7 
 
29.2 
 
5500 
  
Time to 16405 feet - 5.5 mins 
 
329 mph at 13125 feet 
                 
 
Zero  
 
36.1 
 
29.7 
 
6330 
  
Time to 20000 feet - 6.6 mins 
 
340 mph at 19700 feet 
                 
 
Tojo 
 
31 
 
28.9 
 
6598 
  
Time to 20000 feet - 5.5 mins 
 
383 mph at 17000 feet 
                 
                 
  
Dimensions in Feet 
 
Weight in pounds 
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APPENDIX 4 
           
             Comparative table of Allied fighter aircraft ranges 
        
             
   
Basic Range 
 
Maximum Range when applicable 
 
Aircraft internal tankage 
             P40B (Tomahawk IIA) 600 miles 
  
805 miles 
    
133 IG 
 
             P40D (Kittyhawk I) 
 
750 miles 
  
1308 miles 
    
166.6 IG 
 
             P38 (Lightning) 
 
810 miles 
  
1512 miles 
    
279 IG 
 
             P51A (Mustang) 
 
640 miles 
  
1500 miles 
    
186 IG 
 
             P51B (Mustang) 
 
950 miles 
  
2250 miles 
    
150 IG 
 
             
P51D (Mustang) 
 
950 miles 
  
2190 miles 
    
150 IG 
 
             P47 (Thunderbolt) 
 
835 miles 
  
2100 Miles 
    
254 IG 
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Mohawk 
  
620 miles 
  
860 miles 
    
132 IG 
 
             Hurricane IIB 
 
480 miles 
  
1090 miles 
    
97 IG 
 
             Hurricane IIC 
 
460 miles 
  
1090 miles 
    
97 IG 
 
             Spitfire Vc 
 
469 miles 
  
1135 miles 
    
84 IG 
 
             Spitfire VIII 
 
660 miles 
  
1530 miles 
    
120 IG 
 
             Beaufighter 
 
1480 miles 
 
1640 miles 
    
550 IG 
 
             Mosquito FB.IV 
 
1120 miles 
 
1500 miles 
    
536 IG 
 
             
           
IG = Imperial Gallons 
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APPENDIX 5 
              
                
                
  
Comparative Dimensions of Principal U.S. and Japanese Fighters 
       
                
                
                
   
Wingspan Length 
 
Maximum Weight 
 
Rate of Climb 
  
Maximum Speed 
                
                
 
P40B 
 
37.3 
 
31.7 
 
7778 
  
Time to 15000 feet - 7.1 mins 
 
345 mph at 15000 feet 
                
 
P38 (Lightning) 
 
52 
 
37.9 
 
15500 
  
Time to 16000 feet - 6.75 mins 
 
400 mph at 16800 feet 
                
 
P51A (Mustang) 
 
37.25 
 
31.5 
 
7708 
  
Time to 20000 feet - 8.8 mins 
 
388 mph at 16500 feet 
                
 
P51B (Mustang) 
 
37 
 
32.3 
 
9190 
  
Time to 20000 feet - 7.5 mins 
 
395 mph at 20000 feet 
                
 
P51D (Mustang) 
 
37 
 
32.3 
 
9478 
  
Time to 20000 feet - 7.5 mins 
 
407 mph at 20000 feet 
                
 
P47D (Thunderbolt) 40.9 
 
36 
 
14600 
  
Time to 15000 feet - 5.1 mins 
 
440 mph at 29000 feet 
                
                
                
 
Oscar 
 
35.7 
 
29.2 
 
5500 
  
Time to 16405 feet - 5.5 mins 
 
329 mph at 13125 feet 
                
 
Zero  
 
36.1 
 
29.7 
 
6330 
  
Time to 20000 feet - 6.6 mins 
 
340 mph at 19700 feet 
                
 
Tojo 
 
31 
 
28.9 
 
6598 
  
Time to 20000 feet - 5.5 mins 
 
383 mph at 17000 feet 
                
                
  
Dimensions in Feet 
            
                
  
Weight in pounds 
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Appendix 6 - Average Number of Aircraft on Strength of Operational RAF and 
USAAF Squadrons 
Hurricane/Spitfire/Thunderbolt/P-47/P-40/P-51
Beaufighter/Lightning
347 
            
 
 
           
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
 
 
 
 
 
           
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Dec-43 Jan-44 Feb-44 Mar-44 Apr-44 May-44 Jun-44 Jul-44 Aug-44 Sep-44 Oct-44
Ai
rc
ra
ft
 N
um
be
rs
 
Appendix 7 - Average Number of Serviceable Aircraft in RAF Operational 
Squadrons, Eastern Air Command 
Spitfire
Hurricane/Thunderbolt
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Appendix 8 - Average Number of Serviceable Aircraft in RAF Operational 
Squadrons, 222 and 225 Groups 
Spitfire/Hurricane/Thunderbolt
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